STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. RENFORD WILSON
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2013-16T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RENFORD WILSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
Submitted March 12, 2018 – Decided March 22, 2018
Before Judges Sabatino and Ostrer.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Mercer County, Indictment No.
97-11-1297.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Steven M. Gilson, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Laura Sunyak,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Renford Wilson appeals from the trial court's
August 8, 2016 order denying his petition for post-conviction
relief ("PCR"). We affirm because defendant has not established
a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted in March 2002 of
felony murder, aggravated manslaughter as a lesser-included charge
to murder, armed robbery, armed burglary, conspiracy to commit
armed robbery, and related weapons offenses. He was sentenced to
a life term with thirty years of parole ineligibility on the felony
murder charge and concurrent terms on the remaining charges.
The State's proofs at trial established that on June 29,
1997, defendant participated with three other men in the armed
robbery of a bordello in Trenton. While attempting to carry out
the robbery, defendant fired a shotgun at and killed the victim
in the premises' kitchen. As the perpetrators fled the scene on
foot, defendant discarded the shotgun and a scarf he had been
wearing in an alley. The police apprehended the other
perpetrators, and two of them gave statements implicating
defendant as the victim's shooter. The police eventually located
and apprehended defendant in the Bronx in July 2000.
All three of the co-perpetrators pled guilty to manslaughter
and testified for the State at defendant's trial. The State's
proofs included evidence that defendant's fingerprints had been
detected on the car the perpetrators drove to the crime scene.
The fingerprint match was supported by expert testimony from a
police detective, Robert Pacillo. Defendant took the stand in his
2 A-2013-16T3
own defense. He denied knowing the three co-defendants or having
any involvement in the crime.
On direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant's
convictions, but remanded for reconsideration of the sentence
because the sentencing court had failed to merge certain counts
and misapplied aggravating factors two and six. State v. Wilson,
No. A-0358-03 (App. Div. Mar. 1, 2007) (slip op. at 5, 17-18).
The Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certification.
State v. Wilson,
191 N.J. 316 (2007). Defendant was resentenced
in August 2007 to a life term with thirty years of parole
ineligibility on the felony murder charge. The murder, armed
robbery, conspiracy, and one weapons charge were merged, while
concurrent sentences were imposed on the remaining charges.
Defendant's revised sentence was affirmed by this court on the
excessive sentencing calendar in an order dated August 18, 2009.
Meanwhile, in August 2007, defendant timely filed a PCR
petition. The petition was denied by the trial court on June 14,
2012.
Defendant appealed the PCR denial. In a sua sponte order
dated September 30, 2013, we remanded for further proceedings. We
noted that PCR counsel had failed to raise, despite defendant's
request, an issue regarding the fingerprint found on the car used
in the crimes. We thereafter clarified our order, directing that
3 A-2013-16T3
"[o]n remand, the trial court shall consider defendant's
contention of ineffective assistance specifically concerning his
former PCR attorney's failure to present his contentions for relief
concerning the admission at trial of fingerprint identification
evidence. No other issues shall be addressed on remand." We left
it to the PCR court's discretion as to whether an evidentiary
hearing was required.
After considering further submissions and oral argument, the
PCR court issued a written opinion on August 8, 2016, again denying
defendant's petition. Referring to the State's evidence of guilt,
the PCR court noted that defendant's three co-defendants had
testified at defendant's trial that defendant had shot the victim.
The PCR court rejected defendant's argument that his trial
counsel's cross-examination of the police detective who found
defendant's fingerprint on the vehicle was deficient. Defendant
claimed that it was suspicious that the fingerprint was not run
through the Automated Fingerprint Identification System ("AFIS")
until he was arrested in 2000, given that the detective had found
the fingerprint in 1997. Defendant maintained that the State had
access to his immigration records and, therefore, had the ability
to compare the fingerprint to his own shortly after it was
recovered. Defendant, further claimed that law enforcement
"essentially, planted and created" the fingerprint evidence to
4 A-2013-16T3
implicate him.
The PCR court found that defendant's "allegations of evidence
tampering [were] dubious" and that he had failed to establish a
prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court
noted that trial counsel's approach to cross-examination was "a
proper execution of trial strategy" and that extensive cross-
examination of the detective regarding the chronology of the
fingerprint identification may not have benefitted defendant, as
it risked "highlighting [to the jury his] status as a fugitive and
emphasizing the three-year delay to effectuate his capture."
In his brief on the present appeal, defendant presents the
following argument:
THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING BECAUSE DEFENDANT
ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF TRIAL
COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVENESS FOR FAILING TO
CROSS-EXAMINE REGARDING THE FINGERPRINT
IDENTIFICATION CHRONOLOGY.
Defendant argues that, by summarily rejecting his petition,
the PCR court did not view his allegations in a light most
favorable to him. He further contends that the fingerprint
evidence "irreparably eviscerated the defense," and that a
"bombshell" revelation that the evidence had been planted would
"dwarf[] any conceivable prejudice inuring to defendant as a result
of the cross-examination." We are unpersuaded by these
5 A-2013-16T3
contentions.
A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a PCR
petition only when (1) he establishes a prima facie case in support
of relief; (2) "there are material issues of disputed fact that
cannot be resolved by reference to the existing record"; and (3)
"an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve the claims for
relief." R. 3:22-10(b). "To establish a prima facie case,
defendant must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that his . . .
claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to
the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits." Ibid.; see
State v. Porter,
216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013). "[B]ald assertions are
not enough–rather, the defendant must allege facts sufficient to
demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard performance." State v.
Jones,
219 N.J. 298, 311-12 (2014) (citations omitted).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
a defendant must show that counsel's performance "fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness," and that "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). "A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694. Further, "counsel is
strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made
6 A-2013-16T3
all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment." Id. at 690. In evaluating an ineffective
assistance claim, a "court must then determine whether, in light
of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance."
Ibid.
Despite the rhetoric in his submissions, defendant has not
presented a prima facie case that his trial counsel's performance
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688.
On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Detective Pacillo
regarding the procedures he followed to process the murder weapon
and vehicle for fingerprints. Among other things, counsel
suggested the fingerprints may have been affected by moisture and
smudging. In his closing argument, defense counsel attempted to
cast doubt on the fingerprint identification. Counsel pointed out
to the jury that the detective was unable to recover any
identifiable fingerprints from the murder weapon, despite
testimony from the three co-defendants that they had handled the
weapon. Counsel also questioned why no fingerprints from defendant
or his co-defendants were identified from inside the vehicle. In
addition to questioning the fingerprint identification, counsel
also attacked the credibility of the co-defendants, pointing out
multiple claimed inconsistencies in their testimony.
7 A-2013-16T3
As the PCR court recognized, counsel's trial strategy
concerning the fingerprint identification "fell within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance." See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 690 (observing that "strategic choices made after thorough
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are
virtually unchallengeable").
Defendant relies on pure speculation in arguing that further
questioning of Pacillo by his trial attorney about the timing of
the retrieval of the fingerprint and its submission to AFIS would
have revealed that the fingerprint was "planted." Although the
fingerprint was retrieved from the vehicle in July 1997,
defendant's rolled fingerprint that was used for comparison was
not obtained until he was arrested in July 2000. During that time
frame, defendant was a fugitive, and he cannot fairly claim the
State was delinquent in not obtaining his fingerprint sooner. We
agree with the PCR judge that, "The simple fact that the police
had access to [defendant]'s fingerprints before he was arrested
in July 2000 [through immigration records] does not lead to the
conclusion that law enforcement sought to fabricate evidence."
All that is shown is that the State perhaps could have pursued the
fingerprint match sooner. It does not establish fabrication.
We also concur with the PCR judge's astute observation that
if defendant's trial counsel had focused on the chronology of the
8 A-2013-16T3
investigation between 1997 and 2000, he ran the risk of unduly
prejudicing defendant with the jurors by highlighting his fugitive
status during that interval and emphasizing the three-year delay
in effectuating his capture.
All other points raised by defendant lack sufficient merit
to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
9 A-2013-16T3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
