SUSAN S. LEE v. WILLIAM B. MEGILL, D.D.S.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                      APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
      Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
        parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.




                                       SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                       APPELLATE DIVISION
                                       DOCKET NO. A-0193-16T3

SUSAN S. LEE,

        Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM B. MEGILL, D.D.S.,

     Defendant-Respondent.
_____________________________

              Submitted March 12, 2018 – Decided March 29, 2018

              Before Judges Ostrer and Rose.

              On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
              Law Division, Somerset County, Docket No. L-
              0885-14.

              Hegge & Confusione, LLC, attorneys for
              appellant (Michael Confusione, of counsel and
              on the brief).

              Philip M. Lustbader and David Lustbader, PC,
              attorneys for respondent (David Lustbader, on
              the brief).

PER CURIAM

        Plaintiff Susan S. Lee appeals from the summary judgment

dismissal of her dental malpractice complaint against defendant

William B. Megill, D.D.S.               Judge Yolanda Ciccone found that
plaintiff's July 2, 2014, complaint was time-barred, because the

cause of action arose no later than October 27, 2011.             Upon our

de novo review, see Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 
204 N.J.
 320, 330 (2010), we affirm.

     The     undisputed   facts   are   that   defendant   last    treated

plaintiff on October 7, 2011. She continued to feel pain in "tooth

number three."     So, on October 27, 2011, she obtained treatment

at the dental clinic of Columbia University Health Care. A dentist

there told plaintiff that defendant had drilled "too deep" and hit

the horn of the tooth that caused plaintiff pain.          At that point,

her cause of action accrued, because she knew or reasonably should

have known that she had an injury, and it was the fault of another,

specifically defendant.     See, e.g., Lynch v. Rubacky, 
85 N.J. 65,

70 (1981).    As she filed her complaint over two years after that,

see 
N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, the court properly dismissed it.

     Plaintiff's arguments to the contrary lack sufficient merit

to warrant discussion in a written opinion.        R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

     Affirmed.




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