IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF T.T.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                     NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                   APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
  This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
   Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
     parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.




                                    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                    APPELLATE DIVISION
                                    DOCKET NO. A-3302-15T5

IN THE MATTER OF THE
CIVIL COMMITMENT OF
T.T., SVP-226-02.
_________________________

           Submitted May 3, 2018 – Decided May 10, 2018

           Before Judges Haas and Rothstadt.

           On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
           Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. SVP-
           226-02.

           Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
           for appellant T.T. (Nancy C. Hayes, Designated
           Counsel, on the brief).

           Gubir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney
           for respondent State of New Jersey (Melissa
           H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of
           counsel; Jacqueline R. D'Alessandro, Deputy
           Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      T.T. appeals from an April 11, 2016 order, finding him to

be a sexually violent predator and ordering that he continue to

be committed to the Special Treatment Unit (STU), pursuant to the

New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), 
N.J.S.A. 30:4-

27.24 to -27.38.     We affirm.
       We    begin   by    referencing       the       essential    background     facts

concerning T.T.'s history of committing sexually violent acts as

set forth in our most recent opinion reviewing his commitment

status.      In re Civil Commitment of T.T., No. A-1030-12 (App. Div.

Feb. 9, 2015) (slip op. at 1-4).                 T.T. committed his first sexual

assault in 1976.          Id. at 1.   At that time, T.T. "approached a six-

year old child in an apartment hallway, put his hand over her

mouth,      told   her    to   be   quiet,       and   carried     into   an   abandoned

apartment."        Ibid.       T.T. then removed the child's "clothing and

inserted two fingers and then his penis into her vagina."                         Id. at

1-2.

       After the assault, T.T. returned the victim to her apartment

and she reported the incident. Id. at 2. "[A] medical examination

revealed that [the child's] genitals were swollen and a discharge

was coming out of her vagina."                   Ibid.    T.T. was later convicted

of carnal abuse and sentenced to five years in prison.                         Ibid.

       While on probation for a possession of a weapon offense in

1992, T.T. violently attacked a thirty-seven year old female in

her apartment.       T.T. "stabbed her with a pair of scissors and hit

her in the head with a bat, causing her to lose consciousness."

Id. at 3.     When the victim regained consciousness, she "discovered

[T.T.] was shaving her pubic hair."                      Ibid.     T.T. then sexually

assaulted the victim "repeatedly, slapping her on the head as he

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did so.      [T.T.] also forced the victim to perform oral sex upon

him, stabbed her with a screwdriver and tried to smother her with

a pillow."     Ibid.

       "The victim survived this horrific attack and contacted the

police."     Ibid.    T.T. later pled guilty to first-degree aggravated

sexual assault, second-degree aggravated assault, and third-degree

terroristic threats.          Ibid.   The trial court sentenced him to an

aggregate fifteen-year term in prison.               Ibid.

       T.T. was committed to the STU in 2002 and, by the time of the

March 28, 2016 hearing in this case, he had been in the STU for

over   fourteen      years.      During       that   entire   period,   T.T.   has

consistently refused all treatment offered to him by facility

staff.

       At the March 28, 2016 hearing,                the State presented the

testimony of an expert psychiatrist, Dr. Howard Gilman, M.D., and

the testimony of an expert psychologist, Dr. Paul Dudek, Ph.D.

T.T. briefly testified at the hearing, and stated he had not

committed any institutional infractions while in prison or the

STU.     T.T. did not present any lay or expert witnesses on his

behalf.

       Dr.   Gilman     diagnosed     T.T.      with    the   following    mental

conditions:     (1) Alcohol Use Disorder in Institutional Remission;

(2) Cannabis Use Disorder in Institutional Remission; and (3)

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Antisocial Personality Disorder.              Dr. Gilman stated in his report

that T.T. continued "to be at high risk to sexually reoffend due

to   his    history   of    repeated    sexual    assaults,      his     history      of

untreated     substance      dependence,       his     history    of     Antisocial

Personality Disorder, and his history of untreated sex offending

behavior."

      Dr.    Dudek    diagnosed        T.T.    with    the   following          mental

abnormalities:        (1) Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder (non-

consent     and   pedophilic    features);       (2)   Alcohol     Use    Disorder,

Severe, In a Controlled Environment; (3) Cannabis Use Disorder,

Severe, In a Controlled Environment; and (4) Other Specified

Personality Disorder with Antisocial Features.                   Dr. Dudek opined

that T.T. had "not made any appreciable progress towards lowering

his risk to reoffend via treatment effect.               Given both static and

dynamic factors, [T.T] remains highly likely to reoffend sexually

if not confined to a secure facility such as the STU."

      Following the hearing, the trial judge rendered a short, but

legally sufficient, oral opinion, concluding that T.T. should

remain committed at the STU.           In so ruling, the judge credited the

uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Gilman and Dr. Dudek.                     The judge

found by clear and convincing evidence that T.T. had been convicted

of   sexually     violent    offenses,    and    "suffer[ed]      from     a    mental

abnormality and personality disorder that does not spontaneously

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remit[;] . . . that affects him emotionally, cognitively[,] and

volitionally," and that "predisposes him to sexual violence[.]"

Therefore, the judge concluded that T.T. was "highly likely to

sexually reoffend" if not placed in a secure facility for custody,

care, and treatment.     This appeal followed.

     On appeal, T.T. argues that "the State failed to prove by

clear and convincing evidence that [he] is a sexually violent

predator   and   that   the   risk   of    future   recidivism   is     at    a

sufficiently high level to justify continued civil commitment

under the current treatment plan."         We disagree.

     The governing law is clear.         An involuntary civil commitment

under the SVPA can follow an offender's service of a custodial

sentence, or other criminal disposition, when he or she "suffers

from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the

person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined

in a secure facility for control, care and treatment."            
N.J.S.A.

30:4-27.26.

     As defined by the statute, a "mental abnormality" consists

of "a mental condition that affects a person's emotional, cognitive

or volitional capacity in a manner that predisposes that person

to commit acts of sexual violence."        Ibid.    The mental abnormality

or personality disorder "must affect an individual's ability to

control his or her sexually harmful conduct."             In re Commitment

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of W.Z., 
173 N.J. 109, 127 (2002).             A showing of an impaired

ability to control sexually dangerous behavior will suffice to

prove a mental abnormality.       Id. at 129; In re Civil Commitment

of R.F., 
217 N.J. 152, 173-74 (2014).

     At a commitment hearing, the State has the burden of proving

under the SVPA that the offender poses a threat:

            to the health and safety of others because of
            the likelihood of his or her engaging in
            sexually violent acts. . . . [T]he State must
            prove that threat by demonstrating that the
            individual   has    serious   difficulty   in
            controlling sexually harmful behavior such
            that it is highly likely that he or she will
            not control his or her sexually violent
            behavior and will reoffend.

            [W.Z., 
173 N.J. at 132.]

The court must address the offender's "present serious difficulty

with control over dangerous sexual behavior."           Id. at 132-33.      To

commit the individual to the STU, the State must establish, by

clear and convincing evidence, that it is highly likely that the

individual will reoffend.      Id. at 133-34; see also R.F., 
217 N.J.

at 173.

     As   the   Supreme   Court   emphasized    in   R.F.,   the   scope    of

appellate   review   of    judgments    in   SVPA    commitment    cases    is

"extremely narrow."       R.F., 
217 N.J. at 174 (quoting In re D.C.,


146 N.J. 31, 58 (1996)). "The judges who hear SVPA cases generally

are 'specialists' and 'their expertise in the subject' is entitled

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to 'special deference.'"   Ibid. (quoting In re Civil Commitment

of T.J.N., 
390 N.J. Super. 218, 226 (App. Div. 2007)).   On appeal,

we must give deference to the judicial findings from the commitment

hearing, not only in recognition of the SVPA judge's expertise,

but also because the judge has "the 'opportunity to hear and see

the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing

court cannot enjoy.'"   Ibid. (quoting State v. Johnson, 
42 N.J.
 146, 161 (1964)).

     Applying these well-settled standards, we affirm the order

committing T.T. to the STU.   There is ample credible evidence in

the record to support the judge's findings and T.T.'s arguments

to the contrary are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion

in a written opinion.   R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A) and (E).

     Affirmed.




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