STATE TROOPERS FRATERNAL ASSOCIATION v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0532-15T4
STATE TROOPERS FRATERNAL
ASSOCIATION; STATE TROOPERS
NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS
ASSOCIATION; and STATE TROOPERS
SUPERIOR OFFICERS ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, CHRISTOPHER
CHRISTIE, THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, DIVISION OF STATE
POLICE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
AND SUPERINTENDENT OF STATE POLICE
RICARDO FUENTES IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY,
Defendants-Respondents.
__________________________________
Argued November 29, 2017 – Decided January 24, 2018
Before Judges Alvarez, Nugent and Currier.
On appeal from the Division of State Police
and the Governor's Office of Employee
Relations.
Michael A. Bukosky argued the cause for
appellants (Loccke, Correia & Bukosky,
attorneys; Lauren P. Sandy, of counsel and on
the briefs).
Steven W. Suflas argued the cause for
respondents (Ballard Spahr, LLP, attorneys;
Steven W. Suflas and Emily J. Daher, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellants, State Troopers Fraternal Association, State
Troopers Non-Commissioned Officers Association, and State Troopers
Superior Officers Association, filed this appeal after receiving
an August 24, 2015 letter, written by an attorney for the State
of New Jersey, Division of State Police (the "Division") 1 during
negotiations for a new collective negotiations agreement. The
letter informed appellants, among other things, of the Division's
decision to suspend the factfinding process, discontinue paying
step increases as requested by the factfinder, and initiate
compulsory interest arbitration.
In their notice of appeal, appellants characterize the
Division's letter and decisions as a "State Agency decision entered
on August 24, 2015/inaction." We conclude that the Division's
decision, embodied in the quoted letter, does not constitute a
final action or inaction of a state administrative agency or
officer for purposes of conferring jurisdiction upon the Appellate
1
For ease of reference, we refer to the Division rather than to
all respondents.
2 A-0532-15T4
Division. We further conclude appellants failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies. For these reasons, we dismiss the appeal.
This is the factual background. In June 2012, the collective
negotiations agreements between the Division and Appellants
expired. Approximately two years later, in 2014, the parties
agreed to appoint a factfinder in an attempt to resolve their
impasse. In August 2015, in a letter written by its attorney, the
Division suspended the factfinding process and decided to initiate
compulsory interest arbitration. The letter provided in pertinent
part:
Please accept this letter as formal
notice that effective immediately, the
Governor's Office of Employee Relations and
the Division of State Police are suspending
the fact-finding process with respect to the
above-listed negotiations units, given the
employer's decision to file a Petition to
Initiate Compulsory Interest Arbitration with
the Public Employment Relations Commission.
. . . .
Finally, following the strong
recommendation of [the] Fact-Finder . . ., the
parties agreed that the Division would
continue to provide applicable incremental
step increases for Troopers in the
negotiations units during the fact-finding
process only. With the suspension of that
process, that agreement is no longer in place.
Accordingly, based upon the express language
in those contracts and governing case law,
increment payments will no longer be continued
effective with Pay Period 20, pending the
interest arbitration process.
3 A-0532-15T4
Appellants filed an emergent application with the Appellate
Division seeking to stay the Division's decision not to issue
salary increment raises pending interest arbitration. The
Appellate Division denied appellants' application. Appellants
next sought the same emergent relief from the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court denied appellants' request for emergent relief,
stating in its order, "it appearing, on this record, that the
Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate this matter."
Having been unsuccessful in their efforts to stay the
Division's decision, appellants filed this appeal, which purports
to challenge the "Final Agency Decision of the Division of State
Police and Governor's Office of Employee Relations dated August
24, 2015 ordering Incremental Step Increases for State Troopers
frozen." Two days later, appellants and the State Troopers
Captains Association filed a verified complaint in the Law
Division, Mercer County, seeking the same relief sought in this
appeal. The Division subsequently petitioned the Public
Employment Relations Commission (PERC) to initiate compulsory
interest arbitration, as did the State Troopers Non-Commissioned
Officers Association. An arbitrator rendered decisions and awards
in the matters involving the State Troopers Fraternal Association
and the State Troopers Non-Commissioned Officers Association. The
4 A-0532-15T4
awards included dispositions of the issues raised on this appeal
concerning the Division's payment of step increases. The State
Troopers Fraternal Association filed an appeal to PERC of the
arbitrator's award denying restoration of the frozen salary
increments.2
We first address the issue of jurisdiction. The Division
contends the appellate court is without jurisdiction to hear this
matter because appellants have not appealed from a final decision
of an administrative agency or officer. Appellants counter that
the Division's refusal or failure to implement what appellants
claim to be automatic annual increases constitutes either agency
action or inaction from which appeals may be taken directly to the
Appellate Division. Appellants further contend the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies may be relaxed in cases
involving solely a question of law. They contend this case
presents such a question.
Having considered the parties' arguments, we conclude we have
no jurisdiction. The New Jersey Constitution provides for
appellate review of both trial court decisions and administrative
agency action. "Appeals may be taken to the Appellate Division
2
We are unaware of the final disposition of the Order to Show
Cause appellants filed in Superior Court and the administrative
appeal or appeals the State Troopers Fraternal Association filed.
5 A-0532-15T4
of the Superior Court from the law and chancery divisions of the
Superior Court, the County Courts and in such other causes as may
be provided by law." N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, ¶ 2. "Prerogative
writs are superseded and, in lieu thereof, review, hearing and
relief shall be afforded in the Superior Court, on terms and in
the manner provided by rules of the Supreme Court, as of right,
except in criminal causes where such review shall be
discretionary." N.J. Const. art. VI, § 5, ¶ 4.
Rule 2:2-3(a)(2) states in pertinent part that appeals may
be taken to the Appellate Division as of right:
(2) to review final decisions or actions of
any state administrative agency or officer,
and to review the validity of any rule
promulgated by such agency or officer
excepting matters prescribed by R. 8:2 (tax
matters) and matters governed by R. 4:74-8
(Wage Collection Section appeals), except that
review pursuant to this subparagraph shall not
be maintainable so long as there is available
a right of review before any administrative
agency or officer, unless the interest of
justice requires otherwise[.]
The rule requires in the first instance that an agency
decision must be final. The Supreme Court has provided guidance
as to when an agency action is final.
A trial court's order is generally "considered final if it
disposes of all issues as to all parties." Silviera-Francisco v.
Bd. of Educ.,
224 N.J. 126, 136 (2016). Thus, "in a multi-party
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. . . case, an order granting summary judgment, dismissing all
claims against one of several defendants, is not a final order
subject to appeal as of right until all claims against the
remaining defendants have been resolved by motion or entry of a
judgment following a trial." Ibid. The Court added, "[t]he same
principle pertains to orders and decisions of state administrative
agencies." Ibid.
"Final agency action is also characterized by findings of
fact, conclusions of law, a definitive ruling, and a clear
statement that the interested party may seek review of the decision
and the manner in which that may be accomplished." Id. at 139.
So, for example, "a letter without those necessary elements and
written in terms that caused the Court to consider the letter no
more than 'a polite refusal' by the agency to change its previously
stated position could not be considered final agency action for
purposes of triggering a right to appeal." Ibid.
In the case before us, neither the Division attorney's letter
nor the Division's action referenced in the letter contained any
indicia of a final administrative agency action. The letter
certainly did not dispose of all outstanding issues the parties
were negotiating in an effort to finalize a collective negotiations
agreement. The letter did not undertake to set forth comprehensive
findings of fact, dispositive conclusions of law, and a definitive
7 A-0532-15T4
ruling, nor did it contain a clear statement about how appellants
could seek review. In short, the letter was nothing more than a
statement that the Division was going to pursue its statutory
right to initiate compulsory interest arbitration and therefore
discontinue the course of action it had undertaken to facilitate
the factfinding process.
Not only did the Division attorney's letter lack any indicia
of a final agency decision or action, but appellants also had
"available a right of review before an[] administrative agency."
Rule 2:2-3(a)(2). This is evidenced by the course the parties
chose in this very case. They initiated compulsory interest
arbitration, an arbitrator rendered two decisions, and, in at
least one of those instances, appellants exercised their right to
take an administrative appeal to PERC.
The Supreme Court's decision in In re County of Atlantic,
230 N.J. 237 (2017), represents a further instance in which collective
bargaining units exhausted their administrative remedies before
resorting to an appeal to the Appellate Division. Like the case
before us, the issue in In re County of Atlantic was "whether the
parties to the specific collective negotiations agreements . . .
at issue . . . were required to continue scheduled salary increases
during the period between the expiration of those contracts and
the formation of their successor agreements."
230 N.J. at 242.
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When Atlantic County informed the bargaining units it would no
longer implement the incremental salary scheme provided for in
those contracts, the unions filed charges with PERC, claiming that
the County had engaged in an unfair labor practice. Ibid. Only
after a hearing examiner and PERC rendered decisions did the unions
seek review in the Appellate Division. Id. at 242-43.
Here, regardless of whether appellants characterize the
Division attorney's letter as administrative action, namely,
terminating payments respondents had been making at the urging of
the fact finder; or inaction, namely, not making payments
respondents were required to make; neither the letter nor the
cessation of payments constituted final agency action.
Consequently, the Appellate Division does not have jurisdiction
under Rule 2:2-3(a)(2). The appeal must be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
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