ROBERT O. SLAUGHTER v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

ROBERT O. SLAUGHTER,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD,

Respondent.

_______________________________

February 3, 2017

Submitted December 19, 2016 Decided

Before Judges Nugent and Currier.

On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.

Robert O. Slaughter, appellant pro se.

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Gregory R. Bueno, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellant Robert Slaughter appeals the final administrative action of the New Jersey Parole Board (Board), denying parole and setting a 96-month future eligibility term (FET). We affirm.

Appellant is serving a life sentence for a conviction of felony murder. After he became eligible for parole, appellant appeared before a hearing officer who referred the matter to a two-member Board panel for a hearing. On December 16, 2013, the panel denied parole based on appellant's: (1) extensive and repetitive prior criminal record; (2) prior probation and parole terms that were violated and failed to deter criminal behavior; (3) prior incarceration that did not deter criminal behavior; (4) lack of insight into the criminal behavior and minimizing the criminal behavior; and (5) lack of an adequate parole plan to assist in successful reintegration into the community. The panel found: "inmate still has failed to address the rage that led to this offense. In addition, [he] has no insight to future plans for transition after 37 years of incarceration."

As the two-member panel determined that establishing an FET within the board's presumptive schedule would be inappropriate due to appellant's lack of satisfactory progress in reducing the likelihood of future criminal behavior, the case was referred to a three-member Board panel for review and establishment of the FET.

The three-member panel reiterated the findings of the prior panel as reasons for its denial of parole and set a 96-month FET. In its comprehensive written decision, the panel wrote

The Board Panel is concerned about the continued lack of progress in your case. Troubling is your portrayal of the murder as being a spontaneous act that was unplanned . . . . You claim your initial actions were for monetary reasons, however when the [77-year-old female] victim was not complying with your threats you beat, strangled and stabbed her, taking her life. . . .

The Board Panel believes that you continue to lack adequate insight into your past criminal behavior. You placed a significant amount of the blame for the extensive criminal behavior in your case leading up to the murder on an undefined "criminal" mindset that you had that motivated you to live a non-law-abiding lifestyle. You added some additional generic and formulaic words in an effort to explain your past behavior, asserting that you were "not in control" and that you committed crimes because you "thought I was entitled." You used similar non-specific language in explaining what you would do if released on parole . . . . The Board Panel believes, based on your absence of any articulable insight that you have gained, you must come to some understanding as to why [you] led a life of persistent criminal behavior leading up to the death of your victim.

Following an administrative appeal, the full Board issued a final agency decision on January 28, 2015, affirming the denial of parole and establishment of a 96-month FET. The Board concurred with the two-member panel that "a preponderance of the evidence indicates that there is a substantial likelihood that you would commit a crime if released on parole at this time."

In his appeal, appellant argues that the Board did not apply the appropriate standards in making its determination to deny him parole and setting a 96-month FET. We disagree.

Our standard of review of administrative decisions by the Board is limited and "grounded in strong public policy concerns and practical realities." Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 200, modified, 167 N.J. 619 (2001) (Baime, J., dissenting). "The decision of a parole board involves 'discretionary assessment[s] of a multiplicity of imponderables.'" Id. at 201 (alteration in original) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 10, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2105, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668, 677 (1979)). "To a greater degree than is the case with other administrative agencies, the Parole Board's decision-making function involves individualized discretionary appraisals." Ibid. (citing Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 358-59 (1973)).

Consequently, our courts "may overturn the Parole Board's decisions only if they are arbitrary and capricious." Ibid. With respect to the Board's factual findings, we do not disturb them if they "could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence in the whole record." Id. at 172 (majority opinion) (quoting Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 154 N.J. 19, 24 (1998)) (citation and quotations omitted).

The governing standard set forth in N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(d) allows a three-member Board to establish a "future parole eligibility date which differs from that required by the provisions[1] . . . if the future parole eligibility date which would be established pursuant to such subsections is clearly inappropriate due to the inmate's lack of satisfactory progress in reducing the likelihood of future criminal behavior." (emphasis added). Because our scope of review is narrow, the determination that "there is a substantial likelihood an inmate will commit another crime if released" must be affirmed unless the Board's decision was unreasonable and unsupported by credible evidence in the record or contrary to law. Trantino, supra, 166 N.J. at 172 (citation and quotations omitted).

The Board's findings are neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, but are supported by credible evidence that appellant has demonstrated a lack of satisfactory progress in reducing future criminal behavior. The Board has authority to make the assessment as to the substantial likelihood that an inmate will commit another crime if released on parole and extend the FET. We find that the Board's decision to impose a 96-month FET is supported by sufficient credible evidence found in the record.

Affirmed.

1 N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(a)(1) establishes a presumptive future parole eligibility schedule of an additional twenty-seven months for a prison inmate serving a sentence for murder.