STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. EUGENE LAVERGNE
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0522-17T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
EUGENE LAVERGNE, a/k/a
EUGENE MARTIN LAVERGNE,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
Submitted January 14, 2019 – Decided January 29, 2019
Before Judges Fasciale and Rose.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 12-11-
1894.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Louis H. Miron, Designated Counsel, on the
brief).
Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Monmouth County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Monica do
Outeiro, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
A grand jury returned two separate indictments against defendant
simultaneously.1 In the charges related to the first indictment (No. 12-11-1840-
Z), a jury found defendant guilty of second-degree misapplication of entrusted
property, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-15; and fourth-degree contempt, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a).
We affirmed those convictions. State v. LaVergne, No. A-3210-14 (App Div.
Nov. 7, 2018). As to the second indictment (No. 12-11-1894-Z), and shortly
after that jury trial ended, defendant pled guilty to fourth-degree unauthorized
practice of law, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-22, which is the conviction from which he now
appeals. In this appeal, defendant makes the same arguments he made in the
first appeal.
On appeal, defendant argues:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING
[DEFENDANT]'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE
INDICTMENT BECAUSE [A] MONMOUTH
COUNTY GRAND JURY DID NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE CASE AND
RETURN AN INDICTMENT AGAINST
[DEFENDANT].
A. [Defendant] Did Not Waive His Right
to Raise a Jurisdictional Challenge to the
1
Defendant is a disbarred attorney. See In re LaVergne, 212 N.J. 427 (2012).
A-0522-17T4
2
Monmouth County Grand Jury. (Not
Raised Below).
B. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in
Not Dismissing the Indictment on the
Grounds That the Grand Jury Lacked
Jurisdiction.
We affirm.
I.
The pertinent facts of this case begin back in 2011 when defendant
appeared before the Monmouth County Assignment Judge (the first judge) on
an order to show cause (OTSC) filed by defendant in an attorney ethics matter.
Defendant sought the recusal of the first judge based on a claim filed by
defendant in a pending federal lawsuit. The first judge recused himself and
arranged to have the matter heard in Middlesex County.
Approximately one year later, the Monmouth County Prosecutors Office
(MCPO) prepared to present two criminal cases involving defendant to a grand
jury. Because of the prior conflict, the first judge advised the MCPO to bring
any issues during presentation to the grand jury to a second judge. The first
judge presided over the empanelment of the grand jury to hear a multitude of
matters over several months, not specifically an investigative jury solely for
defendant. Immediately upon the State's presentation of defendant's case,
A-0522-17T4
3
defendant filed an OTSC seeking the recusal of the MCPO and the first judge,
and transfer out of county. The second judge conducted a hearing and denied
defendant's motions.
Thereafter, defendant filed six motions, including a motion to disqualify
the prosecutor, recuse an assigned Monmouth County judge (the third judge),
and transfer venue to another county. Although the third judge determined there
was "no basis" for him to disqualify himself, on April 5, 2013, prior to
defendant's arraignment, the third judge transferred the case to Middlesex
County.
In June 2014, defendant filed a motion re-raising the same issues before a
judge in Middlesex County. That judge rejected defendant's reliance on In re
Newman, 189 N.J. 477 (2006), in which a municipal court judge, motivated by
a desire to spare the defendant from having to return to court and appear before
a different judge, was disciplined for conducting an arraignment of a defendant
notwithstanding the existence of an acknowledged conflict of interest. The
judge explained that "while judicial supervision is necessary to ensure the
independence of the grand jury . . . 'no judge presides to monitor its
proceedings,'" quoting State v. Murphy, 213 N.J. Super. 404, 411 (App. Div.
1986). The judge noted that "[t]he supervisional duties of the [first judge]
A-0522-17T4
4
include charging the grand jury, administering the oath . . . , [and] discharging
the grand jury at the end of their term."
The judge in Middlesex County also rejected defendant's interpretation of
Rule 1:12-3,2 that only the Chief Justice could assign the matter to a different
judge after the first judge was conflicted out. The judge found that defendant
did not cite, and the court could not find any legal authority supporting
defendant's claim. The judge also noted that the grand jury process was
conducted "without any questions of the grand jurors that necessitated any
judicial involvement whatsoever" and that defendant did not suffer any
prejudice from the simple fact that the first judge empaneled the grand juries
that heard defendant's cases. The judge in Middlesex County stated:
Defendant mischaracterizes the fact by stating
that [the first judge] empaneled the grand juries to hear
. . . defendant's case[s]. This was not an investigatory
grand jury which is empaneled for the purposes of
investigating a case. It was a standard . . . grand jury
empanelment to sit [eighteen] weeks . . . , [one] day a
2 Rule 1:12-3(a) provides in pertinent part that
[i]n the event of the disqualification or inability for any
reason of a judge to hear any pending matter before or
after trial, another judge of the court in which the matter
is pending or a judge temporarily assigned to hear the
matter shall be designated by the Chief Justice or by the
Assignment Judge of the county where the matter is
pending . . . .
A-0522-17T4
5
week, and to get everything from drug cases, to
homicides, to bad checks, to apparently [defendant]'s
matter.
....
It is a simple fact that [the first judge] had no
direct contact with defendant's case. And his role in
swearing in a jury and using standard language and
form promulgated from the conference of Assignment
Judges had absolutely no prejudicial [e]ffect, nor any
[e]ffect whatsoever on this defendant. And no rational
person would conceive that there's even an appearance
of impropriety.
Defendant filed motions for leave to appeal the order entered by the Middlesex
County judge. Both this court and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied the
motions.
In January 2017, defendant appeared before another judge in Middlesex
County (the second Middlesex judge) on several pre-trial motions. The second
Middlesex judge denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment "based on
[a] lack of jurisdiction by the [c]ourt," and also rejected defendant's contention
that the first judge's appointment of the second judge as a conflict judge violated
Rule 1:12-3. Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the judge
denied.
A-0522-17T4
6
II.
"Generally, a defendant who pleads guilty is prohibited from raising, on
appeal, the contention that the State violated his constitutional rights prior to the
plea." State v. Owens, 381 N.J. Super. 503, 508 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting State
v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 470 (2005)). Consequently, "a guilty plea waives all
issues, including constitutional claims, that were or could have been raised in
prior proceedings." Id. at 508-09 (citing Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258,
267 (1973)). In Tollett, the United States Supreme Court held,
a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events
which has preceded it in the criminal process. When a
criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court
that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is
charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims
relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that
occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.
[ 411 U.S. at 267.]
However, there are exceptions to this general rule. "[T]he guiding
principle" of these exceptions was established in Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975). State v. Truglia, 97 N.J. 513, 523 (1984). In Menna, the United
States Supreme Court concluded that the defendant could raise a double
jeopardy challenge, even though the defendant had pled guilty. 423 U.S. at 62.
The Court held that a guilty plea does not waive a claim when "the charge is one
A-0522-17T4
7
which the State may not constitutionally prosecute." Id. at 62 n.2. The Court
noted the difference between "factual guilt," which is established by a guilty
plea, and a defendant's claim that the State simply cannot prosecute because it
is prohibited by the United States Constitution. Ibid.
Accordingly, double jeopardy and other "constitutional violation[s] akin
thereto" are not waived by the entry of a guilty plea. State v. Garoniak, 164 N.J.
Super. 344, 348 (App. Div. 1978). "Since the application of this type of
constitutional protection would be to prevent a trial from taking place at all, a
defendant may raise the applicable constitutional issue and obtain relief by a
reason thereof, notwithstanding that his conviction was entered pursuant to a
counseled plea of guilty." Ibid. However, relevant here, we have previously
concluded that "challenge[s] [to] the indictment" and "the unconstitutionality of
grand jury selection" are not "constitutional violation[s] akin" to double
jeopardy, and thus, are waived by a guilty plea. Id. at 348-49; Owens, 381 N.J.
Super. at 509.
There is no reason to conclude that defendant's claim was not waived by
his entry of a guilty plea. Defendant's jurisdictional claim is not a
"constitutional protection" like the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fif th
Amendment that would prevent a trial from taking place at all. Garoniak, 164
A-0522-17T4
8 N.J. Super. at 348. Defendant's contention is not that the State was prohibited
from indicting him on these charges, but that he could not be indicted by a grand
jury that was empaneled by the first judge. Yet, defendant pled guilty on this
indictment. If defendant wanted to subsequently challenge the grand jury
process, he should have entered a conditional guilty plea. 3 He did not do so.
Moreover, defendant's claim does not rise to a constitutional level.
Defendant's argument is based on the first judge's empanelment of the grand jury
and his assignment of a conflict judge. Defendant argues that because the first
judge previously recused himself, he could not empanel the grand jury or assign
the matter to a different judge. However, we have recognized that "[m]ost
matters relating to judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional
level." State v. Presley, 436 N.J. Super. 440, 458 (App. Div. 2014) (second
alteration in original) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820-
21 (1986)). "Rather, issues involving a judge's qualifications to hear a case are
ordinarily resolved 'by common law, statute, or the professional standards of the
bench and bar.'" Ibid. (quoting Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-05
3 Pursuant to Rule 3:9-3(f), "a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty
reserving on the record the right to appeal from the adverse determination of any
specified pretrial motion. If the defendant prevails on appeal, the defendant
shall be afforded the opportunity to withdraw his . . . plea."
A-0522-17T4
9
(1997)). Accordingly, defendant's argument regarding [the first judge's]
disqualification does not rise to "a constitutional level." Ibid.
The "crux" of defendant's jurisdictional challenge is that the first judge
"never should have had any involvement with a case brought against" defendant.
Defendant contends that because the first judge recused himself, "[ Rule] 1:12-3
require[d] the Chief Justice, not the recused assignment judge, to designate a
judge to hear the matter, including communications with the prosecutor,
[e]mpaneling the grand jury, voir dire of grand jurors, returning indictments[,]
and corresponding with defense counsel."
Because this issue was addressed and decided in LaVergne, slip op. at 22-
32, we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth therein. The panel addressed
defendant's argument that Rule 1:12-3 required the first judge to relinquish
jurisdiction to the Chief Justice – the same contention brought by defendant on
this appeal. We stated:
Here, defendant offers no support for his
proposition that Rule 1:12-3 prohibited [the first judge]
from empaneling a grand jury or assigning other judges
to handle defendant's case, including the grand jury
presentation. By its plain language, Rule 1:12-3(a)
requires the assignment judge or the Chief Justice to
designate another judge "to hear any pending matter
before or after trial" if the judge hearing the matter is
disqualified. Nor is there any support for defendant's
proposition that where the case is ultimately transferred
A-0522-17T4
10
to a different county after indictment, but prior to
arraignment, a conflict by [the first judge] creates a
jurisdictional issue mandating the dismissal of the
indictment in the absence of any finding of prejudice,
perceived or actual, in the grand jury presentation. On
the contrary, we are satisfied that [the first judge's]
ministerial and insubstantial acts "did not 'substantially
undermine' the objectivity of the charging process or
case harm to the defendant." [State v. Murphy, 110 N.J.
20, 35 (1988)].
[LaVergne, slip op. at 31.]
Affirmed.
A-0522-17T4
11
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
