U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION v. TIMOTHY L. JACKSON

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                      APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
      Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
        parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.




                                       SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                       APPELLATE DIVISION
                                       DOCKET NO. A-5618-15T2


U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
AS TRUSTEE FOR CITIGROUP MORTGAGE
LOAN TRUST 2006-WFHE4, ASSET-BACKED
PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES,
SERIES 2006-WFHE4,

        Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TIMOTHY L. JACKSON and HAPPY
JACKSON, his wife;

        Defendants-Appellants,

and

MONMOUTH COUNTY DIVISION OF SOCIAL
SERVICES fka MONMOUTH COUNTY BOARD OF
SOCIAL SERVICES; PNC BANK, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION fka MIDATLANTIC NATIONAL
BANK/NORTH; 440 ELIZABETH CORPORATION;
CENTRAL MORRIS RADIOLOGY ASSOC.;
MIDLAND FUNDING LLC; CACH OF NEW JERSEY
LLC; NEW CENTURY FINANCIAL SERVICES;
STATE OF NEW JERSEY; DEUTSCHE BANK
NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE
FOR SOUNDVIEW HOME LOAN TRUST 2006-
WF2, ASSET BACKED CERTIFICATES,
SERIES 2006-WF2,

     Defendants.
____________________________________
            Submitted October 17, 2017 – Decided December 8, 2017

            Before Judges Fisher and Moynihan.

            On appeal from Superior Court of
            New Jersey, Chancery Division, Camden
            County, Docket No. F-036814-13.

            Timothy L. Jackson and Happy A. Jackson,
            appellants pro se.

            Reed Smith LLP, attorney for respondent
            (Henry F. Reichner, of counsel and on the
            brief; David G. Murphy, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

     Defendants appeal from the denial of their motion to vacate

a final foreclosure judgment, reiterating the Rule 4:50-1(d)1

arguments made to the motion judge that the foreclosure judgment

was void because there is no evidence plaintiff owned, possessed

or controlled the underlying note, and thus plaintiff did not have

standing to file the original complaint; and, if plaintiff did not

have standing, the court did not have jurisdiction to enter

judgment.    We affirm because the motion judge correctly found

plaintiff had standing.

     The record discloses defendant, Timothy L. Jackson, executed

a note for $333,600 to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.; the note was secured



1 Rule 4:50-1 provides, in pertinent part that "[o]n motion, with
briefs, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a
party or the party's legal representative from a final judgment"
if "the judgment or order is void."


                                 2                          A-5618-15T2
by a mortgage – signed by Timothy L. and Happy Jackson, husband

and wife – on defendants' home. Wells Fargo executed an assignment

of mortgage to plaintiff on July 21, 2011.2   Plaintiff's complaint

alleges the assignment was recorded in the Office of the Camden

County Clerk on December 5, 2011.   Plaintiff filed the foreclosure

complaint on October 11, 2013.       Although Timothy L. Jackson

answered and counterclaimed, his answer and affirmative defenses

were stricken and his counterclaim was dismissed.   Plaintiff moved

for final judgment which was entered on May 26, 2016.

     Defendants moved to vacate the judgment on August 2, 2016.3

The motion judge denied the motion to vacate.   She found plaintiff

had standing "[w]hether the plaintiff had the original note or

whether it had an interest, a financial interest[,] in this matter

as a result of the assignment."      She further concluded "those

events were taken under consideration by the Office of Foreclosure

at the time the application was made for final judgment."        The

judge also found defendants' standing argument was "late" because

it was advanced after entry of the final judgment.

     Our limited review recognizes that


2
   The assignment is dated July 19, 2011, but was not executed
until July 21.
3
  Defendants later attempted to amend the motion; it was, however,
marked "received but not filed" because it was not accompanied by
the required filing fee.

                                3                           A-5618-15T2
          [t]he trial court's determination under the
          rule warrants substantial deference, and
          should not be reversed unless it results in a
          clear abuse of discretion.     The Court finds
          an abuse of discretion when a decision is
          "made   without    a   rational   explanation,
          inexplicably    departed    from   established
          policies, or rested on an impermissible
          basis."

          [US Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 
209 N.J.
          449, 467 (2012) (citations omitted) (quoting
          Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
191 N.J. 88,
          123 (2007)).]

     Standing is conferred to a party that is in "either possession

of the note or an assignment of the mortgage that predated the

original complaint."   Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Angeles, 
428 N.J. Super. 315, 318 (App. Div. 2012).

     The motion judge, in finding plaintiff provided true copies

of the note and assignment to the Office of Foreclosure, recognized

plaintiff had to include "proofs as required by R[ule] 4:64-2"

with its application for entry of judgment.    See R. 4:64-1(d)(1).

The "proofs" required to be produced under Rule 4:64-2(a) include

the original mortgage, evidence of indebtedness, and assignments;

or legible, certified true copies of those filed or recorded

documents; or certified true copies of any unfiled documents.    Any

proofs required by Rule 4:64-1 "may be submitted by affidavit,

unless the court otherwise requires."    R. 4:64-2(a).




                                4                           A-5618-15T2
      Among   the   documents   submitted    in   support     of    plaintiff's

motion for final judgment was the certification of Brent Marquis

Watkins, a "Vice President Loan Documentation," who certified that

plaintiff, directly or through an agent, had possession of the

note.     So too, plaintiff's counsel, in an affidavit required by

Rule 4:64-2(d), attested Watkins informed her that he "personally

reviewed the . . . original or true copy of the note, mortgage and

recorded assignments . . . about to be submitted to the court" and

he "confirmed the accuracy of those documents."

      The motion judge's decision is supported by the record.

Possession of the assignment or the note – or both – was sufficient

to accord plaintiff standing to foreclose.          Inasmuch as plaintiff

had standing, we need not address the timeliness of defendants'

challenge to standing.4       The balance of defendants' arguments are

without    sufficient   merit    to   warrant     discussion.         R.     2:11-

3(E)(1)(e).    The    final     judgment    was    properly        entered      and

defendants' motion properly denied.

      Affirmed.




4
    We note defendants' answer raised plaintiff's lack of standing.

                                      5                                    A-5618-15T2