MORRIS PLAINS HOLDING VF LLC v. MILANO FRENCH CLEANERS, INC

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                      APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
      Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
        parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.




                                       SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                       APPELLATE DIVISION
                                       DOCKET NO. A-0604-16T1

MORRIS PLAINS HOLDING VF,
LLC,

        Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MILANO FRENCH CLEANERS, INC.
and ALFONSO MEGHNAGI,

        Defendants,

and

VITO MEGHNAGI,

     Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________________

              Submitted April 10, 2018 – Decided April 20, 2018

              Before Judges Fisher and Moynihan.

              On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
              Law Division, Morris County, Docket No. L-
              1303-13.

              Lindabury, McCormick, Estabrook & Cooper, PC,
              attorneys for appellant (Vito A. Pinto, of
              counsel and on the brief).

              Cole Schotz PC, attorneys for               respondent
              (David M. Kohane and Wendy F.               Klein, of
          counsel; David M. Kohane, Wendy F. Klein and
          Elizabeth A. Carbone, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

     In this appeal, we consider the imposition of Spill Act1

liability on defendant Vito Meghnagi, the sole shareholder of an

entity that operated a dry-cleaning business. Finding no error in

the judge's determination at the conclusion of a nonjury trial

that Meghnagi was a responsible party, we affirm.

     Plaintiff Morris Plains Holding VF owns a shopping center in

Morris Plains. In 1987, defendant Milano French Cleaners Inc.

(Milano) leased space in the shopping center to operate a dry-

cleaning business. Meghnagi was then and always has been Milano's

only shareholder.

     In 1999, tetrachloroethylene (PCE) – a substance commonly

used by dry-cleaning businesses – in excess of soil-remediation

standards was found on the property. Milano spent approximately

$140,000 toward remediating the property over a ten-year period

before closing its business in July 2012 and filing for bankruptcy

protection. Plaintiff assumed responsibility for remediation and,

in May 2013, commenced this suit. After a four-day nonjury trial




1
  Spill Compensation and Control Act, 
N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11 to -
23.24.

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in August 2014, the judge found Meghnagi to be a responsible party

within the meaning of the Spill Act.

       Meghnagi appeals and argues we must reverse because:

            I. THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL DID NOT ESTABLISH
            THAT [MEGHNAGI] IS LIABLE AS A "DISCHARGER"
            UNDER THE SPILL ACT.

            II. PURSUANT TO THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
            . . . IN DIMANT,[2] [MEGHNAGI] IS NOT "IN ANY
            WAY RESPONSIBLE" FOR A DISCHARGE OF HAZARDOUS
            SUBSTANCES BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF A
            SUFFICIENT NEXUS TO ESTABLISH LIABILITY.

            III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING JOINT
            AND SEVERAL LIABILITY ON [MEGHNAGI] PURSUANT
            TO COUNT I OF ITS COMPLAINT UNDER [N.J.S.A.
            58:10-23.11(g)(c)(1)].

            IV. THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE DO NOT JUSTIFY THE
            COURT PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL OF MILANO
            . . . IN ORDER TO IMPOSE PERSONAL LIABILITY
            ON . . . MEGHNAGI.

We find insufficient merit in these arguments to warrant further

discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), and affirm

substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Robert J. Brennan

in his oral decision. We add only the following few comments.

       The Spill Act imposes liability on persons "in any way

responsible" for discharges of hazardous substances:

            Whenever one or more dischargers or persons
            cleans up and removes a discharge of hazardous
            substance, those dischargers and persons shall
            have a right of contribution against all other
            dischargers and persons in any way responsible

2
    N.J. Dep't of Environ. Prot. v. Dimant, 
212 N.J. 153 (2012).

                                  3                           A-0604-16T1
            for a discharged hazardous substance or other
            persons who are liable for the cost of the
            cleanup and removal of that discharge of a
            hazardous substance.

            [N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f(a)(2)(a).]

Liability    arises      whether   the       discharge   was    the   result       of

"intentional or unintentional" acts or omissions. 
N.J.S.A. 58:10-

23.11b.

     In seeking reversal, Meghnagi urges, among other things, a

lack of evidence to demonstrate he was "in any way responsible,"

N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f(a)(2)(a), and also that Dimant required a

greater   nexus     to   the   discharge      than   shown    here.   The    former

contention seems to rest on the absence of a witness claiming to

have seen Meghnagi actually discharge PCE onto the property. The

judge properly recognized that the lack of what he referred to as

a "smoking gun witness" was of no moment. The evidence adduced at

trial, upon which the judge was entitled to rely, demonstrated

that: Meghnagi's dry-cleaning business was the only such business

ever on the property and that it operated there for twenty-five

years; the operation used approximately fifteen gallons of PCE

annually; the machinery used sat on a concrete floor without

drains;     there   was    evidence      of    spills    in    that   area;      and

contamination was found in the soil directly beneath the dry-

cleaning machine. Based on this and other evidence, plaintiff's


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expert concluded that "the source of the soil, groundwater[,] and

air . . . is related to Milano French Cleaner's use, and release

or discharge, of PCE into the environment[,]" and that there was

no "credible mechanism" through which soil contamination could

have migrated either horizontally or vertically to a place directly

beneath the dry-cleaning operation. In response, Meghnagi provided

little   more    than   unfounded     speculation   about   other     potential

causes of the contamination and his own self-serving denials.

      The thorough factual findings rendered by the judge in favor

of plaintiff's position were fully supported by the credible

evidence.    Our standard of review requires deference "unless we

are   convinced    that    [the   judge's   findings]     are   so   manifestly

unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and

reasonably      credible   evidence    as   to   offend   the   interests      of

justice." Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 
65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974); see also D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 
216 N.J.
 168, 182 (2013). Meghnagi has offered no principled basis upon

which we might conclude the findings offend the interests of

justice. To the contrary, the credible evidence fully supported

the experienced judge's factual determinations.

      We also reject Meghnagi's argument that the judge erred in

disregarding his corporate veil. The evidence firmly established

the judge's findings that Meghnagi was "everything" vis-à-vis this

                                        5                               A-0604-16T1
business: its sole shareholder, the operator of the business, the

person responsible for overseeing and handling the PCE used, and

the person charged with ensuring legal and regulatory compliance.

The fact that the Spill Act broadly imposes liability on persons

"in   any    way      responsible,"     N.J.S.A.       58:10-23.11f(a)(2)(a),

demonstrates    the     legislative   intent      to   expand   the   scope    of

liability without regard for corporate veils and the like. Indeed,

the Legislature expressly called for a "liberal[] constru[ction]"

of the Spill Act "to effect its purposes."             
N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11x;

see also Marsh v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 
152 N.J. 137, 146

(1997). It is quite clear that through its in-any-way-responsible

language, the Legislature did not intend that a shareholder of a

close corporation could contaminate property, put his corporation

in bankruptcy, and walk away from the problem. And Dimant does not

suggest otherwise; in Dimant, the Court continued to maintain that

only a "reasonable nexus" is necessary to demonstrate a person's

responsibility for contribution. 
212 N.J. at 182. This test does

not impose on plaintiffs an obligation to satisfy proximate-cause

principles because, as the Court recognized, such a "precondition"

to Spill Act relief "would thwart the salutary public purpose

underlying     this     comprehensive       and   groundbreaking      statutory

program." Id. at 181-82. We agree substantially for the thoughtful

reasons expressed by Judge Brennan that plaintiff established that

                                        6                               A-0604-16T1
reasonable nexus and that it was appropriate to impose Spill Act

liability on Meghnagi.

    Affirmed.




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