THOMAS A. WHELIHAN, ESQUIRE v. DONNA RAIVELY

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                      APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
      Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
        parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.




                                       SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                       APPELLATE DIVISION
                                       DOCKET NO. A-4887-16T3

THOMAS A. WHELIHAN, ESQUIRE,

        Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DONNA RAIVELY,

     Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________________

              Submitted March 12, 2018 – Decided March 15, 2018

              Before Judges Ostrer and Rose.

              On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
              Law Division, Special Civil Part, Cumberland
              County, Docket No. DC-001353-17.

              Donna Raively, appellant pro se.

              The Whelihan Law Firm, LLC, attorneys for
              respondent (Thomas A. Whelihan, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

        Defendant Donna Raively agreed to arbitrate a dispute over

the fee that her attorney, plaintiff Thomas A. Whelihan, sought

for legal services rendered.           After a hearing, see R. 1:20A-3(b),

the District Fee Arbitration Committee entered an award for the
full amount Whelihan sought, $13,557.60.         The Disciplinary Review

Board affirmed the award, by dismissing her appeal.         See R. 1:20A-

3(c).     In a subsequent summary action to enforce the award, see

R. 1:20A-3(e), Whelihan obtained a judgment in that amount, plus

$75 costs, and interest.      Raively appeals from that June 27, 2017

order   of    judgment,   raising   various   contract   defenses   to   her

attorney's fee claim.

     We are constrained to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.             "In

any application for the entry of a judgment in accordance with

[the fee arbitration] rule, no court shall have jurisdiction to

review a fee arbitration committee determination."         R. 1:20A-3(e);

see also In re LiVolsi, 
85 N.J. 576, 601-02 (1981) (stating that

the purpose of limiting appellate rights from fee arbitration

decisions is to control the time and expenses incurred by clients

in resolving fee disputes); Linker v. The Company Car Corp., 
281 N.J. Super. 579, 586 (App. Div. 1995) (finding that Law Division

judge was powerless to review a fee arbitration award).                  Had

plaintiff wanted to retain her full appellate rights, she should

have allowed the fee dispute to proceed to court in the usual

course.      Instead, she surrendered those appellate rights when she

opted for binding fee arbitration.            See R. 1:20A-2(a) ("A fee

arbitration determination is final and binding upon the parties

except as provided by R. 1:20A-3(c).").

                                      2                             A-4887-16T3
Appeal dismissed.




                    3   A-4887-16T3