SUSANEDEN v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM -

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                                       SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                       APPELLATE DIVISION
                                       DOCKET NO. A-0449-16T1

SUSAN EDEN,

        Petitioner-Appellant,


v.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT
SYSTEM,

     Respondent-Respondent.
______________________________

              Argued January 10, 2018 – Decided March 1, 2018

              Before Judges Alvarez and Currier.

              On appeal from the Board of Trustees, Public
              Employees' Retirement System, Docket No.
              1002872

              Samuel M. Gaylord argued the                cause for
              appellant (Gaylord Popp, LLC,               attorneys;
              Samuel M. Gaylord, on the brief).

              Christina Cella, Deputy Attorney General,
              argued the cause for respondent (Christopher
              S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney;
              Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General,
              of counsel; Christina Cella, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
       Petitioner Susan Eden appeals from the August 18, 2016 final

decision of respondent, the Board of Trustees of the Public

Employees' Retirement System (PERS), which adopted the June 23,

2016   initial   decision   of   an   Administrative    Law   Judge     (ALJ)

affirming respondent's denial of petitioner's application for

ordinary   disability   retirement        benefits.   After   a   review     of

petitioner's arguments, in light of the record and applicable

principles of law, we affirm.

       Petitioner was enrolled in PERS on March 1, 1996, when she

became employed by the Camden County Health Services Center (Camden

County) as a licensed practical nurse (LPN). She remained employed

by Camden County until November 25, 2013, when petitioner was

dismissed due to a reduction in the work force.

       Petitioner alleges that she suffered injuries due to several

work-related incidents between 2011 and 2013.           In November 2011,

petitioner slipped and fell at work, causing pain in her lower

back and leg.    She was released to full duty in February 2012.             In

June 2013, while transferring a "very large patient" into a bed,

she felt sharp pain in her back.          Petitioner states she attempted

to return to work, but was unable to perform her job duties and

she began to use her sick time.           On November 4, 2013, petitioner

was released to full duty with no restrictions.



                                      2                               A-0449-16T1
       After returning to full duty in November 2013, petitioner

states she had difficulty standing up from a kneeling position.

After a Functional Capacity Exam (FCE) was conducted,1 petitioner

was given a twenty-pound weight restriction at work. Nevertheless,

she states she continued to physically struggle while performing

her job and began to take sick days again.

       On January 22, 2014, petitioner filed an application for

accidental disability retirement benefits based on the 2011 and

2013 incidents.           On June 18, 2014, PERS denied petitioner's

application for accidental disability retirement benefits, finding

that   she   was    not   totally   and        permanently    disabled   from   the

performance of her regular and assigned duties.

       Petitioner     appealed      this       denial   and    the   matter     was

transferred to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) on August

21, 2014.2   Following petitioner's lay-off from her employment due

to a reduction in the work force, she accepted a position as an

LPN for a private company, Lincoln Specialty Care, where she works

two full shifts each weekend because there is "less demand and she

can work at her own pace."


1
   The FCE indicated that petitioner "used sub-maximal effort and
magnified   or   exaggerated  her   symptoms  and/or   functional
limitations."
2
   With respondent's consent, petitioner amended her application
to seek only ordinary disability benefits.

                                           3                               A-0449-16T1
     After   hearing   testimony   from   petitioner,   and   orthopedic

surgeons on behalf of both parties, the ALJ issued an initial

decision on June 23, 2016.         The ALJ found that the evidence

"indisputably" showed that petitioner could continue to work as

an LPN.      In denying her application for ordinary disability

retirement, the ALJ reasoned:

          the fact that [petitioner] is able to perform
          duties in the general area of her ordinary
          employment as a practical nurse while working
          at Lincoln Specialty Care shows that she is
          not physically incapacitated as a practical
          nurse and, therefore, not entitled to an
          ordinary disability retirement.    While her
          current position as a practical nurse may be
          less physically demanding than her prior
          public employment, she is able to perform
          general duties as a practical nurse for full
          shifts on back-to-back days.

     PERS affirmed the ALJ's decision on August 18, 2016.               On

appeal, petitioner argues that she is totally and permanently

disabled from the performance of her regular and assigned job

duties.

     Our review of an administrative agency's decision is limited.

Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 
206 N.J. 14,

27 (2011).   We will sustain the Board's decision "unless there is

a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable,

or that it lacks fair support in the record."       Ibid. (quoting In

re Herrmann, 
192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007)).      As the reviewing court,


                                   4                             A-0449-16T1
we "may not substitute [our] own judgment for the agency's, even

though      [we]    might     have     reached         a   different      result."        In    re

Stallworth, 
208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (quoting In re Carter, 
191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007)).

       While       we   generally       "afford         substantial       deference       to    an

agency's interpretation of [the] statute that the agency is charged

with    enforcing[,]"          we    are    "in       no   way    bound     by    the   agency's

interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly

legal issue."           Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret.

Sys., 
192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007) (first citing R&R Mktg., L.L.C. v.

Brown-Forman Corp., 
158 N.J. 170, 175 (1999), then quoting In re

Taylor,      
158 N.J.      644,    658    (1999)).             We   review      an   agency's

interpretation of a statute or case law de novo.                             Russo, 
206 N.J.

at 27.

       Applying         our   highly       deferential           standard    of     review,     we

conclude that there is substantial credible evidence in the record

to     support      respondent's           finding         that    petitioner       failed      to

demonstrate        an    entitlement         to       ordinary     disability       retirement

benefits.

       In    order      to    qualify       for       ordinary     disability       retirement

benefits under 
N.J.S.A. 43:15A-42, petitioner must establish by a

preponderance of the credible evidence that she is physically or

mentally incapacitated from performing her duties.                               "The applicant

                                                  5                                      A-0449-16T1
for ordinary disability retirement benefits has the burden to

prove that he or she has a disabling condition and must produce

expert evidence to sustain this burden."              Bueno v. Bd. of Trs.,

Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund, 
404 N.J. Super. 119, 126 (App.

Div. 2008).    She "must establish incapacity to perform duties in

the general area of [her] ordinary employment[,] rather than merely

show[] [an] inability to perform [her] specific job."              Id. at 130-

31 (quoting Skulski v. Nolan, 
68 N.J. 179, 205-06 (1975)).

     In applying this standard, we are satisfied that petitioner

did not meet her burden.        As the ALJ noted, while petitioner "may

not be able to perform some of the more physically demanding duties

. . . [of] a practical nurse, she has not shown that she cannot

physically    perform   other    duties   in    the   general   area   of   the

position."    The ALJ further found that petitioner's "employment

as a practical nurse . . . at Lincoln . . . shows that she is not

physically incapacitated from performing duties in the general

area of employment as a practical nurse."             The ALJ also concluded

that the fact that petitioner "only works two days a week does not

alter   the   conclusion    that     [petitioner]       is   not   physically

incapacitated as a practical nurse."           Petitioner's own expert even

concluded that she was not totally and permanently disabled from

nursing.



                                      6                                A-0449-16T1
      Having reviewed the record on appeal, we are satisfied that

petitioner failed to demonstrate that PERS' affirmance of the

ALJ's initial decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable,

or that it was not supported by substantial credible evidence in

the   record.     In   finding   that       petitioner   was   not   physically

incapacitated from performing duties in the general area of her

ordinary employment as a practical nurse, the ALJ assessed the

expert testimony presented by both parties.                    We must afford

appropriate deference to the ALJ's and PERS' findings, where, as

here, those findings are based on sufficient credible evidence in

the record.     See Taylor, 
158 N.J. at 658-59.           Accordingly, there

is no basis to disturb respondent's decision.

      Affirmed.




                                        7                               A-0449-16T1


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