STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. ALIMAMY SESAY
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3337-16T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ALIMAMY SESAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Submitted December 18, 2018 – Decided February 11, 2019
Before Judges Rothstadt and Gilson.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 11-09-
1419.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Mark Zavotsky, Designated Counsel, on the
brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Lila B. Leonard, Deputy Attorney General,
of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Alimamy Sesay appeals from a January 17, 2017 order denying
his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) after oral argument, but without an
evidentiary hearing. Defendant contends he should be permitted to withdraw
his guilty plea because his counsel was ineffective in failing to review discovery
with him prior to advising him to accept a plea offer and in misadvising him
about the immigration consequences of his plea. Defendant suffered no
prejudice from the alleged failure of counsel regarding discovery and the record
establishes that he was advised of the immigration consequences of his plea.
Accordingly, we affirm.
I.
In July 2011, defendant was indicted for three crimes related to his
unauthorized entry into a vacant apartment in Sayreville. Those charges
included third-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2; third-degree possession of a
controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); and third-degree
endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a).
In December 2011, defendant pled guilty to third-degree burglary and
third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance. In exchange for
his guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the charge of endangering the welfare
of a child.
A-3337-16T1
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Before giving his plea, defendant reviewed, completed, and signed a plea
form. In response to question seventeen on that form, defendant stated that he
was not a United States citizen. He then acknowledged that he had the right to
consult with an attorney about the effect of a guilty plea on his immigration
status, and noted he had discussed the potential immigration consequences of
his guilty plea with an attorney. He also acknowledged that he understood he
could be removed from the United States if he pled guilty, and stated that, after
discussing the potential immigration consequences, he still wished to enter a
guilty plea.
At the plea hearing, defendant informed the court that he was not a United
States citizen. Defendant also stated that he had discussed the potential
immigration consequences of his plea with his counsel, and had received the
opportunity to discuss those consequences with an immigration attorney, but had
chosen not to do so. He also acknowledged that he understood his guilty plea
would result in his deportation. Thereafter, he confirmed for a second time that
he did not wish to speak with an immigration attorney prior to the entry of his
plea.
In that regard, defendant had the following exchange with his counsel, the
assistant prosecutor, and the judge:
A-3337-16T1
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[COUNSEL:] We discussed the immigration
consequences, correct?
[DEFENDANT:] Right.
[COUNSEL:] You are not a citizen, right?
[DEFENDANT:] Correct.
[COUNSEL:] And I explained to you these charges will result
in you being deported, right?
[DEFENDANT:] Correct.
[COUNSEL:] You were given an opportunity or
asked if you want an opportunity to discuss
immigration consequences with an immigration
attorney?
[DEFENDANT:] Right.
[COUNSEL:] You chose not to do that, right?
[DEFENDANT:] Right.
[COUNSEL:] Understanding these charges will in
fact result in deportation, correct?
[DEFENDANT:] Correct.
....
[ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR:] You do not wish
to speak to an immigration attorney at this time, right?
[DEFENDANT:] Right, sir.
....
A-3337-16T1
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[THE COURT:] Do you understand to the extent
there are immigration consequences this court has no
control over that?
[DEFENDANT:] Yes, sir.
[THE COURT:] This is considered to be a deportable
offense that in fact it will begin proceeding. That's in
the hands of an agency other than this one. Do you
understand that?
[DEFENDANT:] Yes. I've been through it.
[THE COURT:] Knowing the case you still want the
court to accept this negotiated plea?
[DEFENDANT:] Yes, sir.
Following that exchange, the judge confirmed with defendant that (1) he had
reviewed the plea form with his attorney, (2) he had understood all the questions
and answers on the form, (3) his answers on the form were truthful and freely
given, and (4) his attorney had answered all of his questions.
Defendant also testified to the factual basis for his plea. In that regard, he
testified that on April 12, 2011, he was in Sayreville when he unlawfully entered
a residence with the intent to possess cocaine once inside. Based on defendant's
testimony, the court found there was an adequate factual basis for the plea that
was "unforced" and "uncoerced." Thereafter, the court accepted defendant's
plea of guilt.
A-3337-16T1
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Prior to sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming
that counsel had not provided him with discovery prior to the entry of his plea .
On June 7, 2012, the court heard oral argument and denied the motion. On July
9, 2012, a judgment of conviction was entered sentencing defendant to
concurrent terms of three years in prison. That sentence was also run concurrent
to his sentence for violating probation.
On direct appeal, defendant challenged the denial of his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. On April 29, 2013, we affirmed defendant's
convictions and sentence. State v. Sesay, No. A-5626-11 (App. Div. Apr. 29,
2013) (slip op. at 7). In that decision, we addressed defendant's "claims that he
did not receive the State's discovery prior to the entry of his guilty plea
and . . . would not have pled guilty 'had he been fully advised of the State's
discovery.'" Ibid. In reaching our decision, we noted that the only discovery
contained in the record was a police report from Officer Ziola that was
"consistent with defendant's allocution" and contained "nothing . . . that appears
remotely exculpatory." Ibid.
On February 29, 2016, defendant filed a petition for PCR. He was
assigned counsel, who filed an amended PCR petition on August 27, 2016. The
PCR court heard oral argument on December 21, 2016, and on January 17, 2017,
A-3337-16T1
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the court issued an order and twelve-page decision denying defendant's petition.
The court determined defendant was barred from arguing ineffective assistance
of counsel based on the alleged failure to review discovery because that issue
was addressed by this court on defendant's direct appeal. The court also found
that defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance
of counsel.
II.
On this appeal, defendant makes three arguments, which he articulates as
follows:
POINT ONE – DEFENDANT'S CLAIM HE
RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL FOR COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO REVIEW
DISCOVERY WITH HIM SHOULD NOT BE
BARRED BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S CLAIM WAS
NOT EXPRESSLY ADJUDICATED BY THE
APPELLATE DIVISION.
POINT TWO – DEFENDANT WAS DENIED
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
ENTITLING HIM TO POST CONVICTION RELIEF
AND AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THE
ISSUES OF FAILURE OF COUNSEL TO REVIEW
DISCOVERY, AND COUNSEL'S
MISINFORMATION REGARDING DEPORTATION
CONSEQUENCES OF HIS GUILTY PLEA.
POINT THREE – DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO
WITHDRAW HIS PLEA BECAUSE THE NATURE
A-3337-16T1
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AND STRENGTH OF HIS CLAIM OUTWEIGH THE
STATE'S INTEREST IN PRESERVING THE PLEA.
We reject defendant's arguments because his petition lacks substantive merit.
Defendant's petition arises from the application of Rule 3:22, which
permits collateral attack of a conviction based upon a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel within five years of the conviction. See R. 3:22-2(a);
R. 3:22-12(a)(1); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87
(1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). To establish a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the two-part Strickland test: (1)
"counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment," and (2) "the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58 (adopting the Strickland two-part test in New Jersey).
When a defendant has entered a guilty plea, he or she satisfies the first
Strickland prong if he or she can show that counsel's representation fell short of
the prevailing norms of the legal community. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366-67 (2010). A defendant proves the second part of Strickland by
establishing "a reasonable probability that" the defendant "would not have pled
guilty," but for counsel's errors. State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 351 (2012)
(quoting State v. Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129, 138-39 (2009)).
A-3337-16T1
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In cases involving noncitizen defendants, "a defendant can show
ineffective assistance of counsel by proving that his [or her] guilty plea resulted
from 'inaccurate information from counsel concerning the deportation
consequences of his [or her] plea.'" State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 392
(App. Div. 2013) (quoting Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. at 143). Moreover, counsel's
duty encompasses informing a defendant who enters a guilty plea of the relevant
mandatory deportation law if it is "succinct, clear, and explicit." Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368. Counsel's "failure to advise a noncitizen client that a guilty plea
will lead to mandatory deportation deprives the client of the effective assistance
of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." State v. Barros, 425 N.J.
Super. 329, 330 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368-69).
Applying these principles and using a de novo standard of review, see
State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 420-21 (2004), we affirm the denial of defendant's
petition for PCR. Rule 3:22-5 provides that "[a] prior adjudication upon the
merits of any ground for relief is conclusive whether made in the proceedings
resulting in the conviction or in any post-conviction proceeding . . . or in any
appeal from such proceedings." Accordingly, a previous adjudication on the
merits bars a defendant from reasserting an identical or substantially equivalent
issue in a proceeding for PCR. State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 484 (1997).
A-3337-16T1
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In this case, the PCR court determined defendant's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel based on the alleged failure to provide discovery was
addressed on direct appeal. Defendant argues his claim differs from that raised
on direct appeal because he previously argued he was entitled to withdraw his
guilty plea when he had not received or reviewed discovery, and now argues his
counsel was ineffective for failing to provide that discovery. We need not decide
whether those issues are the same. Rather, our prior conclusion that the
discovery was consistent with defendant's plea establishes that defendant cannot
show any prejudice. As the discovery would not have offered defendant a
defense that he was not aware of when he pled guilty, counsel's alleged failure
to review that discovery with defendant caused no prejudice.
Next, the record amply demonstrates that defendant was fully aware of the
immigration consequences of his guilty plea. Indeed, in his plea form and at the
plea hearing, defendant confirmed that he had the right to consult with an
immigration attorney and that he understood that by pleading guilty he probably
would be deported and face other immigration consequences. Accordingly,
there is no showing that defendant was not properly advised of the immigration
consequences of his plea. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 367-69; Gaitan, 209 N.J. at
380; Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. at 139-40; Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. at 393.
A-3337-16T1
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Defendant has also made no showing that it would have been rational for
him to reject the plea bargain. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372; see also State v.
DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994) (explaining a defendant must show a
"reasonable probability" that, absent the incompetent representation, he or she
"would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial" (quoting
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985))). Here, defendant was facing three
third-degree charges. He has shown no reasonable probability that he would
have rejected receiving a sentence of three years in prison that ran concurrent to
a sentence under a separate indictment, and instead gone to trial where he faced
the possibility of receiving a sentence of five years in prison that would run
consecutive to his sentence on the separate indictment.
There was also no showing that required an evidentiary hearing on
defendant's PCR petition. A PCR judge should only grant an evidentiary hearing
"if a defendant has presented a prima facie claim in support of post-conviction
relief." State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992). To establish a prima facie
claim, "a defendant must demonstrate the reasonable likelihood of succeeding
under the test set forth in Strickland[.]" Id. at 463. A defendant "must do more
than make bald assertions that he [or she] was denied the effective assistance of
counsel." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). "He
A-3337-16T1
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[or she] must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard
performance." Ibid.
Finally, defendant has no grounds for withdrawing his guilty plea. First,
he made such a motion before the trial court, it was denied, and that ruling was
affirmed on direct appeal. Sesay, No. A-5626-11 (slip op. at 7). As defendant's
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails, he is now left with the same
arguments presented on direct appeal. Accordingly, our ruling on his direct
appeal precludes reconsideration on a PCR proceeding. See R. 3:22-5;
McQuaid, 147 N.J. at 484.
Moreover, even if we were to consider the issue, defendant has not
established any of the factors that allow for the withdrawal of a guilty plea.
Those factors are "(1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of
innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant's reasons for withdrawal; (3)
the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would result in
unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused." State v. Slater,
198 N.J. 145, 157-58 (2009).
Defendant does not contend that he is innocent of the crimes to which he
pled guilty. Instead, he argues that he only pled guilty based on his trial
counsel's failure to review discovery and misadvise about the immigration
A-3337-16T1
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consequences of his plea. As we already found defendant suffered no prejudice
by the alleged failure of counsel to review discovery with him, and the record
does not support his claim regarding deportation consequences, we find the first
factor under Slater has not been satisfied. Moreover, none of the other Slater
factors support defendant's arguments to withdraw his guilty plea. The nature
and strength of defendant's reasons for withdrawal are rebutted by the record.
There was a plea agreement, which was favorable to defendant. Finally, given
the passage of time, allowing the withdrawal would result in unfair prejudice to
the State.
Affirmed.
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