U.S.BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION v. WILLIAM M. NIELSON

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                      APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
      Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
        parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.




                                       SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                       APPELLATE DIVISION
                                       DOCKET NO. A-0010-16T3

U.S. BANK, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, NOT IN ITS
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, BUT
SOLELY AS TRUSTEE FOR
THE RMAC TRUST,
SERIES 2012-5T,

        Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

WILLIAM M. NIELSON and
JEAN M. NIELSON, husband
and wife,

        Defendants-Appellants.


              Submitted December 13, 2017 – Decided January 25, 2018

              Before Judges Alvarez and Geiger.

              On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
              Chancery Division, Camden County, Docket No.
              F-029097-12.

              William M. Nielson, appellant pro se.

              Pluese, Becker, & Saltzman, LLC, attorneys for
              respondent (Stuart H. West, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
     On July 8, 2016, a Chancery judge denied defendant William

M. Nielson's motion. Defendant's home in Atco, subject to mortgage

foreclosure proceedings in which judgment entered by default, had

been sold at a sheriff's sale by deed recorded April 15, 2016.

     We affirm the July 8 order denying Nielson's application to

vacate the prior proceedings for two reasons; first, defendant's

contentions in support of his application are not based in law or

fact.   Second, they are untimely.   We deem defendant's arguments

on appeal to lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion.       See

Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

     The sheriff's sale took place some thirteen months after the

March 6, 2015 final judgment in foreclosure.    Defendant did not

file his motion until one month after that.     He now raises the

following points:

          A. THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF
          LAW BY ALLOWING A COMPLAINT VERIFIED ONLY
          UNDER THE PLAIN[TIFF'S] ATTORNEY WITHOUT A
          COMPETENT WITNESS; THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS
          ENTERED WITHOUT PROPER VERIFICATION.

          B.   THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF
          LAW IN GRANTING ANY JUDGMENT ON THE DEFECTIVE
          COMPLAINT WHERE THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO VERIFY
          OR SET FORTH THE CHAIN OF TITLE AS TO THE
          "DEBT INSTRUMENT" UNDER RULE OF PROCEDURE
          [4:64-1](b)(6).

          C.   NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS   ARE  GOVERNED
          UNDER UCC PRINCIPLES ALIEN TO CHANCERY COURT
          AND CANNOT APPEAR AS MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE


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CLAIMS WHICH PROCEED IN EQUITY; CHANCERY COURT
LACKED JURISDICTION FROM THE BEGINNING.

D.   THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF
LAW BY ALLOWING A JUDGMENT BASED ON THE
EXPANSION OF FICTITIOUS BANK-ACCOUNT ENTRIES
IN VIOLATION OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION. WHICH REQUIRES ADHERENCE
TO ARTICLE 
1 SECTION 10 THEREIN "NO STATE
SHALL MAKE ANYTHING BUT GOLD OR SILVER (LEGAL)
TENDER FOR PAYMENT OF DEBTS".

E.   THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF
LAW BY REFUSING TO SET TERMS FOR PROPER
REDEMPTION IN EQUITY AS THE MATTER FALLS
WITHIN THAT JURISDICTION.    REDEMPTION IS A
SUBSTANTIVE   PROPERTY   RIGHT   BESIDES  AN
INALIENABLE PROCEDURAL RIGHT.

F.   THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED OR ABUSED
DISCRETION IN FAILING TO HEAR APPELLANT[']S
PLEA FOR EQUITABLE "IN REM" RELIEF REDUCING
THE UNDERLYING MORTGAGE CLAIM NOT TO EXCEED
THE VALUE OF SUBJECT PREMISES, ESPECIALLY
WHERE THE ORIGINAL FINANCING ARRANGEMENT WAS
CLEARLY A PREDATORY AND FRAUDULENT LOAN
PRACTICE BASED ON AN IMPOSSIBLE APPRAISAL.

G.   THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED OR ABUSED
DISCRETION IN FAILING TO HEAR APPELLANT[']S
PLEA FOR EQUITABLE "IN REM RELIEF" ALLOWING
FOR PROPER REDEMPTION OF THE PREMISES WITHIN
THE MONEY STANDARD AT ARTICLE 
1 SECTION 10
U.S. CONSTITUTION.

H.   THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED OR ABUSED
DISCRETION IN FAILING TO HEAR APPELLANT[']S
PLEA FOR EQUITABLE "IN REM RELIEF" REDUCING
ORIGINAL PLAINTIFFS CLAIM BY THE EQUIVALENT
RECOUPMENT DERIVED IN THE EXPANSION OF
ACCOUNT-MONIES AS THERE WAS NO LOAN EVER
EXTENDED OR SECURED.   INSTEAD THE FINANCIAL
ARRANGEMENT WAS CONCEIVED IN THE MONETIZATION
OF DEBT-SECURITIES THROUGH THE OPERATION OF
LEGAL TENDER STATUTES.

                      3                          A-0010-16T3
          I.   THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF
          LAW IN ALLOWING THE UNDERLYING FOR[E]CLOSURE
          COMPLAINT   TO  PROCEED   ON  AN   IMPOSSIBLE
          ACCOUNTING WHERE THE PRINCIPLE WAS ISSUED AS
          NEW MONIES AND MUST BE RECOUPED AGAINST THE
          ORIGINAL DEBT ALLOWING RECISSION UNDER THE
          TERMS OF CONTRACT.       THE ACCOUNTING WAS
          THEREFORE WRONG ON THE FACE FAILING TO COMPLY
          WITH LEGAL NOTICE REQUIREMENTS.

     It is noteworthy that neither before the trial judge nor on

appeal does Nielson address the dispositive hurdle he faces,

namely, that his application for relief was made over a year after

the judgment entered.   Rule 4:50-1, which controls, states that a

party may seek relief from a judgment under various categories

dependent upon specified grounds.    Nielson does not identify any

grounds or allege any good cause recognized in the law, or any

factual basis supported by the record as required by sections (a),

(b), or (c) of the rule.   See U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume,


209 N.J. 449 (2012). Nielson did not raise any meritorious defense

or claim attacking the validity of the judgment.       Nor does he

explain the reason for his delay.

     Rule 4:50-2 states that motions seeking relief under from

judgment under Rule 4:50-1(a), (b), or (c), must be made no more

than one year after the judgment has entered. Hence those sections

of the rule are in any event unavailable to Nielson.

     Were we to categorize Nielson's application as based on other

reasons included within Rule 4:50-1(d) or (f), because his grounds

                                 4                         A-0010-16T3
for vacating the judgment are simply not cognizable in the law or

supported   by    the   record,   those   sections   of   the   rule    do   not

independently      constitute     a   basis   for    relief.           Although

applications made under those sections of the rule can be heard

beyond the one-year time-bar, that does not make the application

viable.   The Court explained in Guillaume that it would defy logic

to set aside a default judgment when no meritorious defense exists.

Id. at 469.      It would defy logic to vacate the judgment here.

     Affirmed.




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