STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. CAREY R. GREENE
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NOS. A-1382-15T1
A-1614-15T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CAREY R. GREENE and
TYLEEK A. LEWIS,
Defendants-Appellants.
_____________________________
Submitted December 5, 2018 – Decided January 28, 2019
Before Judges Koblitz, Ostrer and Mayer.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 14-08-
0877.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant Carey R. Greene (Jay L. Wilensky, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant Tyleek A. Lewis (Michael J. Confusione,
Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Scott A. Coffina, Burlington County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Nicole Handy, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs).
Appellant Tyleek A. Lewis filed a pro se supplemental
brief.
PER CURIAM
Defendants Carey R. Greene and Tyleek A. Lewis appeal from their
convictions of first-degree murder of Edward Baker while in the course of a
robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count one); first-degree murder of Baker while
in the course of a burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count two); first-degree
robbery for inflicting injury upon Baker in the course of committing a theft while
armed with a deadly weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1) (count three); and second-
degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(1) (count four). They were sentenced
simultaneously1 to terms of thirty-five years in prison subject to the No Early
Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7. We write one opinion to resolve both
appeals, and reverse and remand for a new trial because the State told the jury
in its opening statement that Greene had confessed to his grandmother, who
never testified. The State's disclosure was too prejudicial to both defendants to
be remedied by the court's cautionary instruction.
1
We note that simultaneous sentencing is not authorized by the criminal code.
A-1382-15T1
2
The State presented the following sequence of events. In the evening of
July 16, 2010, Greene, Lewis, Toney Holliday2 and a minor, A.J., had been
driving around Pemberton and Mount Holly, New Jersey in an attempt to obtain
marijuana. They stopped at a gas station and then a Wawa near Baker's
Westampton home. All four individuals entered the Wawa to purchase drinks.
Security footage taken at the Wawa showed A.J., Greene, and Lewis. Greene
was wearing a white T-shirt.3 A.J. said Greene had visible tattoos up and down
both arms. While at the Wawa, they collectively decided to commit a robbery.
Lewis drove all four individuals to Baker's home. After exiting the car, Greene
and Lewis armed themselves with guns from a black book bag. All four
individuals covered their faces with black bandanas. At the time, Lewis was
wearing a hat that was red and grey with a letter "P" on it. Greene, Lewis, and
Holliday entered the house, while A.J. stood outside of the house. A short time
later, Holliday came out of the house and waited outside with A.J.
2
Holliday was tried with Greene and Lewis. The jury was unable to decide
Holliday's case and the judge declared a mistrial as to Holliday.
3
The videotape was not provided to us, but defense counsel commented on
Greene's white T-shirt in his summation, despite the State's key witness, Ariel
Dickens, testifying that Greene was wearing an Ed Hardy shirt, "something you
hardly confuse."
A-1382-15T1
3
Meanwhile, Baker was at his home with two women, Ariel Dickens, who
testified at trial, and another woman, who did not testify. Dickens said that on
that evening, Baker smoked marijuana and Dickens had one beer. While they
were sitting at the dining room table, two men entered the home with guns and
yelled for Baker to give them his "shit."
Dickens observed that one man wore a reddish-orange t-shirt and had no
tattoos, while the other man wore a black polo shirt. Both men wore triangular
black masks that tied behind their heads. She had a good opportunity to look at
both men and noticed that both were African-American. Although she gave only
an approximation of his first name to police, she claimed to recognize one man
as Greene, because she had seen pictures of him on social media five years
before. She identified Greene through one photograph shown by police, and
said she was not "a hundred percent sure." She was caught in various
contradictions on cross-examination.
Baker stood up and confronted the two men, while Dickens and the other
woman ran out of the home through the back door. As Dickens was running,
she turned her head and saw Baker push one of the men. A few moments later,
she heard a gunshot.
A-1382-15T1
4
Dickens re-entered Baker's home through the backdoor a few seconds
after hearing the gunshot. Baker stumbled towards her from the front door, fell
to the ground, and had difficulty breathing. She observed blood on Baker's shirt
near his stomach.
The jury heard the 911 call placed by Dickens, in which she stated that a
person was shot at Baker's home after a robbery. She said she did not know who
the robbers were, but that two men wearing black masks fled in a black car.
At trial, Officer Ralph Lutz testified the police found money, drugs and a
shell casing on the floor. A large amount of marijuana contained in a shoebox
was also found at the victim's home.
Michael Wiltsey, the primary crime scene investigator with the Burlington
County Prosecutor's Office, testified that a Jesus pendant with a broken clasp
was found on the floor of the living room, and a red and grey Phillies baseball
cap on the walkway outside of the front door. Wiltsey believed that the hat had
blood on the back of it. A grey, green, and black Nike sneaker was discovered
on a mulch bed directly in front of the home. DNA profiles generated from the
items showed that Lewis was the source of DNA retrieved from the sweat band
of the hat.
A-1382-15T1
5
A.J. testified that he pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter and agreed
to give "truthful testimony" as part of the plea agreement. In exchange, the State
recommended a seven-year sentence. A.J. testified the hat recovered at the
scene looked like Lewis's hat. A.J. also said the shoe recovered by police looked
like Holliday's shoe. A.J. testified he heard a single gunshot from his position
outside of the home. Afterwards, all four individuals ran to the car and drove to
Greene's grandmother's home in Willingboro, where Greene entered the home
by himself. According to A.J., Lewis was no longer wearing his hat when he
exited Baker's home. A.J. was cross-examined on his criminal behavior since
the plea four years ago, his drug involvement and his boastful, aggressive
Facebook posts.
None of the defendants testified.
Greene argues on appeal:
POINT I: THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED
MISCONDUCT BY INCORRECTLY
REPRESENTING THAT THE STATE WOULD
PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT
HAD CONFESSED, AND THE TRIAL COURT'S
REMEDIAL INSTRUCTION WAS INADEQUATE,
NECESSITATING REVERSAL.
A. THE PROSECUTOR'S FAILURE TO PRESENT
TESTIMONY THAT THE DEFENDANT
CONFESSED, AFTER REPRESENTING IN
OPENING THAT HE WOULD DO SO.
A-1382-15T1
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B. THE TRIAL COURT'S REMEDIATION WAS
INADEQUATE.
POINT II: THE PROSECUTOR REPEATEDLY
MISSTATED THE LAW TO DEFENDANT'S
PREJUDICE, AND ACCORDINGLY COMMITTED
MISCONDUCT, BY REPEATEDLY
CHARACTERIZING THE TRIAL AS A "SEARCH
FOR TRUTH." U.S. CONST., AMEND. IX; N.J.
CONST., ART. 1, PAR.[4]
POINT III: THE PROSECUTOR ERRED TO
DEFENDANT'S PREJUDICE BY FALSELY
CLAIMING IN SUMMATION, IN A FELONY-
MURDER CASE, THAT A PENDANT HAD BEEN
TAKEN FROM THE VICTIM.
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT'S WRITTEN
CHARGE WAS INCOMPLETE IN SIGNIFICANT
RESPECTS, COMPELLING THE CONCLUSION
THAT THE JURY WAS IMPROPERLY
INSTRUCTED.
POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
PREJUDICIALLY IN DENYING A REQUESTED
WADE HEARING AS TO A WITNESS WHO
IDENTIFIED THE DEFENDANT.
POINT VI: THE CUMULATION OF ERRORS
REQUIRES REVERSAL.
POINT VII: THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSED AN
EXCESSIVE SENTENCE, NECESSITATING
REDUCTION.
4
Defendant does not state the paragraph number in the point heading or his
brief.
A-1382-15T1
7
Lewis argues through counsel on appeal:
POINT I: THE PROSECUTOR VIOLATED STATE
v. LAND, 435 N.J. SUPER. 249, 269 (APP. DIV.
2014), WARRANTING REVERSAL AND REMAND
FOR A NEW TRIAL.
POINT II: THE PROSECUTOR WENT BEYOND
FAIR COMMENT ON THE EVIDENCE IN
SUMMATION.
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ADMITTING THE WAWA VIDEOTAPE INTO
EVIDENCE.
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT INFRINGED
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DISCOVERY AND
CROSS-EXAMINATION.
POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DENYING A POST-VERDICT INTERVIEW OF A
COMPROMISED JUROR.
POINT VI: DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS
IMPROPER AND EXCESSIVE.
Lewis argues in his pro se supplemental brief:5
POINT I: IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE
JUDGE TO FAIL TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON
ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY, ESPECIALLY IN
LIGHT OF THE JURY'S QUESTION SIGNALING
ITS CONFUSION.
5
We corrected minor typographical errors.
A-1382-15T1
8
Greene and Lewis argue that the assistant prosecutor violated State v.
Land, 435 N.J. Super. 249, 269 (App. Div. 2014), when he informed the jury in
his opening statement that it would be hearing testimony from Ethel Smith,
Greene's grandmother. They contend that the assistant prosecutor knew that
Smith might not testify and that his comments about her anticipated testimony
were prejudicial. Additionally, Greene argues that the court's remedial jury
charge was inadequate.
I. Pre-Trial Proceedings.
Prior to the start of trial, the court granted the State's motion for a Gross6
hearing regarding the admissibility of Smith's testimony. At the Gross hearing
on November 12, 2014, Detective Jayson Abadia testified that Smith made a
tape-recorded statement to police in which she stated that Greene confessed to
her that he shot the victim by accident. Abadia testified that she later changed
her statement and refused to return his calls. Smith appeared at the hearing and
testified that her recorded statement to police, stating Greene told her he went
to buy marijuana from the victim and the gun accidentally discharged, was false.
6
State v. Gross, 121 N.J. 1 (1990). A Gross hearing is also called a N.J.R.E.
803(a)(1) hearing. See Biunno, Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of
Evidence, cmt. 1(a) on N.J.R.E. 803(a)(1) (2018).
A-1382-15T1
9
She testified Greene never said that to her, and she had lied to police in an effort
to "help him by saying that it was an accident if he was involved in it."
The court held that Smith's statement was reliable pursuant to Gross, 121 N.J. at 10, 17. Smith was served with a material witness order, which required
her to appear for trial. That same day, in anticipation of Smith's testimony, the
court held a Bruton7 hearing regarding the redaction of Smith's statement so that
references to Lewis and Holliday could be removed.
The State expressed concern that Smith would invoke her Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent and explained that the assistant prosecutor
intended to discuss Smith's statement during openings. The court granted the
State's request to conduct a Rule 104 hearing. N.J.R.E. 104(a).
On January 15, 2015, the court conducted the Rule 104 hearing. Although
defendants were present, they were not permitted to ask questions or present
argument. The court heard testimony from Smith. When asked if she recalled
giving a statement to Abadia regarding a conversation she had with Greene, she
refused to answer and invoked her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The
State played the tape recording of Smith's prior statement to Abadia. In the
recording, Smith told Abadia that Greene went to the victim's home to buy drugs,
7
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 132 (1968).
A-1382-15T1
10
there was a scuffle over the gun, and the gun discharged. After admitting that
her voice was on the tape, she refused to answer further questions. Her basis for
refusing to answer was "because a lot of things in that statement is false." She
refused to explain any other basis upon which she was asserting her Fifth
Amendment right other than to state that she did not want to provide false
testimony. On January 20, 2015, the court held that Smith would be compelled
to testify at trial and that she could not invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege.
II. Trial.
During his opening on January 22, 2015, the assistant prosecutor stated:
The evidence is going to show that when these four
individuals got back in the car, they went to
Willingboro. They didn't go back to Pemberton, they
went to Willingboro. Specifically they went to where
Carey Rasheed Greene's grandmother, maternal
grandmother lived. Her name is Mrs. Ethel Smith. And
you're going to meet Mrs. Smith during the course of
this trial.
And I just want to say a few words about Mrs. Smith.
Mrs. Smith, I don't think it's a stretch to say, is in a
difficult position. You see, because sometime after this
event, the police went to Mrs. Smith's house, serve [sic]
some legal papers, and Mrs. Smith got to talking to one
of the detectives from the Burlington County
Prosecutor's Office and she agreed to give a taped
statement to that detective. His name is Jason [sic]
Abadia and you're going to hear from Mrs. Smith what
she said to Detective Abadia and I submit that what she
said during this taped statement to Detective Abadia
A-1382-15T1
11
was that at some point after the events of July 16th, she
had the opportunity to talk with her grandson, Mr.
Greene. In fact, Mr. Greene came over to her house and
he was very upset and he told his grandmother what
happened on July 16th, 2010. He told his grandmother
he went to that house, that he had a gun, that there was
a struggle between him and Eddy Baker, and that Eddy
Baker got shot. . . .
Now, Mrs. Smith is in a difficult position. She's in the
position stuck between the love of her grandson and
testifying in court and that's a tough, that's a tough
position for Mrs. Smith. I understand that it's a difficult
position for her and I just hope that when Mrs. Smith
comes to the witness stand you too will appreciate the
situation that she's in in testifying here in court.
On February 3, 2015, the court held a Rule 104 hearing in connection with
the State's motion to admit the out-of-court statement of Smith pursuant to either
Rule 804(b)(9), as a forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exception, or Rule
804(b)(1)(A), as the prior testimony of a witness. N.J.R.E. 804.
Abadia testified for the State. He explained that he appeared at Smith's
home to serve legal paperwork in September 2010, that they started talking, and
that she provided a taped statement to police. In September 2014, he tried
calling Smith again to advise her that the trial date was approaching. She did
not return his calls. He also detailed additional attempts to contact Smith and
explained that she was ultimately served with a court order to appear at trial .
A-1382-15T1
12
The following day, Abadia was able to reach Smith who told him that she would
not be attending the trial and that her initial statement was a lie.
Smith appeared at the hearing, refused to be sworn in, claimed that her
prior statement was a lie, and did not answer questions. The court denied the
State's Rule 804(b)(9) motion, explaining that although Smith refused to make
herself available for trial, there was no evidence that Greene was responsible for
Smith's unavailability. Also, defendants were not permitted to cross-examine
Smith during the Gross hearing and the scope of the Gross hearing was more
limited than trial testimony. We granted the State leave to appeal and summarily
affirmed the decision of the trial court. State v. Holliday, No. A-4327-14 (App.
Div. Feb. 11, 2015) (slip op. at 1).
At trial, but outside of the presence of the jury, the State called Smith as
a witness. Smith refused to be sworn in, refused to answer questions from the
State and claimed she lied in her police statement. The court held Smith in
contempt of court. Smith did not testify at trial, nor was her statement admitted.
During the jury charge, the court provided the following remedial
instruction:
The arguments, statements, remarks, openings and
summations of counsel are not evidence and must not
be treated as evidence. In that regard, during opening
statements, the prosecutor indicated that you would
A-1382-15T1
13
hear testimony from Ethel Smith. Ethel Smith did not
testify in this case. Any statements the prosecutor made
regarding Ethel Smith is [sic] not evidence and cannot
be considered by you in your deliberations.
At trial, Greene's counsel did not object to the curative instruction, which was
consistent with counsel's requested instruction.
III. Opening statement.
In Land, 435 N.J. Super. at 250-52, we reversed and remanded a matter in
which two criminal defendants failed to receive a fair trial in light of repetitive,
unsupported descriptions of facts made by the prosecutor during her opening
statement. Id. at 265-66. The prosecutor told the jury several times that they
would hear testimony from a witness who never testified despite a grant of
immunity. Id. at 250-52, 257. The prosecutor attempted to prove the allegations
against the defendants, including the charge of attempted murder, through other
competent evidence. Id. at 258.
We noted that the prosecutor's opening statement in Land was "replete"
with descriptions of facts that were never supported. Id. at 270-71. Also, the
evidence the State presented in that case was "less than overwhelming." Id. at
250. At the time the prosecutor made the statements during the openings, there
was considerable reason to doubt whether the victim would testify. Id. at 269-
70. Even if a prosecutor acts in good faith, he or she makes the prejudicial
A-1382-15T1
14
statements at his or her own peril. Id. at 270. As a result, we reversed and
remanded, holding that the defendants did not receive a fair trial. Id. at 250,
273.
On appeal, Greene contends the State's unequivocal statement that Smith
would testify Greene confessed to her was a direct violation of Land. The
assistant prosecutor expounded in detail about Smith's forthcoming testimony,
telling the jury Smith would explain that Greene confessed to shooting Baker
and the details of what happened. There was a strong indication prior to opening
statements that Smith would refuse to testify. In fact, the assistant prosecutor
was aware that Smith stated she would be invoking her Fifth Amendment right.
The assistant prosecutor did not yet know whether the court would admit
Smith's statement through another mechanism because it had not ruled on the
State's motion to admit the out-of-court statement of Smith pursuant to either
Rule 804 (b)(9) or Rule 804(b)(1)(A). The assistant prosecutor had specific
knowledge that Smith could well refuse to testify.
While defense counsel did not object during the opening statement when
the assistant prosecutor spoke of Smith's testimony, under Land a prosecutor's
good faith belief about whether or not someone will testify is not crucial because
A-1382-15T1
15
a prosecutor makes representations in opening statements at his or her own peril.
Id. at 270.
IV. Curative instruction.
Not only did the assistant prosecutor violate Land based upon the remarks
he made during opening statements, but the court's curative instruction was
inadequate because it could not remediate the prejudice that defendants
experienced when the assistant prosecutor told the jury Greene confessed to his
grandmother.
The assistant prosecutor told the jury they would be hearing testimony
from Smith that Greene confessed to her. Greatly amplifying the harm, he told
the jury that Smith was in a difficult position because she was "stuck between
the love of her grandson and testifying in court." As a result, the jury was
expecting either that Smith would testify Greene confessed to her, or Smith
would fail to testify because she loved Greene too much to reveal his confession.
After Smith failed to testify, the jury may well have concluded that Greene had
confessed to Smith, but she did not want to present evidence against her
grandson. Such compelling harm to Greene also infected Lewis' trial. As a
result, the court's instruction to disregard the assistant prosecutor's statements
about Smith was woefully inadequate. The court could not "unring the bell"
A-1382-15T1
16
sounded by the assistant prosecutor. See State v. W.L. 292 N.J. Super. 100, 116
(App. Div. 1996) (quoting Demers v. Snyder, 282 N.J. Super. 50, 58 (App. Div.
1995)) (noting curative instructions are "not always palliative or sufficient to
mitigate the damage").
Due to the additional commentary regarding why Smith might not choose
to testify, the court's instruction failed to cure the prejudice to defendants. Nor
would any other formulation of the instruction have erased the damage done by
the assistant prosecutor's opening statement. The opening not only disclosed
extremely damaging testimony that did not materialize, but it also disclosed the
reason why the testimony might not be heard. This raises a "reasonable doubt"
that it caused the jury to reach a result it would not have reached otherwise,
especially in light of the hung jury on the third co-defendant. See State v.
Walden 370 N.J. Super. 549, 555-56, 561-62 (App. Div. 2004) (reversing where
the prosecutor recounted to the jury the statement of a witness that "[the
defendant] was the shooter," when the witness did not testify, and the prosecutor
then vouched for the honesty of a second witness in light of the non-testifying
witness's statement).
Wawa surveillance video showed all four individuals at a location near
Baker's home. A.J. testified that Lewis and Greene entered Baker's home armed
A-1382-15T1
17
with guns. Dickens testified that an armed man she recognized as Greene had
an altercation with Baker. Both A.J. and Dickens testified that they heard a
gunshot while Greene and Lewis were in the home, and Baker died of a gunshot
wound shortly after the four individuals fled. Moreover, there was DNA
evidence linking Lewis and Holliday to the scene. But, Greene was wearing a
white shirt in the Wawa security footage and had tattoos, contrary to Dickens'
testimony that the shooter was wearing a red shirt and had no tattoos. Her
testimony that she recognized Greene from five-year-old Facebook pages was
also not compelling evidence. A.J. was undercut by his lack of overall
credibility. Thus, although there was strong evidence of Greene's and Lewis's
guilt, it was not undisputed. The jury did not find Holliday guilty. Due to the
contradictory exculpating evidence here, similar to Land, "[w]e cannot say -- in
light of the less than overwhelming evidence of guilt -- that the prosecutor's
imprudent comments, even if made in good faith, failed to prejudice
defendants." 435 N.J. Super at 250. The jury could have concluded that Greene
and Lewis were guilty independent of the prosecutor's unfounded opening
remarks and the court's inadequate curative instruction. We cannot say,
however, that beyond a reasonable doubt the jury was not infected by the State's
improper opening statement.
A-1382-15T1
18
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
A-1382-15T1
19
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