CESAR ASIJTUJ-JUTZUY v. WERNER, CO. a
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0981-16T1
CESAR ASIJTUJ-JUTZUY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WERNER, CO. and M. SIKORSKI
CONSTRUCTION SALES,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
B&S RESTORATION, INC.,
Defendant.
_________________________________
Submitted February 28, 2018 – Decided September 5, 2018
Before Judges Nugent and Geiger.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-
0948-14.
Ginarte Gallardo González & Winograd, LLP,
attorneys for appellant (Richard M. Winograd,
on the briefs).
Michael J. Dunn, attorney for respondent
Werner Co.
Zirulnik, Sherlock & Demille, attorneys for
respondent M. Sikorski Construction Sales
(Joseph E. Kelley, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff, Cesar Asijtuj-Jutzuy, a former construction
worker, appeals the summary judgment dismissal of his personal
injury action, a lawsuit he filed to recover damages for permanent
debilitating injuries he suffered when he fell eleven or twelve
feet from a scaffold plank. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's
negligence claim against defendant M. Sikorski Construction Sales
(Sikorski Construction), finding plaintiff presented no proofs
that Sikorski Construction had any involvement with the
construction project where plaintiff's accident occurred. The
trial court later dismissed plaintiff's failure-to-warn product
liability claim against defendant Werner Co., determining there
was no duty to warn of an obvious danger. Genuinely disputed
issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the
negligence claim but not on the product liability claim. We thus
affirm in part and reverse in part.
Plaintiff filed his personal injury action in March 2014,
alleging he sustained disabling injuries on March 16, 2012, when
he fell from a scaffolding plank at a construction site. The
complaint alleged Sikorski Construction was responsible for
oversight of the entire project and was acting as a general
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contractor. As such, according to the complaint, Sikorski
Construction breached its duty to plaintiff by failing to provide
a reasonably safe place to work. The complaint also alleged
Sikorski Construction "created, permitted, and maintained a
dangerous and hazardous condition at the site."
The complaint against Werner alleged that Werner designed,
manufactured, and sold the aluminum scaffold plank from which
plaintiff fell. The complaint also alleged that the scaffolding
plank was defectively designed and manufactured, and was defective
because of its failure to include adequate "cautionary labelling
devices, and instructional information and materials at the time
it was placed into the stream of commerce."
Following completion of discovery, Sikorski construction
moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion.
Thereafter, Werner moved for summary judgment, and the court
granted the motion as to the product claim based on inadequate
warnings but denied it as to defective design. Plaintiff moved
for reconsideration of the order granting summary judgment to
Werner. The trial court denied the motion. Plaintiff dismissed
his defective design claim against Werner and filed this appeal.
According to the pleadings and the discovery submitted in
support of and opposition to the summary judgment motions, these
are the undisputed facts concerning the accident. Plaintiff was
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an employee of C. Bossolina Construction, Inc. (Bossolina
Construction). Bossolina Construction had contracted to do
masonry repairs to the front and rear facades of the Mayfair
Condominium in North Bergen Township (the Project). Plaintiff
explained in an interrogatory how the accident occurred:
On March 16, 2012, at about 1:00 p.m.,
plaintiff was standing on an aluminum work
platform manufactured by [Werner Co.], which
was positioned at a height of approximately
[eleven] to [twelve] feet, while performing
stucco removal with the use of a power
grinder, on the rear wall of a residential
apartment building . . . . While doing this
work, the grinder jammed and kicked back
causing plaintiff to lose his balance and
fall, striking his head on the cement pavement
below.
The "aluminum work platform" was a "ladder scaffold." The
scaffold consisted of a Werner Taskmaster Aluminum Plank, Model
2320, twenty feet long by two feet wide, supported by two ladders.1
Bossolina Construction owned the plank. Plaintiff and several
other Bossolina Construction employees had loaded and transported
it from Bossolina Construction's shop to the Mayfair jobsite before
beginning work on the Project.
The plank had several warnings on it, including the following:
1
According to Werner's undisputed statement of material facts,
"[t]he plank was manufactured in 1990 by Old Ladder Co. f/k/a R.D.
Werner Co., not moving defendant, Werner Co. (DE), which did not
come into existence until 2007." This was not, however, the basis
for the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to Werner.
4 A-0981-16T1
Use safety belts or harnesses, lanyards
and lifelines on all jobs which expose a
worker to a fall of [six] or more feet, and
which are NOT performed from a plank at least
[eighteen] inches wide having guardrails on
all open sides and are NOT fixed.
The scaffold plank had no guardrails. Plaintiff testified at his
deposition that he read the warnings on the plank.
Plaintiff was not using fall protection equipment when he
fell, because though there was a harness for his use, there was
no place to tie it off, and he was going to use the ladder scaffold
"for only that small area." He also testified the label on the
scaffold did not really say at what "height you have to use the
safety belt." He said he did not understand the fall protection
equipment should be used even when the scaffold height was not
above a building's first story.
Plaintiff and four other Bossolina Construction employees
were working on the job site the day plaintiff fell. The parties
dispute who was responsible for job safety and supervision.
Plaintiff said he was supervising the site. He testified Bossolina
Construction's principal, "Charlie" Bossolina, instructed the
workers on what to do at the job, but on the day of the accident
Bossolina was on vacation. He left plaintiff in charge of the
crew, a responsibility that included ensuring not only that the
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work was performed properly and safely, but also that the employees
were using equipment properly.
Bossolina remembered things differently. When deposed, he
said Sikorski Construction's principal, Michael Sikorski, was
responsible for the Project. Asked to describe their relationship,
Bossolina said Sikorski owned his own company. Sikorski did not
work for Bossolina. Bossolina never employed him. Rather,
Bossolina hired him as a subcontractor.
Bossolina did not enter into a written contract with Sikorski
because he had "never done a contract with Mike Sikorski" before.
According to Bossolina, there was no need for a contract, because
they knew each other and did a lot of work together. He said he
probably first spoke to Sikorski about the Project when he was
estimating the job.
Asked what Mike Sikorski did for him, Bossolina responded
that "[i]t could be anything. General contracting. That could
be from foundation all the way to the roof cap. Anything in-
between." Bossolina also testified Sikorski "was going to do the
[P]roject. He was going to set it up and do the [P]roject."
Bossolina made clear that from his perspective Sikorski was a
subcontractor. Bossolina insisted Sikorski understood he was
supposed to do the labor on the project. He also testified
Sikorski obtained the permits for the Project.
6 A-0981-16T1
Bossolina was away when the accident occurred. From what
Sikorski later told him, Sikorski started the job either the week
before the accident or during that week. Bossolina said he did
not even know the project had started. In Bossolina's absence,
Sikorski would direct the employees and had "full reign on picking
and choosing what should be done on a particular day." Sikorski
would supervise the crew. When supervising, Sikorski would at
times do the labor, but rarely.
Bossolina paid Sikorski by a check and gave him a "1099" tax
form. According to Bossolina, with the exception of the check and
1099, there was no paperwork between Bossolina Construction and
Sikorski.
Sikorski contradicted Bossolina. During his deposition,
Sikorski testified that Sikorski Construction was his "sales
company," which used to be a sole proprietorship, but was now an
"S-Corp." Sikorski was the company's sole officer. In 2012, when
plaintiff's accident occurred, Sikorski Construction had no
employees other than Sikorski.
According to Sikorski, he became employed as an outside sales
person for Bossolina Construction in approximately 2002 or 2003.
He was still employed in that capacity by Bossolina Construction
as of the time of his deposition in May 2016. Sikorski testified
he did certain limited supervision for Bossolina Construction. He
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was compensated by way of an $11,000 per month sales draw. Other
than operating Sikorski Construction and working for Bossolina
Construction, Sikorski held no positions or employment with any
other companies.
Sikorski denied ever working as a laborer for Charlie
Bossolina. He claimed he had undergone a lumbar fusion in February
2012, the month before plaintiff's accident, and was still
recovering in March. He was unable to drive due to his
recuperation. He was in no condition to be doing physical labor.
Due to the surgery and a death in his family, Sikorski was unable
to participate in any way in the Project. Besides, the Project
was what Sikorski termed a "Preferred Management" (PMI)
construction job. Sikorski arranged no work for Bossolina to do
for PMI.
Plaintiff retained the services of an expert in Human Factors
to evaluate whether the scaffold plank was defective. The expert
opined the scaffold plank was defectively designed because it did
not include guardrails. The expert also opined the plank was
defective because it did not include warnings that would come to
the attention of users and alert them to the potential for serious
injury if guardrails or fall protective devices were not used.
8 A-0981-16T1
The trial court granted summary judgment to Sikorski
Construction. The court found there was no evidence Sikorski
Construction was ever at the Project site.
The trial court also granted summary judgment to Werner as
to the warnings claim, concluding there was no duty to warn of
open and obvious dangers. The court denied Werner's motion as to
the design defect claim, which plaintiff later dismissed.
Appellate courts "review[] an order granting summary judgment
in accordance with the same standard as the motion judge." Bhagat
v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014) (citations omitted). We "review
the competent evidential materials submitted by the parties to
identify whether there are genuine issues of material fact and,
if not, whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment
as a matter of law." Ibid. (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); R. 4:46-2(c)). A trial
court's determination that a party is entitled to summary judgment
as a matter of law is not entitled to any "special deference," and
is subject to de novo review. Cypress Point Condo. Ass'n v. Adria
Towers, LLC, 226 N.J. 403, 415 (2016) (citation omitted).
We first address the order granting summary judgment to
Sikorski Construction. The disputed issues of material fact
include these: who was responsible for running the job and
implementing safety measures, and, was the responsible party
9 A-0981-16T1
either Sikorski or his company. Plaintiff, as the party opposing
the motion, "must receive 'the benefit of all favorable evidence
and inferences presented in the record.'" State v. Quaker Valley
Farms, LLC, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op. at 23) (citing
Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 585 (2012)).
Applying this standard, we conclude genuine issues of material
fact precluded the grant of summary judgment to Sikorski
Construction.
There is a major dispute about whether Sikorski worked at the
Project. He says he did not, but Bossolina testified he
subcontracted the project to Sikorski. Bossolina also testified
Sikorski obtained the permits for the Project. Additionally,
according to Bossolina, after he learned of plaintiff's accident,
he spoke to Sikorski and Sikorski said he started the Project
either the week of or the week before plaintiff's fall. Last,
Bossolina testified he paid Sikorski and gave him a 1099.
To be sure, Sikorski's testimony contradicted Bossolina's
testimony. Issues of credibility, however, are to be decided by
the jury, not a judge evaluating a summary judgment motion. Brill,
142 N.J. at 540.
The trial court granted summary judgment to Sikorski
Construction on the ground there was no evidence of Sikorski being
on the project site and no evidence of it having any contract with
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respect to the project. In doing so, the court noted Sikorski had
not been named as an individual defendant. For several reasons,
we disagree that these considerations were a basis for granting
summary judgment.
First, Bossolina testified that his relationship with
Sikorski was that Sikorski owned a company and that they did a lot
of work together. Although Bossolina did not distinguish between
himself and Bossolina Construction, nor Sikorski and Sikorski
Constuction, his testimony could reasonably be construed as
referring to their companies. For example, when Bossolina
testified he subcontracted the job to Sikorski, he did not,
individually, have a job to subcontract out. The contract for the
Project was between the owner and Bossolini Construction. Thus,
when he testified he subcontracted the Project to Sikorski, he
likely meant Bossolina Construction subcontracted the job, and he
may have meant — and a jury could have reasonably inferred —
Bossolina Construction subcontracted the Project to Sikorski
Construction.
Next, Sikorski testified he generally performed work either
as an employee of Bossolina or an employee of Sikorski
Construction, no one else. Bossolina denied Sikorski was ever an
employee of Bossolina Construction. Thus, if Sikorski worked at
11 A-0981-16T1
the Project, a reasonable inference is he did so as Sikorski
Construction.
Last, it appears in the weeks leading up to plaintiff's
accident Sikorski was a sole proprietorship using the name Sikorski
Construction. Although the record does not clarify when Sikorski
Construction became a corporation, at oral argument Sikorski's
attorney appeared to concede Sikorski Construction was not a
corporation, and the court intimated as much.
If such were the case, Sikorski and Sikorski Construction
were indistinguishable as legal entities. "In a sole
proprietorship, the business and its owner are one and the same."
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2797 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Thus, Sikorski could not avoid
liability by using a name for his business when his business was
a sole proprietorship. The court should either have permitted
plaintiff to amend the pleadings or ultimately amended the
pleadings itself to conform to the evidence. See R. 4:9-2.
In summary, unresolved issues of material fact precluded the
grant of summary judgment to Sikorski Construction. The issues,
among others, include: whether Sikorski or Sikorski Construction
verbally agreed to supervise the Project's construction, and, if
so, the scope of the supervisory responsibility; whether Sikorski
worked on the project; and, if Sikorski worked on the Project,
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whether he worked as a Bossolina employee or as an employee or
principal of his sole proprietorship. In view of these unresolved
issues and the standard requiring the evidence to be construed in
the light most favorable to plaintiff, we reverse the order of
summary judgment for Sikorski Construction and remand the matter
for trial.
We reach a different result as to the grant of summary
judgment to Werner. Plaintiff's principal argument on appeal is
that when the trial court considered the open and obvious nature
of falling from an unguarded scaffold, the court failed to consider
that the "open and obvious" defense is not available when the
accident involves workplace equipment. We disagree.
The New Jersey Products Liability Act (PLA), N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-
1 to -11, provides that "[a] manufacturer or seller of a product
shall be liable in a product liability action only if the claimant
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the product causing
the harm was not reasonably fit, suitable or safe for its intended
purpose." N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-2. Plaintiffs can prove a product is
defective, that is, not reasonably fit, suitable or safe for its
intended purpose, by establishing the product had a design,
manufacturing, or warning defect. A plaintiff can establish such
a defect by proving the product: "a. deviated from the design
specifications, formulae, or performance standards of the
13 A-0981-16T1
manufacturer or from otherwise identical units manufactured to the
same manufacturing specifications or formulae, or b. failed to
contain adequate warnings or instructions, or c. was designed in
a defective manner." Ibid.
In product liability actions "for harm allegedly caused by a
product that was designed in a defective manner," it is an absolute
defense that:
The characteristics of the product are known
to the ordinary consumer or user, and the harm
was caused by an unsafe aspect of the product
that is an inherent characteristic of the
product and that would be recognized by the
ordinary person who uses or consumes the
product with the ordinary knowledge common to
the class of persons for whom the product is
intended.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-3(a)(2).]
The statute expressly states this defense "shall not apply to
industrial machinery or other equipment used in the workplace."
Ibid.
Plaintiff asserts the exception applies as well to product
liability warning defect cases. Werner argues it does not.
Previously, we have explained that though the statutory defense
of "obvious danger" is:
[E]xpressly unavailable as an absolute defense
for industrial machinery under the design
defect section of the [PLA], N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-
3(a)(2), a different rule pertains in a
failure to warn case. Nothing in the [PLA]
14 A-0981-16T1
or case law suggests that the obviousness of
danger may not be considered as a factor to
establish what is an "adequate warning" . . .
or whether a breach of that duty could be a
proximate cause of the accident.
[Fabian v. Minster Mach. Co., Inc., 258 N.J.
Super. 261, 279 (App. Div. 1992); accord,
Grier v. Cochran Western Corp., 308 N.J.
Super. 308, 323-24 (App. Div. 1998).]
We agree with the trial court that the danger of falling from
a scaffold and sustaining serious injury is open and obvious. We
further agree the open and obvious nature of the risk of falling
from the scaffold and sustaining serious injury was a proper
consideration in determining whether the warnings were adequate.
The open and obvious nature of the danger would not have been an
absolute defense to plaintiff's design-defect theory, but
plaintiff dismissed that claim.
We note plaintiff did not dispute he read the warnings on the
scaffold plank and knew there was fall protection equipment
available. He testified to a number of reasons why he did not use
fall protective equipment, one reason being there was nowhere to
anchor it. If such equipment was unusable because there was
nowhere to anchor it, then perhaps the only alternative was to use
different scaffolding. That decision would have been
appropriately made by whoever was supervising the Project.
15 A-0981-16T1
Plaintiff's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit
to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the summary judgment
order in favor of Werner but reverse the summary judgment in favor
of Sikorski and remand for trial.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for trial.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
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