JORDANAELROM v. ELAD ELROM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                      APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
      Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
        parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.



                                       SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                       APPELLATE DIVISION
                                       DOCKET NO. A-4582-15T3

JORDANA ELROM,

        Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ELAD ELROM,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________

              Submitted February 1, 2018 – Decided February 20, 2018

              Before Judges Haas and Rothstadt.

              On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
              Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County,
              Docket No. FM-02-2214-11.

              Elad Elrom, appellant pro se.

              Ceconi   &  Cheifetz,   LLC,  attorneys   for
              respondent (Lizanne J. Ceconi, of counsel and
              on the brief; Christina V. Kolevich, on the
              brief).

PER CURIAM

        In this post-judgment matrimonial matter, defendant appeals

from the Family Part's April 29, 2016 order entered by Judge Bonnie
Mizdol.1     In this order, the judge, among other things: (1) denied

defendant's application for relief from a prior order under Rule

4:50-1; (2) denied defendant's request to escrow the children's

passports; (3) required defendant to pay plaintiff $503 per week

in   child      support;   and   (4)    found    defendant    in     violation    of

litigant's rights for his failure to secure a life insurance policy

to   secure      his   support    obligations.       The     judge    rendered     a

comprehensive oral opinion summarizing her findings of fact and

conclusions of law.         Based upon our review of the record and the

applicable law, we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed

by Judge Mizdol.        We add the following brief comments.

      The scope of our review of the Family Part's order is limited.

We owe substantial deference to the Family Part's findings of fact

because of that court's special expertise in family matters.

Cesare     v.   Cesare,    
154 N.J.   394,    411-12   (1998).       Thus,   "[a]

reviewing court should uphold the factual findings undergirding



1
   Defendant also challenges the trial court's June 1, 2016 order
denying without prejudice his motion to reconsider the April 29,
2016 order because defendant's motion did not comply with Rule
5:5-4(a), Rule 4:5-4(b), and Rule 4:49-2. However, the June 1,
2016 order was interlocutory as it did not foreclose further
litigation by defendant before the trial court. Accordingly, it
was not final or appealable as of right under Rule 2:2-3(a)(1).
Nevertheless, we have considered defendant's arguments concerning
the court's denial of the motion for reconsideration, and conclude
they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

                                         2                                 A-4582-15T3
the trial court's decision if they are supported by adequate,

substantial and credible evidence on the record."     MacKinnon v.

MacKinnon, 
191 N.J. 240, 253-54 (2007) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth

& Family Servs. v. M.M., 
189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)) (alteration in

original).

     While we owe no special deference to the judge's legal

conclusions, Manalapan Realty v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 
140 N.J.
 366, 378 (1995), we "'should not disturb the factual findings and

legal conclusions of the trial judge unless . . . convinced that

they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the

competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend

the interests of justice' or when we determine the court has

palpably abused its discretion." Parish v. Parish, 
412 N.J. Super.
 39, 47 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Cesare, 
154 N.J. at 412).        We

will only reverse the judge's decision when it is necessary to

"'ensure that there is not a denial of justice' because the family

court's 'conclusions are [] "clearly mistaken" or "wide of the

mark."'"     Id. at 48 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs.

v. E.P., 
196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)) (alteration in original).

     Applying these principles, defendant's arguments concerning

the April 29, 2016 order reveal nothing "so wide of the mark" that

we could reasonably conclude that a clear mistake was made by the

judge.   The record amply supports Judge Mizdol's factual findings

                                  3                        A-4582-15T3
and,   in   light   of   those   findings,   her   legal   conclusions   are

unassailable.

       Affirmed.




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