OFCHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY v. P.M and A.C. and S.P IN THE MATTER OF C.C. and S.P Minors

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                        NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                      APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
      Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
        parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.




                                       SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                       APPELLATE DIVISION
                                       DOCKET NO. A-0813-16T1



NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD
PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

        Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

P.M.,

        Defendant-Appellant,

and

A.C. and S.P.,

     Defendants.
______________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF C.C. and S.P.,

     Minors.
______________________________________

              Argued January 9, 2018 – Decided February 23, 2018

              Before Judges Yannotti, Carroll and Mawla.

              On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
              Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex
              County, Docket No. FN-12-0276-15.
           Richard Foster, Assistant Deputy Public
           Defender, argued the cause for appellant
           (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney;
           Richard Foster, of counsel and on the briefs).

           Joshua Bohn, Deputy Attorney General, argued
           the cause for respondent (Christopher S.
           Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa
           Dutton Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General,
           of counsel; Joshua Bohn, on the brief).

           Lisa M. Black, Designated Counsel, argued the
           cause for minors (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
           Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Lisa M.
           Black, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

     P.M. appeals from an order entered by the Family Part on

March 8, 2016, which found that her minor child S.P. was an abused

or neglected child within the meaning of 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4),

due to her inadequate supervision and medical neglect. On appeal,

P.M. also claims she did not have the effective assistance of

counsel at the fact-finding hearing. For the reasons that follow,

we affirm the trial court's order finding that P.M. abused or

neglected S.P. and reject P.M.'s claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel.

                                  I.

     We   briefly   summarize   the       relevant   facts   and   procedural

history. P.M. is the mother of two daughters, C.C. (born in October

2005) and S.P. (born in November 2012). C.C. has always lived with

her maternal grandmother. S.P. lived with P.M. until shortly before

                                      2                               A-0813-16T1
this action was commenced, when she began to reside with her

father, S.A.P.

       On June 2, 2015, S.A.P. picked up S.P. for his routine visit

and noticed that she had numerous marks and bruises on her body.

S.A.P. brought the child to the Raritan Bay Hospital Center for

evaluation. A staff member of the hospital notified the Division

of Child Protection and Permanency (Division), which began an

investigation that was handled by caseworker Angela Flores. S.A.P.

informed Flores that he had been told another child had bitten

S.P.

       Thereafter, Flores interviewed P.M., who told Flores that on

May 30, 2015, she had a gathering with relatives and friends at

her home. P.M. drank beer during the day and at approximately

12:45 a.m. on May 31, 2015, she went to a bar. P.M. left S.P. in

the care of her friend, E.P., who has a three-year-old son, A.J.

P.M. said that when she left to go to the bar, S.P. did not have

any marks on her body. At the bar, P.M. had "at least [two] shots

of Hennessey and cranberry."

       P.M. said that when she returned home from the bar, she did

not notice any injuries or wounds on S.P. She laid down on the

same bed with S.P. and A.J. When she woke in the morning, P.M.

discovered that S.P. had numerous bites or bruises on her body.

P.M. told Flores she did not hear S.P. cry or scream while she was

                                  3                         A-0813-16T1
sleeping. She said she did not bring S.P. to the hospital because

she feared the Division would investigate and remove the child.

       P.M. told Flores she called E.P. and informed her that S.P.

had marks on her body. E.P. said A.J. had bitten S.P. P.M. claimed

she took the child to a physician, but she could not produce the

doctor's name or address, and she denied the doctor had provided

her with any paperwork.

       Flores also interviewed E.P. and her son. E.P. said A.J. had

a history of biting other children. A.J. admitted he bit S.P.

while they were alone on the bed.

       The Division asked S.A.P. to pick up S.P. and keep her in his

care    until   a   medical   evaluation   could   be   performed.    S.P.'s

pediatrician evaluated the child on June 4, 2015. She found marks

on the child's body, which she believed could be bite marks. She

said the child had broken skin in very sensitive areas, such as

the shoulders and an eyelid. The injuries were extensive and the

child was in pain when touched. The doctor noted she had treated

S.P. since her birth and there was no indication of abuse in the

past.

       The Division also had Gladibel Medina, M.D. evaluate the

child's injuries. According to Dr. Medina, S.P. had marks and

bites all over her body. The child's skin had been broken and

scabs had formed. Her right eye had a puncture with broken skin.

                                     4                               A-0813-16T1
Dr. Medina stated that because the child's injuries were so

extensive, she had to have been screaming while being bit. The

doctor said a child could have inflicted the injuries.

     On June 29, 2015, the Division filed a verified complaint for

the care and supervision of S.P. and C.C., alleging that both

children were abused or neglected within the meaning of N.J.S.A.

9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b). In addition to P.M., the Division named S.A.P.

and C.C.'s father, A.C., as defendants.

     The Family Part judge heard testimony on June 29, 2015, and

granted the Division's application for care and supervision of the

children. The judge did not change the children's legal or physical

custody. The judge ordered P.M. to participate in substance abuse

treatment and allowed her liberal visitation, supervised by the

Division.

     On August 11, 2016, the return date of the order to show

cause, the court entered an order, which continued the children

in the Division's care and supervision. The judge ordered that

S.P. would remain in the physical custody of her father, and C.C.

would remain with her maternal grandmother. The judge ordered P.M.

to attend substance abuse treatment and individual counseling. The

court again allowed P.M. to have liberal supervised visits with

the children.



                                5                           A-0813-16T1
     Beginning on December 15, 2015, the judge conducted a fact-

finding hearing on the Division's allegations of abuse or neglect.

At the first proceeding, Flores testified regarding the Division's

involvement in the matter and her observations of the family. The

Division submitted photographs of S.P.'s injuries, which were

admitted into evidence.

     At the next proceeding, which took place on January 20, 2016,

the court admitted Dr. Medina's report into evidence and Dr. Medina

testified. In her report, the doctor detailed the injuries that

S.P. had sustained, which included bite marks on the left cheek,

right cheek, the upper right extremity, back, and eyelid.

     Dr. Medina found that the bite marks were consistent with

bites by a child. She stated that the bites were forceful enough

to leave teeth impressions and create puncture wounds. She opined

that the injuries were indicative of a physical assault which

lasted   over   a   period   of   time,   and   were   likely   painful   and

distressing to the child.

     In the report, Dr. Medina stated.

           Under normal circumstances, a caretaker just
           asleep would have likely awakened after the
           first bite, especially when on the face,
           thereby stopping the other injuries from being
           inflicted. However, in this case, it is
           possible that [S.P.'s] mother while under the
           influence of alcohol was not arousable to
           prevent   the    assault   from    continuing.
           Nevertheless, the following morning after the

                                      6                              A-0813-16T1
          injuries were observed, [S.P.] should have
          been taken for medical attention because the
          injuries were extensive over her body and
          involved open wounds and abrasions that can
          be associated with increased risk of skin
          superinfection if not appropriately cleansed
          and cared for. Medical neglect and maternal
          substance [abuse] significant enough to
          hinder/impede [P.M.'s] ability to respond to
          [S.P.'s] needs at the time she was responsible
          for caring for [S.P.] is a major concern.

          [S.P.'s] injuries are inflicted in nature even
          though not necessarily abusive since the
          alleged perpetrator is a toddler and biting
          is not uncommon behavior in this age group.
          [S.P.'s] injuries could have been preventable,
          [and] neglect due to the influence of alcohol
          appears contributory. Furthermore, failure to
          seek   medical   care    or   verbal   medical
          consultation regarding [S.P.'s] extensive
          cutaneous injuries is indicative of neglect
          as well.

     At the February 3, 2016 proceeding, P.M. presented an expert

report and testimony from Zhongxue Hua, M.D., Ph.D., who was

qualified as an expert in the fields of forensic pathology,

neuropathology, and forensic toxicology. In his report, Dr. Hua

opined that S.P.'s bite marks occurred when A.J. and S.P. were

alone, which was between 11:00 p.m. on May 30 and 1:45 a.m. on May

31, 2015. Dr. Hua based this opinion on his review of A.J.'s

statements and the statements of others involved.

     Dr. Hua said he disagreed with Dr. Medina's conclusion that

P.M. could have been unconscious when S.P. was attacked. The doctor

stated there was no forensic evidence to support that conclusion.

                                7                           A-0813-16T1
Dr. Hua also stated that E.P. probably left the children alone for

a   time,   even   though      she    was   supposed   to   be    babysitting    the

children.

      The Division then moved to strike Dr. Hua's report and

testimony, arguing he had provided a net opinion, which was

unsupported by facts. The judge granted the motion. The judge

noted that the doctor had based his opinion on an assessment of

the timing of the injuries based on the differing statements, but

gave more weight to A.J.'s statement.

      On March 8, 2016, the judge rendered her oral decision,

finding by a preponderance of the evidence that P.M. was S.P.'s

primary caregiver when the child suffered numerous bite marks. The

judge found that P.M. failed "to exercise a minimum degree of

care" because she failed to provide adequate supervision and proper

medical     attention    for    the    child.   The    judge     memorialized    her

decision in an order dated March 8, 2016.

      The judge conducted a compliance review hearing on May 24,

2016, and found that P.M. had not completed the court-ordered

substance     abuse     treatment.      Therefore,     S.P.      remained   in   her

father's physical custody, and C.C. remained with her maternal

grandmother. The court's order of May 24, 2016 again required P.M.

to attend substance abuse treatment and provided that P.M. could

continue to have liberal supervised visitation.

                                            8                               A-0813-16T1
       On September 14, 2016, the judge entered an order terminating

the abuse or neglect proceedings. The court's order continued the

children's existing custody arrangements, and again permitted P.M.

to have liberal supervised visitation. The order also stated that

any    modifications       to    the   existing   visitation    or   custody

arrangements must be made under the court's FD docket1 and P.M.

would be required to provide proof that she had completed substance

abuse treatment.

       P.M. thereafter filed a notice of appeal. She then filed a

motion in this court to supplement the record with documents,

which she contended were essential to the resolution of her claim

that she had been denied the effective assistance of counsel in

the fact-finding proceedings. We granted the motion.

                                       II.

       On appeal, P.M. argues that the judge erred by finding that

S.P.   was   an   abused    or    neglected   child   under   
N.J.S.A.   9:6-

8.21(c)(4). She contends the Division failed to present sufficient

credible evidence to support the judge's finding of inadequate

supervision and medical neglect.

       Initially, we note that the trial court's findings of fact


1
  The FD docket in the Family Part "consists of child custody,
visitation, child support, paternity, medical support, and spousal
support in non-divorce matters." B.C. v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot.
& Permanency, 
450 N.J. Super. 197, 205 (App. Div. 2017).

                                        9                            A-0813-16T1
in an abuse and neglect proceeding are entitled to deference and

will be upheld if supported by adequate, substantial, and credible

evidence   in   the   record.   N.J.    Div.   of   Youth   &   Family    Servs.

v. P.W.R., 
205 N.J. 17, 38 (2011) (citing N.J. Div. of Youth &

Family Servs. v. M.M., 
189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)). We will defer

to the trial court's findings unless the findings "went so wide

of the mark that a mistake must have been made." Ibid. (quoting

M.M., 
189 N.J. at 279).

      
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c) defines the term "abused or neglected

child" in relevant part as a child less than eighteen years of age

           whose physical, mental, or emotional condition
           has been impaired or is in imminent danger of
           becoming impaired as the result of the failure
           of his parent or guardian . . . to exercise a
           minimum degree of care (a) in supplying the
           child with adequate . . . medical or surgical
           care though financially able to do so . . .
           or (b) in providing the child with proper
           supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably
           inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm,
           or substantial risk thereof . . . .

     A finding of abuse and neglect under 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-21(c)(4)

"can be based on proof of imminent danger and a substantial risk

of harm." Dep't of Children & Families v. E.D.-O., 
223 N.J. 166,

178 (2015) (quoting N.J. Dep't of Children & Families v. A.L., 
213 N.J. 1, 22 (2013)). Moreover, the failure "to exercise a minimum

degree of care" refers to conduct that is "grossly or wantonly

negligent, but not necessarily intentional." Id. at 179 (quoting

                                       10                                A-0813-16T1
G.S. v Dep't of Human Servs., 
157 N.J. 161, 178 (1999)).

     "Conduct is considered willful or wanton if done with the

knowledge that injury is likely to, or probably will, result."

Ibid. (quoting G.S., 
157 N.J. at 178–79). "[T]he concept of willful

and wanton misconduct implies that a person has acted with reckless

disregard for the safety of others." Ibid. (quoting G.S., 
157 N.J.

at 178–79).

     A parent or guardian "fails to exercise a minimum degree of

care when he or she is aware of the dangers inherent in a situation

and fails adequately to supervise the child or recklessly creates

a risk of serious injury to that child." Ibid. (quoting G.S., 
157 N.J. at 181). "Where an ordinary reasonable person would understand

that a situation poses dangerous risks and acts without regard for

the potentially serious consequences, the law holds [that person]

responsible for the injuries [he or she] causes." Ibid. (quoting

G.S., 
157 N.J. at 179).

     In addition, when "a parent or guardian acts in a grossly

negligent or reckless manner, that deviation from the standard of

care may support an inference that the child is subject to future

danger." Dep't of Children & Families v. T.B., 
207 N.J. 294, 307

(2011). On the other hand, if the parent or guardian has only been

negligent, "there is no warrant to infer that the child will be

at future risk." Ibid.

                               11                           A-0813-16T1
     A. Inadequate Supervision

     P.M. argues that the evidence does not support the judge's

finding that she failed to provide adequate supervision for S.P.

and thereby exposed the child to a risk of substantial injury. We

disagree.

     Inadequate supervision may constitute abuse or neglect under


N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b) if the parent or guardian's supervision

is grossly negligent or recklessly exposes the child to substantial

risk of harm and the child is in imminent danger of impairment.

E.D.-O., 
223 N.J. at 178-79. The Division may establish gross

negligence   based   on   inadequate   supervision   with   evidence   the

parent or guardian left a child unattended, thereby exposing the

child to potential harm. Id. at 181–85.

     Here, the judge found that P.M. was S.P.'s sole caretaker

when the child was injured. The judge noted that S.P. had received

seventeen different bites, and the injuries were significant. The

judge found that P.M. either left the children unattended or was

so inebriated she could not hear the child's cries as she was

attacked. The judge noted that P.M. had stated she did not hear

S.P. cry, and Dr. Medina had testified it was highly unlikely the

child would not have screamed or cried during the attack.

     The judge stated that P.M. may have been "out cold from

drinking" or "just outside somewhere." Nevertheless, the judge

                                  12                             A-0813-16T1
found that P.M. was the child's caregiver at the relevant time,

and whether intentional or not, she did nothing to prevent the

biting from continuing. The judge concluded that P.M. did not

exercise   the   minimum   degree   of   care   required   by   failing    to

adequately supervise the child.

     We are convinced there is sufficient credible evidence in the

record to support the judge's findings and conclusion that S.P.

was an abused or neglected child under 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b)

due to P.M.'s inadequate supervision. The record supports the

judge's determination that P.M. was grossly negligent and her

failure to supervise S.P. adequately exposed the child to the risk

of significant injuries, which she actually sustained.

     In support of her argument that the evidence does not support

the judge's finding of inadequate supervision, P.M. relies upon

New Jersey Division of Child Protection & Permanency v. J.C., 
440 N.J. Super. 568 (App. Div. 2015). In that case, we reversed the

trial court's abuse or neglect finding where on a single occasion

the parent drank alcohol to excess and slept late with her bedroom

door closed, leaving the child wearing a dirty diaper with the

apartment door ajar. Id. at 579. We noted there was no evidence

that the parent had left the door ajar while intoxicated, or that

she had even known it was ajar. Ibid.

     In J.C., we also noted that "there was no proof of harm to

                                    13                              A-0813-16T1
[the child], or that [the mother's] conduct met the statutory

standard of abuse or neglect." Ibid. In this case, however, S.P.

was seriously injured. She suffered numerous painful bites while

in her mother's care, and P.M.'s conduct met the statutory standard

for abuse or neglect. Thus, P.M.'s reliance upon J.C. is misplaced.

     P.M. also argues that our decision in New Jersey Division of

Child Protection & Permanency v. B.O., 
438 N.J. Super. 373 (App.

Div. 2014), does not support the trial judge's finding of abuse

or neglect. In B.O., we upheld an abuse or neglect finding after

a mother accidentally suffocated her child while sleeping and

under the influence of drugs, based on the mother's "reckless

disregard for the consequences." Id. at 381-82 (quoting G.S., 
157 N.J. at 178).

     P.M. contends that this case is substantially different from

B.O. She argues that the evidence shows she did not act in reckless

disregard of any potential harm because she was unaware that A.J.

had a propensity to bite other children. However, in this case

there is substantial evidence that P.M. did, in fact, act in

reckless disregard for the safety of S.P. As the judge found, P.M.

either left the child unattended or was so inebriated she could

not act to protect the child from further injury.

     B. Medical Neglect

     Next, P.M. argues that the judge erred by finding that S.P.

                               14                           A-0813-16T1
was an abused or neglected child under 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4) due

to medical neglect. She contends the Division failed to show that

her failure to bring the child for a medical evaluation and

treatment placed the child in imminent danger or a substantial

risk of harm.   Again, we disagree.

     As noted previously, the term "abused or neglected child" is

defined in 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4) to include a child "whose

physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is

in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure"

of that child's parent or guardian "to exercise a minimum degree

of care (a) in supplying the child with adequate . . . medical or

surgical care though financially able to do so . . . or (b) in

providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by

unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or

substantial risk thereof . . . ."

     Here, the judge found that the Division had established

medical neglect based on P.M.'s "failure to exercise a minimum

degree of care" because P.M. did not take the child to a doctor

or consult with a medical professional by phone after she observed

the child's injuries. The judge stated that "[t]here is absolutely

no proof in this case that [P.M.] took the child anywhere for

medical attention" even though S.P. was "obviously" in pain as a

result of "seventeen different injuries," including open wounds,

                               15                           A-0813-16T1
bite marks, and "[a] bite mark on top of a bite mark."

     Indeed, Dr. Medina had opined that the child's injuries posed

an increased risk of new skin infection if the injuries were not

cleaned and cared for appropriately. The judge also found it was

"quite compelling" that P.M. had claimed that she had taken S.P.

to a doctor, when there was no proof that she had done so.

     We are convinced that the evidence established that S.P.'s

injuries posed a substantial risk of further harm and should have

been treated promptly after they were inflicted. Indeed, Dr. Medina

emphasized that S.P. "should have received care right away, as

soon as the injuries were noted" in order to prevent the risk of

further injury. See T.B., 
207 N.J. at 307 (noting that gross

negligence can be found based on evidence that the child was

exposed to a risk of future harm).

     We reject P.M.'s contention that a finding of medical neglect

was not warranted because the child's bites and bruises did not

become infected. As the evidence shows, the child suffered actual

harm, and Dr. Medina's testimony established that the child was

placed at risk of further harm by P.M.'s failure to seek prompt

medical attention for the child's injuries.

     Therefore, we affirm the trial court's finding that S.P. was

an abused or neglected child within the meaning of 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.21(c)(4)(a) and (b), due to inadequate supervision and medical

                               16                            A-0813-16T1
neglect.

                                      III.

       P.M. also argues that she was denied the effective assistance

of counsel during the fact-finding proceedings. She contends her

attorney was deficient in handling the Division's medical neglect

allegations.

       A defendant in a Title 9 abuse or neglect proceeding has the

right to counsel, and indigent parents have the right to have an

attorney      appointed    to   represent    them.   
N.J.S.A.   9:6-8.43(a).

Moreover, the right to counsel in Title 9 proceedings is the right

to the effective assistance of counsel. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family

Servs. v. B.H., 
391 N.J. Super. 322, 345 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting

McMann v. Richardson, 
397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).

       To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the parent

or guardian must meet the two-part test established in Strickland

v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 558, 594 (1984). B.H., 
391 N.J. Super. at
 346-48; see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. B.R., 
192 N.J.   301,    308-09     (2007)   (applying   Strickland   test   in     cases

involving the termination of parental rights).

       Thus, the parent or guardian must first show that counsel's

performance was deficient, meaning that counsel's performance was

outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.

B.R., 
192 N.J. at 307 (citing Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694). The

                                      17                                A-0813-16T1
parent    or   guardian   also    must    show       that   counsel's    deficiency

prejudiced the defense, which requires the parent or guardian to

show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's

errors,   the    result   would   have        been   different.       Ibid.   (citing

Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694). P.M. has not satisfied the two prongs

of the Strickland test.

     The record shows that after the judge struck                         Dr. Hua's

testimony, the judge offered P.M.'s attorney the opportunity to

present other witnesses, which counsel declined. P.M. asserts that

her attorney should have sought additional time in which to locate

and identify an expert to provide a report and rebut Dr. Medina's

testimony.      Alternatively,     P.M.       asserts       counsel    should     have

presented documents already in her possession, which allegedly

showed that S.P.'s injuries were not as severe as Dr. Medina

indicated.

     P.M. has not, however, presented a report from a qualified

expert, which would have countered Dr. Medina's assessment of

S.P.'s injuries. In B.R., the Court noted that if a party claims

ineffective assistance of counsel due to a failure to produce an

expert or lay witness, the party must supply a certification from

any such witness detailing "the substance of the omitted evidence

along with arguments regarding its relevance." B.R., 
192 N.J. at
 311; see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. N.S., 412 N.J.

                                         18                                   A-0813-16T
1 Super. 593, 643 (App. Div. 2010) (rejecting ineffective assistance

claim based on failure to present witnesses because certifications

not provided to support the claim).

      On appeal, P.M. cites certain medical records, which she

claims show that S.P.'s injuries were not as severe as Dr. Medina

indicated. She has not, however, provided this court with                           a

certification from a qualified expert, with an opinion to a

reasonable degree of medical certainty, that S.P.'s injuries were

not serious, did not pose a substantial risk of further harm, and

did not require immediate medical attention.

      P.M. further argues that her attorney should have objected

to the judge's consideration of the Division's alleged "amended

allegations" of medical neglect and sought time in which to address

those      allegations.     However,      the    Division's     complaint        and

investigatory summaries included allegations of medical neglect.

      Furthermore, Flores raised the issue of medical neglect in

her testimony on the first hearing date on December 15, 2015, and

the judge questioned her on this issue. In addition, Dr. Medina's

June 2015 report and testimony at the proceeding on January 20,

2016, also addressed the issue of medical neglect. The judge held

an   additional     hearing      on   February   3,   2016,   wherein      Dr.   Hua

testified and the court granted the Division's motion to strike.

      In    light   of    this    procedural     history,     there   is     little

                                        19                                  A-0813-16T1
likelihood the court would have granted P.M. additional time to

address the issue of medical neglect even if counsel had made such

a request. In any event, P.M. cannot show that the outcome of the

proceeding would have been different even if the court had granted

P.M.'s attorney additional time and counsel had presented evidence

disputing Dr. Medina's testimony on medical neglect.

       P.M. has not shown that it is reasonably probable the court

would have reached a different conclusion on the issue of medical

neglect. Even if that were the case, the result of this proceeding

here would have been the same. The court found that S.P. was an

abused or neglected child based on inadequate supervision. That

finding would not have changed if the court had reached a different

conclusion regarding medical neglect.

       We therefore conclude P.M. was not denied the effective

assistance    of   counsel   in    the     abuse    or   neglect   fact-finding

proceedings. P.M. failed to show that her attorney's handling of

the case fell below the wide range of professional assistance or

that   the   result   of   the    proceeding       probably   would   have   been

different if counsel had handled the issue of medical neglect

along the lines suggested by P.M.

       Affirmed.




                                      20                                 A-0813-16T1