MEHRZAD AZMI SHABESTARI v. REZA FARHADI
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3759-17T1
MEHRZAD AZMI SHABESTARI,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
REZA FARHADI,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
Argued May 9, 2019 – Decided June 18, 2019
Before Judges Simonelli, Whipple and Firko.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County,
Docket No. FM-18-0817-16.
Gregory A. Pasler argued the cause for appellant
(Townsend, Tomaio, & Newmark, LLC, attorneys;
Gregory A. Pasler, on the briefs).
Karen Fasano Thomsen argued the cause for respondent
(Armour Law Firm, attorneys; Karen Fasano Thomsen,
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant, Reza Farhadi, appeals from a March 14, 2018 dual final
judgment of divorce, entered after a seven-day trial, ordering him to pay his
student loan and marital debt; concluding plaintiff, Mehrzad Azmi Shabestari,
satisfied a portion of her tuition expenses with funds provided by her parents;
and requiring defendant to pay one-half of the rent after he left the marital
residence. There exists substantial, credible evidence in the record to support
the trial judge's findings, including his credibility findings, and we see no abuse
of discretion. We affirm substantially for the reasons given by the judge in his
comprehensive seventeen-page written opinion.1 We add the following remarks.
I.
The parties were married in Iran on July 22, 2011, and in Somerset, New
Jersey on July 26, 2014. No children were born of the marriage. In Fall 2011,
the parties moved to New Jersey and both enrolled in post-graduate Ph.D.
1
Defendant's appeal relative to registration of the parties' Islamic divorce is
moot because an order entered on September 14, 2018, and a consent order
entered on October 29, 2018, resolve the issues on appeal. Further, at oral
argument, counsel for plaintiff represented the Islamic divorce was registered
on January 14, 2019, rendering defendant's appeal as to this issue moot. Plaintiff
thus withdrew her cross-appeal seeking defendant's compliance with registering
the Islamic divorce prior to oral argument. We also note consent orders are not
appealable, Janicky v. Point Bay Fuel, Inc., 410 N.J. Super. 203, 207 (App. Div.
2009) (citation omitted), and the consent order here did not preserve any right
to appeal.
A-3759-17T1
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programs at Rutgers University. In order to meet their tuition expenses,
defendant testified he obtained two student loans in his name totaling $145,540
but since his tuition was approximately $80,000, the difference was applied
towards payment of marital expenses. Defendant admitted over $41,377.73 of
interest accrued on his loans because he failed to timely complete his studies,
and his parents provided the parties with $225,000 in cash in order to subsidize
their expenses.
Defendant claimed he procured two types of student loans, Stafford Direct
Loans totaling $82,000, and Student Plus Loans totaling $63,540, yet his first
Case Information Statement (CIS) dated July 14, 2016 indicates his student loan
debt was $176,661. Under the section entitled "Name of Responsible Party" he
listed "D." He claimed his tuition was fully paid for by the Stafford Direct Loans
and the loan funds were directly remitted to Rutgers. Even though defendant
claimed his Student Plus Loan was utilized for marital living expenses, the judge
found defendant "failed to provide any evidence whatsoever that any loan
proceeds were deposited into the parties' joint account or used for joint
expenses."
Defendant had a green card and applied for his loans as a single, unmarried
student, even though he was married at the time. Due to her immigration status,
A-3759-17T1
3
plaintiff was ineligible for student loans, and paid her tuition with monetary gifts
from her family. Both parties agreed plaintiff maintained her own personal
savings account during the marriage, where she deposited gifts from her parents
and her earnings. Defendant deposited money he received from his parents into
the parties' joint account because "he viewed the marriage as a joint enterprise
and he was the main investor." He also deposited his earnings into the joint
account, and a portion into plaintiff's individual account. In total, defendant
claimed he contributed $289,043 more than plaintiff towards their marital
expenses, and he sought equitable distribution of these monies. He produced no
documentary evidence specifying what he sought reimbursement for.
Plaintiff objected to defendant's claim for reimbursement because it was
not pled or briefed, and he improperly raised it for the first time on the last day
of trial during her redirect examination. The trial judge found defendant did not
amend his CIS to list the loans from his parents until the eve of trial , on October
29, 2017. Defendant's amended CIS listed a loan in the amount of $232,825
from his parents under the Statement of Liabilities section, and he indicated it
was a joint responsibility. 2
2 Pursuant to Rule 5:5-2(c):
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The parties owned no significant assets in the United States, and any
property individually owned by them in Iran remained in their respective names.
Plaintiff testified she left the marriage debt free and obtained employment as an
assistant professor of accounting at Towson University, while defendant allowed
interest in excess of $41,377.73 to accrue on his student debt while he remained
unemployed, but he pursued his dissertation in finance.
Defendant testified he made "proclamations" in Iran around the time of
the parties' 2011 wedding and claimed plaintiff and her family "silently
assented" to a loan agreement. The judge concluded, "[a]fter two years of
litigation, [d]efendant did not offer any proof during trial to support his financial
claim of a loan to the married couple from his parents[,]" and there were no
terms associated with the purported loans. The judge found: "[d]efendant failed
to present competent evidence rebutting the presumption that a transfer of
Parties are under a continuing duty in all cases to
inform the court of any material changes in the
information supplied on the [CIS]. All amendments to
the statement shall be filed with the court no later than
[twenty] days before the final hearing. The court may
prohibit a party from introducing into evidence any
information not disclosed or it may enter such other
order as it deems appropriate.
Defendant's second CIS was untimely filed.
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money from a parent to a child is a gift." On the issue of the loans, the judge
concluded defendant
failed to meet his burden of proof to establish the
existence of his student loans. . . . No proof was
provided that any indebtedness existed at the start of
trial . . . . Additionally, [d]efendant failed to provide
any proof regarding where the proceeds of the alleged
loans were deposited or for what purpose they were
used.
At trial, defendant "offered no proof of the existence of any parental loans,
only his father's testimony[.]" Defendant's father testified there was no written
documentation to confirm the so-called loans, he was unsure of the amount of
money he gave his son during the marriage, and he was not informed the sum
was $225,000 until after the complaint for divorce was filed. Moreover, the
monies from defendant's parents were transferred into the parties' joint account,
which was shared with defendant's brother and mother, leading the judge to
conclude the money was comingled, and he could not "definitively conclude that
the gifted monies were exclusively used for marital expenses." The judge also
concluded defendant "failed to present competent evidence rebutting the
presumption that a transfer of money from a parent to a child is a gift."
On appeal defendant argues the judge erred in his application of the
statutory criteria under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1 by finding defendant failed to
A-3759-17T1
6
provide sufficient proof of his student loans, the amount owed, concluding it
was "unproven, forgivable student debt[;]" ordering him to be responsible for
all of the marital debt; that the trial judge abused his discretion by finding
plaintiff satisfied $68,242 of her tuition payments; failed to equitably reimburse
defendant for his investment in the marriage; and required him to contribute one-
half of the rental payments for the parties' marital residence after he returned to
Iran.
II.
This was a relatively short-term marriage. Neither party sought alimony,
no real property was acquired during the marriage, and there were minimal
personal assets subject to equitable distribution. Neither party was awarded
counsel fees. The judge carefully considered each statutory factor for equitable
distribution under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1 and determined plaintiff paid $78,391.25
towards her tuition debt of $93,203.55 based upon her "documentary proofs
showing $68,242 in transfers from her individual account into the parties' joint
. . . account . . . that correlate with tuition checks to Rutgers from the joint
account." The parties' respective families gifted $14,812.30 to her to pay the
tuition balance, and plaintiff provided documentary evidence of her $46,557.70
payment towards marital expenses.
A-3759-17T1
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Regarding defendant's student loan debt, the judge found defendant
provided limited evidence . . . . He presented a partial
printout of a login screen with his name on it as his sole
proof of loans. He continually stated at trial that he
"could go on-line" and print out the loan documents but
he never did so. He did not provide any loan origination
documents, loan statements or a credit report. [The
partial printout] does not evidence loans in
[d]efendant's name or show that any loans are
outstanding.
In contrast, plaintiff produced extensive banking records, tuition bills, and
her testimony was found credible by the judge. Plaintiff proved her tuition cost
was $93,203.55 and $78,391.25 was paid towards the same. Defendant did not
object to plaintiff's proofs. We reject defendant's arguments that the judge
abused his discretion on this issue.
"Where the issue on appeal concerns which assets are available for
distribution or the valuation of those assets . . . the standard of review is whether
the trial judge's findings are supported by adequate credible evidence in the
record." Borodinsky v. Borodinsky, 162 N.J. Super. 437, 443-44 (App. Div.
1978). But "where the issue on appeal concerns the manner in which allocation
of the eligible assets is made . . . . [we] may determine whether the amount and
manner of the award constituted an abuse of the trial judge's discretion." Id. at
444. Thus we review the judge's decision as to equitable distribution for abuse
A-3759-17T1
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of discretion, recognizing the court's "special jurisdiction and expertise in family
matters[.]" Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). And we affirm equitable
distribution awards "as long as the trial court could reasonably have reached its
result from the evidence presented, and the award is not distorted by legal or
factual mistake." LaSala v. LaSala, 335 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (2000).
Equitable distribution is governed by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1. This statute
authorizes a judge to determine not only which assets are eligible for distribution
and their value, but also how to allocate those assets. Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 232 (1974). When determining the parties' equitable distribution of
the marital estate, a judge must consider, but is not limited to, the factors set
forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1.
The judge applied the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1 to the
parties' circumstances and found the parties were married for five years an d
eight months, they were in "good health[,]" and neither party brought substantial
assets to the marriage. Plaintiff was twenty-nine years old and defendant was
thirty-three years old. They lived a "moderately enhanced student lifestyle[,]"
renting an apartment near Rutgers at a cost of $1,190 per month. Plaintiff
completed her coursework and was employed while defendant delayed
completion of his Ph.D.—admittedly to defer his student loan payments—and
A-3759-17T1
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remained unemployed and supported by his family. The judge reached this
conclusion because he found the parties commenced their studies in the United
States at the same time, have similar post-graduate degrees, and comparable
earning capacities. The judge found defendant incredulous when he "testified
he has not looked for employment because there is no job available for him in
the current market."
Defendant argues the judge abused his discretion by concluding plaintiff
satisfied $68,242 of her tuition debt because there are "only three" simultaneous
transfers to the joint account from plaintiff's individual account which
correspond with tuition payments, and if "every dollar she contributed from her
sole account to the joint account . . . went towards her tuition," she could not
have contributed to the parties' living expenses. Defendant further contends
plaintiff's documentation establishes she paid $41,849.25 of her tuition, and not
$68,242, which he contends is proof he paid the remaining balance of
$51,354.30 towards her tuition, while she did not contribute to his tuition and
only minimally towards living expenses. We disagree. The judge aptly found
plaintiff's parents gifted her approximately $123,000 over the course of the
parties' marriage, which plaintiff credibly testified was not anticipated to be used
for living expenses.
A-3759-17T1
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The judge also found plaintiff credibly testified she earned $32,000 over
five years, making her contribution to the marriage approximately $155,000.
Subtracting the $27,000 bank account balance at the time she filed her
complaint, plaintiff's financial contribution to the marriage was approximately
$128,000.
At trial, plaintiff provided a detailed analysis of the money transfers from
her personal account to the parties' joint checking account in order to write
checks to Rutgers, and documentation from her student account verifying her
tuition per semester, along with correlating checks to Rutgers for those amounts.
Relying on Tiernan v. Carasaljo Pines, 51 N.J. Super. 393, 404-05 (App. Div.
1958), the trial judge rightfully determined the testimony of defendant and his
father did not satisfy the two elements required to prove the existence of a loan:
the lender advancing money or something of value at the time of the agreement,
and a stipulation or agreement to repay the lender, including interest rates and
date of repayment. Defendant failed to submit proof of any written or oral
agreement to substantiate repayment of monies to his family.
All property "legally or beneficially acquired during the marriage . . . by
either party by way of gift, devise, or intestate succession" except interspousal
gifts is generally excluded from equitable distribution. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(h).
A-3759-17T1
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"A 'gift' is a transfer without consideration, requiring an unequivocal donative
intent on the part of the donor, actual or symbolic delivery of the subject matter
of the gift, and an absolute and irrevocable relinquishment of ownership by the
donor." Sleeper v. Sleeper, 184 N.J. Super. 544, 548 (App. Div. 1982) (citation
omitted). "These matters are fact sensitive. When a particular debt is claimed
to be owed to a member of one spouse's family, the burden of proof rests on the
claiming spouse to establishing a bona fide obligation to repay the monies
asserted as loans." Slutsky v. Slutsky, 451 N.J. Super. 332, 348 (App. Div.
2017).
Because there was no documentary evidence submitted by defendant, all
of his proofs in this matter were testimonial in nature. The testimony of
defendant and his father was insufficient to prove an oral contract was formed
between plaintiff and defendant's family to repay the $225,000 amount. At his
deposition, defendant testified: "Let me make it clear for you[,] for all money
that I am claiming from my family[,] I didn't sign anything, I don't have proof
from my family." Consequently, defendant failed to defeat the presumption that
the monies from his parents were a gift. We see no reason to disturb the judge's
findings on this issue.
III.
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Next, defendant argues pursuant to Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488
(1982), the judge erred by failing to apply an equitable remedy to reimburse
defendant for his investment in the marriage. Plaintiff argues defendant failed
to plead let alone prove a reimbursement claim. In Mahoney, the parties were
married for approximately seven years before separating, and they shared the
household expenses during the marriage. Id. at 492. The husband entered into
a post-graduate program for sixteen months. Ibid. He did not contribute to
household expenses during that time while the wife contributed approximately
$24,000 towards the household expenses. Ibid.
The wife later returned to school part-time to obtain a post-graduate
degree. Id. at 493. She worked full-time while in school, and completed her
degree one year after the parties separated. Ibid. Neither party requested
alimony, the parties did not acquire any real property, and they divided their
minimal personal property. Ibid. The only issue at trial was whether the wife
should be reimbursed for her contribution to the marriage while her husband was
in school. Ibid. The trial court found the wife was entitled to an equitable share
of the value of her husband's degree, but we reversed, finding professional
licenses and educational degrees are not subject to equitable distribution. Id. at
493-94. Further, our Supreme Court has held it did not support reimbursement
A-3759-17T1
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between former spouses in alimony proceedings, and "every joint undertaking
has its bounds of fairness." Id. at 500. Defendant relies on the Supreme Court's
analysis:
Where a partner to marriage takes the benefits of his [or
her] spouse's support in obtaining a professional degree
or license with the understanding that future benefits
will accrue and inure to both of them, and the marriage
is then terminated without the supported spouse giving
anything in return, an unfairness has occurred that calls
for a remedy.
In this case, the supporting spouse made financial
contributions towards her husband's professional
education with the expectation that both parties would
enjoy material benefits flowing from the professional
license or degree. It is therefore patently unfair that the
supporting spouse be denied the mutually anticipated
benefit while the supported spouse keeps not only the
degree, but also all of the financial and material rewards
flowing from it.
[Ibid.]
Defendant argues both parties pursuing doctorate degrees was a pivotal
factor in entering the marriage, and since he paid more than one-half of
plaintiff's tuition costs, he should be reimbursed for his "investment in the
marriage." We disagree. As a procedural matter, defendant failed to preserve
this issue on appeal because he did not plead same and did not brief it for the
trial court. "[A] mere mention of an issue in oral argument does not require an
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appellate court to address it." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules,
cmt. 3 on R. 2:6-2 (2019); Selective Ins. Co. v. Rothman, 208 N.J. 580, 586
(2012). Nevertheless, we will address the merits for the sake of completeness.
As noted previously, defendant did not raise the reimbursement issue until
nine days before trial, thereby resulting in prejudice to plaintiff. If a party
requests college or post-secondary school contribution, the CIS instructions
require a party to
attach all relevant information pertaining to that
request, including but not limited to documentation of
all costs and reimbursements or assistance for which
contribution is sought, such as invoices or receipts for
tuition, board and books; proof of enrollment; and proof
of all financial aid, scholarships, grants and student
loans obtained.
[Family Part Case Information Statement, Pressler &
Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix V to R.
5:5-4 at www.gannlaw.com (2019).]
Defendant's first CIS attached three Rutgers invoices, which are of such
poor quality it is impossible to discern the amounts of the bills or which semester
they coincide with. Defendant's second CIS also includes blurry invoices, and
only half of a screenshot listing federal loans and other loans allegedly in his
name. The judge rightfully concluded these documents were incomplete and
insufficient to support defendant's reimbursement and equitable distribution
A-3759-17T1
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claims. Further, plaintiff was deprived of the opportunity to conduct discovery
as to defendant's second CIS which raised material, new information, and
theories. Our courts have long upheld parties must come to court with "clean
hands." "[T]he discretionary application of the equitable maxim of unclean
hands applies to matrimonial cases. It is well settled that a party 'in equity must
come into court with clean hands and . . . must keep them clean . . . throughout
the proceedings.'" Clark v. Clark, 429 N.J. Super. 61, 77 (App. Div. 2012)
(citation omitted) (quoting Chrisomalis v. Chrisomalis, 260 N.J. Super. 50, 53-
54 (App. Div. 1992)).
Mahoney also held reimbursement alimony consists of "all financial
contributions towards the former spouse's education, including household
expenses, educational costs, school travel expenses[,] and any other
contributions used by the supported spouse in obtaining his or her degree or
license." 91 N.J. at 501. "[A]ny other contributions" includes expenses such as
"medical expenses, clothing expenses, entertainment and leisure expenses, costs
of toiletry and personal expenses and the like." Reiss v. Reiss, 195 N.J. Super.
150, 159 (Ch. Div. 1984), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 205 N.J. Super. 41
(App. Div. 1985).
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Defendant claims he contributed $416,215 towards marital expenses,
including the money from his parents, his student loans, and the interest accrued
from those loans, while plaintiff only contributed $127,172. The evidence
shows plaintiff contributed approximately $128,000 toward the marriage, and
defendant failed to prove he paid for her entire education.
The present case is therefore distinguishable from Mahoney. Defendant
did not exclusively pay for plaintiff's education, and she contributed to martial
expenses, while the husband in Mahoney did not. Moreover, in Mahoney, the
wife deferred her own education for the benefit of her husband. Here, the judge
articulated:
[t]he present case is distinguishable from cases where
there is a supporting spouse who contributes to a
partner's degree and is left without any benefit upon
divorce. Both parties were students, both commenced
[Ph.D.] studies at the same time, both worked during
the marriage, and both received monetary gifts from
their families.
[(Citation omitted).]
Defendant's reliance on Mahoney is misplaced, and we defer to the judge's
credibility assessments of the parties, the witness, and the judge's findings. The
judge's decision was supported by ample credible evidence in the record and we
see no reason to disturb his findings.
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IV.
Finally, defendant argues the judge erred by requiring him to contribute
one-half of the rental payments because the complaint was filed three months
after the parties separated, thereby releasing him from any obligation to pay rent.
We disagree. Defendant left the marital residence and returned to Iran leaving
plaintiff with exclusive possession of their apartment. Defendant relies on
Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 218 (1974), superseded in part by statutory
amendment, N.J.S.A. 2A:23-, L. 1980, c. 181, §1, as recognized in Landwehr v.
Landwehr, 111 N.J. 491, 498 (1988), which held, "for purposes of determining
what property will be eligible for distribution the period of acquisition should
be deemed to terminate the day the complaint is filed."
Plaintiff testified defendant's name was on the parties' lease agreement,
creating a contractual obligation separate and apart from "property" subject to
equitable distribution, thereby making Painter inapplicable. She testified she
asked defendant to either pay the rent or remove his name from the lease, which
he refused to do. From the time defendant left the former marital residence, in
December 2015, until the end of the lease term in July 2016, plaintiff paid for
all Schedule A shelter expenses herself using her own funds.
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It is a basic principle of landlord-tenant law that one has an obligation to
pay rent under a lease, regardless of whether they live at the premises or not. A
tenant's abandonment of a premises, without the consent of the landlord, severs
the tenant's privity of estate, but does not sever the privity of contract, which
requires the tenant to continue to pay rent under the lease. See N.J. Indus. Props.
v. Y.C. & V.L. Inc., 100 N.J. 432, 443-44 (1985). Painter does not change this
principle. The judge did not abuse his discretion by requiring defendant to
reimburse plaintiff for one-half of the rental payments after he voluntarily
abandoned the premises.
We conclude that the remaining arguments – to the extent we have not
addressed them – lack sufficient merit to warrant any further discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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