JACOB GROSSMAN v. SUNIM JUN

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is only binding on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

JACOB GROSSMAN,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SUNIM JUN,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________

October 19, 2016

Submitted October 5, 2016 Decided

Before Judges Nugent and Haas.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. SC-1321-15.

Sunim Jun, appellant pro se.

Jacob Grossman, respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM

Defendant Sunim Jun appeals from the June 18, 2015 judgment of the Special Civil Part awarding $2566.50 to plaintiff Jacob Grossman in this breach of contract case. We affirm.

We derive the following facts from the record developed during the one-day bench trial. Plaintiff operated a car audio shop, which installed Bluetooth equipment, automatic starters, and other specialty items in cars. Defendant's fiancé owned a competing business. After the fiancé died, plaintiff contacted defendant in October 2013 to inquire whether he could buy the fiancé's shop's inventory. In response, defendant proposed that plaintiff perform installation work for customers that she would send him, and defendant would pay him for his services.

Plaintiff agreed to this arrangement and, over the course of the next several weeks, plaintiff installed equipment for customers that defendant referred to him. Plaintiff prepared invoices totaling $2566.50 and submitted them to defendant. Plaintiff testified that defendant refused to pay him and, instead, charged the customers directly and "kept the money, all the money. I was not paid any of it."

Defendant did not testify at the trial. Her attorney alleged that defendant was a shareholder in her deceased fiancé's "S corporation," but he presented no witnesses or documentary evidence to corroborate this assertion. Plaintiff stated he dealt with defendant on an individual basis "from beginning to end" and that defendant "never presented herself as an officer of the corporation."

Finding that plaintiff's account of the transaction was undisputed, the trial judge granted judgment in favor of plaintiff for $2566.50 as set forth in the invoices he submitted. This appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant contends that "the trial court erred by holding that [plaintiff] provided sufficient evidence to warrant piercing of the corporate veil of" her alleged corporation. We disagree.

We review the factual findings made by a trial judge to determine whether they are "supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence." Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). Such findings made by a judge in a bench trial "should not be disturbed 'unless they are so wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of justice.'" Id. at 483-84 (quoting Greenfield v. Dusseault, 60 N.J. Super. 436, 444 (App. Div.), aff'd o.b., 33 N.J. 78 (1960)). Factual findings that "are substantially influenced by [the judge's] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case" enjoy deference on appeal. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964). However, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

After reviewing the record in light of these principles, we discern no basis for disturbing the trial judge's determination. Plaintiff's testimony concerning the terms of the parties' arrangement was uncontradicted. Defendant agreed to refer customers to plaintiff and, following his completion of the installation work, agreed to pay him for his services. However, defendant breached this agreement by collecting the amounts due from the customers and then refusing to pay plaintiff. Thus, there was ample evidence in the record to support the judge's decision to enter judgment in plaintiff's favor for the work he performed.

Defendant correctly points out that our Supreme Court has recognized as a "fundamental proposition[] that a corporation is a separate entity from its shareholders, and that a primary reason for incorporation is the insulation of shareholders from the liabilities of the corporate enterprise." State Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 500 (1983) (citing Lyon v. Barrett, 89 N.J. 294, 300 (1982)). However, defendant's continued assertion that she was a shareholder in her fiancé's corporation lacks support in the record. As noted above, defendant did not testify at trial, call any witnesses, or present any documentary evidence to refute plaintiff's testimony that he dealt with defendant as an individual. Thus, contrary to defendant's assertion, the trial judge did not have to pierce the corporate veil of any corporation to conclude that defendant was individually liable.

Affirmed.