Thisopinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3 JERSEY MICHAEL GRIFFIN v.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

MICHAEL GRIFFIN,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

HACKENSACK UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER,

Respondent-Respondent.

____________________________________________________

February 2, 2017

Argued October 6, 2016 Decided

Before Judges Guadagno and Suter.

On appeal from the Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Division of Workers' Compensation, Claim Petition No. 2007-13581.

John K. Robertson, Jr., argued the cause for appellant (Marcus & Levy, attorneys; Mr. Robertson, on the briefs).

David P. Kendall argued the cause for respondent (Ann DeBellis and Mr. Kendall, attorneys; Ms. DeBellis and Mr. Kendall, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Petitioner Michael Griffin appeals from orders of the Division of Workers' Compensation denying his motions for medical treatment, for reimbursement of expenses for prescriptions and treatment, and to enforce a prior order of total disability with the Second Injury Fund.

In October 2005, petitioner suffered a work-related injury while employed by respondent Hackensack University Medical Center (HUMC). Between 2006 and 2008, petitioner underwent three lumbar surgeries performed by a neurosurgeon, Dr. Roy Vingan. On May 6, 2010, an order of total disability with Second Injury Fund benefits was entered declaring petitioner totally and permanently disabled as of October 28, 2008. HUMC and the Second Injury Fund shared responsibility with a 75%/25% split.

When the May 6, 2010 order was entered, three physicians were authorized by respondent to treat petitioner: Dr. Ali Seckin, for pain management, Dr. Louis Arroyo, for psychiatric treatment, and Dr. Ellen Reicher, for psychological treatment.

In July 2010, petitioner was seen by Dr. Seckin. When Dr. Seckin explained to petitioner that he was required to submit to urine screens because he was receiving opioids, petitioner admitted to using cocaine and said he "would not want this to be known by his attorney or the judge." When Dr. Seckin suggested a referral to a substance abuse program, petitioner walked out of Dr. Seckin's office.

In May 2011, respondent arranged an appointment for petitioner with another pain management specialist, Dr. Joseph Valenza, Director of Pain Management at Kessler Institute of Rehabilitation. Dr. Valenza noted that petitioner was taking several medications, including oxycodone six times a day, and Roxicodone three times a day. After reviewing Dr. Seckin's report indicating petitioner's use of cocaine, Dr. Valenza asked petitioner to provide a urine sample. Petitioner left Dr. Valenza's office without providing the sample. In his report, Dr. Valenza suggested that he believed petitioner was continuing to use cocaine, and should not be prescribed controlled substances without a urine screen to determine whether he was using illicit substances.

Respondent referred petitioner to a third pain management specialist, Dr. Robert Brady. During petitioner's first appointment, Dr. Brady asked him to provide a urine sample. Petitioner refused and left the building. Dr. Brady noted that petitioner "demonstrated no outward signs of pain and ambulated with a nonantalgic gait."

After the May 6, 2010 total disability order, petitioner was involved in motor vehicle accidents on May 22, 2010, and August 19, 2011. After the August 19 accident, in which petitioner's car was rear-ended by another car, petitioner received treatment from several doctors including, Dr. David Porter, Dr. Thomas Findley, and Dr. Amit Goswami. Petitioner was examined by Dr. Porter ten days after the August 19 accident and claimed he was in good health before the accident. Dr. Porter saw petitioner thirty times and found "a direct causal relationship between petitioner's condition and the accident of August 19, 2011."

Petitioner saw Dr. Findley, a psychiatrist, on September 27, 2011 and reported he was "in a good state of health" before the August 19 accident.

Petitioner saw Dr. Goswami for pain management on November 18, 2011, and told him "he was in good health and pain free before he was involved in [the August 19] accident. . . . [he] did not experience any pain before the [August 19] accident . . . [and] started having severe pain after he was involved in the accident." Dr. Goswami administered lumbar epidural injections. On February 17, 2012, Dr. Goswami noted: "The patient has a remote history of L4-L5 fusion but he states that he had improved very well after the surgery and was in excellent health before he was involved in a motor vehicle accident."

Petitioner had been seeing Dr. Louis Arroyo, a psychiatrist, since 2008. In 2010, Dr. Arroyo began prescribing pain management medication, after petitioner's claimed "falling out" with his other pain management doctors. On February 4, 2014, respondent's carrier, New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company, informed Dr. Arroyo that he was not authorized to treat petitioner for the 2005 work-related injury, and the cost of any treatment provided would be borne by petitioner. Petitioner moved to enforce the May 6, 2010 total disability order and compel the reinstatement of Dr. Arroyo and clinical psychologist Dr. Ellen Reicher as authorized treating physicians.

Trial on petitioner's application began in March 2014. Judge of Compensation Diana Ferriero heard testimony of petitioner and Dr. Arroyo. On July 10, 2014, Judge Ferriero read a decision into the record, denying the petition for additional treatment.

Petitioner testified at trial and denied telling Drs. Porter, Findley, or Goswami that he was in good health and pain free before the August 19 accident, as they indicated in their reports. Judge Ferriero rejected petitioner's testimony and found he was not credible on this issue. The judge also found petitioner was not forthcoming when he attempted to minimize the nature and extent of the August 2011 accident, noting he had exhausted the personal injury protection benefits coverage of $250,000 as a result of that accident.

Judge Ferriero also noted that petitioner was receiving prescription narcotic medications from Drs. Porter, Goswami, and Arroyo simultaneously, and rejected petitioner's claim that he was unaware this practice violated protocol. The judge found that petitioner abused his medication and "intentionally withheld information so he could get narcotic medication from multiple sources." The judge concluded petitioner suffered from addiction and should be seeking rehabilitation.

The judge relied on a report by Dr. Vingan, who examined petitioner in November 2012, and noted "[petitioner's] lower back was doing well prior to the motor vehicle accident of August 19, 2011." The judge also noted that Dr. Vingan's conclusions were consistent with the three other doctors who reported that petitioner was doing well before the 2011 accident.

Petitioner relied on the testimony of Dr. Arroyo in support of his claim that respondent remained obligated to provide him with treatment and medication from the 2005 incident. Judge Ferriero observed that even Dr. Arroyo found it suspicious that petitioner had issues with three different pain management specialists, and it made no sense for him to refuse urine screens if he was not abusing drugs. The judge noted that Dr. Arroyo had been prescribing narcotic medication to petitioner for several years, but had never completed a physical examination of him.

Judge Ferriero rejected Dr. Arroyo's conclusion that petitioner suffered only temporary exacerbation from the 2011 accident, noting that Dr. Arroyo had never reviewed any treatment records from the accident and, had he done so, he would have realized petitioner's psychiatric condition worsened after the accident. The judge found that Dr. Arroyo attributed petitioner's condition to the 2005 accident because he lacked any knowledge of the 2011 accident.

Based on this evidence, Judge Ferriero concluded that the 2011 accident was a superseding event that adversely affected petitioner's lumbar spine, and petitioner failed to prove that his pain management needs related to the 2005 incident. The judge also noted petitioner had filed a negligence action against the driver of the other vehicle involved in the 2011 accident, alleging that accident was the proximate cause of his injuries. Judge Ferriero found the August 2011 accident "was not in any way attributable to or connected with the original compensable work injury."

On appeal, petitioner claims the decision denying his motion for treatment was against the weight of the evidence; he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motions to enforce and for medical benefits; and the judge was required to follow the recommendations of his physicians. We are not persuaded by any of these arguments, and after reviewing the record in light of these contentions, we affirm substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Ferriero, in her thorough oral decision of July 10, 2014. We add only the following brief comments.

Our review of a decision of the Division of Workers' Compensation is limited to "'whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record, considering the proofs as a whole, with due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to judge of their credibility.'" Lindquist v. City of Jersey City Fire Dep't, 175 N.J. 244, 262 (2003) (quoting Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965)). We defer to the factual findings and legal determinations of the judge of compensation, "unless they are 'manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" Perez v. Monmouth Cable Vision, 278 N.J. Super. 275, 282 (App. Div. 1994) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)), certif. denied, 140 N.J. 277 (1995). Such courts are considered experts with respect to weighing the testimony of competing medical experts and appraising the validity of compensation claims. Ramos v. M & F Fashions, Inc., 154 N.J. 583, 598 (1998).

Judge Ferriero carefully considered the testimony of petitioner and Dr. Arroyo, and meticulously examined numerous medical records and reports. Her conclusion that both witnesses lacked credibility finds abundant support in the record, as does her finding that the 2011 accident was a superseding event that adversely affected petitioner's lumbar spine. Furthermore, petitioner failed to prove that his need for pain management was related to the 2005 incident. Petitioner has provided us with no basis to disturb Judge Ferriero's decision.

Affirmed.