STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JUAN R. RODRIGUEZ
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3252-16T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JUAN R. RODRIGUEZ, a/k/a JESUS
RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________
Submitted April 18, 2018 – Decided April 26, 2018
Before Judges Alvarez and Nugent.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Hudson County, Indictment No.
14-05-0877.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Svjetlana Tesic,
Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant, Juan R. Rodriguez, appeals from the Law Division's
order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR)
following an evidentiary hearing. He makes a single argument on
appeal:
POINT ONE
MR. RODRIGUEZ IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF ON HIS
CLAIM THAT HIS ATTORNEY RENDERED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR FAILING TO OBTAIN
PHONE RECORDS DUE TO AN INADEQUATE
INVESTIGATION, LEADING TO AN INADEQUATE CROSS-
EXAMINATION, DEPRIVING HIM OF DUE PROCESS AND
HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.
Finding no merit in defendant's argument, we affirm.
A Law Division judge convicted defendant during a two-day
bench trial in 2015 of five offenses: disorderly persons simple
assault,
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a)(1); disorderly persons false
imprisonment,
N.J.S.A. 2C:13-3; third-degree possession of a
weapon for an unlawful purpose,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); fourth-degree
unlawful possession of a weapon,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d); and third-
degree terroristic threats,
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b). The judge
sentenced defendant to time served on the disorderly persons
offenses and merged the third-degree weapons offense into the
terroristic threats offense for purposes of sentencing. The court
imposed concurrent three-year probationary terms on the remaining
two counts.
To provide context for defendant's PCR claim, we summarize
the trial testimony. According to the victim, on a February
evening in 2014, she and defendant were at the residence they
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shared on 10th Street in Union City, watching television.
Defendant appeared angry. When the victim asked if he was okay,
he responded, "[y]eah, I'm fine." Defendant then left the room
where they were watching television and went to lie down in bed,
covering himself head to toe with the sheets. The victim followed
defendant to the bedroom and again asked if he was ok. Defendant
repeated, "I'm fine." The victim then dressed for bed, turned off
the bedroom light and went to get in the bed with defendant.
After the victim got in bed next to defendant, he said, "I
wanna talk," but she declined, saying she was tired and would talk
the following day. Defendant responded, "I fuckin' said I wanna
talk now," got out of bed, turned on the light, and pulled off the
sheets covering the victim. Defendant "slammed [the victim] on
the bed, . . . got on top of [her] and . . . started to rip [her]
shirt and rip [her] underwear." The victim screamed and struggled
with defendant, but he held her down on the bed with his right
forearm across her throat, left hand on her hair, and knee pressing
against her stomach.
Despite her cries to stop, defendant continued to hold her
down, causing her to vomit. She also experienced a painful pop in
the back of her neck. Defendant eventually released the victim
and apologized. The victim stood up, grabbed another shirt, and
went to the bathroom. While in the bathroom, the victim
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photographed her injuries with her cellular telephone. The
photographs, introduced by the State at trial, depicted injuries
to the victim's left cheek, the underside of her tongue, her right
hand, and behind her left knee.
Just as the victim took the last photograph, defendant entered
the bathroom with a knife, grabbed the victim's phone, placed the
knife to her stomach, and said, "[y]ou're fuckin' not gonna be
nobody's, you're only gonna be fuckin' mine or I'll kill you and
then kill myself." Fearing for her life, the victim attempted to
calm defendant, but he said, "I'd rather kill you," as he placed
the knife horizontally along her neck. Defendant dragged the
victim to the bedroom by her hair and threw her on the bed. She
hit her head on the backboard.
The victim testified defendant went "crazy." He began to
pace throughout the bedroom, threw her phone against the wall,
"started marking himself," and advised he was going to kill
himself. The victim began to put on her boots and asked defendant
if he wanted to go smoke a cigarette, hoping that would give her
the opportunity to escape. Defendant told her, "[y]ou're not
fuckin' going nowhere," and lunged toward her, slicing her boot
with the knife.
Defendant jumped on the bed with the knife still in his hand,
grabbed the victim's hair to pull her close to him, and told her
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they were going to stay naked in bed. The victim remained in bed
next to defendant. If she attempted to move, he would pull her
close, threaten her with the knife, and ask her where she was
going.
As the two were lying in bed, the victim's phone began to
ring. She knew by the unique ringtone it was her mother. The
victim answered the phone after receiving defendant's permission
and spoke to her mother. Her mother asked the victim to accompany
her somewhere. The victim initially said she would go, but
defendant said, "[y]ou're not fuckin' going nowhere." Defendant
eventually relented and permitted the victim to go with her mother
on the condition that he accompany them. They began to get dressed
until the mother called back and advised she did not need them to
accompany her.
The pair remained in the apartment until later that afternoon
when the victim asked if she could go upstairs to the landlord's
apartment to obtain a letter needed for Medicaid. Defendant,
still wielding the knife, said "[a]ll right. Hurry up. Go. Hurry
up, but I'm gonna wait for you here." The victim quickly walked
upstairs to the landlord's apartment and knocked on the door. The
landlord immediately noticed the victim was in distress and let
her in the apartment. After explaining what happened, the victim
called her mother, who in turn called the police.
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The State presented one other witness, the emergency room
physician who treated the victim following her ordeal with
defendant. The physician's testimony corroborated the victim's
story based on the victim's emotional state and injuries observed
at the emergency room not long after the victim she was able to
leave defendant.
The bench trial took place on May 19 and 20, 2015. Nearly
nine months earlier, in August 2014, defense counsel had submitted
an investigation request through the Hudson County Public
Defender's Office to obtain the victim's cell phone records for
the date of the incident. Counsel did not actually receive the
records until after the trial.
Following the presentation of the State's proofs, defendant
moved for an adjournment or mistrial based on the absence of these
cellular phone records. Counsel advised the court defendant
insisted she make this motion since the records would contradict
or impeach the victim's testimony. The court denied the request
because defendant was unable to articulate why the phone records
were important to defendant's case beyond defendant's bald
assertions they would impeach the victim's testimony.
Following his conviction and the imposition of sentence,
defendant filed, but later withdrew, a direct appeal. On June 6,
2016, he filed a pro se petition for PCR. Designated counsel
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later supplemented defendant's petition with a letter brief.
Defendant argued trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to request a timely adjournment in order to obtain the
victim's cell phone records. On February 6, 2017, Judge Patrick
J. Arre, who was not the trial judge, conducted an evidentiary
hearing.
Defense counsel testified she had numerous discussions with
defendant regarding the phone records, but she was unable to obtain
the records prior to trial because she initially had the wrong
service provider. When asked why she abandoned her efforts to
obtain the records prior to trial, counsel explained she and
defendant had a difference of opinion regarding the significance
of the phone records. The victim alleged she was held
incommunicado overnight. Defendant claimed the records would show
"she was communicating . . . with friends, definitely with
[defendant's] mother, . . . and with [defendant's] grown daughter."
Despite defendant's perceived significance of the records, counsel
felt the phone records were not important and, "in [her] view the
phone records were not really dispositive of . . . the issue of
kidnapping in th[e] case." Further, defense counsel noted similar
information regarding the victim's cell phone use was included in
the police report, and the matter remained a he-said she-said
issue, with the added element of medical records.
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Defense counsel also explained to defendant she was more
concerned with the "incontestable" medical records that
demonstrated the victim had sustained inflicted injuries. Counsel
believed she would be able to "score those points" relating to the
victim's cell phone usage without the records themselves.
According to defense counsel, defendant accepted this advice
and agreed to go to trial without the telephone records.
Nonetheless, defendant brought the issue up the second day of
trial, after the victim had testified on the first day, now
stressing the importance of the records. This insistence is what
prompted counsel to request the adjournment or mistrial. When
questioned concerning the significance of the phone records,
counsel said she had since thoroughly reviewed the records, did
not think they were important, and would have done nothing
different at trial had she had the records.
On cross-examination, trial counsel said she thought it
appropriate to proceed to trial without the records since she
could elicit testimony from the victim regarding her
communications with other individuals during the night in
question. If the victim denied making such communications, the
defense could introduce impeachment testimony through other
sources, such as the defendant's daughter or mother.
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Defendant testified at the PCR hearing. He contended that
if trial counsel had obtained the records before trial, the trial
court would have had the benefit of considering the "substantial
amount of time of phone usage [and] text messaging," during a time
the victim alleged she was under duress. This would have provided
a more beneficial outcome for defendant.
On March 6, 2017, Judge Arre issued a comprehensive written
decision denying defendant's petition. He determined defendant
failed to satisfy either prong under the Strickland – Fritz test
for evaluating ineffective-assistance claims1: that is, he failed
to "overcome a 'strong presumption' that counsel exercised
'reasonable professional judgment' and 'sound trial strategy' in
fulfilling his responsibilities," State v. Nash,
212 N.J. 518,
542 (2013) (citation omitted); and he failed to demonstrate "how
specific errors of counsel undermined the reliability of the
finding of guilt," United States v. Cronic,
466 U.S. 648, 659
n.26 (1984).
The judge held that trial counsel's strategy of "impeaching
[the victim] by bringing to light that she was in possession of
her cell phone during the alleged confinement, as well as the
operability of her cell phone . . . did not fall below an objective
1
Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984); State
v. Fritz,
105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).
9 A-3252-16T4
standard of reasonableness rendering her representation
ineffective."
Concerning the second Strickland prong, the court found
defendant "failed to proffer any evidence as to how the[] records
would have impeached [the victim's] trial testimony . . . and
failed to show the result of the trial would have been different."
Finally, Judge Arre found "in light of the whole case, the
discrepancies alleged by the [defendant] are not so material in
character or so prejudicial as to justify a reversal."
We affirm, substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge
Arre in his thorough and well-reasoned written opinion.
Defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant
further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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