DIVIAION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY v. D.J.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-04770-15T1

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

D.J.,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

OF K.J., a minor.

__________________________________

May 18, 2017

Submitted May 2, 2017 Decided

Before Judges Koblitz, Rothstadt and Sumners.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket No. FG-15-10-15.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Joseph F. Kunicki, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa Dutton-Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Daniel Pierre, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (Joseph H. Ruiz, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant D.J. appeals from a June 23, 2016 Family Part order terminating his parental rights to his son K.J., who was five years old at the time of the guardianship trial. We affirm, substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Therese A. Cunningham in her thirty-one page written opinion issued with the order.

The evidence is outlined in detail in the judge's opinion. A summary will suffice here. K.J. was born in 2011 to a mother who was addicted to drugs and who passed away in 2015. The newborn had withdrawal symptoms at birth, and was transferred to a specialized children's hospital where he stayed for approximately six weeks. D.J. initially denied paternity until a paternity test administered when K.J. was two and one-half years old demonstrated he was in fact the father. Defendant was incarcerated at times during the litigation and only complied sporadically with scheduled dates for evaluations and court hearings. He was present for the third and final trial day only, explaining he had been confused about the first two dates.

Defendant has a lengthy criminal and domestic violence history. He was confrontational and hostile toward the Division workers. He did not visit his son regularly. At the time of trial, defendant had only seen his son twice during the prior year, once for the bonding evaluation. The bonding evaluator found defendant's bond with his son was "weak." Defendant did not have a stable home or job. The Division placed K.J. with relatives, but the placement did not work out. At the time of trial, K.J. was in his sixth placement, and this placement had lasted for two years. His resource parents wished to adopt him and the Division's expert opined that a secure bond was forming between them and K.J. at the time of the bonding evaluation.

In her comprehensive opinion, Judge Cunningham found that the Division had proven all four prongs of the best interests test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), and that termination of defendant's parental rights was in the child's best interests. On this appeal, our review of the trial judge's decision is limited. We defer to her expertise as a Family Part judge, Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998), and we are bound by her factual findings so long as they are supported by sufficient credible evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 269 (2007) (citing In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993)). After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial judge's factual findings are fully supported by the record and, in light of those facts, her legal conclusions are unassailable.

Defendant contends that the trial judge erred in her analysis because he never specifically harmed K.J. "directly," did not produce positive drug tests for two years, and attended some services. Those arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.