STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. SHANIQUA COLCLOUGH

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Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0841-15T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

SHANIQUA COLCLOUGH,

Defendant-Appellant.

Argued October 31, 2017 – Decided December 6, 2017

Before Judges Yannotti and Carroll.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Hudson County, Indictment No.
13-09-1683.

Cody T. Mason, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for appellant
(Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney;
Mr. Mason, of counsel and on the briefs).

Frances Tapia Mateo, Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for respondent (Esther
Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney;
Ms. Mateo, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Following denial of her motion to suppress the results of a

search conducted pursuant to a warrant, a jury convicted defendant
Shaniqua Colclough of endangering the welfare of a child. On

appeal, defendant argues that her conviction should be reversed

because the trial court erred in denying her suppression motion.

Alternatively, defendant contends a new trial is warranted due to

deficiencies in the jury selection process and the trial court's

refusal to excuse certain jurors for cause. Having considered the

parties' arguments in light of the record and applicable legal

standards, we affirm.

We need only briefly outline the procedural history of the

case. Defendant and others were charged in a twenty-one count

indictment that stemmed from a 2013 narcotics investigation.

Specifically, defendant was charged with possession with intent

to distribute ten or more grams of phencyclidine (PCP),
N.J.S.A.

2C:35-5a(1) and
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(6) (count eight); possession

with intent to distribute ten or more grams of PCP within 1000

feet of school property, in violation of
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (count nine); possession with intent to

distribute ten or more grams of PCP within 500 feet of a public

housing facility, public park, or public building,
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-

5a(1) and
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (count ten); conspiracy to dispense

or distribute ten or more grams of PCP,
N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2,
N.J.S.A.

2C:35-5a(1), and
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(6) (count eleven); two counts

2 A-0841-15T1
of possession of a firearm in the course of committing, attempting

to commit, or conspiring to commit a drug offense,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

4.1a (counts fifteen and sixteen); possession of a defaced firearm,

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3d (count seventeen); and second-degree endangering

the welfare of a child (count eighteen).

Following her indictment, defendant moved to suppress the

fruits of the search of her second-floor apartment. Defendant

argued that the search warrant did not describe the place to be

searched with sufficient particularity because it did not identify

an apartment number. In May 2014, the judge denied the motion

without an evidentiary hearing.

In June 2015, a jury convicted defendant of second-degree

child endangerment (count eighteen), and acquitted her of the

remaining charges. On August 7, 2015, the judge vacated the

second-degree child endangerment conviction due to an omission in

the jury charge, and molded the verdict to third-degree child

endangerment. The judge then sentenced defendant to three years'

probation, subject to the following conditions: 364 days in the

Hudson County jail; the Division of Child Protection and Permanency

to approve all contact with her children; undergo parent

counseling; and obtain gainful employment or perform 100 hours of

community service.

In this appeal, defendant argues:

3 A-0841-15T1
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE MOTION
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE SEARCH
WARRANT DID NOT SPECIFY WHICH APARTMENT WAS
TO BE SEARCHED, THE AFFIDAVIT CONTAINING THAT
INFORMATION WAS NEITHER INCORPORATED INTO NOR
ATTACHED TO THE WARRANT AND THE SEARCH WAS NOT
JUSTIFIED BY EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

A. The Warrant Was Invalid Because It Did Not
State Which Apartment Was to Be Searched and
Could Not Be Cured by the Underlying
Affidavit, Which Was Neither Incorporated into
Nor Attached to the Warrant.

B. The Officers Discovered the Guns, PCP, and
Documents Connecting Colclough and Her
Codefendants to the Apartment Through the
Execution of a Search Warrant, and Not as the
Result of Exigent Circumstances.

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED COLCLOUGH'S RIGHT TO
A FAIR TRIAL WHEN IT DID NOT ASK PROSPECTIVE
JURORS REQUIRED QUESTIONS IN OPEN COURT (NOT
RAISED BELOW), REHABILITATED PROSPECTIVE
JURORS WHO EXPRESSED BIASES, AND CAUSED
DEFENSE COUNSEL TO EXHAUST HIS PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES AFTER DECLINING TO REMOVE FOR CAUSE
A JUROR WHO BELIEVED POLICE OFFICERS WERE MORE
LIKELY TO TELL THE TRUTH.

A. The Trial Court Violated Colclough's Right
to an Impartial Jury When it Failed to Ask
Required Open-Ended Questions, Did Not Ensure
That the Jurors Understood the Questions, Did
Not Pose Probing Follow-Up Questions, and
Rehabilitated Partial Jurors with Leading
Questions.

1. The trial court violated
Colclough's right to an impartial
jury when it failed to ask required

4 A-0841-15T1
open-ended questions and ensure
that the jurors understood the
questions posed.

2. The trial court violated
Colclough's right to an impartial
jury when it repeatedly
rehabilitated partial jurors and
failed to ask follow-up questions
aimed at detecting possible biases.

B. The Trial Court Infringed on Colclough's
Right to a Fair Trial When It Declined to
Excuse a Biased Juror for Cause, Which
Resulted in the Exhaustion of Defense
Counsel's Peremptory Challenges and a Partial
Jury.

II.

We first address defendant's challenge to the search warrant.

This case arises out of a police investigation into drug-related

activity in the area of xxx Wilkinson Avenue, Jersey City.

Defendant resided with her seven-year-old daughter in the second-

floor apartment at that location.

On April 17, 2013, Jersey City Police Officer Israel Cortes

applied for a warrant to search the second-floor apartment of xxx

Wilkinson Avenue. In his sworn affidavit, Cortez averred, in

relevant part, that:

(1) In March 2013, he received information from a confidential

informant (CI) who knew from personal knowledge and past

interaction with an unidentified male that the unidentified male

was one of the main suppliers of PCP within the Wilkinson Avenue

5 A-0841-15T1
area. The CI told Cortes "that the unidentified male primarily

conducts his narcotics distribution operations from his residence

located at [xxx] Wilkinson Avenue, Apartment #[yyy], Jersey City,

New Jersey." The CI described the suspect as "a dark brown skin

black male[,] slim build, approximately 5'10", approximately 18-

22 years of age with black dreadlocks, clean shaven[.]"

(2) On April 1, 2013, "the CI agreed to arrange a controlled

purchase of [] PCP from the unidentified male from the area of

Wilkinson Avenue[,] specifically [xxx] Wilkinson Avenue Apartment

#[yyy], Jersey City[.]" Police set up surveillance and observed

the CI hand the unidentified male currency, who in turn handed the

CI two green tinted Ziploc bags containing suspected PCP. Cortes

then "observed the unidentified male stick his head outside of the

second-floor window and began talking with one of the individuals

standing in the group in front of [xxx] Wilkinson Avenue[.]"

(3) On April 11, 2013, "the CI agreed to arrange a controlled

purchase of [] PCP from the unidentified male from the area of

Wilkinson Avenue[,] specifically [xxx] Wilkinson Avenue Apartment

#[yyy], Jersey City[.]" Prior to the controlled buy, the police

set up surveillance and Cortes again saw the unidentified male

"look[] out of the second-floor window." Similar to the first

transaction, the CI handed the suspect money in exchange for two

Ziploc bags containing suspected PCP.

6 A-0841-15T1
(4) A subpoena served on Public Service Electric & Gas (PSE&G)

revealed that Shaniqua Colclough resided at xxx Wilkinson Avenue,

Apartment #yyy. Defendant's criminal history showed she had been

arrested for a narcotics offense, specifically PCP, in September

2012.

Cortes "requested that a [s]earch warrant be issued for the

subject premise [xxx] Wilkinson Avenue, Apartment #[yyy], Jersey

City, New Jersey." He described the "subject premise" as

[A] two-story red brick building with six
cement white-colored steps leading up to a
white-colored metal front door, with the
number ["xxx"] in black located in the middle
of the door, with the door positioned on the
eastern most end of the building, and the
windows having white trim. The structure also
has two satellite cable antennas located above
the first floor apartment windows positioned
on the western most end of the structure.

Based on this information, a search warrant issued on April

17, 2013. The description of the premises to be searched mirrored

that contained in the affidavit, as set forth above. Although the

warrant identified the property address, it did not specify the

apartment number.

The police executed the search warrant the next day. An

inventory of the property seized pursuant to the warrant was

prepared in defendant's presence. The inventory specified the

items were recovered from "[xxx] Wilkinson Avenue Apt. [yyy]."

7 A-0841-15T1
Among the items seized were 133 Ziploc baggies containing greenish

vegetation dipped in suspected PCP; two handguns; ammunition; a

New Jersey Identification Card bearing defendant's name, which

listed her address as xxx Wilkinson Avenue, Jersey City; and

numerous letters addressed to defendant.

On appeal, defendant does not challenge the probable cause

supporting the search warrant. Rather, she renews her argument

that the search warrant was invalid because it did not identify

with sufficient particularity the apartment to be searched. She

further contends the supporting affidavit did not cure the

warrant's lack of particularity because it was neither

incorporated into nor attached to the warrant.

Certain well-established principles guide our analysis.

Although we normally grant deference to the findings of fact made

by a trial judge in connection with a motion to suppress, there

was no evidentiary hearing in this case. State v. Elders,
192 N.J. 224, 243-44 (2007). Instead, the judge relied on the text

of Cortes's affidavit.1 Our review of purely legal issues is

plenary. Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140

1
A reviewing court may only consider whether the motion to
suppress was properly decided based on the evidence presented at
that time. State v. Gibson,
318 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div. 1999).

8 A-0841-15T
1 N.J. 366, 378 (1995); State v. Goodman,
415 N.J. Super. 210, 225

(App. Div. 2010), certif. denied,
205 N.J. 78 (2011).

"[A] search executed pursuant to a warrant is presumed to be

valid" and "a defendant challenging its validity has the burden

to prove 'that there was no probable cause supporting the issuance

of the warrant or that the search was otherwise unreasonable.'"

State v. Jones,
179 N.J. 377, 388 (2004) (citation omitted).

"Doubt as to the validity of the warrant '"should ordinarily be

resolved by sustaining the search."'" State v. Keyes,
184 N.J.
541, 554 (2005) (citations omitted).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution provide in

nearly identical language that "no warrant shall issue except upon

probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly

describing the place to be searched and the papers and things to

be seized." N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7 (emphasis added). This

particularity requirement "mandates that 'the description is such

that the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable effort

ascertain and identify the place intended,'" State v. Marshall,

199 N.J. 602, 611 (2009) (quoting Steele v. United States,
267 U.S. 498, 503,
45 S. Ct. 414, 416,
69 L. Ed. 757, 760 (1925)), and

was intended "to prevent general searches," Maryland v. Garrison,

9 A-0841-15T1

480 U.S. 79, 84,
107 S. Ct. 1013, 1016,
94 L. Ed. 2d 72, 80 (1987).

As Justice Stevens explained for the Court in Garrison:

By limiting the authorization to search to the
specific areas and things for which there is
probable cause to search, the [particularity]
requirement ensures that the search will be
carefully tailored to its justifications, and
will not take on the character of the wide-
ranging exploratory searches the Framers
intended to prohibit.

[Id. at 84,
107 S. Ct. at 1016,
94 L. Ed. 2d
at 80.]

That is, the scope of a lawful search is "defined by the object

of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to

believe that it may be found." United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798, 824,
102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172,
72 L. Ed. 2d 572, 593 (1982).

The particularity requirement, however, has presented

difficulties when police suspect criminal activity in a multi-unit

structure. In keeping with the constitutional principles briefly

outlined above, our Supreme Court has mandated that "the affidavit

in support of the search warrant must exclude those units for

which police do not have probable cause." Marshall, supra,
199 N.J. at 611. In Marshall, the Court found a search warrant – that

did not define the particular apartment in a multi-unit structure

but, instead, left it to the executing officers to discern the

proper location upon execution of the warrant – repugnant to our

state constitution. Ibid.

10 A-0841-15T1
In an earlier case, State v. Wright,
61 N.J. 146, 149 (1972),

which the Marshall Court limited to its facts,
199 N.J. at 615,

the Court found sufficient a description of the premises to be

searched as the apartment over which the suspect had "possession,

custody, control, or access," id. at 608; the Wright Court found

no constitutional violation because the record demonstrated the

police were familiar with the apartment to be searched and there

was no likelihood that the wrong apartment would be searched.

Marshall differed in that the police did not know which of multiple

apartments in a single structure was being utilized by the suspect

and because the issuing judge abdicated his authority by leaving

it to the police to determine the correct apartment upon execution

of the warrant.
199 N.J. at 616-17.

In the present case, Cortes only sought to search the second

floor apartment and not the entire dwelling. His request for a

warrant was specifically limited to that apartment. The search

conducted pursuant to the warrant was not a wide-ranging

exploratory search, which the United States and New Jersey

Constitutions are intended to prevent. The inventory of the items

seized from defendant's second floor apartment confirms the

limited scope of the search.

The Court noted in Wright that the premises to be searched

must be described with "reasonable accuracy" rather than "pin-

11 A-0841-15T1
point precision." Wright, supra,
61 N.J. at 149. There was no

inaccuracy in the property description here. Moreover, in contrast

to Miller, the issuing judge did not intend to leave it to the

police to discern the correct apartment upon execution of the

warrant. As in Wright, the police were familiar with the apartment

to be searched, having conducted surveillance and obtained utility

records from PSE&G. An officer could ascertain with little effort

that the second floor apartment was in fact the subject of the

search warrant by consulting the supporting affidavit establishing

probable cause to search that apartment. Accordingly, under the

specific facts presented, we conclude the suppression motion was

properly denied.

III.

In Point II of his brief, defendant argues the trial court

violated his right to a fair trial because the jury voir dire was

deficient in its thoroughness. Defendant further contends the

court improperly rehabilitated partial jurors, failed to ask

follow-up questions aimed at detecting possible biases, and did

not excuse a biased juror for cause. We address these arguments

in turn.

Defendant argues the trial court committed reversible error

because it did not "read and review each question en banc with the

12 A-0841-15T1
first jurors seated in the box" and did not ask open-ended

questions during jury selection, as required by New Jersey Supreme

Court Administrative Directive #4-07.

A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to a trial

by an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.J. Const. art. I,

¶ 10; Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333, 362,
86 S. Ct. 1507,

1522,
16 L. Ed. 2d 600, 620 (1966); State v. Fortin,
178 N.J. 540,

575 (2004). Historically, the scope and choice of questions used

in jury voir dire rested with "the discretion of the trial court,

limited only by the demands of fairness and justice." State v.

Sullivan,
43 N.J. 209, 239 (1964), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 990,
86 S. Ct. 564,
15 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1966).

In 2006, our Supreme Court directed the Administrative Office

of the Courts (AOC) to issue two directives addressing jury voir

dires. See Administrative Directive #21-06, "Approved Jury

Selection Standards, Including Model Voir Dire Questions" (Dec.

11, 2006),

http://www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/directives/dir_21_06.pd

f and Administrative Directive #4-07, "Jury Selection – Model Voir

Dire Questions Promulgated by Directive #21-06 – Revised

Procedures and Questions" (May 16, 2007),

http:/www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/directives/dir_04_07.pdf

Directive #21-06 mandated certain procedures for jury selection.

13 A-0841-15T1
Among other things, that directive required trial judges to ask

each individual juror a set of standard questions, as well as

questions tailored to the individual case.

After Directive #21-06 was issued, trial judges reported that

the requirement of individual questioning of jurors on every

question was counterproductive and caused unnecessary delay.

Thus, on May 16, 2007, the Supreme Court caused the AOC to issue

Directive #4-07, which supplemented and modified Directive #21-

06.

Directive #4-07 authorized trial judges to conduct voir dires

without asking each question individually to each juror. Instead,

the trial court must provide potential jurors with a printed copy

of the questions, and read the questions en banc to the first

jurors seated in the box. Directive #4-07 also required that each

juror be asked at least three open-ended questions that require

answers in narrative form.

The directives in #4-07 and #21-06 are mandatory and are

binding on all trial courts. We have previously explained:

[T]he Supreme Court . . . "has the power to
promulgate rules of administration as well as
practice and procedure" pursuant to the New
Jersey Constitution. In addition, as Judge
Stern (then sitting in the Law Division)
noted, "the Chief Justice, as administrative
head of the court system, can promulgate
binding directives either directly or through
the Administrative Director of the Courts."

14 A-0841-15T1
Thus, the [d]irective which includes its
commentary, has the force of law.
[State v. Morales,
390 N.J. Super. 470, 472
(App. Div. 2007) (quoting State v. Linares,

192 N.J. Super. 391, 397 (Law Div. 1983)).]

Here, the trial judge did not read aloud each question to

the first group of jurors. Also, he only posed two, rather than

three, open-ended questions to the jurors. Consequently, the

court failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Directive

#4-07.

Having determined that the trial court here erred, we turn

to the question of whether that error warrants a reversal of

defendant's conviction. Because defendant did not raise this

issue at trial, we consider it under the plain error standard,

pursuant to which we disregard any error or omission by the trial

court "unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly

capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2. "To warrant

reversal[,] . . . an error at trial must be sufficient to raise

'a reasonable doubt . . . as to whether the error led the jury to

a result it otherwise might not have reached.'" State v.

Funderburg,
225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016) (quoting State v. Jenkins,
178 N.J. 347, 361 (2004)). The plain error standard is akin to the

harmless error standard, which "requires that there be some degree

of possibility that [the error] led to an unjust result. The

possibility must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable

15 A-0841-15T1
doubt as to whether [it] led the jury to a verdict it otherwise

might not have reached." State v. Lazo,
209 N.J. 9, 26 (2012)

(alteration in original) (citing State v. R.B.,
183 N.J. 308, 330

(2005)).

Constitutional errors, like other errors, are generally also

subject to the harmless error analysis. State v. Camacho,
218 N.J. 533, 547 (2014). When a constitutional error has occurred,

however, the burden shifts to the State to show that such error

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Slaughter,

219 N.J. 104, 118 (2014) (finding violation of defendant's

confrontation rights was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt);

State v. Cabbell,
207 N.J. 311, 337-39 (2011) (holding denial of

right to cross-examine witness was not harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt).

In this case, we are not dealing with a constitutional error.

Directive #4-07 arose from our Supreme Court's desire for uniform

voir dire practices; the directive's mandates are not

constitutionally required. Instead, as noted earlier, the

Constitutions of both the United States and New Jersey guarantee

a criminal defendant an impartial jury. See Skilling v. United

States,
561 U.S. 358, 377,
130 S. Ct. 2896, 2912,
177 L. Ed. 2d 619, 641 (2010) ("The Sixth Amendment secures to criminal

defendants the right to trial by an impartial jury."); State v.

16 A-0841-15T1
Winder,
200 N.J. 231, 252 (2009) ("Generally, a trial court's

decisions regarding voir dire are not to be disturbed on appeal,

except to correct an error that undermines the selection of an

impartial jury.").

Moreover, failure to read the questions aloud or ask open-

ended questions during jury voir dire is not a structural error.

Structural errors exist "only in a very limited class of cases."

Johnson v. United States,
520 U.S. 461, 468,
117 S. Ct. 1544,

1549,
137 L. Ed. 2d 718, 728 (1997). "A structural error [has

been] defined as a 'defect affecting the framework within which

the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial

process itself.'" State v. Purnell,
161 N.J. 44, 60 (1999)

(quoting Johnson, supra,
520 U.S. at 468,
117 S. Ct. at 1549,
137 L. Ed. 2d at 728).

Our Supreme Court has explained that "a structural error

affects the legitimacy of the entire trial, rather than an isolated

error that occurs during a certain part of the trial process and

does not contaminate the trial as a whole." Id. at 61. Thus, a

structural error is a "structural defect[] in the constitution of

the trial mechanism, which [defies] analysis by 'harmless-error'

standards." Ibid. (alterations in original) (quoting Arizona v.

Fulminante,
499 U.S. 279, 309-10,
111 S. Ct. 1246, 1265,
113 L. Ed. 2d 302, 331 (1991)).

17 A-0841-15T1
Accordingly, here we apply the harmless error standard set

forth in Rule 2:10-2. In doing so, we examine whether the trial

court's failure to read the questions aloud, or ask three open-

ended questions, was of "such a nature as to have been clearly

capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2. Using that

standard, we have reviewed the jury voir dire conducted in this

case and conclude it was sufficiently comprehensive to ensure that

an impartial jury was selected.

Here, twelve jurors and two alternates were selected. All

potential jurors were given a printed copy of the jury

questionnaire and instructed to provide full and truthful answers.

The judge further instructed the jurors: "If, for any reason, my

questions do not cover why you would not be able to listen with

an open mind to the evidence in this case or be unable to reach a

fair and impartial verdict, it is necessary that you volunteer

this information to me when you are questioned."

All potential jurors then answered the standard list of

questions with "yes" or "no" responses and provided their

biographical information. The trial judge individually questioned

potential jurors on any "yes" response. The judge then posed two

open-ended questions to the jurors, asking them to explain why

they could be a fair juror, and their opinion on the "war on

drugs." During that process, defendant and his counsel had the

18 A-0841-15T1
opportunity to evaluate each of the potential jurors based on

their responses to these questions.

During jury selection, some seventy-eight potential jurors

were examined, of which forty-four were excused by the court for

cause based on their answers to questions and follow up

questioning. The potential jurors who were not immediately excused

for cause provided narrative responses, and all fourteen jurors

selected to hear the case spoke during the selection process.

Importantly, none of the jurors expressed confusion about the

questions or asked to have them read aloud.

The overall jury selection process was comprehensive. Our

review of the jury voir dire process in this case convinces us

that the selected jury was an impartial jury. Thus, we conclude

that the judge's failure to read the questions to the first group

of jurors in the box or to ask three open-ended questions did not

constitute plain error.

Finally, defendant contends the trial court improperly

rehabilitated several biased jurors and failed to thoroughly pose

follow-up questions aimed at gauging the jurors' impartiality.

Defendant also argues the court improperly denied his request to

excuse an allegedly biased juror for cause, thereby forcing defense

counsel to exhaust his peremptory challenges and leaving several

19 A-0841-15T1
biased jurors on the panel. We do not find these arguments

persuasive.

Trial courts possess considerable discretion in determining

the qualifications of prospective jurors. State v. Pennington,

119 N.J. 547, 588-89 (1990). A trial court's decision on the

removal of a prospective juror for cause is thus reviewed for an

abuse of that discretion. Ibid. In determining whether removal

is warranted, the trial court should make a "probing inquiry" on

the record into the juror irregularity, and rely on its own

objective evaluation of the potential for prejudice. State v.

Scherzer,
301 N.J. Super. 363, 487-88 (App. Div.), certif. denied,

151 N.J. 466 (1997). A juror's statement of impartiality is

afforded "a great deal of weight," and a reviewing court defers

to the trial court's ability to assess the juror's sincerity and

credibility about his or her impartiality. State v. Singletary,

80 N.J. 55, 64 (1979).

Guided by these principles, we conclude from our review of

the record, when viewed as a whole, that the trial court exercised

proper discretion in questioning and assessing potential jurors,

and in excusing those who could not be impartial. Moreover, we

note defendant was acquitted of all charges except for child

endangerment, which buttresses our conclusion that the trial

20 A-0841-15T1
court's jury selection process did not violate defendant's right

to a fair trial.

Affirmed.

21 A-0841-15T1

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