Thisopinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the UNION COUNTY DIVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES OBO DCF CENTRAL-OFFICE TRENTON v. J.D

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                      APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
      Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
        parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.




                                       SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                       APPELLATE DIVISION
                                       DOCKET NO. A-0578-16T1

UNION COUNTY DIVISION OF
SOCIAL SERVICES OBO DCF-
CENTRAL-OFFICE TRENTON,

        Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.D.,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________

                Submitted November 9, 2017 – Decided December 18, 2017

                Before Judges Currier and Geiger.

                On appeal from the Superior Court of New
                Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Union
                County, Docket No. FD-20-1454-14.

                J.D., appellant pro se.

                Robert E. Barry, County Counsel, attorney for
                respondent (Ellen Grod, Assistant County
                Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

        Defendant J.D. appeals the August 11, 2016 order denying her

motion     to    vacate   default    judgment.       After   a   review    of      her
contentions in light of the record and applicable principles of

law, we affirm.

     Defendant's child was removed from her custody in September

2013, and the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP)

was subsequently awarded legal and residential custody.                 At the

time, defendant and her child resided in New Jersey.1                 In March

2014, plaintiff, Union County Division of Social Services, filed

a complaint against defendant seeking child support payments and

medical coverage.

     After four unsuccessful attempts to serve defendant with the

complaint and summons at the New Jersey address, it was determined

that defendant had relocated to New York.                In April 2014, the

Family Part judge ordered that defendant be served by regular and

certified mail at the New York address.          The green return receipt

was signed on June 2, 2014, and returned to the court.                Defendant

failed to appear or answer the complaint.              A child support order

was entered against her.

     In January 2016, the Family Part transferred custody of the

child   back   to   defendant   and       terminated    her   child    support

obligation.    Because no child support payments had been made, an

order for arrears was entered against defendant on March 19, 2016.


1
   Defendant is an attorney licensed to practice in New Jersey.
The service address was also the address listed in the New Jersey
Lawyers Diary.
                                      2
     Nearly two years after the issuance of the child support

order, defendant filed a motion to vacate the default judgment

pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(d) and (f), contending that the judgment

was void for improper service of process.      After oral argument,

the judge denied the motion and ordered defendant to pay the

arrears.   The judge found that plaintiff had complied with the

rules by serving defendant at the address that she had provided

to DCPP and used in her profession.      Furthermore, she had been

served at the New York address as evidenced by the signed return

receipt for the certified mail.2

     In this appeal, defendant argues the Family Part judge abused

her discretion in denying the motion to vacate the default judgment

and ordering her to make payments on the arrears.3

     The decision whether to grant a motion to vacate is "left to

the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed

absent an abuse of discretion."    Mancini v. EDS, 
132 N.J. 330, 334

(1993).    "[W]here the motion is based on [Rule] 4:50-1(f), for

'any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the




2
   The judge also noted the favorable child support award, as
minimum wage had been imputed to defendant in calculating the
award, rather than her actual income.
3
   Defendant also argues the initial removal of her son from her
custody was unconstitutional. This argument bears no relevance to
the complaint that is the subject of this action and, therefore,
is not addressed in this decision.
                                   3
judgment   or   order,'   the    motion      must    be   supported   by   'truly

exceptional     circumstances'     in       the    interests   of   finality   of

judgments." M & D Assocs. v. Mandara, 
366 N.J. Super. 341, 350

(App. Div.) (quoting Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 
135 N.J.
 274, 286 (1994)), certif. denied, 
180 N.J. 151 (2004).

      Defendant asserts the judgment should be vacated under Rule

4:50-1(d), "the judgment or order is void", and (f) "any other

reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or

order."    We disagree.

      The Family Court judge did not abuse her discretion in finding

proper service and declining to vacate the default judgment.

Service was attempted at the address where defendant was living

with her child at the time of his removal: the same address

provided to DCPP and used in her professional listing.                When those

attempts were unsuccessful, plaintiff sought, and was granted, an

order permitting substituted service under Rule 4:4-3(a) in which

a party may be served via "registered or certified mail, return

receipt requested, to the usual place of abode of the" party "[i]f

personal service cannot be effected after a reasonable and good

faith attempt."    Upon the return of the signed receipt, the court

was   permitted   to   find     service      and    enter   default   judgment.4


4
   Service in this case was also proper pursuant to Rule 5:4-
4(b)(2). Rule 5:4-4(b)(2) provides, in pertinent part, that in


                                        4
Defendant's argument that she was not served with the complaint

is without merit.

     Rule 4:50-1(f) permits a judge to vacate a default judgment

for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the

judgment or order," and "is available only when 'truly exceptional

circumstances are present.'"    U.S. Bank N.A. v. Guillaume, 
209 N.J. 449, 484 (2012) (quoting Little, supra, 
135 N.J. at 286).

The applicability of this subsection is limited to "situations in

which, were it not applied, a grave injustice would occur."   Ibid.

(quoting Little, supra, 
135 N.J. at 289).

     Defendant reiterates her argument of improper service in

support of her assertion that subsection (f) permits the vacating

of the default judgment.   In light of our discussion, supra, we

are satisfied that defendant has failed to show any "exceptional

circumstances" required under Rule 4:50-1(f).    The Family Court

judge did not abuse her discretion in denying defendant's motion.

     Affirmed.




Family Part summary actions, "service by mail . . . shall have the
same effect as personal service, and the simultaneous mailing
shall constitute effective service unless there is no proof that
the certified mail was received." Service here was evidenced by
the signed return receipt of the certified mail and was, therefore,
proper.
                                5