STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JEFFREY SMITH
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5096-15T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JEFFREY SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________________
Submitted March 14, 2018 – Decided April 11, 2018
Before Judges Fuentes and Manahan.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Hudson County, Indictment No.
15-09-1243.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Stephen P. Hunter, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the
brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney
for respondent (Sarah E. Ross, Deputy Attorney
General, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Jeffrey Smith appeals from his conviction for
fourth-degree possession of a false government document,
N.J.S.A.
2C:21-2.1(d). Defendant entered a conditional plea after the
denial of his motion to suppress. On appeal, defendant argues
that the decision to deny the motion was erroneous. We affirm.
On September 8, 2015, defendant was indicted by a Hudson
County Grand Jury and charged with fourth-degree obstruction of
administration of law or other government function,
N.J.S.A.
2C:29-1 (count one); fourth-degree unlawful theft or receipt of a
credit card,
N.J.S.A. 2C:21-6(c)(1) (count two); and fourth-degree
possession of a false government document,
N.J.S.A. 2C:21-2.1(d)
(count three). Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence
uncovered during the search of his person. At the conclusion of
the testimonial hearing, the judge denied the motion in an oral
decision.
Thereafter, defendant entered into a negotiated plea and was
sentenced in accordance therewith to thirty days in the Hudson
County Jail, plus additional fines and penalties. All other
charges were dismissed. This appeal followed.
We derive the relevant facts from the motion hearing. On
March 29, 2015, Lieutenant Robert Ryan, a seventeen-year veteran
of the Bayonne Police Department, was working a security detail
at a Shop Rite supermarket, which was also a liquor store. While
working in this capacity, Ryan was working for the City of Bayonne
as a contracted officer through Shop Rite to provide security and
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was expected to patrol all departments of the store. On the night
of the incident, Ryan was not in his police uniform, but rather
in "off-duty plain clothes." On his person, Ryan carried his
firearm, handcuffs, and police radio, which was clipped to his
jeans pocket and was visible from the front.
At approximately 8 p.m., Ryan was called to the liquor
department by a loss prevention officer. Upon entering, Ryan
observed two black men, one with dreadlocks, at the counter, who
were in the process of purchasing cases of “high-end liquor.” As
Ryan made eye contact with the men, they abandoned the purchase
and hurriedly exited the store.
Premised upon his knowledge of recent incidents involving two
men of the same description using fraudulent credit cards to
purchase high-end liquor, Ryan became suspicious and followed the
men outside. As he approached the men, Ryan asked them, "What's
the story fellas? How come you're not finishing . . . making your
purchase?" The men denied being in the store and denied that they
were attempting to make a purchase. Subsequently, as Ryan called
police headquarters to request back up and to inform them that he
was going to conduct a field check, the two men walked away. Ryan
followed the men and ordered that they stop by saying, ""Police,
stop, let's talk about what just happened in the store, the
purchases you were trying to make." The men ignored his orders
3 A-5096-15T3
and continued walking. A foot pursuit ensued, which resulted in
the apprehension of one individual, later identified as defendant.
The other individual, later identified as Joseph Basile, was
apprehended by back-up officers. Both individuals were arrested.
Following his arrest, defendant was taken to Bayonne Police
headquarters for processing.
A search incident to arrest led to the recovery of a New York
driver's license with the name William Price found in defendant's
right shoe, as well as ten credit cards, also bearing the name
William Price. A Massachusetts driver's license issued to
defendant was also recovered from his wallet.
Defendant raises the following arguments on appeal:
POINT I
OFFICER RYAN, WHO WAS WORKING AS A SUPERMARKET
SECURITY GUARD, LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO
ARREST DEFENDANT FOR OBSTRUCTION BECAUSE RYAN
WAS DRESSED IN PLAIN CLOTHES AND FAILED TO
PRESENT A BADGE OR ANY OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE THAT
HE WAS A POLICE OFFICER WHEN HE REQUESTED
DEFENDANT TO STOP. THE DIRECT FRUITS OF THIS
ILLEGAL ARREST SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.
U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV, XIV; N.J. CONST. ART.
I, ¶¶ [SIC] 1, 7.
POINT II
ALTERNATIVELY, OFFICER RYAN LACKED REASONABLE
SUSPICION FOR AN I[]VESTIGATORY STOP AND THE
STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH A SIGNIFICANT
ATTENUATION BETWEEN THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL STOP
AND THE SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE FOUND DURING THE
SEARCH INCIDENT TO THE ARREST. STATE v.
4 A-5096-15T3
WILLIAMS,
410 N.J. SUPER. 549 (APP. DIV.
2009). U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV, XIV; N.J.
CONST. ART. I, ¶¶ [SIC] 1, 7.
Our Supreme Court has recited the standard of review
applicable to an appellate court's consideration of a trial judge's
fact-finding on a motion to suppress:
[A]n appellate court reviewing a motion to
suppress must uphold the factual findings
underlying the trial court's decision so long
as those findings are "supported by sufficient
credible evidence in the record." [State v.
Elders,
386 N.J. Super. 208, 228 (App. Div.
2006)] (citing State v. Locurto,
157 N.J. 463,
474 (1999)); see also State v. Slockbower, 79
N.J. 1, 13 (1979) (concluding that "there was
substantial credible evidence to support the
findings of the motion judge that the . . .
investigatory search [was] not based on
probable cause"); State v. Alvarez, 238 N.J.
Super. 560, 562-64 (App. Div. 1990) (stating
that standard of review on appeal from motion
to suppress is whether "the findings made by
the judge could reasonably have been reached
on sufficient credible evidence present in the
record" (citing State v. Johnson,
42 N.J. 146,
164 (1964))).
An appellate court "should give deference
to those findings of the trial judge which are
substantially influenced by his opportunity to
hear and see the witnesses and to have the
'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court
cannot enjoy." Johnson,
42 N.J. at 161. An
appellate court should not disturb the trial
court's findings merely because "it might have
reached a different conclusion were it the
trial tribunal" or because "the trial court
decided all evidence or inference conflicts
in favor of one side" in a close case. Id.
at 162. A trial court's findings should be
disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken
5 A-5096-15T3
"that the interests of justice demand
intervention and correction." Ibid. In those
circumstances solely should an appellate court
"appraise the record as if it were deciding
the matter at inception and make its own
findings and conclusions." Ibid.
[State v. Elders,
192 N.J. 224, 243-44
(2007).]
An appellate court need not give deference to a trial judge's
interpretation of the law. State v. Vargas,
213 N.J. 301, 327
(2013); State v. Gandhi,
201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010); State v. Handy,
412 N.J. Super. 492, 498 (App. Div. 2010) (stating that our review
of the judge's legal conclusions is plenary), aff’d,
206 N.J. 39
(2011). Legal issues are reviewed de novo. Ibid. "A trial
court's interpretation of the law . . . and the consequences that
flow from established facts are not entitled to any special
deference." State v. Lamb,
218 N.J. 300, 313 (2014).
The judge found Ryan had a reasonable and articulable
suspicion to believe criminal activity was afoot and therefore was
justified in ordering defendant to stop. The judge further found
that since defendant did not follow Ryan's orders to stop, they
obstructed his performance of an official function, giving Ryan
probable cause to arrest. The judge also found that Ryan, while
attempting to conduct an investigatory stop, was performing an
official governmental function in good faith based upon reasonable
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suspicion. Predicated upon those findings, the judge held the
search incident to arrest was justifiable.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article 1, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee
the right "of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]"
U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. The Fourth
Amendment and Article 1, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution
both "require[] the approval of an impartial judicial officer
based on probable cause before most searches may be undertaken."
State v. Patino,
83 N.J. 1, 7 (1980).
Warrantless searches are presumed invalid. State v. Gamble,
218 N.J. 412, 425 (2014); State v. Cooke,
163 N.J. 657, 664 (2000).
"Any warrantless search is prima facie invalid, and the invalidity
may be overcome only if the search falls within one of the specific
exceptions created by the United States Supreme Court." State v.
Hill,
115 N.J. 169, 173 (1989) (citing Patino,
83 N.J. at 7). The
State carries the burden of proving the existence of an exception
by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Amelio,
197 N.J.
207, 211 (2008), cert. denied,
556 U.S. 1237,
129 S. Ct. 2402,
173 L. Ed. 2d 1297 (2009).
7 A-5096-15T3
Defendant argues that the evidence recovered during the
search should be suppressed because Ryan did not have a probable
cause to make the warrantless arrest. We disagree.
A warrantless arrest can only be justified by probable cause.
Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within an
officer's knowledge are "sufficient in themselves" to warrant a
person of reasonable caution in believing that a crime has been
or is being committed. State v. Moore,
181 N.J. 40, 46 (2004).
A person commits crime of obstruction if he or she purposely
obstructs "the administration of law or other governmental
function" or prevents a "public servant" from performing an
"official function."
N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1. "Purposely" is defined
as follows:
A person acts purposely with respect to the
nature of his conduct or a result thereof if
it is his conscious object to engage in
conduct of that nature or to cause such a
result. A person acts purposely with respect
to attendant circumstances if he is aware of
the existence of such circumstances or he
believes or hopes that they exist.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(1).]
Thus, to commit the crime of obstruction, a person has an awareness
that a public servant is performing a governmental function and
it is the person's conscious object to interfere with that
governmental function.
8 A-5096-15T3
Our Supreme Court examined the obstruction statute in State
v. Crawley,
187 N.J. 440, 451-52 (2006), and found that a person
does not have the right to self-help and "must obey [an] . . .
officer's order to stop and may not take flight without violating
N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1." The Court made clear that the officer must be
"acting in good faith and under the color of his authority. . .
." Id. at 451.
In Crawley, there was no issue as to defendant's knowledge
of whether an authorized police officer was engaged in the
performance of one's duties. Here, defendant claims that he did
not know that Ryan was a police officer. In refutation of that
claim, Ryan's uncontroverted testimony was that he announced his
status as a police officer when he requested defendant and Basile
to stop.
As the judge found, and we agree, that at the time Ryan made
the request of defendant to stop, he was acting in good faith and
under the color of his authority. Ryan's testimony relative to
the basis for his suspicion of criminal activity i.e., prior
incidents of similar fraudulent activity, and the conduct of
defendant in abandoning the purchase was also uncontroverted. When
Ryan's suspicion was coupled with defendant's failure to stop and
his flight, we conclude there was probable cause to arrest
9 A-5096-15T3
defendant and the search conducted incident to that arrest was not
constitutionally infirm.
In sum, we hold the judge's findings were supported by
sufficient and credible evidence in the record and her conclusions
of law that flowed from those findings were unassailable. As
such, we discern no basis for error.
Affirmed.
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