STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. ISIAH T. MCNEAL
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APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5226-15T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ISIAH T. MCNEAL, a/k/a ISIAH
T. MCNEIL, and ISAIAH MCNEAL,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________
Submitted December 21, 2017 – Decided March 22, 2018
Before Judges Rothstadt and Gooden Brown.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Cape May County, Indictment Nos.
13-06-0614, 13-07-0725, 14-01-0032, 14-12-
1056 and 15-06-0447.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Marcia Blum, Assistant Deputy
Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Robert W. Johnson, Acting Cape May County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Gretchen
A. Pickering, Special Deputy Attorney
General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of
counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant entered negotiated guilty pleas to count two of
Indictment No. 14-12-1056, charging second-degree aggravated
assault,
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); count four of Indictment No. 13-
06-0614, charging third-degree theft of a motor vehicle,
N.J.S.A.
2C:20-3(a); count one of Indictment No. 13-07-0725, charging
fourth-degree throwing bodily fluids at a law enforcement officer,
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-13; count one of Indictment No. 14-01-0032,
charging fourth-degree rioting,
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-1(a); and count two
of Indictment No. 15-06-0447, charging third-degree conspiracy to
distribute controlled dangerous substances,
N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, 35-
5(a)(1), and 35-5(b)(3). He was sentenced in accordance with the
plea agreement to a ten-year prison term, subject to the No Early
Release Act's (NERA) eighty-five percent period of parole
ineligibility,
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, on Indictment No. 14-12-1056,
to run concurrent with an aggregate thirteen-year term imposed on
the remaining four indictments. The aggregate thirteen-year term
consisted of five years each on Indictment Nos. 13-06-0614 and 15-
06-0447, and eighteen months each on Indictment Nos. 13-07-0725
and 14-01-0032. The remaining counts of the indictments as well
as a sixth indictment were dismissed under the plea agreement.1
1
Four of the indictments encompassed multiple counts, and two
included first-degree charges.
2 A-5226-15T4
Defendant now appeals his convictions and sentence raising
the following single point for our consideration:
DEFENDANT DID NOT ENTER THE PLEA KNOWINGLY,
INTELLIGENTLY, AND VOLUNTARILY BECAUSE THE
COURT AND COUNSEL GAVE DEFENDANT INCORRECT,
CONFLICTING, AND CONFUSING ADVICE ABOUT HIS
JAIL CREDIT; THEREFORE, THE PLEA MUST BE
VACATED. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
We affirm.
A summary of the procedural history leading to the challenged
plea will provide context for defendant's contention. After
denying defendant's pre-trial motions to dismiss the indictment
and suppress telephone recordings, the trial court commenced a
bench trial on Indictment No. 14-12-1056, but adjourned the matter
on the third day of trial. Several days later, when the trial
resumed, the State tendered a new plea offer, which defendant
accepted. The new offer would resolve all six indictments
referenced above and differed from the ultimate offer that is the
subject of this appeal in that it encompassed an eight-year,
instead of a ten-year, term on the NERA offense, concurrent with
the aggregate thirteen-year flat term on the remaining charges.
In the midst of the plea allocution on the new plea offer,
when the judge asked defendant if he understood that he was waiving
his right to "continue with [the] trial" by entering a guilty
plea, defendant responded, "I understand you all tricked me.
3 A-5226-15T4
That's what I understand." In response to the judge's additional
questions seeking clarification of defendant's accusation,
defendant stated, "I'm not answering no more questions. Whatever
you're all gonna do, you're all gonna do it . . . . There's
nothing else for us to talk about, point blank, period."
As defendant continued to utter a barrage of expletives in
the courtroom and impugn his attorney's representation, the judge
stated:
[I]f you don't understand that when you plead
guilty, you waive your right to a trial, which
is what I explained to you from the very
beginning, that if you wanted to plead guilty,
you waive your right to a trial, you said you
understood that.
But now, you're telling me you don't
understand? You think that you can plead
guilty and still go to trial? That's not how
it works. But clearly, you don't understand
your constitutional rights so I'm not going
to be able to accept this guilty plea.
The prosecutor responded by withdrawing the new offer and
indicating that the State was ready to continue with the trial.
When the trial resumed two days later, defendant apologized
both directly and through his attorney for his disruptive behavior.
According to defense counsel, after being advised "that he would
be entitled to [2438] days' jail credit as to [I]ndictment 14-12-
1056 just because of the nature of the plea and the actual
consecutive sentences on some of the other counts," defendant
4 A-5226-15T4
"want[ed] to go forward with the plea." The prosecutor responded
that the plea was "not being reoffered to . . . defendant." The
court concluded:
[T]he plea on the record was rejected. This
[c]ourt found that it could not even accept
the plea, and thereafter, the defendant
himself said he didn't want the plea, he
wanted to go to trial. He didn't want to go
to trial with his attorney at that time, that
he believed that he was being tricked, and I
took it as he was being tricked by the [c]ourt
and by counsel . . . . There's absolutely no
trickery that took place; there was no
collusion. If anything, it was possibly the
frustrations at that point and possibly a
misunderstanding. But this is a situation
where . . . the [c]ourt agrees that the plea
was not accepted; it's been withdrawn.
At that point, instead of requesting a mistrial, defendant
indicated through his attorney that he would accept "the State's
original plea offer, which was ten years at 85 percent concurrent
to the [thirteen] flat." Defense counsel added it had "been
represented to counsel, and to the [c]ourt, and to the State, and
therefore, [he] represented it to [defendant] that . . . with
respect to [] [I]ndictment 14-12-1056, [he was] going to be
entitled to . . . [2438] days of jail credit. And he [was]
entering this plea with that understanding."
The prosecutor promptly countered:
[W]hat I would just note for that purpose
is . . . there['s] absolutely no question
from the State's perspective that the
5 A-5226-15T4
defendant [is] entitled to whatever credit he
lawfully is entitled to. But . . . if the
defendant gets, for instance, six years'
credit for being in jail for three years, I
don't know . . . how that makes any sense. I
don’t know if their calculations are mistaken
or not, but the defendant has been in jail for
less than three years on this matter.
. . . And I don't . . . believe that
that should be part and parcel of the plea
negotiations. He's entitled to the days that
he's entitled to, but the idea that he somehow
will be able to bypass through . . . [eight-
and-one-half]2 years is not something that the
State is signing off on at this point in time
whatsoever. It seems clear from the State's
perspective . . . he’s going to have to do a
minimum of [eight-and-one-half] years' real
time. He's not going to get bonus time for
the fact that he's in . . . jail on more than
[one] case.
Obviously, there's certainly a
possibility . . . that I'm wrong in terms of
my assessment, that somehow [eight-and-one-
half] years can be satisfied with five years
or something like that . . . . [But] I would
submit that he's going to have to do [eight-
and-one-half] years and . . . to the extent
that his reliance upon this number that’s been
proffered out there is potentially being
determined by Ms. Caruso and Ms. Brand,3 and
I have great respect for both of those
women, . . . I would submit that . . . common
sense would indicate that a person pleading
to a sentence which requires [eight-and-one-
half] years of parole [stipulation], would
2
The prosecutor was referring to the eighty-five percent parole
ineligibility period on the ten-year NERA sentence, which amounted
to eight years, six months, and two days.
3
The reference was presumably to probation officers who are
responsible for preparing the pre-sentence reports.
6 A-5226-15T4
actually have to do [eight-and-one-half]
years. So anyway, . . . that’s something that
I just want to make sure is clear on the
record.
After defendant was sworn, the following colloquy occurred
between the judge and defendant:
[COURT] [B]efore we put the . . . plea
through[,] . . . the jail credit . . . that
has been provided to me is . . . [2438]. I
cannot represent to you how that will affect
you on this sentence and, in particular, the
parole ineligibility. Do you understand that?
[DEFENDANT] Yeah.
[COURT] You understand in other words that
you're entering into this plea
negotiation . . . understanding that nobody's
making you any promises other than the fact
that that is your jail credit . . . .
[DEFENDANT] Yes, I understand that.
[COURT] Okay. So
any . . . plea . . . negotiations that you’re
entering into should not be entered into by
you thinking that [2438] days comes out to
[six] years and . . . that's all going to go
towards your parole ineligibility. It may; I
just can't represent it to you, and I don't
want you to accept this plea thinking that
anybody is telling you that it is going to be
applied to your parole ineligibility. Do you
understand that?
[DEFENDANT] Yes.
. . . .
[COURT] So again, . . . you're entering into
this guilty plea and you understand that
there's no representation made as to how those
7 A-5226-15T4
credits would be applied in particular to your
sentence and/or to your parole ineligibility;
is that correct?
[DEFENDANT] Yes.
The judge continued the plea allocution, ensuring that
defendant was satisfied with his attorney's representation,
reviewed the discovery in all his cases, discussed any potential
defenses with his attorney, reviewed and answered the questions
on the plea forms truthfully, and understood the terms of the plea
agreement and the consequences of his guilty pleas. Defendant
indicated that he understood that by pleading guilty, he was giving
up his constitutional rights, including the right to continue with
his trial and to go to trial on the remaining indictments.
Defendant also provided a factual basis for each offense that was
satisfactory to the judge and the State. Upon determining that
defendant was entering the guilty pleas "freely and voluntarily,"
was not promised anything other than what was discussed, and was
not "forced or coerced" into pleading guilty, the judge accepted
the pleas in accordance with Rule 3:9-2. When defendant was
sentenced on May 20, 2016, he received 1012 days of jail credit
8 A-5226-15T4
on the NERA offense.4 The judgments of conviction were entered on
June 8, 2016, and this appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant argues for the first time that "[b]ecause
the trial judge, as well as defense counsel, gave [him] incorrect,
contradictory, and confusing advice about his jail credit, he did
not enter the plea knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily . . . in violation of his right to due process."
Therefore, according to defendant, he should be allowed to withdraw
his plea. We disagree.
Rule 3:9-2 governs the taking of pleas. In particular, it
mandates that a court not accept a guilty plea to a criminal charge
without first "determining . . . that there is a factual basis for
the plea and that the plea is made voluntarily . . . and with an
understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of
the plea." R. 3:9-2. "The specificity and rigor embodied in Rule
3:9-2 manifest a systemic awareness that a defendant waives
significant constitutional rights when pleading guilty, which
places an affirmative obligation on a court to reject a plea of
guilty when that court is not independently satisfied that the
4
Defendant also received 1060 days of jail credit on Indictment
No. 13-06-0614, 1043 days of jail credit on Indictment No. 13-07-
0725, 891 days of jail credit on Indictment No. 14-01-0032, and
721 days of jail credit on Indictment No. 15-06-0447.
9 A-5226-15T4
Rule's prerequisites are met." State ex rel. T.M.,
166 N.J. 319,
326 (2001).
"Although a court is not responsible for informing a defendant
of all consequences flowing from a guilty plea, at a minimum the
court must ensure that the defendant is made fully aware of those
consequences that are 'direct' or 'penal.'" State v. Johnson,
182 N.J. 232, 236 (2005) (quoting State v. Howard,
110 N.J. 113, 122
(1988)). "The requirement that the court be satisfied in that
respect serves several salutary ends. It avoids having a defendant
enter into a plea hampered by being 'misinformed . . . as to a
material element of a plea negotiation, which [he] has relied [on]
in entering his plea.'" Id. at 236-37 (alterations in original)
(quoting State v. Nichols,
71 N.J. 358, 361 (1976)). It also
"promotes the binding resolution of charges because it serves to
ensure that a defendant's 'expectations [are] reasonably grounded
in the terms of the plea bargain.'" Id. at 237 (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Marzolf,
79 N.J. 167, 183 (1979)).
In State v. Alevras, we acknowledged:
[T]hat, at least in certain circumstances, a
defendant's misunderstanding of credits may
affect his understanding of the maximum
exposure. Hence, a guilty plea based on this
misunderstanding may fail to satisfy the
constitutional requirement that a plea be
voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly
entered, at least where the denial of the
expected credits results in the imposition of
10 A-5226-15T4
a sentence longer in duration than the maximum
contemplated. This would be particularly true
if a misunderstanding not clarified during the
plea colloquy had an impact on his decision
to enter the guilty plea.
[
213 N.J. Super. 331, 338-39 (App. Div. 1986)
(citations omitted).]
Rule 3:21-1 permits a court to vacate a guilty plea after
sentencing only if withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct
a "manifest injustice." "To demonstrate a manifest injustice,
defendant must show that the lack of information prejudiced him
in making his decision to plead." Johnson,
182 N.J. at 244. Here,
we find no manifest injustice. While misrepresentations regarding
jail credit may upend a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, a review
of the record in its entirety contradicts defendant's claim. Thus,
we conclude that defendant entered his guilty pleas knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. See R. 3:9-2.
Affirmed.
11 A-5226-15T4
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