KIM RAGLAND v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

KIM RAGLAND,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,

Respondent.

_________________________________

January 30, 2017

 

Submitted December 7, 2016 Decided

Before Judges Carroll and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of the Treasury.

Kim Ragland, appellant pro se.

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Gregory R. Bueno, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellant Kim Ragland appeals from the May 28, 2015 final agency decision of the New Jersey Department of the Treasury (Treasury) denying his request for a declaratory ruling pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-8. Appellant relies on N.J.S.A. 30:4-871 and N.J.S.A. 30:4-1332 to support his claim that Treasury should direct the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC) to disburse unpaid wages he alleges he earned while incarcerated. Appellant further contends that Treasury's failure to return the unclaimed wages violates his rights protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey State Constitution. Appellant also asserts, without evidentiary support, that DOC improperly deducted funds from his inmate account.3 Treasury determined that it did not have the authority to compel DOC to tender unclaimed wages earned while in the custody of DOC or return wages improperly withdrawn from an inmate's account. We agree and affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Treasury in its final agency decision.

I.

The following facts inform our legal analysis. Appellant, an inmate at Northern State Prison, is serving a five-year sentence for burglary and trespassing. On or about October 3, 2014, appellant filed a complaint in the State Treasury Office, which he described as a request for a declaratory ruling pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-8 to -10. In his complaint, Ragland sought the disbursement of $9245 from Treasury based on his claim that DOC failed to pay him sixteen years' worth of "unclaimed wages" that he earned while incarcerated, and an additional $7500 from unspecified sources held in his inmate trust account.4

When appellant received no response to his request, he filed a notice of appeal on January 13, 2015, claiming agency inaction and moved for summary disposition pursuant to Rule 2:8-3(b). Treasury opposed appellant's motion for summary disposition and moved to remand the matter for further proceedings in accordance with Rule 2:9-1. We denied appellant's motion for summary disposition and granted Treasury's motion for a remand, and, by order dated April 16, 2015, directed Treasury to complete the remand proceedings by June 30, 2015.

In a final agency decision dated May 28, 2015, Treasury denied appellant's request for a declaratory ruling, stating

Treasury has no authority over [DOC], which is a separate State department headed by its own Commissioner, who reports directly to the Governor. N.J.S.A. 30:1B-1 et seq. Treasury is not authorized to, and will not, direct [DOC] to take any form of action in response to your request because the power to regulate, review or respond to an inmate's request for a return of funds does not fall within its scope of powers. Rather, it is a matter for [DOC] to address. Therefore, we cannot take any further action in this matter and deny your request.

Treasury advised appellant to direct his request to DOC if he wished to pursue it further. Appellant filed an amended notice of appeal on November 13, 2015, and this appeal followed.

II.

Our standard of review of a final decision of a State administrative agency is well-settled. As an intermediate court, we have "a limited role in reviewing a decision of an administrative agency." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579 (1980). We will not disturb an agency's judgment unless we find the agency's decision to be "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or [ ] not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Barrick v. State, Dep't of Treasury, 218 N.J. 247, 259 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182,194 (2011)). The burden of showing that an agency's action was arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious rests upon the appellant. J.B. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 444 N.J. Super. 115, 149 (App. Div.), certif. granted, 226 N.J. 214 (2016) (citations omitted).

Although we generally must accord deference to administrative agency actions, "we are 'in no way bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue[.]'" Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)). Accordingly, "we apply de novo review to an agency's interpretation of a statute or case law." Ibid. (citation omitted). Applying this standard, we find no reason to disturb Treasury's decision. We add only the following comments.

The issuance of a declaratory ruling by a State agency is discretionary. United Sav. Bank v. State Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 360 N.J. Super. 520, 524 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 177 N.J. 574 (2003). N.J.S.A. 52:14B-8 provides, in pertinent part, that "an agency upon the request of any interested person may in its discretion make a declaratory ruling with respect to the applicability to any person, property or state of facts of any statute or rule enforced or administered by that agency" (emphasis added). Clearly, based upon the plain language of the statute, Treasury is neither required nor endowed with the authority to grant appellant the declaratory relief he seeks. As Treasury aptly indicated in its final agency decision, DOC is a wholly independent State agency, see N.J.S.A. 30:1B-1 et seq., under the direct authority of the Governor, N.J.S.A. 30:1B-2. Therefore, appellant has directed his request to the wrong administrative agency. Accordingly, we find that Treasury's decision to deny appellant's request for a declaratory judgment was neither arbitrary, capricious nor unreasonable and we discern no abuse of discretion.

Second, appellant's attempt to assert a property interest in his alleged unclaimed wages is misplaced. It is well-settled that inmates have no property interest in a job while incarcerated. James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 630 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 870, 110 S. Ct. 197, 107 L. Ed. 2d 151 (1989); Bryan v. Werner, 516 F.2d 233, 240 (3d Cir. 1975). By extension, we have held that an inmate has no liberty or property interest in "the wages or credits that can be earned from performing a prison work assignment." Lorusso v. Pinchak, 305 N.J. Super. 117, 119 (App. Div. 1997) (citing James, supra, 866 F. 2d at 629), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 403 (1998). See also Shabazz v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 385 N.J. Super. 117, 128-29 (App. Div. 2006) (finding that appellant was not "entitled to any credit or wages he might have earned for employment while placed in a halfway house."). We have considered appellant's remaining contentions in light of the record and applicable legal principles and conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D).

Affirmed.


1 N.J.S.A. 30:4-87 provides in pertinent part

Determination by the original order for commitment as to settlement and indigency shall apply to and govern upon the transfer of [an] . . . inmate. The rate of payment of maintenance shall be that fixed pursuant to law for the institution to which the . . . inmate is transferred. With the transfer there shall pass to the institution to which the inmate . . . is transferred copies of all records, papers, and documents relating to the . . . commitment of the inmate . . . , medical records, securities for the payment of maintenance, and the like. If, for any reason, there has been no determination of settlement or indigency, these facts shall be determined as in an original application, upon the initiative of the chief executive officer of the institution in which such inmate . . . is when transfer is desired. Due notice of the transfer shall be given to the director of the board of chosen freeholders of the county in which such inmate . . . is determined to have a legal settlement, if any, of such transfer having been made.

2 N.J.S.A. 30:4-133 provides

All unclaimed wages, salary or compensation, for services, due any person at an institution supported in whole or in part by State funds shall be held at the institution at which the same were earned, awaiting claim therefor, for the time prescribed in and disposed of as provided in the "Uniform Unclaimed Property Act (1981)," R.S. 46:30B-1 et seq.

3 Although unclear, appellant appears to argue that he "is entitled to be paid for work performed at the institution . . . and that the facility superintendent is authorized to place funds in a trust account for [him] and the superintendent is entitled to withdraw funds from [his] account for court [ordered] fines and restitution and for maintenance if order by court is issued by the Board of Chosen Freeholders in the county where inmate is imprisoned" but since "no order is attached to the order of commitment or Board of Chosen Freeholders never made a determination as to prisoner . . . indigence for payment of maintenance then the courts shall bear cost therefore . . . [and] no . . . payment for maintenance by superintendent shall be taken from [his] earnings . . . and any money . . . must be given [back] to him after completion of his term."

4 The components of these figures are unclear from the record. Appellant includes in his calculations thirteen years of work at a rate of $1.30 per day. However, appellant never identified the time period. Moreover, while his account statement showed regular monthly deposits for wages at that rate, there were also withdrawals for commissary sales, postage and other fees that significantly depleted his account balance.


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