ROBERT J. TRIFFIN v. ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                      APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
      Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
        parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.


                                       SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                       APPELLATE DIVISION
                                       DOCKET NO. A-0297-16T4


ROBERT J. TRIFFIN,

        Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE
COMPANY, a/k/a ZURICH and
CHRISTIAN JEREZ,

        Defendants-Respondents.

_________________________________________

              Argued December 18, 2017 – Decided January 31, 2018

              Before Judges O'Connor and Vernoia.

              On appeal from Superior Court of New
              Jersey, Law Division, Camden County,
              Docket No. DC-004242-16.

              Robert J. Triffin, appellant, argued
              the cause pro se.

              Walter F. Kawalec, III, argued the
              cause for respondent (Marshall Dennehey
              Warner Coleman & Goggin, attorneys;
              Dante C. Rohr, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
    In this matter, plaintiff Robert J. Triffin seeks to

recover the sum of $999.39 on an allegedly dishonored check

in the amount of $592.42, which defendant Zurich American

Insurance Company (Zurich) had issued to the order of co-

defendant Christian Jerez.   Plaintiff appeals from an order

granting Zurich summary judgment dismissal.   Because the

order is interlocutory and plaintiff failed to seek leave

to appeal as required by Rule 2:2-4, we dismiss.

    In his notice of appeal, plaintiff represented there

were not any claims against any party that had not been

disposed of with finality.   However, although the complaint

against Zurich had been dismissed with prejudice, the

complaint against Jerez was still pending.    The clerk had

entered default against Jerez because of his failure to

appear or file a responsive pleading, see Rule 6:6-2, but

plaintiff had not sought the entry of final judgment

against him, see Rule 6:6-3.

    Only final judgments may be appealed as of right.

R. 2:2-3(a).   In general, to be a final judgment, an order

or judgment must dispose of all claims against all parties.

"To have the finality required to create appellate

jurisdiction, an order must not only completely dispose of

all pleaded claims as to all parties, but all its


                                2                           A-0297-16T4
dispositions must also be final."     Grow Co. v. Chokshi, 
403 N.J. Super. 443, 460 (App. Div. 2008) (citing Lawler v.

Isaac, 
249 N.J. Super. 11, 17 (App. Div. 1991)).     If devoid

of the required finality, an order is interlocutory and

appellate review is available only by leave granted under

Rule 2:2-4 and Rule 2:5-6(a).

    Moreover, interlocutory review is "limited to those

exceptional cases warranting appellate intervention, [and]

the sole discretion to permit an interlocutory appeal has

been lodged with the appellate courts."    Chokshi, 
403 N.J.

Super. at 458 (citing Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 
195 N.J. 575, 599-600 (2008)).   "Interlocutory review is highly

discretionary and is to be exercised only sparingly because

of the strong policy 'that favors an uninterrupted

proceeding at the trial level with a single and complete

review . . . .'"   Id. at 461 (quoting S.N. Golden Estates,

Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 
317 N.J. Super. 82, 88 (App.

Div. 1998)) (citation omitted).

    An entry of default judgment constitutes a final

disposition but the entry of default does not.     Thus, when

the notice of appeal was filed the complaint against Jerez

had not been disposed of with finality and remained

unresolved.   Because plaintiff neither sought nor obtained


                                  3                        A-0297-16T4
leave to appeal the order from which he appeals, we must

dismiss the appeal as interlocutory.

    Appeal dismissed.




                               4                           A-0297-16T4