STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. HENRY W. GRANDERSON

Annotate this Case
RECORD IMPOUNDED

                        NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                      APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
      Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
        parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.




                                       SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                       APPELLATE DIVISION
                                       DOCKET NO. A-3415-15T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

        Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

HENRY W. GRANDERSON, a/k/a
MUHAMMAD BILAH,

        Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________

              Submitted December 19, 2017 – Decided January 25, 2018

              Before Judges Gilson and Mayer.

              On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
              Law Division, Hudson County, Indictment No.
              14-01-0154.

              Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
              for appellant (John Douard, Assistant Deputy
              Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

              Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
              attorney for respondent (Sarah C. Hunt, Deputy
              Attorney General, of counsel and on the
              brief).

PER CURIAM

        Defendant Henry Granderson appeals from his conviction for

sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, and endangering the
welfare of a child.         Defendant also appeals his sentence.             We

affirm.

       Sally1 was seven years old when she began taking music lessons

with defendant at his home studio.              Sally's mom, Diane, would

occasionally leave Sally with defendant to run errands during

Sally's lesson. According to Sally, during her third music lesson,

defendant started "hugging [her] and trying to pick [her] up.              And

then   he   put   his   hands   under   [her]   pants,   and   through   [her]

underwear, . . . started touching her butt." Defendant instructed

Sally not to tell anyone about his behavior, including Sally's

mother.

       Defendant continued his sexual assaults on Sally weekly for

the next two years.       During the trial, Sally recounted instances

of defendant's abuse, including defendant instructing Sally to

squeeze his penis, putting his mouth on Sally's "private," licking

"her private part," and inserting his finger and penis into Sally's

"butt and . . . private part."

       On January 5, 2013, Diane took Sally and Sally's younger

sister to defendant's home for Sally's music lesson.                     Diane

returned to defendant's home about twenty-five minutes later. When

Diane returned, she noticed Sally was not in the studio where


1
  We use pseudonyms to protect the privacy interests of the victim
and her family. R. 1:38-3(d)(10).

                                        2                            A-3415-15T2
defendant conducted his music lessons.              Nor did Diane hear music

being played in defendant's home.             When Diane left defendant's

house with her children, she discovered that defendant gave Sally

two dollars and a violin.          Diane was uncomfortable with the gifts

given by defendant to Sally.          Diane then asked Sally "if anything

happened."      Sally told her mother that defendant sexually abused

her.

       The same day, Diane took Sally to the emergency room at a

local hospital, and then to another hospital where Sally could be

examined by a sexual assault nurse examiner.             On January 6, 2013,

at 12:10 a.m., Nurse Bonnie C. Rogers performed a pediatric assault

examination.     Nurse Rogers collected Sally's clothing, which Sally

had not changed since she left defendant's home, and had them

tested for biological fluids.         The nurse also took "a buccal swab,

a[n] oral swab, a vaginal swab, and an . . . external vaginal

swab."

       The   laboratory     results   from   "inside    the    crotch   area    of

[Sally's]      underwear"    and   the   external    genital    swab    detected

amylase, which occurs "in very high concentrations in saliva."

Sally's underwear also revealed "a Y-STR DNA profile," which did

not exclude defendant "as a possible contributor."

       On January 6, 2013, Detective Paola Bolivar, a Special Victims

Unit   (SVU)    detective,    interviewed    Sally     regarding   the    sexual

                                         3                               A-3415-15T2
assault. The detective employed the RATAC method (rapport, anatomy

identification, touch inquiry, abuse scenario, and closure) during

the interview.       According to the detective, the RATAC method

"allow[s] the victim to provide a narrative [of the abuse] in a

non-leading way."      In the recorded interview,2 the detective used

anatomically detailed male and female dolls and diagrams to "assess

[Sally's] knowledge of the different body parts and also to gain

a common language between [Sally] and [herself]."                Detective

Bolivar also used the dolls to help Sally explain portions of her

narrative that she was unable to express with specificity through

her choice of words.

     Prior    to    trial,    the   prosecutor   requested   permission      to

introduce statements that Sally made to her mother and Detective

Bolivar related to the sexual assaults.          After a Rule 104 hearing,

the motion judge barred the prosecution's use of Sally's statements

to her mother as unreliable.            The motion judge permitted the

prosecution    to    use     Sally's   statements   to   Detective   Bolivar

conditioned on Sally testifying, "in order to satisfy Crawford v.

Washington, [541] U.S. 36 (2004)."

     The trial commenced in September 2015.               On September 25,

2015, defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-


2
  The recorded interview was played at trial as part of the State's
case.

                                        4                            A-3415-15T2
degree aggravated sexual assault, 
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a); two counts

of second-degree sexual assault, 
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b); and two

counts   of    second-degree     endangering   the   welfare    of    a     child,


N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). The judge sentenced defendant to an aggregate

thirty-four-year prison term, subject to the No Early Release Act

(NERA), 
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

       On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:

              POINT I

              THE JUDGE ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE'S MOTION
              TO ADMIT [SALLY'S] DISCLOSURE OF SEXUAL ABUSE
              DURING HER INTERVIEW WITH BOLIVAR, BECAUSE
              BOLIVAR   UTILIZED   THE   HIGHLY   SUGGESTIVE
              TECHNIQUE   OF   DEMONSTRATING    ABUSE   WITH
              ANATOMICALLY ACCURATE PICTURES AND DOLLS.

              POINT II

              THE IMPOSITION OF TWO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES[,]
              EACH ABOVE THE MIDPOINT OF THE FIRST-DEGREE
              RANGE, WITH AN [EIGHTY FIVE PERCENT] PERIOD
              OF PAROLE INELIGIBILITY, WAS EXCESSIVE AND
              BASED ON AN ARBITRARY DIVISION OF THE OFFENSES
              IN THE INDICTMENT.

       We review the trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse

of    discretion.   State   v.    Harris,   
209 N.J.   431,   439       (2012).

"Considerable latitude is afforded a trial court in determining

whether to admit evidence . . . ."          State v. Feaster, 
156 N.J. 1,

82.    A trial court's discretionary decision to admit or exclude

relevant evidence is reversible only if "the trial court palpably

abused its discretion, that is, that its finding was so wide of

                                      5                                   A-3415-15T2
the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted."       State v.

Carter, 
91 N.J. 86, 106 (1982).

     Defendant argues that Sally's statements to Detective Bolivar

fail to satisfy the requirements of N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) because

the statements were unreliable.   N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27), known as the

"tender years exception," provides:

           A statement by a child under the age of
           [twelve]   relating   to   sexual   misconduct
           committed with or against that child is
           admissible in a criminal . . . proceeding
           if[:] (a) the proponent of the statement makes
           known to the adverse party an intention to
           offer the statement and the particulars of the
           statement at such time as to provide the
           adverse party with a fair opportunity to
           prepare to meet it; (b) the court finds, in a
           hearing conducted pursuant to [N.J.R.E.]
           104(a), that on the basis of the time, content
           and circumstances of the statement there is a
           probability that the statement is trustworthy;
           and (c) either (i) the child testifies at the
           proceeding, or (ii) the child is unavailable
           as a witness and there is offered admissible
           evidence corroborating the act of sexual
           abuse; provided that no child whose statement
           is to be offered in evidence pursuant to this
           rule shall be disqualified to be a witness in
           such proceeding by virtue of the requirements
           of [N.J.R.E.] 601.

     To be admissible under the tender years exception, a child's

"statement 'must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its

inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at

trial.'"   State v. Roman, 
248 N.J. Super. 144, 152-53 (App. Div.

1991) (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 
497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990)).     "[I]n

                                  6                         A-3415-15T2
making the determination whether a statement offered under the

Rule is trustworthy, the trial court should evaluate the 'totality

of the circumstances' surrounding the statement."                   State v. Burr,


392 N.J. Super. 538, 569 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Roman, 
248 N.J.

Super. at 152).        The following factors are applied in determining

whether a child's statement is trustworthy: "whether the statement

was made spontaneously, whether the account is repeated with

consistency,     the    mental    state       of   the    declarant,      the   use     of

terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, lack of a motive

to fabricate, use of interrogation, and manipulation by adults."

Id. at 570.

     The judge who conducted the Rule 104 hearing addressed each

of these factors and found:

              Detective Bolivar is an experienced SVU
              detective, trained in forensic interviewing.
              [Sally's] statement primarily was the result
              of non-leading, non-suggestive questioning in
              which   [Sally]   volunteered   the   details
              surrounding      the      alleged      sexual
              assaults. . . . [Sally's mental state at the
              time of the interview] was verbal, well-
              spoken, responsive and bright. In addition,
              [Sally] used age-appropriate terminology in
              her responses to Detective Bolivar's age-
              appropriate forensic interviewing techniques.

     After reviewing the record, we find that the judge did not

abuse   her    discretion    in    determining           that   Sally's    statements

satisfied the requirements of N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) and that the


                                          7                                     A-3415-15T2
prosecution could use Sally's statement conditioned upon Sally

testifying at trial.

      On appeal, defendant argues that Detective Bolivar's use of

anatomically      detailed       diagrams      and    dolls    was    "particularly

suggestive," and this "technique . . . has been criticized for

triggering[]      not     the    child's       veridical      memories,    but       her

imagination."3     Defendant contends that the use of such dolls is

improperly suggestive and has been so declared in other states,

including California.           In support of defendant's effort to change

the law in this State, defendant relies on an article finding the

use of anatomically detailed dolls to be "controversial" and "not

generally      accepted    in     the   scientific       community."           Hollida

Wakefield & Ralph Underwager, The Use of Anatomically Detailed

Dolls in Forensic Interviews, 16 ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE ACCUSATIONS

4 (2006), http://www.ipt-forensics.com/library/jmcraig2.htm.

      There is no evidence in the record to support defendant's

claim that Detective Bolivar's use of anatomically correct dolls

was   overly    suggestive.         Defendant        failed   to     present    expert

testimony during the Rule 104 hearing or at trial explaining the

controversy in the relevant scientific community concerning the



3
   Defendant never claimed that the use of anatomically correct
dolls and diagrams rendered Sally's testimony untrustworthy during
the Rule 104 hearing or at trial.

                                           8                                   A-3415-15T2
use of such dolls.           Thus, the prosecutor was deprived of an

opportunity to present countervailing scientific evidence on the

issue.   Nor did the motion judge have an opportunity to rule on

defendant's challenge to Sally's statements based upon the use of

anatomically correct dolls.

     Defendant      acknowledges        that    New     Jersey   courts     have    not

explicitly    denounced      the    use    of    anatomically      correct      dolls.

However, he argues that another panel of this court expressed

disapproval    of    the   use     of   anatomically       correct    dolls     during

interviews with children alleging sexual abuse.                       See State v.

Michaels, 
264 N.J. Super. 579, 621-24 (App. Div. 1993), aff'd, 
36 N.J. 299 (1994).

     Defendant's reliance on Michaels is misplaced.                        Unlike the

interview    in     Michaels,      Detective      Bolivar    did     not    show    the

anatomically      detailed    dolls       to    Sally    until   Sally      recounted

defendant's sexual abuse.           The record reveals that Sally merely

used the dolls to illustrate parts of her narrative that she could

not explain in words.            Detective Bolivar explicitly told Sally

that the dolls were not for play, but rather to help her understand

Sally's description of her interaction with defendant.4


4
    The following exchange between Sally and Detective Bolivar
highlights how the dolls were used during the interview:



                                           9                                  A-3415-15T2
     We find that the record, including the detective's videotaped

interview with Sally, supports the pretrial judge's assessment as

to the reliability and trustworthiness of Sally's statements.

Based on sufficient, credible evidence in the record, we agree

with the pretrial judge that Sally's statements were admissible.

     We next review whether defendant's sentence was excessive and

based upon an arbitrary division of the offenses.           We "review

sentencing   determinations   in    accordance   with   a   deferential

standard . . . [and] must not substitute [our] judgment for that

of the sentencing court."     State v. Fuentes, 
217 N.J. 57, 70

(2014).

     In this case, the sentencing judge found aggravating factor

two was applicable as the "gravity of harm inflicted [on the young

victim] is beyond comprehension." The judge also found aggravating

factor three was applicable as defendant had a prior conviction

for child abuse for which he was imprisoned.     Similarly, the judge

applied aggravating factor six in reviewing defendant's prior


          [SALLY]: Like, he – he told me to . . . . I
          can't explain it.

          DETECTIVE BOLIVAR: Okay, I have some dolls
          here that they work with me and they help me
          understand     when     I'm     talking     to
          kids. . . . They're not for play. So they're
          just [going to] help me understand what you're
          talking about. Okay?


                                   10                          A-3415-15T2
record.    The judge also applied aggravating factor nine finding

that imprisonment would deter defendant from victimizing young

girls in the future.     The sentencing judge, who was also the trial

judge, found no mitigating factors applicable in defendant's case

and noted defendant's "complete lack of remorse."

     Defendant asserts the trial judge erred by: (1) finding

aggravating factors two and six applicable; and (2) imposing

consecutive prison terms without adequate justification.

     We reject each of defendant's sentencing arguments.             There

was ample evidence in the record, the presentence report, and the

victim impact statement to support each of the aggravating factors

found by the sentencing judge.          We find the record contains

credible evidence as to the judge's findings on the aggravating

factors.     See State v. Mahoney, 
444 N.J. Super. 253, 260 (App.

Div. 2016) ("[T]he finding of any factor must be supported by

competent, credible evidence in the record." (quoting State v.

Case, 
220 N.J. 49, 64 (2014))).

     Defendant also argues that the sentencing judge inadequately

explained his reasons for imposing consecutive terms for the two

aggravated    sexual   assault   convictions   requiring   a   remand   for

resentencing.    We find that the sentencing judge properly applied

the criteria established in State v. Yarbough, 
100 N.J. 627, 643-

44 (1985), "in deciding whether to impose consecutive or concurrent

                                   11                             A-3415-15T2
sentences."     State v. Miller, 
108 N.J. 112, 121 (1987).              "[I]n

determining whether the terms should be concurrent or consecutive,

the focus of the court should be on the fairness of the overall

sentence."    State v. Sutton, 
132 N.J. 471, 485 (1993).

       In this case, the sentencing judge provided reasons for his

decision to impose consecutive sentences.          The judge stated that

"the    reasons    for   the     consecutive      sentence     is    because

there . . . were     countless    numbers    of    incidents    of    sexual

penetration on a [child] . . . .         According to her own testimony

over the course of a year . . . .       She[] basically said it happened

every time she went for a lesson.           So, thus there are no free

crimes."     We discern no abuse of discretion in the sentencing

judge's determination that defendant's abuse of Sally was not one

continuous crime, but was a crime each week that he assaulted her

despite Sally's inability to recollect the specific dates of each

assault.     Thus, the judge properly found that defendant's crimes

justified consecutive sentences.        The judge's reasons for imposing

defendant's sentence are supported by competent, credible evidence

in the record.

       Affirmed.




                                   12                                A-3415-15T2


Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.