MICHAELWATTS v. TOWNSHIP OF WEST ORANGE, WEST ORANGE POLICE CHIEF JAMES P ABBOTT, ACTING WEST ORANGE POLICE DIRECTOR ROBERT D. PARISI WEST ORANGE CAPTAIN MICHAEL CORCORAN, WEST ORANGE POLICE LIEUTENANT THOMAS MONTESION WEST ORANGE POLICE SERGEANTS KEVI
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APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3420-15T2
MICHAEL WATTS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TOWNSHIP OF WEST ORANGE, WEST
ORANGE POLICE CHIEF JAMES P.
ABBOTT, ACTING WEST ORANGE
POLICE DIRECTOR ROBERT D. PARISI,
WEST ORANGE CAPTAIN MICHAEL
CORCORAN, WEST ORANGE POLICE
LIEUTENANT THOMAS MONTESION,
WEST ORANGE POLICE SERGEANTS
KEVIN BOLAN, KEVIN DALGAUER,
ROBERT HARTMAN, WILLIAM VARANELLI
and ROBERT MARTIN, WEST ORANGE
POLICE OFFICERS THOMAS BARBELLA
and CHRISTOPHER JACKSIC,
Defendants-Respondents.
_____________________________________
Argued November 15, 2017 – Decided February 20, 2018
Before Judges Fuentes, Koblitz and Manahan.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-5544-
12.
Michael Confusione argued the cause for
appellant (Hegge & Confusione, LLC, and The
Maglione Firm, attorneys; Michael Confusione,
Dean R. Maglione and Elizabeth Bolan, of
counsel and on the brief).
Mark Y. Moon argued the cause for respondents
Township of West Orange, Chief James P. Abbott
and Mayor Robert D. Parisi (Trenk, DiPasquale,
Della Fera & Sodono, PC, attorneys; Richard
D. Trenk and Mark Y. Moon, of counsel and on
the brief).
Alex J. Keoskey argued the cause for
respondents West Orange Captain Michael
Corcoran, West Orange Police Lieutenant Thomas
Montesion, West Orange Police Sergeants Kevin
Bolan, Kevin Dalgauer, Robert Hartman, William
Varanelli and Robert Martin, West Orange
Police Officers Thomas Barbella and
Christopher Jacksic (DeCotiis, FitzPatrick &
Cole, LLP, attorneys; Alex J. Keoskey, of
counsel; Amanda E. Miller, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Michael Watts appeals an order granting summary
judgment in favor of the Township of West Orange (the Township)
and the individual defendants.1 We affirm.
I.
Plaintiff was employed as a police officer with the West
Orange Police Department (Department) from January 22, 2002
through December 26, 2012. During his employment, plaintiff was
the subject of numerous internal affairs (IA) investigations. In
1
The Township, Chief Abbott, Mayor Parisi are represented by
Trenk DiPasquale, Della Fera & Sodono, P.C., and the remaining
individual defendants are represented by DeCotiis, Fitzpatrick &
Cole, LLP. While they submit separate briefs, they acknowledge
that their procedural history and statement of facts are identical.
2 A-3420-15T2
some cases the charges lodged against plaintiff were sustained and
in other cases the charges were not sustained. As a consequence
of the sustained charges, plaintiff was disciplined. The
discipline included several suspensions, remedial training, and
job transfers.
We take the following facts from the record in a light most
favorable to plaintiff. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,
142 N.J.
520 (1995). In early 2011, plaintiff and other officers were
advised that the Township was initiating a restructuring of the
police department. The restructuring resulted in the lay off or
demotion of officers in March 2011. Plaintiff alleged that on
several occasions in February 2011 during patrol line-ups,
supervisors advised officers not to issue summonses or arrest
people, stating those essential functions financially supported
the Township.
On July 22, 2011, plaintiff advised Captain Corcoran of an
alleged "work stoppage scheme" to be carried out by members of the
police department. Plaintiff alleged that he had been "ordered
by certain supervisors not to take any proactive police actions
while on duty." Plaintiff further alleged that "he has been
singled out recently and given tasks/assignments by supervisors
and central communication solely to keep him busy and out of
service and that he has been subjected to a hostile work
3 A-3420-15T2
environment on different dates by different personnel for
attempting to perform his duties." The Department initiated an
IA investigation based on plaintiff's allegations.
On July 12, 2012, an IA investigation report was generated.
The report stated that 101 agency members and one former agency
member were interviewed in connection with the alleged work
stoppage scheme, as well as six potential civilian witnesses
outside the agency. None of those interviewed had knowledge of,
directed, or participated in a work stoppage scheme. The report
concluded plaintiff's allegations were unfounded. Subsequent to
the report's issuance, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking relief
pursuant to the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA),
N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14.
Plaintiff then filed a first amended complaint. The amended
complaint asserted claims under: (1) CEPA; (2) breach of contract;
(3) implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) negligent
infliction of emotional distress; and (5) intentional infliction
of emotional distress.
On August 6, 2012, Sergeant Varanelli prepared a memorandum
to Lieutenant Levens, in accordance with the Attorney General
Guidelines on Internal Affair Policy and Procedures,2 regarding
2
www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide/internalaffairs2000v1_2.pdf.
4 A-3420-15T2
his belief that plaintiff was unfit for duty, and requested a
medical and psychological evaluation be conducted on plaintiff.
In September 2012, the mayor's office received a complaint
from a resident regarding an interaction with plaintiff. The
resident described plaintiff as a "bully officer." The complaint
resulted in an IA investigation of plaintiff's "demeanor/improper
conduct." In late May 2013, the IA investigation was
administratively closed.
Thereafter, Lieutenant Thomas Montesion filed a partial
motion to dismiss the first amended complaint in lieu of an answer.
R. 4:6-2(e). The Township also filed to join in the partial motion
to dismiss. In September 2012, the Township filed to join in
Montesion's partial motion to dismiss. Soon after, defendants
Thomas Montesion, Kevin Bolen, Kevin Dalgauer, Robert Hartman,
Robert Martin, Thomas Barbella, and Christopher Jacksic filed an
amended notice of motion for partial dismissal of the plaintiff's
first complaint. On September 28, 2012, the motion and the amended
motion were granted, dismissing counts four (breach of contract);
five (implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); six
(negligent infliction of emotional distress); and seven
(intentional infliction of emotional distress) of the first
amended complaint.
5 A-3420-15T2
In early October 2012, Sergeant John Morella reported that
while on duty, plaintiff referred to a firehouse tower stating,
"Wow, this is a great place to pick people off, I miss being behind
a scope of a rifle." According to Morella, plaintiff also said:
Did you know there is a perfect spot at
the top of 80 Main [Street] to pick people off
from the rear of headquarters, but don’t worry
you are not on that list. I will call you and
tell you to call out sick the day that I do
it and I will call Rolli too.
On October 5, 2012, the Township issued a Preliminary Notice
of Disciplinary Action (PNDA) based on plaintiff's statements as
reported by Morella. Pursuant to this notice, plaintiff was
suspended pending final disposition and charged with violating
N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12), "other sufficient cause" for discipline.
On November 7, 2012, plaintiff underwent a "Fitness for Duty
Psychological Evaluation" conducted by Dr. Betty McLendon. In her
report, dated November 30, 2012, McLendon concluded that plaintiff
was unfit for duty.
The following month, plaintiff received a second PNDA that
notified him that his paid suspension was converted to an unpaid
suspension, effective immediately, pending final disposition.
Plaintiff was charged with one count of inability to perform
duties, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2(a)(3), one count of conduct unbecoming a
6 A-3420-15T2
public employee, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6), and seven counts of
other sufficient cause, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12).
A hearing was conducted on the charges over four days in
January and February 2013 to determine whether there was sufficient
cause to suspend plaintiff without pay. During the pendency of
the hearing, plaintiff's counsel submitted a letter from Grigory
S. Rasin, M.D., which stated that, "as a result of [plaintiff's]
workplace harassment and/or retaliation, he is presently unfit for
duty."
The hearing officer concluded in the March 22, 2013 decision
that plaintiff was unfit for duty. The hearing officer also
concluded that the violations of workplace violence and uniform
standards of conduct independently support a decision to remove
plaintiff from his position. On April 1, 2013, the Township issued
a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action, which terminated plaintiff.
On August 30, 2013, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint
against defendants that included one count of an alleged violation
of CEPA. Defendants filed an answer.
Following extensive discovery, defendants collectively moved
for summary judgment.
3 On November 16, 2015, the trial court held
3
At plaintiff's request, discovery was extended seven times.
7 A-3420-15T2
oral argument, after which Judge Garry J. Furnari concluded that
there were unresolved issues. A trial date was set for March.
On December 18, 2015, defendants submitted supplemental
briefs. Oral argument was heard on March 23, 2016. After oral
argument, the judge issued an oral decision granting summary
judgment in favor of all defendants. An order was entered
dismissing the complaint.
II.
On appeal, plaintiff raises the following arguments under one
point heading:
[POINT I]
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING
PLAINTIFF'S CEPA CLAIMS AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A. The trial court erred in limiting
the adverse actions a jury can find
to only plaintiff's termination.
B. The trial court contravened New
Jersey law by ruling that the
adverse employment actions taken
against plaintiff by his
supervisors and co-policemen could
not be imputed to the Township of
West Orange.
C. A reasonable jury can find that
defendants' explanation for the
adverse employment actions taken
against plaintiff are unworthy of
credence and mere pretext for the
actual reason: to retaliate against
8 A-3420-15T2
plaintiff for his whistleblowing
activities.
D. The motivation of the individual
defendants, or whether the acts
taken were against the "interests"
of the defendant employer, is not a
requirement of a CEPA claim and not
ground on which to dismiss
plaintiff's claim.
E. Even disregarding the individual
retaliatory acts taken against
plaintiff by his supervisors and co-
workers, the defendant Township's
failure to investigate plaintiff's
complaints of retaliation and stop
the continued harassment against
him is affirmative indifference
that also constitutes adverse
employment action prohibited by
CEPA.
F. The trial court erred in
dismissing plaintiff's CEPA claims
against the individual defendants.
Our review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo, applying
the same standards that governed the trial court. Henry v. N.J.
Dep't of Human Servs.,
204 N.J. 320, 330 (2010). Summary judgment
must be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2. Having considered the
record in light of our standard of review, we affirm substantially
9 A-3420-15T2
for the reasons set forth in Judge Furnari's comprehensive oral
opinion. We add the following.
III.
Plaintiff argues that the judge erred when he dismissed the
CEPA claims. It is well-settled that CEPA is designed to "prevent
retaliation against those employees who object to employer conduct
that they reasonably believe to be unlawful or indisputably
dangerous to the public health, safety or welfare." Mehlman v.
Mobil Oil Corp.,
153 N.J. 163, 193-94 (1998); see also
N.J.S.A.
34:19-3. "[T]he offensive activity must pose a threat of public
harm, not merely private harm or harm only to the aggrieved
employee." Mehlman,
153 N.J. at 188.
"CEPA is designed to protect employees who blow the whistle
on illegal or unethical activity committed by their employers or
co-employees." Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc.,
164 N.J. 598, 609-
10 (2000). "So viewed, CEPA is remedial legislation. Consequently,
courts should construe CEPA liberally to achieve its remedial
purpose." Id. at 610 (citations omitted). "CEPA prohibits an
employer from taking 'retaliatory action' against an employee for
protected conduct." Maimone v. Atl. City,
188 N.J. 221, 235 (2006)
(quoting
N.J.S.A. 34:19-3). CEPA defines a "retaliatory action"
as "the discharge, suspension or demotion of an employee, or other
adverse employment action taken against an employee in the terms
10 A-3420-15T2
and conditions of employment." Ibid. (quoting
N.J.S.A. 34:19-
2(e)). An adverse employment action is not limited to a demotion,
suspension or discharge and need not result in a loss of pay. Id.
at 236. "Many separate but relatively minor instances of behavior
directed against an employee . . . may . . . combine to make up a
pattern of retaliatory behavior." Green v. Jersey City Bd. of
Ed.,
177 N.J. 434, 448 (2003).
To establish a cognizable CEPA claim, the Supreme Court
determined that an employee must prove:
(1) he or she reasonably believed that his or
her employer's conduct was violating either a
law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant
to law, or a clear mandate of public policy;
(2) he or she performed a "whistle-blowing"
activity described in
N.J.S.A. 34:19- 3(c);
(3) an adverse employment action was taken
against him or her; and
(4) a causal connection exists between the
whistle-blowing activity and the adverse
employment action.
[Dzwonar v. McDevitt,
177 N.J. 451, 462
(2003).]
The judge found that plaintiff established the first element
of the CEPA claim.
In this case, plaintiff alleges that the
officers of the Township of Orange [sic] were
engaged in work stoppage scheme by refusing
to issue summonses and make arrests in an
effort to protest the Township's recent budget
11 A-3420-15T2
cuts. Plaintiff testified that on several
occasions parole supervisors [sic] ordered him
and other police officers not to engage in
motor vehicles stops or arrests.
In addition, plaintiff was aware that
prior to the proposal going into [] effect,
collective bargaining unions, officers, and
supervisors of the police publicly voiced
their objection to the proposal. As
demonstrated by the Maimone case, an
intentional refusal to engage in law
enforcement could be detrimental to the safety
of the community and, if true, could violate
a clear mandate of public policy.
Notwithstanding the argument that it
wasn’t the Township doing it, I'm reminded of
the Higgins[4] case where it was another
employee who was involved in doing something
illegal. But [] for this prong it would be
sufficient under any circumstance that such a
report -- it appears to be sufficient --
evidence to establish a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether or not the
plaintiff could have reasonably believed that
-- in this work stoppage scheme and that it
violated the law. So plaintiff has satisfied
the first element.
Concerning the second element of plaintiff's CEPA claim, the
judge stated:
In this case, [] the parties dispute at
length each element of the CEPA claim, except
for element two, that the plaintiff performed
a whistle[-]blowing activity. At least in the
initial briefing, defendants [did] not dispute
that the plaintiff's initiation of the
Internal Affairs investigation and his
reporting of the alleged workplace stoppage
4
Higgins v. Pascack Valley Hosp.,
158 N.J. 404, 424 (1999).
12 A-3420-15T2
constituted a whistle[-]blowing activity
within the meaning of the statute.
. . . .
For purposes of element two, all that is
necessary is [for] plaintiff to show that he
performed an activity that constitutes a
whistle[-]blowing within the meaning of the
statute, i.e. providing information to or
testifying before a public body investigating
an alleged violation of law.
Here, it is undisputed that the plaintiff
initiated an Internal Affairs investigation,
which clearly fits the definition. Therefore,
the [c]ourt concludes that the plaintiff has
established the second element.
The third element, whether there was retaliatory action taken
against plaintiff by defendants, was in dispute. Under CEPA, a
retaliatory action is defined as "the discharge, suspension or
demotion of an employee, or other adverse employment action taken
against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment."
N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(e). "Adverse employment action" is broadly
defined in light of the remedial purposes of the statute and may
include such things as "making false accusations of misconduct,
giving negative performance reviews, issuing an unwarranted
suspension, and requiring pretextual mental-health evaluations."
Donelson v. DuPont Chambers Works,
206 N.J. 243, 257-58 (2011).
It need not take the form of a single discrete action, but can be
"many separate but relatively minor instances of behavior directed
13 A-3420-15T2
against an employee that may not be actionable individually but
that combine to make up a pattern of retaliatory conduct." Green,
177 N.J. at 448.
However, "not everything that makes an employee unhappy is
an actionable adverse action." Cokus v. Bristol Myers Squibb Co.,
362 N.J. Super. 366, 378 (Law Div. 2002) (citation omitted). "[I]n
order to be actionable, an allegedly retaliatory act must be
'sufficiently severe or pervasive to have altered plaintiff's
conditions of employment in an important and material manner.'"
El-Sioufi v. St. Peter's Univ. Hosp.,
382 N.J. Super. 145, 176
(App. Div. 2005) (quoting Cokus, 362 N.J. Super. at 386).
Incidents that cause a "bruised ego or injured pride," Beasley v.
Passaic County,
377 N.J. Super. 585, 607 (App. Div. 2005), Klein
v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey,
377 N.J.
Super. 28, 46 (App. Div. 2005), or that make an employee's job
"mildly unpleasant" but do not have a substantial impact on the
terms and conditions of employment, Hancock v. Borough of Oaklyn,
347 N.J. Super. 350, 360, (App. Div. 2002), are insufficient to
prove actionable retaliation.
With these principles in mind, based on the review of the
judge's thorough examination of plaintiff's allegations of
retaliation, we agree that plaintiff's termination would
constitute the only actionable conduct.
14 A-3420-15T2
Preliminarily, the judge found that the parties "conceded
that the decision to terminate plaintiff's employment is a
retaliatory action under CEPA." The remaining alleged adverse
employment acts were aptly summarized by the court as follows: (1)
insults and demeaning statements; (2) disclosure of plaintiff's
participation in the IA investigation; (3) false charges and
accusations; (4) loss of overtime opportunity; (5) poor
performance evaluations; and (6) failure to transfer.
Workplace conflict alone does not constitute retaliation, as
embarrassing and unpleasant as it may be. Beasley,
377 N.J. Super.
at 607; Klein,
37 N.J. Super. at 46; Hancock,
347 N.J. Super. at
360. Furthermore, filing a CEPA complaint does not insulate an
employee from ordinary supervision. See Higgins,
158 N.J. at 424
(holding CEPA does not insulate an employee from "discharge or
other disciplinary action for reasons unrelated to the
complaint").
Here, plaintiff's complaints of "insults and demeaning
statements" do not rise to the level of retaliation. Plaintiff's
particular complaints are more appropriately characterized as the
sort that result in "a bruised ego or injured pride on the part
of the employee," which are not actionable. Klein,
377 N.J. Super.
at 46. "To reiterate, employment discrimination laws are 'not
intended to be a "general civility" code for conduct in the
15 A-3420-15T2
workplace.'" Cokus,
362 N.J. Super. at 383 (quoting Heitzman v.
Monmouth Cty.,
321 N.J. Super. 133, 147 (App. Div. 1999)).
Moreover, as the court noted, an employer's alleged failure to
maintain a complaining employee's anonymity [does] not rise to an
adverse employment action. Id. at 381-82.
Plaintiff's contention that the "false charges and
accusations" against him were without merit is refuted by the
discovery record. Specifically, plaintiff does not and did not
dispute that he made the alarming statements to Morella. These
undisputed statements alone would form a sustainable basis for his
termination.
Where the affected party does not deny
committing an infraction that resulted in
discipline, the discipline cannot be
considered "proscribed reprisal." Cf.
Esposito v. [Twp.] of Edison, 306 N.J. Super.
280, 291 (App. Div. 1997) (dealing with the
LAD), certif. denied,
156 N.J. 384 (1998).
When plaintiffs are afforded a hearing and
represented by counsel, plaintiffs "cannot
claim that . . . substantiated disciplinary
charges and resulting brief suspensions from
work [are] retaliatory." Hancock v. Borough
of Oaklyn,
347 N.J. Super. 350, 361 (App. Div.
2002), appeal dismissed as improvidently
granted,
177 N.J. 217 (2003). It would
require a strong showing to "transmute [a]
defense to the disciplinary charges into an
affirmative CEPA claim." McLelland v. Moore,
343 N.J. Super. 589, 608 (App. Div. 2001),
certif. denied,
171 N.J. 43 (2002).
[Beasley,
377 N.J. Super. at 607.]
16 A-3420-15T2
We also agree with the judge that plaintiff failed to
demonstrate that the failure to transfer plaintiff to a new unit
constituted an adverse employment action. To the contrary, as the
judge found, "the Township addressed plaintiff's concern by
attempting to separate plaintiff and Sergeant Bolen."
Concerning plaintiff's allegations of lost overtime
opportunity and poor performance evaluations, the judge noted
that, facially, the allegations "could constitute an adverse
employment action, because they may affect the terms and conditions
of [] plaintiff's employment." See Beasley,
377 N.J. Super. at
608. Here, plaintiff alleged that he was denied overtime on three
occasions. The judge found that the record as a whole did not
support plaintiff's claims:
For example, plaintiff alleges that Sergeant
Bolen retaliated against [him] by giving him
a two/five on his performance evaluation for
acceptance of feedback. However, the record
also reflects that the evaluation contained a
total of [twenty-nine] categories of observed
behaviors for which plaintiff receive above
average or superior scores.
Viewing this evaluation as a whole, no
reasonable juror could conclude or could label
this evaluation as negative merely because the
plaintiff scored below average in one category
out of [twenty-nine].
. . . .
Similarly, plaintiff alleges that he was
denied overtime hours on three occasions, yet
17 A-3420-15T2
plaintiff merely points to three specific
dates while ignoring the record as a whole
which shows that during 2011 plaintiff was
hired for thirteen overtime jobs until his
transfer to the Special Investigations on
November 12, 2011.
At the time of plaintiff's transfer, only
five other patrol officers had more overtime
hires than the plaintiff in 2011. In fact,
by the time of his transfer, plaintiff has the
sixth most overtime hours of all [sixty-seven]
officers listed.
We agree. Except for plaintiff's termination, the other
alleged acts of retaliation would not constitute a material change
in the conditions of plaintiff's employment as to be actionable
under CEPA. However, that plaintiff established that he was
subjected to an adverse employment action by his termination, does
not alone satisfy the fourth element.
An employee who claims retaliation under
N.J.S.A. 34:19-3
must demonstrate "a causal connection exists between the whistle-
blowing activity and the adverse employment action." Dzwonar,
177 N.J. at 462. The causal connection "can be satisfied by inferences
that the trier of fact may reasonably draw based on circumstances
surrounding the employment action." Maimone,
188 N.J. at 237. In
drawing inferences from an employer's actions that a plaintiff
claims to have been retaliatory, a factfinder takes into
consideration whether those actions were based on permissible
reasons. Bowles v. City of Camden,
993 F. Supp. 255, 265 (D.N.J.
18 A-3420-15T2
1998). In doing so, the factfinder may consider any
"inconsistencies" or "anomalies" that cast doubt on the employer's
credibility, and raise an inference that the employer did not act
for the reasons it stated. Ibid.
As noted above, plaintiff does not dispute, and in fact
agrees, that he was terminated from his employment because he was
mentally unfit for duty.
In Donelson, the Court held:
an "adverse employment action" is taken
against an employee engaged in protected
activity when an employer targets him for
reprisals — making false accusations of
misconduct, giving negative performance
reviews, issuing an unwarranted suspension,
and requiring pre-textual mental-health
evaluations — causing the employee to suffer
a mental breakdown and rendering him unfit for
continued employment. See
N.J.S.A. 34:19-
2(e).
[
206 N.J. at 258.]
Plaintiff posits that he was subjected to this type of adverse
employment action that caused his depression and anxiety which
resulted in his unfitness for duty. In rejecting this argument,
the judge stated that "plaintiff does not get the benefit of the
argument that he was rendered unfit for duty because of his mental
condition as the plaintiff did in Donelson" because he did not
establish a separate adverse employment action. Again, we agree.
19 A-3420-15T2
Given our standard of review and providing plaintiff with all
favorable inferences drawn from the discovery record, we conclude
that, unlike in Donelson, plaintiff was not subjected by his
employer to false accusations of misconduct, unwarranted negative
performance reviews, unwarranted suspensions or pre-textual
mental-health examinations. As such, plaintiff did not satisfy
the fourth element and the judge correctly rejected his claim of
a violation of CEPA. Dzwonar,
177 N.J. at 462.
IV.
Finally, we conclude that plaintiff's remaining arguments,
not specifically addressed herein, lack sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
20 A-3420-15T2
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