ARTHUR MONTAGUE v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4889-17T1
ARTHUR MONTAGUE,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
_____________________________
Submitted October 7, 2019 – Decided October 25, 2019
Before Judges Sabatino and Natali.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
Corrections.
Arthur Montague, appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Suzanne Marie Davies, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant Arthur Montague appeals from a May 22, 2018 final agency
decision of the New Jersey Department of Corrections (NJDOC) that continued
his designation as a high risk inmate. After considering the parties' arguments
in light of the record on appeal and the applicable legal principles, we vacate
and remand for further proceedings.
I.
Appellant is currently incarcerated at New Jersey State Prison (NJSP) in
Trenton. On January 2, 2014, he was discovered with "two . . . homemade
handcuff keys sewn into the cuff of his thermal undershirt" while he was being
processed for a court appearance. As a result, the NJDOC found appellant guilty
of prohibited acts *.803, "attempting to commit, aiding another person to
commit or making plans to commit any Category A and or B offense," and *.102,
"attempting or planning escape," contrary to N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1. In addition,
the NJDOC High Risk Inmate Designation Committee (HRIDC) designated
appellant as a high risk inmate.
From November 2017 through March 2018, appellant sought removal of
his high risk designation to effectuate a transfer from Trenton to East Jersey
State Prison (EJSP) in Rahway to be closer to his family, and to participate in
rehabilitative programs. The NJDOC informed appellant that a meeting
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regarding his high risk designation would "take place at the end of January
[2018]." On March 4, 2018, NJDOC notified appellant that his designation was
"reviewed by the . . . Committee and the decision notices [would] be sent out by
institutional mail." There is nothing in the record detailing the results of the
HRIDC's review as it relates to appellant's requests.
On May 3, 2018, appellant filed a grievance pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:1-
4.5, challenging his continued high risk designation on the grounds that the
NJDOC's high risk policy was not promulgated as a regulation under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -31. The next day,
Major Craig Sears informed appellant that he would "remain on [h]igh [r]isk
status until deemed otherwise by a committee." Sears further advised appellant
that he was still classified as high risk because he "repeatedly assaulted
correctional staff and [had] attempted escape . . . [by] alter[ing] clothing and
. . . possess[ing] implements to escape."
Appellant responded to Sears on May 17, 2018, and stated that he never
"assault[ed] [any] correctional staff . . . and it [was] not on [his] record, [and
neither were] any other assaults . . . ." Further, appellant restated his claim that
the NJDOC's high risk policy required promulgation under the APA because (1)
the policy "applie[d] to all inmates in correctional facilities"; (2) the policy [had]
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no exceptions; (3) the policy "could not possibly [have been] applied to reach
back in time"; (4) "the [Committee's] restriction [was] not inferable on any basis
other than the breadth of the Commissioner's discretion to operate the
correctional facility"; and (5) "the [high risk policy] . . . involve[d] an exercise
of the Commissioner's discretion and expertise." Five days later, on May 22,
2018, Assistant Superintendent Amy Emrich, according to the NJDOC, "upheld
the decision," and informed appellant that his case would be "routinely reviewed
by the [Committee] and given consideration . . . [and he would] be notified via
institutional mail of the decision rendered." 1 This appeal followed.
Appellant raises two primary arguments on appeal. First, he maintains
that the NJDOC policy that classifies an inmate as high risk constitutes improper
rulemaking, contrary to the APA and, thus, his designation as a high risk inmate
is unenforceable. Second, he argues that the NJDOC's May 22, 2018 decision
was not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record because he
never "assaulted correctional staff."
1
Emrich's May 22, 2018 communication did not clearly state that appellant's
administrative appeal was denied. For finality purposes, however, we accept
NJDOC's representation in its merits brief that she denied appellant's
administrative appeal.
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Initially, we note that in his reply brief, appellant also asserts that: 1) the
NJDOC improperly refused to transfer him to a less secure prison based on his
high risk classification, and his classification has negatively affected his desire
to transfer to EJSP and participate in certain programs, contrary to his liberty
interests as defined by the United States Supreme Court in Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472 (1995); and 2) the NJDOC arbitrarily and capriciously designated
him a high risk inmate by denying his request for an administrative hearing to
"confront, challenge, and present any evidence [as to] why he should or should
not be placed on [or removed from] [h]igh [r]isk." We do not consider these
arguments as they are improperly raised for the first time in a reply brief. See
State v. Smith, 55 N.J. 476, 488 (1970) (declining to consider a reply brief
argument "enlarg[ing] on [defendant's] main argument and attack[ing] an
additional evidential ruling of minor nature"); Bacon v. N.J. Dep't of Educ., 443 N.J. Super. 24, 38 (App. Div. 2015) ("By failing to raise their original
jurisdiction argument in their initial brief, plaintiffs have waived this
contention.").
We note, however, that in Szemple v. Dep't of Corr., 384 N.J. Super. 245
(App. Div. 2006), we held that a high risk designation, which "merely subject[s]
[an inmate] to increased security in the form of additional prison guards . . .
A-4889-17T1
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when he is escorted from the prison" does not constitute the type of "atypical
and significant" scrutiny that triggers an inmate's liberty interest and requires a
hearing. Id. at 251.
Further, no decision from the NJDOC Institutional Classification
Committee (ICC), which possesses the requisite authority to effectuate inmate
transfers and program assignments, is before us and nothing in the record
establishes that appellant sought to effectuate a transfer through the ICC .2
Rather, the May 22, 2018 final decision addressed only the HRIDC's decision to
maintain appellant as a high risk inmate. Finally, as detailed infra at pp. 10-13,
we are remanding the matter for the NJDOC to more thoroughly explain and
amplify its bases for maintaining appellant's high risk designation.
II.
The scope of our review of an agency decision is limited. In re Taylor,
158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999). "An appellate court ordinarily will reverse the
decision of an administrative agency only when the agency's decision is
'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or . . . is not supported by substantial
2
The ICC, among its other responsibilities, assigns "inmates to work,
educational, vocational[,] and treatment programs[,] . . . [r]eview[s] . . . inmate
applications for change in custody status[,] . . . [and] [r]eview[s] . . . inmate
requests for transfer to other facilities . . . ." N.J.A.C. 10A:9-3.1(a).
A-4889-17T1
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credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" Ramirez v. Dep't of Corr., 382 N.J.
Super. 18, 23 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J.
571, 579-80 (1980)). "'Substantial evidence' means 'such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Figueroa
v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 192 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting In re
Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 376 (1961)).
III.
With respect to appellant's first point, we initially note that he has not
included in the record on appeal an actual copy of the policy that he maintains
constitutes improper rulemaking, and we could reject appellant's first argument
on that basis alone. He does, however, acknowledge the existence of such a
policy. Indeed, in appellant's appendix, he provides a January 24, 2008
memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General referencing "Standard
Operati[ng] [Procedure] [No.] 437," which allegedly "sets forth the purpose of
the [h]igh [r]isk designation" and includes procedures that the NJDOC staff
should follow relating to high risk placement, as well as "factors to be
considered" in designating an inmate as high risk. We accordingly glean from
the record and the parties' arguments the existence of the policy and the fact that
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the HRIDC applies the operating procedure in determining whether or not to
designate an inmate as high risk.
"The APA defines an administrative rule as an agency's 'statement of
general applicability and continuing effect that implements or interprets law or
policy, or describes the organization, procedure or practice requirements' of the
agency." In re Authorization for Freshwater Wetlands Statewide Gen. Permit 6,
433 N.J. Super. 385, 413 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting N.J.S.A. 52:14B-2(e)). The
New Jersey Supreme Court has identified six factors to assess whether an agency
engaged in improper rulemaking contrary to the APA's requirements.
Metromedia, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 331-32 (1984).
In accordance with Metromedia, a court should examine if the policy:
(1) is intended to have wide coverage encompassing a
large segment of the regulated or general public, rather
than an individual or a narrow select group; (2) is
intended to be applied generally and uniformly to all
similarly situated persons; (3) is designed to operate . .
. prospectively; (4) prescribes a legal standard or
directive that is not otherwise expressly provided by or
clearly and obviously inferable from the enabling
statutory authorization; (5) reflects an administrative
policy that (i) was not previously expressed in any
official and explicit agency determination, adjudication
or rule, or (ii) constitutes a material and significant
change from a clear, past agency position on the
identical subject matter; and (6) reflects a decision on
administrative regulatory policy in the nature of the
interpretation of law or general policy.
A-4889-17T1
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[Ibid.]
In Grimes v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 452 N.J. Super. 396 (App. Div. 2017),
we applied the Metromedia factors and determined that a NJDOC policy that
prohibited inmates from making phone calls to "cellular, business[,] or non -
traditional telephone service numbers" constituted improper rulemaking. Id. at
399, 406. In that case, we concluded that the policy "applie[d] to all inmates in
correctional facilities and to their relatives and friends," was a "blanket policy
with no exceptions . . . applied 'generally and uniformly to all similarly situated
persons,'" and "necessarily operate[d] 'prospectively.'" Id. at 405 (quoting
Metromedia, 97 N.J. at 331-32). Moreover, we found that based on "[t]he
absence of any mention of cell phones or types of service" in an earlier NJDOC
handbook and "the prohibition of calls on that basis" in a later handbook, the
NJDOC policy suggests "a new restriction not inferable on any basis other than"
the NJDOC's discretion. Ibid. Finally, since the policy created a "significant
impact on members of the public" in that the people affected outside the facility
"could equal, and potentially significantly exceed" the affected inmates, we
concluded that the policy was not exempt from the APA as a statement of
"internal management or discipline." Id. at 407 (quoting N.J.S.A. 52:14B-2).
A-4889-17T1
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Here, based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that the NJDOC's
high risk policy constitutes improper rulemaking. First, it appears undisputed
that the high risk policy addresses enhanced transportation security for specific
inmates who have an escape history, among other factors unique to an inmate
that the HRIDC is charged with considering. Therefore, on the current record,
we cannot conclude that it is "intended to . . . [encompass] a large segment of
the regulated or general public" or "applied generally and uniformly to all
similarly situated persons . . . ." Metromedia, 97 N.J. at 331; see also Szemple,
384 N.J. Super. at 251. Second, appellant has not shown a "material and
significant change" from past agency policy.
Further, based on the description of Standard Operating Procedure No.
437, it would be exempt from promulgation, as the APA's definition of an
administrative rule explicitly "does not include . . . statements concerning
internal management or discipline of any agency . . . ." N.J.S.A. 52:14B-2. In
sum, unlike the telephone policy in Grimes, the high risk policy here appears to
affect only those designated and is intended to ensure the "custody, care, [and]
discipline" of inmates in preventing further escapes which could cause harm to
staff, inmates, or the escapee themselves. N.J.S.A. 30:1B-3; see also Grimes,
452 N.J. Super. at 407.
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IV.
Appellant next maintains that the NJDOC's decision to maintain his high
risk designation was not based on substantial credible evidence, as there is no
support in the record for Sears' statement that appellant "repeatedly assaulted
correctional staff." We agree.
After appellant disputed Sears' basis for his May 4, 2018 decision, Sears
never responded and, as noted, the record contains no evidence to support a
finding that appellant "repeatedly assaulted correctional staff," one of two bases
Sears relied on to support NJDOC's high risk designation. Rather, the NJDOC
progress notes in the record state that appellant was found guilty after hearings
of prohibited acts *.005, "threatening another with bodily harm or with any
offense against his or her person or his or her property," .709, "failure to comply
with a written rule or regulation of the correctional facility," and .256, "refusing
to obey an order of any staff member." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1.
We cannot glean from those guilty findings, however, if the charges relate
to an assault on a correctional officer, and we note that appellant was not charged
with either prohibited act *.002, "assaulting any person," or .013, "unauthorized
physical contact with any person, such as, but not limited to, physical contact
not initiated by a staff member." The only evidence of appellant's charges in the
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record are the aforementioned NJDOC progress notes which contain no
information regarding the underlying factual bases for the offenses.
Accordingly, we vacate the May 22, 2018 final agency decision and
remand for further proceedings to permit the NJDOC to explain and amplify the
bases for its decision to maintain appellant's high risk designation. On remand,
the NJDOC should confirm the relevant operating procedure or policy the
HRIDC relies upon and it should detail its reasons for maintaining appellant's
high risk status. If the NJDOC based its decision, in whole or in part, on
appellant's alleged assault of a correctional officer, it should identify the
incident, whether charges were filed, the result of any hearing, and the weight it
ascribed to the incident, as well as any other factor, when it made its high risk
designation. Conversely, if the NJDOC bases its decision on appellant's
convictions for the *.803 and *.102 offenses exclusively, or in combination with
other aspects of his disciplinary record, it should clearly so indicate. Nothing
in our decision should be interpreted as expressing our view on the result of the
remanded proceedings.
Further, our opinion does not foreclose appellant from challenging
subsequent HRIDC or ICC decisions that specifically address his high risk
designation, custody status, requests to transfer to a different facility, or requests
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to engage in certain rehabilitative programs. Our opinion addresses only the
May 22, 2018 final agency decision with regard to his high risk designation.
To the extent we have not addressed any of appellant's arguments, it is
because we conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in
a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D), (E).
Vacated and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
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