Thisopinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3 OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PE

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

A-0297-15T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

T.D.E. and C.C.E., SR.,

Defendants-Appellants.

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF

C.C.-B.E. JR., C.A.E. and C.G.E.,

Minors.

February 2, 2017

Submitted January 11, 2017- Decided

Before Judges Fuentes, Simonelli and Carroll.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, Docket No. FG-09-259-14.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant T.D.E. (Dianne Glenn, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant C.C.E., Sr. (Gilbert G. Miller, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Jessica M. Steinglass, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors (Sean Lardner, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant T.D.E. is the biological mother and defendant C.C.E., Sr. is the biological father of C.E. ("Carol"), born in 1998; C.C.-B.E., Jr. ("Cal"), born in 2003; C.A.E. ("Cindy"), born in 2007; and C.G.E. ("Candace"), born in 2009.1 In May 2013, the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency ("Division") conducted an emergency removal of the children after Carol disclosed that C.C.E., Sr. physically and sexually abused her and that T.D.E. knew of this abuse but failed to take any action.

After conducting a four-day fact-finding hearing, Judge Bernadette N. DeCastro issued a detailed written opinion in May 2014, concluding that the Division proved by a preponderance of the evidence that C.C.E., Sr. sexually abused and inflicted excessive corporal punishment on Carol and that T.D.E. failed to protect Carol from C.C.E., Sr.'s abuse. The judge further found that both defendants abused and neglected the three younger children by exposing them to domestic violence and physical abuse, thereby creating a home environment injurious to their health and well-being. We affirmed in an unpublished decision. N.J. Div. of Child Protection and Permanency v. T.E. and C.E., No. A-1004-14 (App. Div. Feb. 9, 2016), certif. denied, ___ N.J. ___ (2016).

On May 29, 2014, the Division filed a complaint for guardianship and termination of defendants' parental rights to Cal, Cindy, and Candace. On August 28, 2014, the complaint was amended to also include Carol. Prior to the guardianship trial, defendants voluntarily surrendered their parental rights to Carol to the maternal grandmother, H.R., so that H.R. could adopt Carol. The court accepted the voluntary surrender and entered an order on May 6, 2015, terminating defendants' parental rights and granting guardianship of Carol to the Division.

The guardianship trial with respect to the three younger children proceeded before Judge Mirtha Ospina over four non-consecutive days in May 2015. The Division relied upon documentary evidence and the testimony of the Division's adoption caseworker, Jasmine Soto, and its expert psychologist, Robert James Miller, Ph.D. The Law Guardian supported the Division's request for termination of parental rights and presented the testimony of its psychological and bonding expert, Alison Strasser Winston, Ph.D. C.C.E., Sr. called his expert psychologist, Lidia D. Abrams, Ph.D. Neither C.C.E., Sr. nor T.D.E. testified.

On August 28, 2015, Judge Ospina rendered an oral opinion finding the testimony given by Soto, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Winston, to be "extremely credible." In contrast, the judge found Dr. Abrams' testimony "confusing." In her comprehensive opinion, Judge Ospina carefully reviewed the testimony and evidence and concluded the Division had satisfied the four prongs of the best interests test, as set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a(1) to -15.1a(4), and that defendants' parental rights to Cal, Cindy, and Candace should be terminated.

In these consolidated appeals, T.D.E. argues that the Division failed to prove prongs two, three, and four of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a by clear and convincing evidence. C.C.E., Sr. contends that the Division failed to prove all four prongs. He also argues that the trial court erred in allowing inadmissible hearsay evidence and that the court's reliance on hearsay denied him due process and the right to confront witnesses. Having reviewed defendants' arguments in light of the record and applicable legal principles, we affirm.

Our scope of review on appeals from orders terminating parental rights is limited. In such cases, the trial court's findings generally should be upheld so long as they are supported by "adequate, substantial, and credible evidence." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014). A decision in this context should only be reversed or altered on appeal if the trial court's findings are "so wholly unsupportable as to result in a denial of justice." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 511 (2004) (quoting In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002)). We must give substantial deference to the trial judge's opportunity to have observed the witnesses first hand and to evaluate their credibility. R.G., supra, 217 N.J. at 552. Even where the appellants "allege error in the trial judge's evaluation of the underlying facts and the implications to be drawn therefrom," deference must be afforded unless the court "went so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (citations omitted).

Although Carol is not part of the present appeal, the Division's continued involvement with the family is directly related to Carol's allegations that she was sexually and physically abused by C.C.E., Sr. The Division further alleged that T.D.E. ignored the sexual abuse, and actively participated in the physical abuse. We recounted much of the facts and procedural history underlying these allegations in our prior unpublished opinion on defendants' appeal from the final order terminating the Title Nine proceeding. T.E. and C.E., supra, (slip op. at 3-20). We will not repeat those findings here, but incorporate them in this opinion. Instead, we focus on Judge Ospina's careful summary of the proofs at the guardianship trial on each of the four prongs of the best interests test.

Judge Ospina found Judge DeCastro's decision in the abuse and neglect matter "relevant" to whether the children's health and well-being had been seriously impaired and the risk of harm to the children going forward. As an initial matter, C.C.E., Sr. contends that Judge Ospina erred in giving any consideration to Judge DeCastro's decision. He correctly asserts that Title Nine abuse or neglect proceedings are governed by the preponderance of the evidence standard. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b)(1). In contrast, Title Thirty termination of parental rights proceedings implicate core constitutional rights and therefore are governed by the clear and convincing evidence standard. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.D., 207 N.J. 88, 113 (2011).

We nonetheless find C.C.E., Sr.'s argument lacks merit. Although Judge Ospina gave "some weight" to Judge DeCastro's fact-finding decision, she expressly recognized that the earlier abuse and neglect proceedings were governed by a "different standard." Judge Ospina emphasized that the "standard that's before this [c]ourt in a termination of parental rights [case] is a higher standard: [] that of clear and convincing evidence."

Prior to the guardianship trial, the Division's psychologist, Dr. Miller, conducted psychological evaluations of both defendants, and reviewed a plethora of documents, including Division investigation reports and psychiatric, psychosocial, and medical evaluations for the children that were performed at the Audrey Hepburn Children's House and by other medical professionals. Dr. Miller noted that C.C.E., Sr. appeared "tense and defensive throughout questioning regarding his parenting history." He denied Carol's allegations of sexual and physical abuse, and also "denied the children have made any allegations regarding witnessing domestic violence or alcohol use." Notably, when asked to describe the outcome of his criminal charges, C.C.E., Sr. informed Dr. Miller that "[e]verything was dismissed." On further questioning, C.C.E., Sr. stated, "I [pled] to [] [fourth]-degree child endangerment and child neglect." C.C.E., Sr. further advised that on November 17, 2014, he had agreed to enter the Pre-Trial Intervention (PTI) program. He also stated that T.D.E. "received PTI, got to go to a program, it starts in [three] weeks."

C.C.E., Sr. was unable to provide Dr. Miller with basic information about the children, such as Carol's developmental milestones, or the other children's correct birth dates. Aside from locking Carol in her room, he was unable to offer any strategies that would assist Carol improve her behavioral problems. Various psychological tests administered by Dr. Miller revealed that C.C.E., Sr. exhibited "poor impulse control, anger, impressionistic thinking (denial), externalization of responsibility, and lack of empathy." His responses also indicated "medium risk for lack of understanding of child development, lack of nurturing skills, threatened by child autonomy, [he] is demanding and controlling, and devalues negotiation."

Dr. Miller interviewed Carol, who reported that she was sexually and physically abused at home and her mother did nothing to protect her. Carol reported seeing her parents engage in sexual acts and her father choking her mother. Carol also described suicidal thoughts of stabbing herself because of the abuse. According to Carol, the only person she trusts is her maternal grandmother. The results of Dr. Miller's tests revealed Carol has internalized feelings of poor self-esteem, symptoms of dissociation, and conflict regarding feelings of sexuality. Dr. Miller reported that Carol's "[s]tatements were credible and consistent with [her] previous disclosures," and she "clearly expressed her wish to no longer have contact with her biological parents."

Dr. Miller also interviewed T.D.E., who angrily denied all allegations and accused Carol and the Division caseworkers of lying. According to Dr. Miller's report, T.D.E. could not provide any information regarding Carol's special needs and only "vague and impressionistic statements" about Cal's and Cindy's personalities. Similar to C.C.E., Sr.'s results, T.D.E.'s responses to the testing suggested she had "poor impulse control, anger/paranoia, impressionistic thinking (denial), externalization of responsibility, and lack of empathy." These responses revealed a "moderate risk that [T.D.E.] has less than average understanding of child development, lacks nurturing skills, is demanding and controlling, devalues negotiation, and risk of poor coping with parenting stress."

Dr. Miller conducted a clinical interview with the maternal grandmother, who provided a detailed description of the children's daily routine. Unlike the parents, the grandmother was able to describe Carol's special needs and her improvement in school. The grandmother denied using physical discipline on the children. Notably, she told Dr. Miller, "I'm not gonna do no kinship" and further indicated that her concerns regarding kinship legal guardianship (KLG) were attributable to T.D.E.'s instability.

During Dr. Miller's bonding evaluation2 of the children with T.D.E., Cindy began to cry and turned away from her mother, indicating that she wanted to leave the room. Candace ran by her mother to play with toys. Cal ignored T.D.E. and did not hug her. T.D.E. appeared to passively engage with the children. When the caseworker re-entered the room, the two younger daughters immediately ran to the caseworker, leaving their mother behind. According to Dr. Miller, the interactions between T.D.E. and the children indicated "insecure attachments and lack of affection."

Ultimately, Dr. Miller opined

Both parents were unable or unwilling to consider how their behavior may have impacted on the children's apparent delays in social, emotional, and educational development. Their safety cannot be supported nor [their] capacity to make amends. [T.D.E.] was unable to take the role of a minimally concerned parent to consider potential problems in a timely way that would support reunification.

[T.D.E.] acknowledged unwavering support for [C.C.E., Sr.] without questioning. Neither [C.C.E., Sr.] nor [T.D.E.] can provide sufficient safety for the children in this case.

There was nothing in their parental behavior to suggest confidence that these adults could repair relationships by acknowledging their problems and make amends with their children by apology in order to further reconciliation.

Comparative bonding evaluations suggest the children should remain in the home of relative caregivers. Evaluations and documented history suggest insecure attachments between the children and the biological parents.

Recommendations

The Division should continue to seek termination of parental rights for the children with the goal of adoption by relative caregivers. Further delay in permanency will undermine developing resilience in these protective relationships and delay shift from maladaptive to adaptive development in cognitive, social/emotional, and intellectual domains of functioning.

Secure attachments were observed with the relative caretakers and they appear competent to provide stability and emotional support if the children are separated from the biological parents.

The children should not be separated from each other as they appear to be supportive with evidence of strong sibling bonds. The children will not experience more harm than good if separated from the biological parents by order of the court.

The Law Guardian's expert, Dr. Winston, conducted psychological and bonding evaluations and reached similar conclusions. Dr. Winston expressed concern that Carol had reported "specific, detailed, and unusual allegations against her father" that had been corroborated by her younger siblings, and that T.D.E. denied the allegations during her interview. Dr. Winston noted that in May 2013, T.D.E. acknowledged during a Family Team meeting that she had been aware of the sexual abuse allegations. Dr. Winston found that T.D.E. "demonstrate[d] no insight into the harm that she had caused her children through her failure to act." Dr. Winston also found "no evidence to suggest that [T.D.E.] has made any demonstrable progress in her ability to safely parent her children, indicating that she remains incapable of providing her children with a safe and stable environment at the present time and will be unable to do so within the foreseeable future." Dr. Winston opined that T.D.E. "appears to have deeply ingrained emotional difficulties that will likely require a great deal of time to address in therapy (i.e., several years), and will not be adequately remediated within a timeframe to meet her children's need for permanency" and that T.D.E.'s "compliance with psychotherapy would not justify reunification with her children."

With respect to C.C.E., Sr., Dr. Winston similarly found it concerning "that all three of [his] younger children have consistently reported awareness of the physical and emotional abuse that [Carol] had experienced, in addition to having experienced physical abuse themselves, and that [C.C.E., Sr.] has flatly and repeatedly denied [Carol's] allegations in spite of the evidence against him." Dr. Winston reported that [C.C.E., Sr.] "continues to present a significant risk of harm to his children as a result of his inability to effectively control his temper, and his failure to exhibit meaningful change as a result of his compliance with services indicates that he will continue to present a risk of harm to the children for the foreseeable future."

With respect to her bonding evaluations, Dr. Winston noted that

although the children appear to have a strong and secure emotional attachment to their biological parents, they have similarly strong and secure emotional attachments to their relative caregivers . . . who have demonstrated the capacity to provide the children with a safe and stable environment, and are willing to adopt [Cal, Cindy, and Candace].

Dr. Winston opined that reunification with defendants would cause the children "serious and enduring emotional harm." In contrast, although the children might experience "some emotional harm" if the parents' rights were terminated, "the level of harm . . . would be mitigated by the strong nature of their attachments to their current resource caregivers." Accordingly, Dr. Winston recommended that defendants' parental rights to the three children be terminated so they could be freed for adoption by their relative caregivers.

Defendant countered with the testimony of his expert psychologist, Dr. Abrams. During C.C.E., Sr.'s evaluation, he admitted grabbing Carol by her hoodie when she returned home from her boyfriend's home, but denied all other allegations. Dr. Abrams found that "there was nothing to suggest that he is at risk for being an abusive parent."

During Dr. Abrams' interview with Cal, he stated that he lied to his teachers about his father hitting him. However, Dr. Abrams noted that Cal "gave the strong impression that he didn t want to say anything negative about his father." Cindy also denied being hit by her parents. All three children expressed a desire to return home with their parents.

Dr. Abrams described C.C.E., Sr.'s interaction with the children during the bonding evaluation as "appropriate, pleasant and loving." Dr. Abrams concluded that "there [was] a strong and warm bond between [C.C.E., Sr.] and his children[.]" Dr. Abrams also interviewed the maternal grandmother, H.R., who reported that Carol was doing well in her care. H.R. informed Dr. Abrams that she believed Carol's allegations of abuse by her father. As a result, Carol wanted nothing to do with either parent. If H.R. had a better relationship with the children's parents, "perhaps she might consider doing a KLG." In her testimony, Dr. Abrams elaborated that C.C.E., Sr. and H.R. "have a very long history of animosity," and "there has been [] little communication" between H.R. and T.D.E.

Although C.C.E., Sr. denied the various allegations of abuse, Dr. Abrams reported that

a review of the documentation provided shows a good deal of consistency in the children's reports, consistency with each other's reports as well as within their own interviews by different professionals. The multiple interviews with the children repeatedly document incidents of child abuse, and it is highly unlikely that most if not all the reports would not be true. In particular, the fact that [Carol] no longer wants a relationship with either parent strongly suggests abuse.

. . . .

Due to the discrepancy between reports of abuse given by [C.C.E., Sr.'s] children and his own reports denying everything, this psychologist believes that [C.C.E., Sr.] was not forthcoming about the alleged incidents of abuse. As a result, information about [C.C.E., Sr.'s] thought processes pertaining to abuse could not be gathered. Conclusions regarding risk of future abuse cannot be drawn within a reasonable degree of psychological certainty.

Dr. Abrams further opined that C.C.E., Sr. "likely acted inappropriately towards his children as well as his wife, due to poor anger management and due to wrong ideas about parenting and boundaries."

Although Dr. Abrams concluded it would be harmful for the three younger children to lose contact with C.C.E., Sr., she nonetheless did not recommend their immediate reunification with him. Rather, she opined that "[i]f [H.R.] would consider a KLG adoption of all three children, this would be the best scenario," although it would admittedly "require an improved relationship between [H.R.] and [defendants]." In the interim, Dr. Abrams recommended that C.C.E., Sr. be granted "gradually increased parenting time with the three younger children," and that "additional services should consist of [Division] supervision for the next two years to insure that behavioral changes have occurred and the children are safe." Dr. Abrams testified, "[b]ased on the documents I reviewed, I would feel much better if in the next two years, there were homemakers in the home observing the interactions. Not all the time, but frequently."

Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied that Judge Ospina's findings, related to each of the four prongs of the best interests test, are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record and are entitled to our deference. We are additionally persuaded that the judge applied the correct legal principles in concluding from those facts that the Division established, by clear and convincing evidence, termination was in the children's best interests. We add the following comments.

The appropriate test under the first prong is "whether the child's safety, health or development will be endangered in the future and whether the parents are or will be able to eliminate the harm." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. 418, 440 (App. Div. 2001), certif. denied, 171 N.J. 44 (2002). Causing harm and the inability to eliminate it are related factors. Thus, the evidence that supports one, informs, and may support the other. In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 379 (1999).

Here, Judge Ospina noted that she "heard testimony from three qualified experts who unequivocally agreed that abuse was present in the home." The judge further noted that both defendants "continuously denied allegations of domestic violence and physical, emotional, and sexual abuse." These denials, and defendants' "refusal to acknowledge the problems with their behavior" toward the children led the judge to conclude that the children remained endangered if they were returned to defendants' care. The record amply supports Judge Ospina's finding that the Division satisfied its burden of proof as to the first prong of the best interests test.

This same evidence also clearly and convincingly demonstrated defendants' inability or unwillingness to prevent harm to the children's safety, health, or development, thereby supporting the judge's findings under the second prong. The expert testimony of Drs. Miller and Winston established to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that both parents were incapable of providing sufficient safety for the children. In contrast, C.C.E., Sr.'s expert, Dr. Abrams, was unable to reach any conclusion regarding risk of future abuse within a reasonable degree of psychological certainty. Where qualified experts present opposing opinions on disputed issues, the trier of fact may accept the testimony or opinion of one expert and reject the other. Angel v. Rand Express Lines, Inc., 66 N.J. Super. 77, 85-86 (App. Div. 1961). This principle flows out of the well-known proposition that jurors, or a judge in a bench trial, have the best "opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to get a feel for the case that the reviewing court [cannot] enjoy." Twp. of W. Windsor v. Nierenberg, 150 N.J. 111, 132 (1997).

The third statutory element of the best-interests standard requires the Division to undertake "reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights[.]" N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a(3). "The diligence of [the Division's] efforts on behalf of a parent is not measured by their success. . . . These efforts must be assessed against the standard of adequacy in light of all the circumstances of a given case." D.M.H., supra, 161 N.J. at 393.

Here, Judge Ospina found that the Division "offered the family a multitude of services" in an attempt to find alternatives to terminating defendants' parental rights. Specifically, T.D.E. was referred to domestic violence counselling, psychological evaluations, and parenting skill classes, while C.C.E., Sr. was referred to a substance abuse evaluation, parenting skills and anger management skills classes, and bonding and psychological evaluations.

T.D.E. argues that the Division failed to consider the relative caregivers as kinship legal guardians. A parent "may request . . . that the court consider a kinship legal guardianship arrangement as an alternative disposition," but "[o]nly the [D]ivision or the court" is permitted to ultimately decide whether to seek that alternative disposition. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-87.

The New Jersey Supreme Court has made clear that kinship legal guardianship should only be considered when adoption is not possible

The plain language of the [Kinship] Act, as well as its legislative history, establish kinship legal guardianship as a more permanent option than foster care when adoption "is neither feasible nor likely" and "kinship legal guardianship is in the child's best interest." N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-6d(3)-(4); [N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. S.V., 362 N.J. Super. 76, 88 (App. Div. 2003)]. Conversely, when the permanency provided by adoption is available, kinship legal guardianship cannot be used as a defense to termination of parental rights under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3).

[P.P., supra, 180 N.J. at 512-13.]

Here, kinship legal guardianship was not an available option because, at the time of the guardianship trial, all the children were living with the maternal grandmother, who wished to adopt them. Thus, T.D.E.'s argument that the court improperly failed to consider the concept of kinship legal guardianship is without merit.

The fourth statutory prong requires the court to determine that termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good to the child. N.J.S.A.30:4C-15.1(a)(4). This prong "serves as a fail-safe against termination even where the remaining standards have been met." Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J.596, 609 (2007). The question is "whether a child's interest will best be served by completely terminating the child's relationship with that parent." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J.88, 108 (2008).

The ultimate determination to be made under the fourth prong is "whether, after considering and balancing the two relationships, the child will suffer a greater harm from the termination of ties with [the] natural parents than from the permanent disruption of [the] relationship with [the] foster parents." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 355 (1999). Weighing the potential harm from terminating parental rights against separating the child from foster parents requires expert testimony on the strength of each relationship. Ibid. When a termination action is based on parental unfitness rather than bonding, the proper inquiry under the fourth prong focuses on the child's need for permanency and the parent's inability to care for him or her in the foreseeable future. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. B.G.S., 291 N.J. Super. 582, 593 (1996).

Judge Ospina reviewed the bonding evaluations conducted by the three experts and found that although the children were attached to their parents, the maternal grandmother would be able to mitigate any harm they would suffer from being separated from their parents. The judge credited Dr. Winston's testimony that the children had "a strong, secure attachment with their maternal grandmother," and the harm from separating the children from their grandmother "would not be mitigated because there is a possibility" that the parents would not allow the children to communicate with their grandmother. Judge Ospina also relied on Dr. Winston's opinion that the reunification of the children with defendants would be detrimental and would place them at significant risk of harm. The judge disregarded Dr. Abrams' recommendation of reunification with two years of having homemakers in the home, finding "[t]hat's not reunification, that's not permanency."

In the end, based on the bonding evaluations conducted by Dr. Miller and Dr. Winston, Judge Ospina concluded that "termination of [defendants'] parental rights will not do more harm than good and permanency should not be delayed." We find no basis in the record to disturb the judge's well-reasoned determination.

Finally, C.C.E., Sr. argues that the trial court improperly admitted and relied on hearsay and other unreliable evidence. We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 382-84 (2010). We give substantial deference to the trial judge's discretion on evidentiary rulings, Benevenga v. Digregorio, 325 N.J. Super. 27, 32 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 79 (2000), and reverse only where the judge's ruling was "so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted." State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 106 (1982). We discern no abuse of discretion here.

We begin by noting that the Division moved some 111 exhibits in evidence at the guardianship trial. Defendants only objected to ten of those exhibits. With respect to the other exhibits, defendants stipulated they were admissible pursuant to Rule 5:12-4(d) and Rule 803(c)(6). Rule 5:12-4(d) allows the Division to submit into evidence reports prepared by staff personnel or professional consultants "provided the documents satisfy the requirements of the business records exception, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) and 801(d)." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.G., 427 N.J. Super. 154, 173 (App. Div. 2012); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. B.M., 413 N.J. Super. 118, 129 (App. Div. 2010). N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) provides the definition of a business record constituting an exception to the hearsay rule

A statement contained in writing or other record of acts, events, conditions, . . . made at or near the time of observation by a person with actual knowledge or from information supplied by such a person, [is admissible] if the writing or other record was made in the regular course of business and it was the regular practice of that business to make it, unless the sources of information or the method, purpose or circumstances of preparation indicate that it is not trustworthy.

We have found Division records to be reliable and admissible evidence. In In re Guardianship of Cope, 106 N.J. Super. 336, 343-44 (App. Div. 1969), we explained

[T]he Bureau [of Children's Services, the predecessor agency of the Division3] should be permitted to submit into evidence . . . reports by Bureau staff personnel (or affiliated, medical, psychiatric, or psychological consultants), prepared from their own first-hand knowledge of the case, at a time reasonably contemporaneous with the facts they relate, and in the usual course of their duties with the Bureau.

Reports of this type, prepared by the qualified personnel of a state agency charged with the responsibility for overseeing the welfare of children in the State, supply a reasonably high degree of reliability as to the accuracy of the facts contained therein. The parent remains free to offer evidence contradicting any statements present in such reports and, of course, the trier of the facts may in his discretion call for live testimony on any point.

Many of the exhibits that were admitted without objection were business records that the Division prepared or reports from outside sources. The Division relied on those outside records in order to provide services to defendants. The ten exhibits the defense objected to were reports of the children's medical, psychiatric, and psychological evaluations. The Division agreed that the expert opinions and diagnoses expressed in those reports were not admissible. Accordingly, the court admitted the statements made by the children during the evaluations, but "excluded and redacted" any diagnosis contained in the reports. All three experts who testified at the guardianship trial reviewed and relied on the children's statements in formulating their opinions, as permitted by N.J.R.E. 703, and were subject to cross-examination regarding the facts and information upon which their opinions were based.

In summary, we are bound by the trial judge's factual findings as long as they are supported by sufficient competent, credible evidence. R.G., supra, 217 N.J. at 552. Here, Judge Ospina accepted the Division's evidence as credible, and properly found that the Division satisfied all four prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a by clear and convincing evidence. To the extent that we have not specifically addressed any of defendants' remaining arguments, we deem them without sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

1 We use pseudonyms for the reader's convenience and to protect the privacy of the children. R. 1:38-3(d)(12).

2 For some reason not entirely clear from the record, Dr. Miller conducted a forensic psychological evaluation of C.C.E., Sr., but did not conduct a bonding evaluation of him with the children.

3 See L. 1979, c. 208 (specific language formerly codified at N.J.S.A. 30:4C-2). L. 2012, c. 16 substituted "Division of Child Protection and Permanency" for "Division of Youth and Family Services" throughout the section and deleted "successor to the 'Bureau of Children's Services.'"