B.J.P. v. K.F.W.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                      APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
      Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
        parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.




                                       SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                       APPELLATE DIVISION
                                       DOCKET NO. A-3794-16T1

B.J.P.,

        Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

K.F.W. and M.P.-W.,

     Defendants-Respondents.
__________________________________

              Submitted May 14, 2018 – Decided May 24, 2018

              Before Judges Sabatino, Rose and Firko.

              On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
              Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic
              County, Docket No. FD-16-1237-10.

              B.J.P., appellant pro se.

              Respondents have not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

        Plaintiff BJP appeals from the April 21, 2017 Family Part

order     entered    after    the   trial   judge    conducted    an    in   camera

interview       of   N.P.1,    plaintiff's      granddaughter,         and   denied



1
  We use initials to protect the privacy interests of the parties.
R. 1:38-3(d)(9).
grandparent visitation.   We affirm substantially for the reasons

set forth in the comprehensive written decision rendered by Judge

Sohail Mohammed.

     The parties are familiar with the procedural history and

facts of this case and, therefore, they will not be repeated in

detail here.2

     In her brief on appeal, plaintiff argues:

          POINT I:

          THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING GRANDPARENT
          VISITATION BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND N.P.       IN
          FACT, 
N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1(A)(B) AND (C) WERE
          PROVEN BY A PREPONDERANCE [SIC] OF EVIDENCE
          AND TRIAL TESTIMONY. GRANDPARENT VISITATION
          WAS EXPLICITLY PERMITTED BY BIOLOGICAL PARENTS
          EXERCISING THEIR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.       THE
          CUSTODIANS AND THE LOWER COURT IS NOT
          UPHOLDING THE BIOLOGICAL PARENTS' FUNDAMENTAL
          CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

          POINT II:

          THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN PROTOCOL FOR THE IN
          CAMERA INTERVIEW OF THE CHILD.          PROPER
          PROCEDURES WERE NOT FOLLOWED SUCH AS HAVING A
          FAMILY COURT JUDGE TO CONDUCT THE INTERVIEW,
          NOT GIVING REASONS FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL
          QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY COUNSEL THAT WAS
          DENIED, NOT DISCLOSING PROTOCOL STATEMENT IN
          DECISION, AND NOT DISQUALIFYING ONESELF BEFORE
          INTERVIEW FOR A FAMILY JUDGE TO CONDUCT

2
  The chronology is set forth in this court's unpublished opinion
entered on January 31, 2017 in which we remanded and directed the
trial court to conduct an in camera interview of N.P., pursuant
to Rule 5:8-6. We incorporate, by reference, the facts stated in
our prior opinion to the extent they are consistent with those
developed on remand.

                                2                          A-3794-16T1
            INTERVIEW    AND   ALSO       FOR    IMPARTIALITY      TO
            PREVAIL.

            POINT III:

            THE COURT BELOW'S FAILURE TO CONDUCT AN IN
            CAMERA INTERVIEW OF THE CHILD TWO YEARS AGO
            AND THE DELAY HAS AFFECTED THE CHILD'S
            RESPONSES IN THE INTERVIEW HELD MARCH 24,
            2017. THE COURT BELOW (NOT HAVING A FAMILY
            JUDGE PRESIDING OVER THE INTERVIEW) ERRED TO
            SEE THAT THE NEGATIVE RESPONSES WERE DUE TO
            DURESS AND UNDUE INFLUENCES AND THE FEAR OF
            PUNISHMENT.   PUNISHMENT THAT THE AUNT AND
            UNCLE TESTIFIED WAS BESTOWED UPON N.P. AFTER
            N.P. CONTACTED HER GRANDMOTHER.

       "The scope of appellate review of a trial court's fact-finding

function is limited.      The general rule is that findings by the

trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate,

substantial, credible evidence."          Cesare v. Cesare, 
154 N.J. 394,

411-12 (1998).    Moreover, "[b]ecause of the family courts' special

jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, appellate courts

should accord deference to family court fact finding."                        Id. at

413.   An appellate court should intervene only when convinced that

the trial judge's factual findings and legal conclusions "are so

manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent,

relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interest

of justice." Id. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v.

Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 
65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).               Furthermore,

"[a]   trial   court's   interpretation         of   the   law   and    the     legal


                                      3                                       A-3794-16T1
consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to

any special deference," and this court review questions of law de

novo.   See Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 
140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) (citations omitted).

     Turning to the issues raised by plaintiff, we begin with the

in camera interview of N.P.3      We note that it was extensive and

took approximately forty-five minutes.        Judge Mohammed found N.P.

"was adamant that she did not want the plaintiff to be granted

visitation."   He found her to be "competent, intelligent, and not

under any undue influence."       Judge Mohammed further stated the

court is "clearly convinced that the child made her preferences

clear and her preferences are against any visitation at this time."

     Judge Mohammed further noted the child had a "calm demeanor."

"She answered each question confidently and with age appropriate

vocabulary, she did not appear to be in any distress . . . . "

Saliently,   "the   responses   did   not   appear   to   be   suggestive."

Moreover, Judge Mohammed asked the questions in an open-ended

fashion so as not to provoke a tainted response.

     N.P. spoke "positively" to the judge about her life.             As to

the purpose of the interview, she responded, "I assume because of



3
  The interview was conducted in 2017 in accordance with Rule 5:8-
6. N.P. is now sixteen years old and she will become seventeen
years old in June 2018.

                                      4                             A-3794-16T1
my grandmother."          When pressed about plaintiff's desire to see

her, N.P. responded, "I don't think it's a good idea." She further

added she felt that way, "because [B.J.P.] has a history of not

being good, not acting in my best interest, manipulating, and

lying    to   me."      Judge      Mohammed    set    forth    specific    examples

substantiating N.P.'s position.

     The parties were appropriately permitted to submit questions

for N.P. to Judge Mohammed.            Judge Mohammed gave reasons for not

asking   certain      proposed      questions      submitted    by   plaintiff       as

"inappropriate to ask during the interview or were outside the

scope    of    N.P.'s     knowledge."         After    assessing     the   proposed

questions, the judge appropriately exercised his discretion in

choosing what to ask N.P.

     Judge Mohammed denied plaintiff's application for visitation.

His decision is plainly supported by substantial credible evidence

in the record and the applicable law.                 Plaintiff has not met her

burden by a preponderance of the evidence that the denial of

parenting time would result in harm to N.P.                See 
N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1;

see also Troxel v. Granville, 
530 U.S. 57 (2000); Major v. Maguire,


224 N.J. 1 (2016); and Moriarty v. Bradt, 
177 N.J. 84 (2003).

     Applying        these    principles,     we     are   satisfied   that     Judge

Mohammed      conducted      the   meticulous      investigation     required      and



                                         5                                    A-3794-16T1
properly denied plaintiff's application for the reasons set forth

in his thorough opinion.

     Plaintiff's remaining arguments, including her claim that the

matter should have been remanded to a different judge, are without

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.      R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(A) and (E).

     Affirmed.




                                6                          A-3794-16T1