IN THE MATTER OF STEVEN HOTZ, NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0981-17T2
IN THE MATTER OF STEVEN
HOTZ, NEW JERSEY
DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS.
______________________________
Argued January 28, 2020 – Decided February 13, 2020
Before Judges Yannotti, Currier and Firko.
On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service
Commission, Docket No. 2017-1342.
Joseph Stanley Surman, Jr., argued the cause for
appellant Steven Hotz (Surman Law, LLC, attorneys;
David J. Heintjes, of counsel and on the brief).
Emily Marie Bisnauth, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent New Jersey
Department of Corrections (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
General, attorney; Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Emily Marie Bisnauth,
on the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent New Jersey Civil Service Commission
(Pamela N. Ullman, Deputy Attorney General, on the
statement in lieu of brief).
PER CURIAM
Steven Hotz appeals from a final determination of the Civil Service
Commission (Commission), which found that he made false statements of
material fact during an investigation of suspected inmate abuse, and that the
New Jersey Department of Corrections (NJDOC) was justified in removing him
from his position as a Senior Corrections Officer (SCO). We affirm.
I.
On November 10, 2015, an inmate at the NJDOC's Garden State Youth
Correctional Facility (GSCF) reported he had been physically abused by several
corrections officers. The NJDOC referred the matter to the Special
Investigations Division (SID) for review. The inmate told the SID investigators
that on November 6, 2015, several custody staff members entered the staff
barbershop in the GSCF where he was working and ordered the other inmates to
leave.
According to the inmate, the officers punched him and held him down,
and an officer cut off his hair using electric clippers. The inmate claimed the
officers retaliated because he had allegedly given another officer a "bad" haircut.
The inmate identified appellant as one of the officers who was present during
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the incident. The NJDOC transferred appellant to another facility while the
complaint was investigated.
On March 11, 2016, a SID investigator interviewed appellant. He denied
knowledge of the incident and stated he was unfamiliar with the inmate who
made the complaint. He said that to the best of his knowledge, the incident did
not occur. Appellant suggested someone may have falsely implicated him. He
claimed, "I have been lied on before."
Furthermore, in response to the investigator's questions, appellant denied
that on November 6, 2015, SCO Ivonne Collazo contacted him by radio and
requested that he come to the barbershop or its vicinity. He denied that he
forcibly placed the inmate in the barber chair or saw SCO Brian Attardi do so.
He also denied seeing Collazo cut the inmate's hair with clippers.
On April 15, 2016, the NJDOC issued a Preliminary Notice of
Disciplinary Action (PNDA), which charged appellant with engaging in
"[c]onduct unbecoming of a public employee[,]" in violation of N.J.A.C. 4A:2 -
2.3; physical or mental abuse of an inmate; and violating an applicable NJDOC
rule, regulation, policy, or procedure. On April 22, 2016, the NJDOC held a
departmental hearing and found there was sufficient evidence to support the
charges. The NJDOC suspended appellant without pay, effective immediately.
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On May 26, 2016, a SID investigator interviewed appellant a second time.
He admitted that during the interview on March 11, 2016, he made false
statements about the incident. He said he was in the barbershop on November
6, 2015, and he was familiar with the inmate who made the complaint. He stated
that Collazzo had called him on the radio and asked him to report to GSCF's
reception area. When he arrived at that location, Collazo directed him to enter
the barbershop.
Appellant stated that he entered the barbershop and observed Attardi, who
was face-to-face with the inmate. They appeared to be arguing. When the
inmate raised his left arm, appellant grabbed it, and Attardi grabbed the inmate's
right arm. Appellant and Attardi then placed the inmate in the chair. Appellant
stated that immediately thereafter, Collazzo approached the inmate from behind
and "buzzed his head with the clippers . . . ."
Appellant said he was surprised when Collazzo cut the inmate's hair, and
he asked SCO Jason M. Terhune, who was present at the time getting a haircut,
"What the fuck is this about?" Appellant said Terhune shrugged. Appellant
then left the barbershop. He stated that he had no idea what he was walking into
when he entered the barbershop. Appellant denied he or Attardi physically
assaulted the inmate.
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Appellant also stated that he decided to come forward with the truth at the
second interview because he did not know how to address the matter initially.
He said he wanted to do the right thing. He claimed others had told him not to
say anything and to "just play ball . . . ."
Appellant stated that Collazzo told him she had spoken to a superior
officer, who said she should do what she is supposed to do "and it will go away."
According to appellant, Collazo stated he would be transferred to another
facility for a maximum of six months, after which he would be returned to
GSCF.
On July 8, 2016, the NJDOC amended the PNDA and charged appellant
with falsification, in violation of the applicable NJDOC rules, policies, and
procedures. The amended PNDA stated that under these rules, policies, and
procedures, "falsification" is defined as an "[i]ntentional misstatement of
material fact in connection with work, employment, application, attendant, or in
any record, report[,] investigation or other proceeding."
On September 30, 2016, the NJDOC issued a Final Notification of
Disciplinary Action (FNDA), finding that the charges had been sustained. The
FNDA stated that in November 2016,
an incident occurred wherein physical force was used
against an inmate. This action led to an SID
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investigation that revealed the following. Officer
Steven Hotz was one of [three] [o]fficers who . . .
physically abuse[d] the inmate in the [GSCF s]taff
[b]arbershop; specifically, by holding him down in the
barber chair, punching and slapping him, and cutting
his hair off. This constitutes conduct unbecoming,
physical abuse of an inmate, and a violation of law
enforcement rules, policies and procedures. Total
disregard was given as it pertains to the policy as set
forth in the Law Enforcement Officers Handbook as
well as the NJDOC employee handbook. Additionally,
SCO Hotz provide[d] a supplemental interview with the
NJDOC Internal Affairs Units, in which he admitted to
providing false information during the initial interview.
The NJDOC removed appellant from his position as SCO, effective October 7,
2016.
On October 22, 2016, appellant filed an administrative appeal challenging
the NJDOC's action, and the Commission referred the matter to the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL) for an evidentiary hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ). The NJDOC thereafter filed a motion pursuant to N.J.A.C.
1:1-12.5 for partial summary decision on the falsification charge. Appellant
opposed the NJDOC's motion and filed a cross-motion for summary decision.
Appellant argued, among other contentions, that the NJDOC failed to file
the falsification charge within the time required by N.J.S.A. 30:4-3.11a. The
statute provides in pertinent part that a person may not be removed, suspended,
fired, or reduced in rank from employment as a State corrections officer for a
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violation of the NJDOC's internal rules and regulations unless the complaint
charging the violation is filed within forty-five days "after the date on which the
person filing the complaint obtained sufficient information to file the matter
upon which the complaint is based." Ibid.
On March 24, 2017, the ALJ issued an order, which granted the NJDOC's
motion and denied appellant's cross-motion. The ALJ found there was no
substantial controversy as to whether appellant: (1) lied in the March 11, 2016
interview when he denied any knowledge of the November 6, 2015 incident at
the barbershop; (2) insisted he was not present during the incident; and (3)
asserted he played no part in the abuse of the inmate.
The ALJ noted that he had reviewed the video recordings of appellant's
March 11, 2016 and May 26, 2016 interviews. The ALJ found that appellant
knew the statements he made during the first interview were false. The ALJ
rejected appellant's claim that he did not understand the content of his false
statements, and his assertion that the March 11, 2016 interview was
constitutionally deficient. The ALJ also rejected appellant's contention that he
was entitled to summary decision because the NJDOC did not submit an
affidavit when it opposed his cross-motion.
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The ALJ further found there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the NJDOC filed the charges within the time required by N.J.S.A. 30:4-
3.11a, and that issue would be resolved after an evidentiary hearing. The ALJ
stated that the merits of the remaining charges and the penalty for falsification
also would be determined after the evidentiary hearing.
The ALJ conducted the hearing on March 29, 2017. Thereafter, the ALJ
issued an initial decision finding the NJDOC had not established that appellant
physically abused the inmate. The ALJ stated that Terhune corroborated
appellant's claim that he had been confused when Collazo cut the inmate's hair.
The ALJ also found Terhune testified credibly that he did not see appellant or
Attardi strike the inmate.
In addition, the ALJ rejected appellant's contention that the falsification
charge was time-barred, noting that appellant's "falsification was apparent at the
earliest only after the May 26, 2016" interview. The ALJ decided that the
NJDOC had filed the falsification charge within forty-five days after that
interview, as required by N.J.S.A. 30:4-3.11a.
The ALJ further found that the NJDOC's decision to remove appellant
from his employment was appropriate. The ALJ stated:
Falsification in the setting of a correctional facility such
as [GSCF] strikes at the heart of a correction officer's
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responsibility and accountability. [The officer] is an
integral actor in a paramilitary organization, subject to
its regulatory code and the orders of superiors.
Superior officers must depend on the honesty of their
subordinates to maintain good order in a dangerous
environment. Fellow correction officers must have
confidence that they can rely on the truth of information
dispensed by their colleague[s]. Such certainty is
essential. It is fundamental to secure law enforcement
cooperation during those work demands which place at
risk officer and inmate safety. [Appellant's]
demonstrated dishonesty threatens this arrangement.
For all these reasons, termination is appropriate.
Appellant filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision, and the NJDOC filed a
response. The Commission thereafter issued its final determination adopting the
ALJ's decision. The Commission rejected appellant's claim that the NJDOC
failed to file the falsification charge within the time prescribed by N.J.S.A. 30:4-
3.11a.
The Commission also determined that the ALJ properly decided the merits
of the falsification charge by summary decision and rejected appellant's claim
that the March 11, 2016 interview was constitutionally deficient. The
Commission found that the penalty of removal was appropriate, and stated that
"the egregiousness of . . . appellant's misconduct clearly warrants" termination.
This appeal followed.
II.
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On appeal, appellant argues: (1) his removal based on the falsification
charge must be reversed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-3.11a; (2) the Commission
erred as a matter of law by adopting the ALJ's initial decision; (3) the
Commission's decision is arbitrary, capricious, against the weight of the
evidence, and contrary to law; (4) the March 11, 2016 interview cannot be the
basis for discipline because the interview was "constitutionally offensive" and
contrary to the Attorney General's Guidelines pertaining to investigations of law
enforcement employees; (5) the NJDOC failed to establish just cause for the
discipline imposed; and (6) the penalty of removal is excessive.
Initially, we note that the scope of our review of a final determination of
an administrative agency is limited. In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007).
"[A] strong presumption of reasonableness attaches" to the agency's decision.
In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div. 2001). We may "intervene
only in those rare circumstances in which an agency action is clearly
inconsistent with its statutory mission or other State policy." George Harms
Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 137 N.J. 8, 27 (1994).
Therefore, we will "not disturb an administrative agency's determinations
or findings unless there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the
law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or (3) the
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decision was not supported by substantial evidence." In re Virtua-West Jersey
Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008) (citing
Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 28); see also Circus Liquors, Inc. v. Governing Body of
Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 9-10 (2009).
III.
Appellant first argues that the Commission erred by finding that the
NJDOC filed the falsification charge within the time prescribed by N.J.S.A.
30:4-3.11a. As we stated previously, the statute provides that a State corrections
officer may not be removed from employment, suspended, fined, or reduced in
rank based on a violation of the NJDOC's internal rules and regulations
governing the conduct of its employees unless the charge is filed no later than
forty-five days "after the date on which the person filing the complaint obtained
sufficient information to file the matter upon which the complaint is based."
Ibid.
Here, appellant argues that the NJDOC had "sufficient information" to
bring the falsification charge by April 15, 2016. He asserts that on that date,
the NJDOC charged another corrections officer, Lieutenant Harry Ervin,
with falsification with regard to the November 6, 2015 incident at the
A-0981-17T2
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barbershop. It appears that Ervin was the officer whose haircut allegedly
prompted the incident on November 6, 2015.
The NJDOC charged Ervin with making false statements during the SID's
investigation of the incident, specifically with regard to whether Collazo
approached him with the inmate at GSCF's central control. The NJDOC pointed
out that several witnesses had placed Collazo in that area of the facility and
indicated that Collazo had spoken with Ervin in the presence of the inmate.
Appellant argues that if the NJDOC had sufficient information to charge
Ervin with falsification on April 15, 2016, it also had sufficient information to
charge him with falsification on that date. He also argues that if the NJDOC
had sufficient information to charge him with the underlying conduct, des pite
his denials at the first interview, the NJDOC also had sufficient information to
charge him with falsification at that time. We disagree.
The NJDOC had sufficient information to charge Ervin with falsification
on April 15, 2016, as the ALJ and Commission found. The NJDOC did not,
however, have sufficient information to charge appellant with falsification until
appellant admitted during the May 26, 2016 interview that he lied to SID
investigators during the March 11, 2016 interview.
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As we noted previously, the inmate asserted that appellant was involved
in the November 6, 2015 incident, but appellant denied that allegation. He stated
that he had been "lied on before." The ALJ and Commission determined that
the NJDOC did not have sufficient evidence to support a charge of falsification
against appellant until the May 26, 2016 interview, when appellant admitted he
lied during the March 11, 2016 interview.
We are convinced there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to
support the ALJ's and the Commission's findings. The ALJ and Commission
correctly determined that the NJDOC filed the falsification charge within the
time required by N.J.S.A. 30:4-3.11a.
IV.
Next, appellant argues the Commission's final decision is arbitrary,
capricious, and against the weight of the evidence. He notes that after the
NJDOC filed its motion for partial summary decision on the falsification charge,
he submitted a cross-motion for summary decision on that charge.
Appellant asserts that because the NJDOC did not submit an affidavit in
response to his cross-motion, as required by N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b), the ALJ was
required to grant his cross-motion and dismiss the falsification charge as a
matter of law. N.J.A.C. 1-1:12.5(b) provides:
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When a motion for summary decision is made and
supported, an adverse party in order to prevail must by
responding affidavit set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue which can only be
determined in an evidentiary proceeding. If the adverse
party does not so respond, a summary decision, if
appropriate, shall be entered.
We reject appellant's argument that the rule required the ALJ to grant his
cross-motion. In its motion, the NJDOC established that there were no genuine
issues of material fact relevant to the falsification charge, and that it was entitled
to partial summary decision on the charge. There was no need for the NJDOC
to submit another affidavit in response to appellant's cross-motion, setting forth
specific facts showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact relevant
to the falsification charge.
Moreover, the rule states that a summary decision should be entered only
"if appropriate." Ibid. Here, the ALJ found there were no genuine issues of
material fact regarding the merits of the falsification charge, and the NJDOC
was entitled to partial summary decision on the charge. The Commission
agreed. Thus, it would not have been "appropriate" for the ALJ to grant
appellant's cross-motion.
V.
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Appellant contends his statements during the March 11, 2016 interview
cannot be used as a basis for discipline. He asserts that the interview was
"constitutionally offensive" and contrary to guidelines issued by the Attorney
General, which apply when certain law enforcement employers conduct internal
interviews of employees suspected of misconduct.
Here, the record shows that on December 10, 2015, appellant's attorney
wrote to the Commissioner of the NJDOC and stated he was representing
appellant in the internal investigation of the barbershop incident. The atto rney
stated that appellant was invoking his right to remain silent, and the NJDOC
should contact him before interviewing appellant.
On appeal, appellant asserts the NJDOC failed to notify his attorney about
the March 11, 2016 interview and "forced" him to attend the interview "under
threat of termination . . . ." He claims the statements he made during this
interview were "coerced" and "should not be considered as a basis
for discipline."
There is, however, no evidence that before the March 11, 2016 interview,
the SID investigators were aware of the letter that appellant's attorney addressed
to the Commissioner. Even if the SID had been informed of the letter before the
interview, appellant was under no threat of criminal prosecution at that time.
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The record shows that the NJDOC had referred the matter to the Burlington
County Prosecutor's Office (BCPO), and on March 8, 2016, the BCPO declined
to charge appellant with any criminal offense regarding the incident.
In addition, the record does not support appellant's assertion that his
statements were "coerced." Rather, the record shows that appellant knew he was
a subject of the NJDOC's internal investigation of the November 6, 2015
incident. Indeed, before the March 11, 2016 interview began, appellant sign ed
a document confirming this fact.
Appellant also acknowledged that he had the right to have a union
representative present during the interview and the right to "stop answering
questions at any time until union representation is present." He elected to have
his union representative on hand during the interview.
Furthermore, appellant answered the investigator's questions voluntarily.
He never asserted a right to counsel or refused to answer the investigator's
questions unless his attorney was present. The record therefore supports the
Commission's determination that the March 11, 2016 interview was not
"constitutionally offensive," as appellant claims.
Appellant further argues that the SID investigators interviewed him in a
manner "contrary to every directive of proper investigation of law enforcement
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employees by law enforcement agency employers." In support of this argument,
appellant cites the Attorney General Guidelines, "Internal Affairs Policy &
Procedures" (rev. July 2014).
We note, however, that the NJDOC is expressly exempt from these
guidelines, which state that "State and county correctional agencies
. . . are under no obligation to implement the provisions of this policy."
Moreover, the guidelines apply when a law enforcement officer's conduct may
implicate a violation of a criminal statute and an agency's rules and regulations.
As we stated previously, when the SID investigators interviewed appellant on
March 11, 2016, he was not under threat of criminal prosecution.
VI.
Appellant argues that the NJDOC failed to establish "just cause" to
remove him from his employment as a corrections officer. He claims the
NJDOC did not carry its burden to justify disciplining him. He asserts the
NJDOC's decision to remove him from his position was "frivolous and
arbitrary."
Appellant also argues that the NJDOC "failed to show by a preponderance
of the evidence that [he] acted in any inappropriate fashion that could warrant
discipline." He claims the evidence establishes that he "acted professionally and
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appropriate[ly] under all of the given circumstances." He asserts the NJDOC
"failed to [present] any competent evidence that . . . [he] abused an inmate."
As we have explained, the ALJ found the NJDOC had not sustained the
charges that appellant physically abused the inmate during the November 6,
2015 incident. The Commission affirmed the dismissal of those charges. The
record established, however, that appellant made false and misleading
statements regarding the incident when he was interviewed on March 11, 2016.
Appellant's claim that he acted at all times in a professional and
appropriate manner is patently without merit. Here, the Commission determined
the NJDOC carried its burden by proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that appellant violated the NJDOC's rules, regulations, and procedures, which
prohibit "falsification" of material facts during an internal investigation. We are
convinced there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the
Commission's decision. Its decision affirming the NJDOC removal of appellant
from his position as a corrections officer was not arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable.
VII.
Appellant also contends the penalty of removal is excessive. He asserts
his "otherwise largely unblemished work history mandates that the sanction of
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[r]emoval is shocking to the conscience." He claims "the termination of his
career is so wide of the mark that the [c]ourt's conscience should not permit it."
Again, we disagree.
"A reviewing court should alter a sanction imposed by an administrative
agency only 'when necessary to bring the agency's action into conformity with
its delegated authority.'" Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 28 (quoting In re Polk, 90 N.J.
550, 578 (1982)). A reviewing court "has no power to act independently as an
administrative tribunal or to substitute its judgment for that of the agency." Ibid.
(quoting Polk, 90 N.J. at 578).
When reviewing an agency's disciplinary action, we consider "whether
such punishment is so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the
circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness." Id. at 28-29
(quoting Polk, 90 N.J. at 578). Appellant contends his removal is shocking and
unfair. We disagree.
In its decision, the Commission pointed out that appellant is a corrections
officer, "who, by the very nature of his job duties, is held to a higher standard
of conduct than other public employees." The Commission stated that "appellant
blatantly lied in an interview about his knowledge of and involvement in the
alleged abuse of an inmate." The Commission considered imposing
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"progressive discipline," but ultimately determined that "the egregiousness of
the appellant's misconduct clearly warrants removal from such a safety sensitive
law enforcement position, regardless of his disciplinary history."
In Hermann, the Court recognized that "progressive discipline is a worthy
principle but it is not subject to universal application when determining a
disciplined employee's quantum of discipline." 192 N.J. at 36. Progressive
discipline may be "bypassed when an employee engages in severe misconduct,
especially when the employee's position involves public safety and the
misconduct causes risk of harm to persons or property." Id. at 33.
Here, the Commission found that although appellant did not physically
abuse the inmate, his misconduct was "sufficiently egregious, in and of itself, to
support his removal." There is sufficient credible evidence in the record to
support that determination. We conclude appellant's removal is not "so
disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be
shocking to one's sense of fairness." Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 28-29 (quoting Polk,
90 N.J. at 578).
Affirmed.
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