C.A. v. E.A.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                        NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                      APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
      Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
        parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.




                                       SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                       APPELLATE DIVISION
                                       DOCKET NO. A-1544-15T1

C.A.,

        Plaintiff-Respondent/
        Cross-Appellant,

v.

E.A.,

     Defendant-Appellant/
     Cross-Respondent.
_______________________________

              Argued April 10, 2018 – Decided April 27, 2018

              Before Judges Reisner, Gilson, and Mayer.

              On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
              Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County,
              Docket No. FM-02-1657-10.

              Eilish M. McLoughlin argued the cause for
              appellant/cross-respondent   (Moskowitz Law
              Group, LLC, attorneys; Luther G. Jones, IV,
              of counsel; Luther G. Jones, IV, and Eilish
              M. McLoughlin, on the briefs).

              Jay   R.   Atkins  argued   the   cause   for
              respondent/cross-appellant (Sunshine, Atkins,
              Minassian, Tafuri, D'Amato, Beane & Buckner,
              PA, attorneys; Jay R. Atkins and Christian L.
              Beane, on the briefs).

PER CURIAM
      In     this   post-judgment      matrimonial     case,     defendant    E.A.1

appeals from a June 3, 2015 order of the trial court addressing

custody of the parties' unemancipated children.2                  Plaintiff C.A.

cross-appeals from the order.            We affirm.

      After a bench trial spanning almost thirty trial days, Judge

Ronny Jo Siegal issued a lengthy oral opinion, making detailed

credibility         determinations,       factual     findings,      and      legal

conclusions.        Based on the facts as she found them to be, the

judge      determined   that     the   parties'   existing      shared   parenting

agreement was no longer viable, because defendant was incapable

of shared decision-making about the children.               Most significantly,

the judge found that defendant's unreasonable conduct was harmful

to   the    children's    best    interests   and     was   a   threat   to   their

emotional well-being.

      The judge found that "the defendant does not have the ability

to agree, communicate, cooperate and essentially co-parent with


1
   We use the parties' initials, and we impound the record, to
protect the family's privacy and safeguard the children from
further psychological harm.
2
   Defendant's appeal raised an additional issue, concerning his
entitlement to a credit for overpayment of child support. However,
after oral argument of this appeal, the parties submitted to this
court a document signed by both counsel, reciting that the issue
was resolved, and providing that "the Appellant is hereby entitled
to a credit in the amount of $7,172.82 for overpayment of child
related expenses."    We consider that document to be a binding
settlement agreement on the overpayment issue.

                                          2                                A-1544-15T1
the plaintiff."   Instead, "[defendant] has in significant ways

shown that he will purposefully act unilaterally, act to the

detriment of the children's best interest[s] so that his own way

prevails, or that plaintiff's way does not prevail."

     Judge Siegal concluded that the only way to mitigate the harm

was to designate plaintiff as the parent of primary residence and

to give plaintiff sole legal authority to make final decisions

about the children's health, education, and welfare.    The judge

awarded defendant parenting time, and an opportunity to provide

plaintiff with comments on any proposed significant decisions

about the children's health, education, and welfare.

     On this appeal, both sides accept Judge Siegal's factual

findings.3   Both sides acknowledge that 
N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) gave

Judge Siegal discretion to craft a hybrid custody arrangement in

the children's best interests.   Defendant does not challenge the

provision of the order designating plaintiff as the parent of

primary residence, or the provisions detailing his parenting time.

However, he argues that, once the trial court granted the parties

joint legal custody, the court was also required - as a matter of



3
  Illustrating the narrowness of his appeal, defendant's statement
of facts is four pages long. His legal argument focuses solely
on alleged legal errors in the judge's decision, without referring
to her factual findings.


                                 3                         A-1544-15T1
law - to give him equal participation in making decisions about

the children's health, education, and welfare.          In her cross-

appeal,   plaintiff   argues   that   defendant's    conduct    was     so

demonstrably counterproductive and harmful to the children that

the trial judge should have granted her sole legal custody.

     We review child custody decisions for abuse of discretion.

Pascale v. Pascale, 
140 N.J. 583, 611 (1995); Nufrio v. Nufrio,


341 N.J. Super. 548, 555 (App. Div. 2001).          Family Part judges

have "wide latitude to fashion creative remedies in matrimonial

custody cases."   Beck v. Beck, 
86 N.J. 480, 485 (1981).           In an

appropriate case, the Family Part may restrict the rights of a

parent who has joint legal custody.     See D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio,


344 N.J. Super. 147, 157-58 (App. Div. 2001).

     We owe deference to the expertise of Family Part judges in

crafting child custody arrangements.     See Cesare v. Cesare, 
154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998).   We also defer to a trial judge's feel for

the case, based on the judge's opportunity to observe the witnesses

testify and evaluate their demeanor and credibility.           See ibid.

In this case, Judge Siegal spent weeks listening to the testimony

of these parties and their witnesses, and she was in the best

position to craft a custody arrangement that would serve the

children's best interests. See Palermo v. Palermo, 
164 N.J. Super.
 492, 498 (App. Div. 1978).

                                  4                              A-1544-15T1
     The evidence in this case is amply detailed in Judge Siegal's

opinion.    She found plaintiff to be a credible witness and did not

find defendant's testimony credible.             We need not repeat the

judge's    specific   descriptions       of   defendant's   self-centered,

unreasonable, and counterproductive approaches to parenting time

and to decision-making about the children.          The judge's choice to

grant     plaintiff   sole   final   decision-making        authority   was

overwhelmingly supported by the evidence.         Judge Siegal's decision

to grant the parties joint legal custody, rather than giving

plaintiff sole legal custody, was supported by expert testimony.

The judge also thoroughly discussed the statutory child custody

factors set forth in 
N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c).          Given the facts found by

Judge Siegal, we find no abuse of her discretion in fashioning the

custody arrangement detailed in the June 3, 2015 order.

     We affirm on the appeal and the cross-appeal substantially

for the reasons stated in the judge's comprehensive opinion.            The

parties' respective arguments do not warrant further discussion.

R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

     Affirmed.




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