JOSEPH PISANO v. AAS REALTY HOLDINGS, INC
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0325-16T1
JOSEPH PISANO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
AAS REALTY HOLDINGS, INC.,
Defendant-Respondent.
————————————————————————————————————
Argued November 28, 2017 – Decided April 20, 2018
Before Judges Leone and Mawla.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Union County, Docket No. L-0948-
15.
Daniel J. Williams argued the cause for
appellant (John J. Pisano, attorney; Mr.
Pisano, on the brief).
Robert J. Gallop argued the cause for
respondent (O'Toole Fernandez Weiner Van Lieu,
LLC, attorneys; Mr. Gallop, of counsel and on
the brief; Max S. Sverdlove, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this trip-and-fall case, plaintiff Joseph Pisano appeals
an August 19, 2016 order granting summary judgment to defendant
AAS Realty Holdings, Inc., and dismissing Pisano's personal injury
complaint, and a September 16, 2016 order denying reconsideration.
We affirm.
I.
Plaintiff was deposed and testified as follows. On February
15, 2015, around noon, plaintiff was outside his home. He saw
Gavin, a friend of plaintiff's son, park his vehicle in the parking
lot of a doctor's office located across the street.
Plaintiff walked across the street to talk to Gavin.
Plaintiff crossed the sidewalk and entered the parking lot. As
he approached and was talking to Gavin, he stepped into a partly-
uncovered drain. He described it as "a sewer grate that goes
. . . across the driveway," covered by ten-inch-square grates, one
of which was missing. He tripped and fell. It was a clear day,
the grate was "open and obvious," his view was not blocked, but
he did not look at the grate or notice the square that was missing.
If plaintiff had looked at the area as he was walking, he would
have seen that a square was missing and avoided stepping into it.
Plaintiff was not a patient at the doctor's office and was
not attempting to go to the doctor's office. As it was a Sunday,
the doctor's office was closed. When asked why Gavin parked his
vehicle on defendant's lot, plaintiff stated, "I think the kids
just pull in there and everybody from the other bar right there
too, everybody uses that parking lot on the weekends." Plaintiff
2 A-0325-16T1
filed a complaint against defendant, the owner of the property
containing the doctor's office and its parking lot. The complaint
alleged defendant was negligent in failing to maintain the drainage
cover, causing plaintiff's fall and his resulting severe and
permanent injuries.
Following the conclusion of discovery, defendant filed a
motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that plaintiff
was a trespasser and therefore would only be owed a duty to warn
of artificial conditions on the property that posed a risk of
death or serious bodily injury. Further, the court found defendant
owed plaintiff no duty because he had not presented any evidence
that defendant knew or should have known about the alleged
uncovered drain on its property, or that people were parking in
the doctor's office parking lot on weekends while they patronized
other area businesses. Plaintiff appeals.
II.
Summary judgment must be granted if the court determines
"that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a
matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c). The court must "consider whether
the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party in consideration of
the applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a
3 A-0325-16T1
rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor
of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995). An appellate court "review[s] the trial
court's grant of summary judgment de novo under the same standard
as the trial court." Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union
Fire Ins. Co.,
224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016).
III.
"Premises liability is a subset of general negligence law."
Peguero v. Tau Kappa Epsilon Local Chapter,
439 N.J. Super. 77,
88 (App. Div. 2015). Our courts "have long held that it is
ordinarily a plaintiff's burden to prove negligence, and that it
is never presumed." Khan v. Singh,
200 N.J. 82, 91 (2009). "To
sustain a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must
establish four elements: '(1) a duty of care, (2) a breach of that
duty, (3) proximate cause, and (4) actual damages.'" Townsend v.
Pierre,
221 N.J. 36, 51 (2015) (quoting Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex,
196 N.J. 569, 584 (2008)).
"A prerequisite to recovery on a negligence theory is a duty
owed by defendant to plaintiff." Strachan v. John F. Kennedy
Mem'l Hosp.,
109 N.J. 523, 529 (1988). "The duty owed by a
premises owner . . . depends in general upon the application of
well-established categories through which the status of the
injured party is used to define both duty and foreseeability."
4 A-0325-16T1
Estate of Desir ex rel. Estiverne v. Vertus,
214 N.J. 303, 316
(2013). "When a person alleges that a landowner has acted
negligently, the existence of a duty by a landowner to exercise
reasonable care to third persons is generally governed by the
status of the third person — guest, invitee, or trespasser —
particularly when the legal relationship is clearly defined."
Robinson v. Vivirito,
217 N.J. 199, 209 (2014).
Under the common law, a landowner owes the highest duty to a
business invitee, a person that "has been invited on the premises
for purposes of the owner that often are commercial or business
related." Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors,
132 N.J. 426, 433
(1993). "The landowner is liable to an invitee for failing to
correct or warn of defects that, by the exercise of reasonable
care, should have been discovered." Monaco v. Hartz Mountain
Corp.,
178 N.J. 401, 414-15 (2004). "That includes making
reasonable inspections of its property and taking such steps as
are necessary to correct or give warning of hazardous conditions
or defects actually known to the landowner." Id. at 414 (citing
Hopkins,
132 N.J. at 434).
A licensee is a person who was "'not invited but whose
presence is suffered'" by the landowner. Desir,
214 N.J. at 316
(citation omitted). A social guest is considered a licensee rather
than an invitee because, despite being literally invited onto the
5 A-0325-16T1
premises, their "purposes for being on the land may be personal
as well as for the owner's benefit." Hopkins,
132 N.J. at 433.
"To the social guest or licensee, the landowner . . . does not
have a duty actually to discover latent defects when dealing with
licensees, [but] the owner must warn a social guest of any
dangerous conditions of which the owner had actual knowledge and
of which the guest is unaware." Rowe v. Mazel Thirty, LLC,
209 N.J. 35, 44 (2012) (quoting Hopkins,
132 N.J. at 434); see
Handleman v. Cox,
39 N.J. 95, 103 (1963).
A trespasser is a person "who has no privilege to be on the
land" of another, whether by invitation or permission. Hopkins,
132 N.J. at 433. "The owner owes a minimal degree of care to a
trespasser," even where there is "a dangerous condition" on the
property. Ibid.1 "The duty owed to a trespasser is relatively
slight. A landowner, under most circumstances, has a duty to warn
1
We assume without deciding that the absence of the grate square
was an "artificial condition[] on the property that pose[d] a risk
of death or serious bodily harm to a trespasser." Hopkins,
132 N.J. at 434. In the absence of such a dangerous artificial
condition or activity, traditionally possessors of land owed "'no
duty of care other than to refrain from willful and wanton injury
toward trespassers.'" Vega by Muniz v. Piedilato,
154 N.J. 496,
501 (1998) (citation omitted). Because of our assumption, that
standard is inapplicable here. See Imre v. Riegel Paper Corp.,
24 N.J. 438, 445 (1957) ("The general rule of liability to
trespassers for acts willfully injurious given in the Restatement,
section 333, is qualified by the exceptions formulated in sections
334 to 339" for dangerous conditions and activities).
6 A-0325-16T1
trespassers only of artificial conditions on the property that
pose a risk of death or serious bodily harm to a trespasser."
Rowe,
209 N.J. at 44 (quoting Hopkins,
132 N.J. at 434).
This duty is very similar to the duty to constant trespassers
imposed by Section 335 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Am.
Law Inst. 1965):
A possessor of land who knows, or from facts
within his knowledge should know, that
trespassers constantly intrude upon a limited
area of the land, is subject to liability for
bodily harm caused to them by an artificial
condition on the land, if (a) the condition
(i) is one which the possessor has created or
maintains and (ii) is, to his knowledge,
likely to cause death or seriously bodily harm
to such trespassers and (iii) is of such a
nature that he has reason to believe that such
trespassers will not discover it, and (b) the
possessor has failed to exercise reasonable
care to warn such trespassers of the condition
and the risk involved.
"The rule stated in this Section applies only where the artificial
condition is one which the possessor has knowingly created or
maintained and which he realizes or should realize as involving a
risk of death or serious bodily harm." Id., § 335 at cmt. d.
A.
Here, the trial court properly found plaintiff was a
trespasser because he had no connection to the doctor's office,
he did not intend to visit the closed office, and he had no
invitation or consent to enter the property. See Robinson, 217
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1 N.J. at 214-15 (finding the plaintiff was a trespasser where she
had not been invited onto school property, was "a stranger to the
mission of the school," and "had no right or license and certainly
no consent to use school grounds as a short-cut").
The trial court also properly concluded defendant had not
breached the duty to a trespasser. The court noted there was no
evidence defendant knew the grate square was missing. Thus, there
was no evidence to show defendant "knowingly created or maintained"
the absence of the grate square. Restatement (Second) of Torts,
§ 335 at cmt. c; cf. id. at § 335 illus. 1. Without such knowledge,
defendant could not have "knowledge [the absence of the grate
square] was likely to cause death or serious bodily harm," and
could not warn trespassers of the condition and the risk involved.
Id., § 335; see Rowe,
209 N.J. at 44.
Moreover, liability arises only if the condition "is of such
a nature that [the possessor of land] has reason to believe that
such trespassers will not discover it." Restatement (Second) of
Torts, § 335. "The possessor is entitled to assume that
trespassers will . . . be on the alert to observe the conditions
which exist upon the land." Id., § 335 at cmt. f. Even if the
unsafe condition is "unusual" or is "due to carelessness in the
maintenance of those conditions which are necessary to the use of
the land," the possessor is liable only "if the conditions are not
8 A-0325-16T1
readily observable by the attention which the trespasser should
pay to his surroundings." Ibid. Here, it is undisputed plaintiff
was not alert to or observant of the absence of the grate square,
which was readily observable. Ibid.
Therefore, applying the well-established rules applicable to
trespassers, summary judgment was appropriate.
B.
It is undisputed that plaintiff did not enter defendant's
land as a business invitee. Defendant was not a patient of that
doctor's office, and he was not entering defendant's parking lot
in order to seek medical services at the doctor's office.
Instead, Plaintiff argues he held the status of a licensee
on defendant's land. He cites his unsupported statement in his
deposition that "everybody [from the adjacent bar] uses that
parking lot on weekends," and the absence of evidence defendant
made any effort to prevent that use.
Plaintiff notes that "[p]revailing customs often determine
whether a possessor of land is willing to have a third person come
thereon. They may be such that it is entirely reasonable for one
to assume that his presence will be tolerated unless he is told
otherwise." Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co.,
30 N.J. 303, 312 (1959)
(citing Restatement of Torts, § 330, cmt. d (1934)). However,
both the Restatement and Snyder are referring to "customs" in the
9 A-0325-16T1
sense of social customs. E.g., Restatement of Torts, § 330 at
cmt. d ("a traveler who is overtaken by a violent storm or who has
lost his way, is entitled to assume that there is no objection to
his going to a neighboring house for shelter or direction");
Snyder,
30 N.J. at 312-13 ("visiting an employee at his place of
employment, where a hazardous activity is not being conducted in
the area visited, does not go beyond generally accepted modes of
behavior or custom."). Here, there was no evidence of "customs
prevailing in the community," "local custom," or "a custom in a
particular town" that landowners were allowing the public to park
in their lots when their businesses were closed. Restatement of
Torts, § 330 at cmt. d; accord Restatement (Second) of Torts, §
330 at cmt. d.
The Restatement distinguishes such social customs from the
mere occurrence of trespassing, as alleged here. A possessor of
land has very limited duties to trespassers "although from past
experience or otherwise the possessor has every reason to realize
that there is a strong probability that trespassers will intrude
upon his land." Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 333 & cmt. a;
see id. at cmt. b ("the possessor [is] privileged to ignore the
actual probability that others will trespass upon his land"). As
set forth above, the duties are quite limited even if the possessor
"knows, or from facts within his knowledge should know, that
10 A-0325-16T1
trespassers constantly intrude upon a limited area of the land."
Id., §§ 334, 335. The duties are increased if the possessor "knows
or has reason to know of the presence of another who is trespassing
on the land" because he actually sees the trespasser may be
endangered or "sees an object or hears a sound which causes him
to realize that there is a substantial chance that the trespasser
may be actually" endangered. Id., § 336 & cmt. b, § 337; see
Gonzalez v. Safe & Sound Sec. Corp.,
185 N.J. 100, 122-23 (2005).
As the trial court pointed out, there was no evidence that
defendant knew that persons were parking in its lot on Sundays or
other times when the business was closed. Nor was there any
evidence that defendant, "from facts within [its] knowledge,
should know." Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 335. "[F]rom
facts within his knowledge" means "that the possessor is required
only to draw reasonably correct conclusions from data known to
him, and is not required to exercise a reasonable attention to his
surroundings or to make any inspection or investigation in regard
to them." Id., § 334 at cmt. c. In any case, if defendant knew,
or from facts within its knowledge should have known, that
trespassers "constantly" were parking in the lot of its closed
business on Sundays, defendant would only have the quite limited
duty owed to "trespassers," which was not violated. Id., § 335.
11 A-0325-16T1
Moreover, if there was a social custom which as a courtesy
allowed persons to park in parking lots of businesses which were
closed, only those who parked their cars would become licensees.
"[I]f there is a local custom for possessors of land to permit
others to enter it for particular purposes, residents in that
locality and others knowing of the custom are justified in"
believing they can enter for those purposes. Id., § 330 at cmt.
e. However, persons entering for other purposes remain
trespassers.
Plaintiff did not enter defendant's parking lot to park.
Instead, he admittedly walked onto the parking lot to talk with
Gavin. There was no evidence of a social custom for persons to
congregate on parking lots of closed businesses to hold social
gatherings. Indeed, there is no evidence that the individuals who
parked in defendant's lot on the weekends were also using the lot
to host social meetings, much less that defendant was aware of
that usage. As such, there is no evidence that defendant impliedly
acquiesced to the presence of individuals like plaintiff in their
parking lot during weekends. Thus, even if Gavin was a licensee
parking on defendant's lot because of a social custom allowing
such parking, we agree with the trial court that defendant was a
trespasser.
12 A-0325-16T1
C.
In any event, even if plaintiff was on the parking lot as a
licensee, his claim was doomed by the lack of evidence that
defendant had knowledge of the absence of the grate square. Again,
"[t]o the social guest or licensee, the landowner . . . does not
have a duty actually to discover latent defects when dealing with
licensees, [but] the owner must warn a social guest of any
dangerous conditions of which the owner had actual knowledge and
of which the guest is unaware." Rowe,
209 N.J. at 44 (emphasis
added) (quoting Hopkins,
132 N.J. at 434). Here, there was no
evidence defendant had actual knowledge.
Section 342 of the Restatement imposes a limited duty to warn
a licensee if the owner has "reason to know" of a condition:
A possessor of land is subject to liability
for physical harm caused to licensees by a
condition on the land if, but only if, (a) the
possessor knows or has reason to know of the
condition and should realize that it involves
an unreasonable risk of harm to such
licensees, and should expect that they will
not discover or realize the danger, and (b)
he fails to exercise reasonable care to make
the condition safe, or to warn the licensees
of the condition and the risk involved, and
(c) the licensees do not know or have reason
to know of the condition and the risk
involved.
[Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 342
(emphasis added).]
13 A-0325-16T1
Our Supreme Court has adopted Section 342's standard that a
landowner who "knows or has reason to know" of a dangerous
condition has a duty to warn licensees. Parks v. Rogers,
176 N.J.
491, 494, 498-99 (2003) (citing Section 342); see Rowe,
209 N.J.
at 38, 47-48 (citing Parks).
The Restatement explains that "has reason to know" requires
more knowledge than "should know":
The words "has reason to know" differ from the
words "should know" in that the person whose
conduct is in question in the first case is
under no duty of inspection or investigation
until some fact known to him apprises him of
the necessity therefor. On the other hand,
the words "should know" indicate that the
person whose conduct is in question is under
a general duty to be attentive to his
surroundings and to make investigations
irrespective of whether any fact within his
knowledge indicates a peculiar necessity for
his so doing.
[Id., § 334 at cmt. c (emphasis added).]
There was no evidence defendant knew a fact which apprised it of
the need to investigate to see if the grate square was missing.
In any event, even if defendant had a duty to warn plaintiff
of a dangerous condition of which it should have known, there is
no evidence defendant knew or should have known the grate square
was missing. There was no evidence of accident reports or
complaints. There was no evidence of how long the grate square
was missing, and by extension, the amount of time defendant had
14 A-0325-16T1
to discover and remedy the situation. See Drazin, New Jersey
Premises Liability § 6:4 (2018).
Even an invitee "must prove, as an element of the cause of
action, that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge
of the dangerous condition that caused the accident." Nisivoccia
v. Glass Gardens, Inc.,
175 N.J. 559, 563 (2003); see Prioleau v.
Ky. Fried Chicken, Inc.,
223 N.J. 245, 257 (2015). "[T]he mere
existence of a dangerous condition does not, in and of itself,
establish actual or constructive notice." Prioleau v. Ky. Fried
Chicken, Inc.,
434 N.J. Super. 558, 571 (App. Div. 2014), aff'd
as modified,
223 N.J. 245, 258 (2015). "A defendant has
constructive notice when the [dangerous] condition existed 'for
such a length of time as reasonably to have resulted in knowledge
and correction had the defendant been reasonably diligent.'"
Troupe v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp.,
443 N.J. Super.
596, 602 (App. Div. 2016) (citation omitted). The absence of such
notice "is fatal to plaintiff's claims of premises liability."
Arroyo v. Durling Realty, LLC,
433 N.J. Super. 238, 243 (App. Div.
2013).
IV.
Defendant argues the trial court erred by analyzing
defendant's duty under the common law classifications, rather than
using the more general inquiry utilized in Hopkins. We disagree.
15 A-0325-16T1
As set forth above, defendant and plaintiff were landowner
and trespasser. "When a person alleges that a landowner has acted
negligently, the existence of a duty by a landowner to exercise
reasonable care to third persons is generally governed by the
status of the third person—guest, invitee, or trespasser—
particularly when the legal relationship is clearly defined."
Robinson,
217 N.J. at 209.
"In spite of our continued adherence to this traditional
status-based approach, we have also recognized that it is not
always possible to fit a particular plaintiff precisely into one
of these established categories." Desir,
214 N.J. at 317. "When
the legal relationships are not clearly defined, other factors may
influence the recognition of a duty of care by property owners to
protect third parties from harm, such as the knowledge of
circumstances that may cause harm to another[.]" Robinson,
217 N.J. at 209.
Hopkins was an instance where the legal relationships were
not clearly defined. The defendant was a realtor conducting an
open house at a third-party's residence, and the plaintiff was a
visitor injured while attending the open house.
132 N.J. at 432.
Thus, the defendant was neither the owner nor the regular occupant
of the premises, but a commercial entity using the home temporarily
as a place of business. Id. at 442-444.
16 A-0325-16T1
As the legal relationship between the parties did not fit the
traditional categories, the Hopkins Court considered "the
relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the
opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest
in the proposed solution." Id. at 439. This Hopkins "full duty
analysis" assesses "whether in light of the actual relationship
between the parties under all of the surrounding circumstances the
imposition on the [defendant] of a general duty to exercise
reasonable care in preventing foreseeable harm to [plaintiffs] is
fair and just." Rowe,
209 N.J. at 45.
The Court has applied this more general analysis when it was
hard to place the parties in the traditional categories. See,
e.g., Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,
186 N.J. 394, 399-402 (2006)
(declining to apply the traditional test where the plaintiff was
a spouse who developed mesothelioma from laundering the asbestos-
laden clothes of her husband, a worker at a defendant's facility
she never entered); Brett v. Great Am. Rec.,
144 N.J. 479, 488-
89, 508-09 (1996) (declining to characterize the plaintiffs as
trespassers at the defendant ski resort when some had skied there
earlier and all were staying at a condominium that was adjacent
to the ski trail and that had a relationship to the resort); cf.
Vega,
154 N.J. at 499, 503-10 (distinguishing Brett and applying
the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
17 A-0325-16T1
However, the Supreme Court has since made clear that this
"full duty analysis" applies only "[w]here the status of the
plaintiff, vis-à-vis a landowner, does not fall into one of the
pre-determined categories," as in Hopkins. Rowe,
209 N.J. at 44.
The common law categories are a shorthand, in
well-established classes of cases, for the
duty analysis; they, too, are based on the
relationship of the parties, the nature of the
risk, the ability to exercise care, and
considerations of public policy. The only
difference is that, through the evolution of
our common law, the duty analysis has already
been performed in respect of invitees,
licensees (social guests), and trespassers.
In furtherance of the goal of a 'reasonable
degree of predictability[,]' those standards
continue to guide us.
[Id. at 45 (quoting Snyder,
30 N.J. at 312)
(emphasis added).]
Therefore, the trial court properly analyzed defendant's duty
to plaintiff under the traditional classifications whether
plaintiff was a licensee, as he argues, or a trespasser, as the
trial court found, because both statuses "fall into one of the
pre-determined categories." Id. at 44.
In any event, performing Hopkins's more general analysis does
not change our determination that defendant was properly granted
summary judgment. Plaintiff and defendant had no relationship
other than landowner and trespasser. Plaintiff testified that:
he was not at the time, nor had he ever been a patient of the
18 A-0325-16T1
doctor who occupied the office building on defendant's property;
he did not enter defendant's parking lot for the purpose of
visiting the doctor's office; and, he knew that the doctor's office
was closed at the time, because it was a Sunday. Defendant
extended no invitation to plaintiff, implied or otherwise, to
enter onto his grounds. Moreover, defendant derived no benefit
from plaintiff's presence.
The nature of the risk due to the absence of the grate square
was simply that someone would trip and fall. See, e.g., Desir,
214 N.J. at 324; Jerkins v. Anderson,
191 N.J. 285, 296 (2007).
The missing ten-inch square posed a similar risk of injury as
other simple trip-and-fall scenarios.
The opportunity and ability to exercise care by each party
is also similar to many trip-and-fall cases addressed under the
traditional categories. As the landowner, defendant had the
ability to exercise care in covering the storm sewer, as when the
grate squares were originally installed. However, defendant's
opportunity and ability to exercise care regarding the absence of
a grate square depended on whether it knew the grate square was
missing. As set forth above, there was no evidence that defendant
knew or had any reason to know it was missing, or that it had been
missing long enough for defendant to discover its absence.
19 A-0325-16T1
Defendant's opportunity also depended on whether it knew
persons would be walking on the business's parking lot on Sunday
when the business was closed. Again, there was no evidence
defendant had knowledge or any reason to believe plaintiff as a
trespasser would be walking onto the parking lot. Even if patrons
of a nearby bar parked in defendant's parking lot on weekends,
there was no evidence they would walk near where the square was
missing to go between the bar and defendant's parking lot. In any
event, plaintiff was not one of those patrons and was not parking.
Neither representatives of defendant nor its tenant business was
present that Sunday.
Plaintiff's opportunity and ability to exercise care was more
direct, as he was present and could have looked where he was going.
He admitted that it was "open and obvious" the grate square was
missing, that nothing was blocking his view, and that if he looked
at the area, he would have seen the grate square was missing and
could have walked around the uncovered part of the storm drain.
Finally, there is no obvious public interest in plaintiff's
desired solution of making a landowner liable when a trespasser
has failed to exercise due care to avoid an obvious trip-and-fall
hazard. Landowners are neither omnipresent nor omniscient.
Landowners cannot know when a trespasser will trespass, and cannot
prepare the property for his or her arrival, especially when the
20 A-0325-16T1
business is closed. Nor do we believe they should be required to
do so, as the trespasser has no right or business on the property.
Whether analyzed under the traditional common law categories,
or under Hopkins's more general analysis, plaintiff failed to
establish duty. Thus, the trial court properly granted summary
judgment.
Affirmed.
21 A-0325-16T1
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