CHRISTINE ROSE v. STONE HILL RECREATION CORPORATION
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4974-15T4
CHRISTINE ROSE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STONE HILL RECREATION
CORPORATION, MINERALS RESORT &
SPA MANAGEMENT, INC.; MINERALS
RESORT & SPA, INC.; GRAND
CASCADES LODGE AT CRYSTAL SPRINGS,
LLC; GRAND CASCADES LODGE
MANAGEMENT, INC.; CRYSTAL SPRINGS
BEVERAGES, INC.,
Defendants-Respondents.
_________________________________
Argued December 12, 2017 – Decided February 5, 2018
Before Judges Reisner and Mayer.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Sussex County, Docket No.
L-0679-14.
Deborah L. Mains argued the cause for
appellant (Costello & Mains, LLC, attorneys;
Deborah L. Mains, on the brief).
Stefanie C. Schwartz argued the cause for
respondents (Schwartz Simon Edelstein & Celso,
LLC, attorneys; Stefani C. Schwartz, of
counsel and on the brief; Jody T. Walker, on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Christine Rose appeals from a June 13, 2016 order
granting summary judgment, dismissing her Law Against
Discrimination (LAD) complaint against defendants Stone Hill
Recreation Corporation, Minerals Resort & Spa Management, Inc.,
Minerals Resort & Spa, Inc., Grand Cascades Lodge at Crystal
Springs, LLC, Grand Cascades Lodge Management, Inc. and Crystal
Springs Beverages, Inc.
Plaintiff's LAD complaint alleged that she experienced an
unlawful hostile work environment, and suffered reprisals after
complaining about the hostile environment. See
N.J.S.A. 10:5-
12(d) (prohibiting reprisals against persons who complain about
LAD violations). Our review of the summary judgment order is de
novo, using the Brill1 standard. Townsend v. Pierre,
221 N.J. 36,
59 (2015). After reviewing the undisputed facts2 in light of that
legal standard, we conclude that plaintiff failed to present
evidence sufficient to constitute a hostile work environment. We
1
Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
142 N.J. 520 (1995).
2
Our summary of the facts is partly drawn from the parties'
statements of material facts (SMF), filed as part of their summary
judgment papers. See R. 4:46-2(a). Like the trial court, we deem
undisputed all facts asserted in one party's SMF and admitted in
the other party's response. R. 4:46-2(b).
2 A-4974-15T4
also conclude that she failed to present a prima facie case of
unlawful reprisal under the LAD. Accordingly, we affirm.
I
Plaintiff first worked as a hostess at Kites Restaurant
(Kites), located in a hotel called the Minerals Resort & Spa
(Minerals), and later worked as a hostess at the Crystal Tavern
(Tavern) in the Grand Cascades Lodge (Grand Cascades). Both
Minerals and Grand Cascades were part of a vast complex called the
Crystal Springs Resort (Crystal Springs), which included three
hotels and twelve restaurants. The Tavern was operated by Crystal
Springs Beverages, Inc., and Kites was operated by Stonehill
Recreation Corp. However, it was undisputed that "[w]hile
individuals may work at various restaurants within Crystal
Springs, they ultimately work for Crystal Springs. . . ."
According to plaintiff, on one occasion while she was working
at the Tavern, she heard her supervisor use an obscene sexist term
in referring to a group of female customers. She asserts that
during the same incident, the supervisor also stated, "What do you
want, they are a bunch of women."3 The comments were not made in
3
At the motion argument, plaintiff's attorney confirmed that
there was only one incident, telling the judge: "The harassing
comments arise out of a single incident. There . . . are
essentially three comments that were made in a single incident by
3 A-4974-15T4
the customers' presence, nor were they directed at plaintiff.
According to plaintiff, the customers had complained about the
Tavern's service. The supervisor was angry that the customers had
complained, and he made the derogatory comments about them after
they left the premises.
Plaintiff attested that she found her supervisor's use of the
obscene term to be shocking and unprofessional, although she did
not say anything to the supervisor about it. Plaintiff did not
produce any other evidence of a hostile work environment. She did
not hear any other offensive statements. Nor did she receive any
unwarranted criticism of her work, experience any hostile or
demeaning remarks directed at her by co-workers or supervisors,
or experience any inappropriate conduct directed toward her. Her
entire hostile environment claim rested on the one incident in
which the supervisor made sexist comments about the customers.
According to plaintiff, on September 28, 2013, which was a
couple of days after this isolated incident, she was terminated
from her job at the Tavern for poor job performance. On this
appeal, as in the trial court, she does not contest the reason for
her termination or claim that it was unlawful. The same day she
a supervisor. But a single incident can form the basis of a
harassment claim."
4 A-4974-15T4
was fired, plaintiff went to see Jenny Tapia, who had been her
supervisor at Kites. She told Jenny that she had been fired from
the Tavern for allegedly "not taking ownership" of her job, and
told Jenny about the Tavern supervisor's offensive comments.
On September 29, 2013, plaintiff filed a claim for
unemployment benefits naming both Kites and the Tavern as her
employers. Plaintiff later told an unemployment appeals examiner
that, on October 2, 2013, she attempted to sign up for work at
Kites through the company's website and discovered that she had
been locked out of the system. Based on that information, the
examiner concluded that plaintiff was terminated from both Kites
and Tavern.
According to plaintiff's deposition testimony, "a week or
two" after her termination, she went to Crystal Springs's human
resources (HR) office to discuss her termination and the
supervisor's crude comments. The HR receptionist told plaintiff
that she needed to file a written complaint, but plaintiff did not
do so.
At her deposition, plaintiff testified that someone from the
HR office gave her the impression that she would be able to apply
for jobs at other facilities within the resort. However, despite
applying for twenty-five to thirty jobs within the resort complex,
she was never hired.
5 A-4974-15T4
At his deposition, Youssef Ghantous, the former director of
restaurants, in charge of overseeing the Tavern and other
restaurants at the resort, testified that plaintiff's termination
was documented on a form indicating that her work was substandard.
One of the questions on the form was "would you re-hire this
individual?" That box was checked "no." Ghantous explained that,
because the box was checked "no" plaintiff was not eligible to be
re-hired at any other facilities within the Crystal Springs Resort,
including Kites. According to Ghantous, his superior, Loretta
Westling, authorized plaintiff's termination, based on his
recommendation, and authorized the "do not re-hire" designation
on the termination form. Ghantous testified that, at the time the
decision was made to fire plaintiff, he did not know that plaintiff
had alleged her supervisor made sexist comments about customers.
II
To state a claim for hostile work environment sexual
harassment in this context, plaintiff must allege that the
complained-of conduct:
(1) would not have occurred but for the
employee's gender; and it was
(2) severe or pervasive enough to make a
(3) reasonable woman believe that
6 A-4974-15T4
(4) the conditions of employment are altered
and the working environment is hostile or
abusive.
[Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc.,
132 N.J. 587,
603-04 (1993).]
In this case, the focus is on factor two, whether the
supervisor's conduct was severe enough to create a hostile work
environment. As our courts have recognized, in most cases, "it
is the cumulative impact of successive incidents from which springs
a fully formed hostile work environment claim." Godfrey v.
Princeton Theological Seminary,
196 N.J. 178, 197 (2008). However,
"[a]lthough it will be a rare and extreme case in which a single
incident will be so severe that it would, from the perspective of
a reasonable woman, make the working environment hostile, such a
case is certainly possible." Lehmann,
132 N.J. at 606-07 (emphasis
added).
The motion judge concluded that the one incident in which the
supervisor made sexist comments about the customers was
insufficient, by itself, to create a hostile work environment.
The judge distinguished Taylor v. Metzger,
152 N.J. 490 (1998),
in which a county's sheriff directed a racist slur at one of his
subordinates, a black sheriff's officer, in front of her
colleagues, who then laughed at her. The judge reasoned that
7 A-4974-15T4
[I]n Taylor, the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that a single comment could create a hostile
work environment, not because the comment
alone was offensive, but because all of the
circumstances surrounding the comment altered
the conditions of employment in order to
establish the requisite severity of the
discrimination. Id. at 506-07. The [C]ourt
summarized how the single comment altered the
conditions of the Taylor plaintiff's
employment.
The judge then quoted the following language from Taylor:
The offensive remark was made in the presence
of another supervising officer. When
plaintiff told her co-workers of defendant's
remark, they laughed, and one apparently
mocked her. Moreover, plaintiff had no
realistic opportunity for redress. Defendant
indirectly persisted in perpetuating the
harassment and its hostile impact. When
plaintiff confronted defendant about his
comment, he would not acknowledge that he had
vilified her. Instead, he badgered her for
interpreting the remark as a racial slur. He
was reluctant to apologize. His first
proffered letter did not constitute a sincere
apology; rather, it evaded the patent racial
import of the epithet defendant had used by
falsely stating that plaintiff had worn
fatigues at the time of the comment.
Thereafter, her co-employees acted coolly
toward her; she was labeled a troublemaker.
They were afraid to talk to her and created
the impression that they had been told to stay
away from her. Consequently, a rational
factfinder, crediting such evidence, may
conclude that defendant's racial slur altered
plaintiff's working conditions.
[Taylor,
152 N.J. at 507-08.]
8 A-4974-15T4
The motion judge reasoned that the "single incident" in this
case did not directly affect plaintiff's working conditions, the
comments were not directed at her, and they did not stem from
hostility against her. There was no evidence of any later similar
conduct or comments by the supervisor. The judge considered that
"offhand comments and isolated incidents cannot be deemed to
constitute discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of
one's employment." (citing Herman v. Coastal Corp.,
348 N.J. Super.
1, 23 (App. Div. 2002)).
On the record presented here, we agree with the motion judge
that plaintiff's reliance on Taylor is misplaced. This is not the
"rare and extreme case" where a single incident creates a hostile
work environment. Lehman,
132 N.J. at 606-07. Plaintiff presented
one isolated instance of a supervisor making sexist comments about
a group of women customers, because he was angry that they
complained about the restaurant's service. Unlike Taylor, there
was no other evidence to illuminate how this remark created a
hostile environment for plaintiff. The remarks were not directed
at plaintiff and were not repeated on any other occasion. In
fact, by her own testimony, plaintiff only worked at this
restaurant for another day or two, before being fired for
nondiscriminatory reasons. The trial court properly dismissed the
hostile environment claim on summary judgment.
9 A-4974-15T4
We reach the same conclusion with regard to the retaliation
claim. A prima facie case of retaliation under the LAD requires
evidence of the following factors: "(1) that [plaintiff] engaged
in protected activity; (2) the activity was known to the employer;
(3) plaintiff suffered an adverse employment decision; and (4)
there existed a causal link between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action." Young v. Hobart West Group,
385 N.J.
Super. 448, 465 (App. Div. 2005); see also Battaglia v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc.,
214 N.J. 518, 547 (2013).
In this case, plaintiff failed to satisfy the second prong,
by demonstrating that the person or persons who fired her or failed
to rehire her were aware of her complaint. She also failed to
satisfy the fourth prong of the test by producing evidence of a
causal nexus between her complaint and her termination.
"[T]he mere fact that [an] adverse employment
action occurs after [the protected activity]
will ordinarily be insufficient to satisfy the
plaintiff's burden of demonstrating a causal
link between the two." Only where the facts
of the particular case are so "unusually
suggestive of retaliatory motive" may temporal
proximity, on its own, support an inference
of causation. Where the timing alone is not
"unusually suggestive," the plaintiff must set
forth other evidence to establish the causal
link.
[Young,
385 N.J. Super. at 467 (citations
omitted).]
10 A-4974-15T4
Plaintiff contends that, because she complained to the Kites
supervisor, Jenny Tapia, and to the HR receptionist, she was fired
from Kites and was not rehired at any other Crystal Springs
restaurant. There is no evidence that Tapia had any authority to
make hiring or termination decisions at Kites. Nor is there
evidence that Tapia or the HR receptionist were involved in any
decision to fire plaintiff or not rehire her.
Further, there is no dispute that plaintiff was fired from
the Tavern for poor job performance. Ghantous, the high-level
manager who recommended the firing, also indicated on the
termination form that he would not rehire her. On this record,
the mere fact that plaintiff made a complaint and then was not
rehired is not "unusually suggestive" of a retaliatory motive.
Id. at 467. The more logical inference is that she was not rehired
because she had been fired for poor job performance. Accordingly,
we also affirm the grant of summary judgment on the reprisal claim.
Affirmed.
11 A-4974-15T4
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
