NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY v. M.L.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5142-15T1

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

M.L. and F.C.,

Defendants-Respondents.

_____________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF V.C. and X.C.,

Minors.

___________________________________________________

February 13, 2017

Submitted February 7, 2017 Decided

Before Judges Fisher and Leone.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, Docket No. FN-14-81-14.

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for appellant (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ashley Kolata-Guzik, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for respondent M.L. (John A. Albright, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for respondent F.C. (Kylie A. Cohen, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors (Maria Emilia Borges, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

This appeal follows in the wake of earlier back-to-back appeals filed by defendants M.L. (Myra) and F.C. (Fred), regarding a determination they abused or neglected their two children, and by plaintiff Division of Child Protection and Permanency, which argued the trial judge erred in finding the evidence was insufficient to warrant termination of Myra and Fred's parental rights. Div. of Child Protect. & Permanency v. M.L., Nos. A-2840-15 & 5400-14 (App. Div. Nov. 15, 2016). We affirmed both the order that memorialized the abuse/neglect finding and the judgment that denied termination of parental rights. Id., slip op. at 22.

While those appeals were pending, the Division moved for a stay of a trial court order that mandated the children's unification with Myra. We denied that motion without prejudice and directed that any order permitting unsupervised visitation would be stayed for thirty days to allow the Division to file a formal motion for a stay in this court. On May 3, 2016, the trial judge ordered that, if supervised visitation proceeded for four weeks without incident, unsupervised overnight visitation would follow. After the trial judge denied the Division's motion for a stay on June 16, 2016, the Division moved for leave to appeal, which we granted.

In this interlocutory appeal, the Division argues in a single point

IN VIEW OF THE COMPELLING EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE GUARDIANSHIP TRIAL, AND THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT X.C.'S SIX SEPARATE FRACTURES WERE, CONTRARY TO THE STEADFAST POSITIONS OF [MYRA] AND [FRED], NOT THE RESULT OF ANY MEDICAL CONDITION, IT IS NOT SAFE FOR X.C. AND V.C. TO BE REUNIFIED WITH [MYRA], OR FOR [MYRA] TO BE UNSUPERVISED WITH THE CHILDREN. THUS, THE COURT SHOULD VACATE THE TRIAL COURT'S MAY 3, 2016, AND JUNE 16, 2016, ORDERS AND MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO WITH RESPECT TO SUPERVISED VISITATION PENDING FINAL DISPOSITION OF THE GUARDIANSHIP APPEAL AND ANY REMAND PROCEEDINGS.

As the point heading demonstrates, the Division links its arguments regarding visitation to the contention that it sufficiently proved at the guardianship trial that defendants' parental rights should be terminated; its request for relief from us was limited to preserving the status quo pending disposition of the earlier appeals. By our rejection of the Division's appeal in our earlier opinion, id. at 22 n.10, the foundation for the Division's argument has been eviscerated. In fact, at the conclusion of our earlier opinion, we vacated the stay of visitation that we previously granted.

Thus, the appeal is moot to the extent the Division sought to preserve the status quo pending resolution of its earlier appeal. To the extent the Division argues the evidence in the guardianship trial revealed that unsupervised visitation with Myra would endanger the children, we find the trial judge's May 3, 2016 order was not an abuse of discretion substantially for the reasons set forth in our earlier opinion, which recognized the Division failed to prove the children's safety was endangered by Myra. And, to the extent the Division seeks a reversal or modification of the visitation order on grounds grounds which we do not discern from the Division's submissions on this appeal1 we find insufficient merit in such a contention to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

1 On January 23, 2017, after the perfection of this appeal, the Division wrote to this court we assume pursuant to Rule 2:6-11(f) about this family's status. The Division advised the children were reunified with Myra on December 23, 2016, by way of a December 15, 2016 trial court order. The Division asserted in this letter that although reunification has occurred, "the trial court . . . refused to order the requested targeted therapy for [Myra] [and the] Division remains concerned that [Myra] has not engaged in the necessary therapy with a licensed psychologist, who has concluded that she no longer poses a risk to her children"; the Division concluded by arguing "the FN litigation should remain open with the trial court beyond the next scheduled date of March 30, 2017." Despite its consternation over the matter's status, the Division has not sought relief from this court regarding the December 15, 2016 trial court order. We, thus, neither express nor intimate any view of what the Division has asserted in its January 23, 2017 letter, nor does it have any relevance to the issues before us in this appeal, since this appeal sought review only of the May 3, and June 16, 2016 trial court orders.