WILLIAM WESTPHAL v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMAN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4911-15T1
WILLIAM WESTPHAL,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND
FIREMAN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Respondent-Respondent.
________________________________
Argued December 4, 2017 – Decided April 11, 2018
Before Judges Ostrer and Whipple.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the
Police and Fireman's Retirement System.
Stuart J. Alterman argued the cause for
appellant (Alterman & Associates, LLC,
attorneys; Stuart J. Alterman and Matthew R.
Dempsky, on the briefs).
Robert S. Garrison, Jr., Deputy Attorney
General argued the cause for respondent
(Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney;
Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General,
of counsel; Paul E. Davis, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner William Westphal (petitioner) appeals from a final
determination of the Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen's
Retirement System (Board) denying his application to file for
accidental disability benefits. Because petitioner was not
adequately notified of the type of benefit being sought on his
behalf, we reverse and remand for the Board to permit petitioner
to amend his application to seek accidental disability benefits,
and decide the application on its merits.
Petitioner was employed as a police officer with the Township
of Gloucester (Township) and was enrolled in the Police & Firemen's
Retirement System (PFRS) as of October 1, 1992. After a fitness
for duty examination in August 2015, the Township found petitioner
was unable to perform his assigned duties because he was totally
and permanently disabled. Thereafter, it passed a resolution
authorizing the filing of an application for involuntary
disability retirement benefits on petitioner's behalf.
On November 18, 2015, the Township filed the application as
authorized, seeking a retirement date of December 1, 2015, and a
retirement type of involuntary ordinary disability. That same
day, petitioner received notification the application had been
filed.
On November 19, 2015, the Division of Pension and Benefits
(Division) wrote a letter to petitioner informing him the Township
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had filed an application on his behalf for disability benefits.
The letter informed petitioner he could view the application and
make changes through the Member Benefits Online System (MBOS), and
provided instructions to access the MBOS. The letter further
informed petitioner of the thirty-day deadline, provided under
N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.10, to "contest the involuntary disability
retirement application." Petitioner took no action by December
18, 2015, the expiration of the thirty-day period, and the Division
began to process his application.
On January 18, 2016, petitioner filed an application for
accidental disability benefits effective as of December 1, 2015.
However, because the application submitted by the Township was in
process, and the thirty-day window for petitioner to contest that
application had passed, the Division did not process petitioner's
application.
Thereafter, petitioner sent a letter to the Board inquiring
about why his application for accidental disability benefits was
rejected, and asking it to consider the application regardless.
In a March 15, 2016 letter, the Board denied petitioner's
request to change his application to accidental disability
retirement benefits, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.10, because
petitioner did not contest the application by December 18, 2015.
Further, it found the regulations did not allow for an amendment
3 A-4911-15T1
of an application once processed by the Division. Lastly, it
reasoned petitioner was not a "member in service" at the time he
filed his application for accidental disability benefits, and
therefore was ineligible to file under
N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7. As a
result, the Board approved the Township's application for ordinary
disability benefits, which set petitioner's benefits pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6(3).1
In April 2016, petitioner appealed the decision of the Board,
requesting reconsideration of its decision to deny his application
for accidental disability benefits. In May 2016, the Board
reconsidered and reaffirmed its denial of his application.
On June 14, 2016, the Board issued its final administrative
decision denying petitioner's request for accidental disability
benefits for the same reasons laid out in its March 15, 2016
letter. Additionally, the Board noted that in an application for
disability benefits filed by an employer, the employer must submit
a written statement detailing the grounds for the disability
request, and the Township had no intention of amending the
application to provide for accidental disability benefits. The
1
Petitioner is currently receiving benefits equal to fifty-nine
percent of his final compensation, based on twenty-three years of
PFRS service credit. If petitioner had been granted involuntary
accidental disability benefits, he would be entitled to two-thirds
of his annual compensation pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(2)(b).
4 A-4911-15T1
Board made its decision without a hearing in the Office of
Administrative Law.
This appeal followed. On appeal, petitioner contends that
he was not provided with adequate notice of the type of benefits
sought by the Township, thus it was a reasonable mistake for
petitioner to believe the Township filed for accidental disability
benefits, and the failure of the Board to consider this rendered
its final determination arbitrary and capricious. We agree.
"It is settled that [a]n administrative agency's
interpretation of statutes and regulations within its implementing
and enforcing responsibility is ordinarily entitled to our
deference." Ciesla v. N.J. Dep't of Health & Sr. Servs.,
429 N.J.
Super. 127, 148 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Wnuck v. N.J. DMV,
337 N.J. Super. 52, 56 (App. Div. 2001)) (alteration in original). We
will not upset the ultimate determination of an agency unless the
petitioner meets his burden of showing that the agency action was
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it violated
legislative policies expressed or implied in the act governing the
agency. Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv.,
39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963);
see also In re Proposed Quest Academy Charter School,
216 N.J.
370, 385-87 (2013); In re Holy Name Hosp.,
301 N.J. Super. 282,
295 (App. Div. 1997). "Arbitrary and capricious action of
administrative bodies means willful and unreasoning action,
5 A-4911-15T1
without consideration and in disregard of circumstances."
Worthington v. Fauver,
88 N.J. 183, 204 (1982) (citation omitted).
Ultimately, however, an "agency's statutory obligation must
concur with its constitutional obligation." Rivera v. Bd. of
Review,
127 N.J. 578, 587 (1992). Under the United States and New
Jersey Constitutions, no person may be deprived of property or
liberty absent due process of law. Cunningham v. Dep't of Civil
Serv.,
69 N.J. 13, 19 (1975). Such due process requires the state
to provide "notice and an opportunity for hearing appropriate to
the nature of the case." Rivera,
127 N.J. at 583 (citing Mullane
v. Central Hanover B. & T. Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).
Here, the Township filed its application on petitioner's
behalf on November 18, 2015, and informed petitioner by letter
that benefits were being sought on his behalf. The letter also
directed petitioner to view the application through an online
portal system and informed him of a thirty-day window within which
he could contest the application. This thirty-day period expired
on December 18, 2015; it was not until January 18, 2016, that
petitioner filed an application for accidental disability
benefits.
Petitioner argues that the information provided in the
November 19, 2015 letter was insufficient to put him on notice of
the difference between involuntary ordinary disability benefits
6 A-4911-15T1
and involuntary accidental disability benefits. We agree.
Notably, the letter made only one mention of "involuntary ordinary
disability benefits" and never made clear that there are different
types of benefits, which pay different amounts and have different
qualifications. Further, the sentence advising Westphal that he
had thirty days2 to contest the application referred only to the
"involuntary disability retirement application" without regard to
whether it was ordinary or accidental. Petitioner did not contest
his involuntary disability retirement – only the form of it. Thus,
the letter was not sufficient to alert petitioner that he should
be concerned about the form of benefits being sought on his behalf.
Even if a reasonable person in petitioner's position should
have known the kind of benefits sought, Rivera provides that the
allowance for good cause exceptions to such rigid application of
time limitations, as occurred here, "would . . . go a long way
toward protecting due-process rights."
127 N.J. at 590; see Garzon
v. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Labor,
370 N.J. Super. 1, 5-6 (App.
Div. 2004). While petitioner did not submit his application for
accidental disability benefits by the December 18, 2015 deadline,
it was submitted before the original application was finalized.
2
The regulation providing thirty days to contest also refers
only to "involuntary retirement" – not the form of benefits. See
N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.10.
7 A-4911-15T1
It would have caused no prejudice for the Board to permit the
change and consider the application as petitioner desired. Thus,
regardless of the sufficiency of the November 18, 2015 letter, the
Board should have made a good cause exception for petitioner's
application.
Lastly, we do not think that the Board was correct in denying
petitioner's application because he was not a "member in service"
at the time he filed his application for accidental disability
benefits. While petitioner did file his application in January
of 2016 after a retirement date of December 1, 2015, he was still
employed by the Township when the original application was filed
and when he received the letter which provided him with the
inadequate notice. As such, we do not think that this technicality
should bar his application from consideration.
Reversed and remanded for the processing of petitioner's
application for involuntary accidental disability benefits and the
decision of said application on its merits. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
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