ANDRE DENNIS v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

ANDRE DENNIS,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

____________________________________

January 11, 2016

Submitted December 9, 2015 Decided

Before Judges Fuentes and Kennedy.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.

Andre Dennis, appellant pro se.

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Randy Miller, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Andre Dennis is an inmate at the New Jersey State Prison in Trenton, serving a life sentence with an eighty-four-year term of parole ineligibility for murder and a number of other violent offenses. He appeals from a final administrative determination by the Department of Corrections (DOC) dated June 4, 2014, that found he committed disciplinary infractions, to wit, prohibited acts *.215, distribution or sale of prohibited substances that included illicit drugs, intoxicants, or related paraphernalia; *.803/*.215, attempt to distribute illicit drugs, intoxicants, or related paraphernalia; *.803/*.306, attempt to disrupt or interfere with the security or orderly administration of the correctional facility; *.803/*.704, attempt to perpetuate frauds, deceptions, confidence games, riots or escape plots; two counts of *.006, extortion, blackmail, and/or protection; demanding or receiving favors, money, or anything of value in exchange for protection against others, to avoid bodily harm, or under threat of informing; and two counts of *.803/*.751, attempt to give or offer any official or staff member of the penal institution a bribe or anything of value, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a).1

The DOC sanctioned appellant with time served in administrative detention, 365 days in administrative segregation, 365 days loss of commutation time, and 180 days loss of recreation privileges. The sanctions were to be served consecutive to any other sanctions appellant had previously received for unrelated disciplinary infractions. The disciplinary charges under review here were brought by the DOC after conducting an extensive investigation by the Special Investigations Division (SID) in response to evidence revealing the existence of a large conspiracy to illegally bring contraband into the prison.

The conspiracy involved the active participation of corrupt prison staff who worked to bring into the prison illicit drugs and cellphones. Corrupt staff also assisted appellant with money laundering and conducted a campaign of threats of violence and intimidation to collect debts owed to appellant by other inmates. These nefarious activities directly undermined the security of the prison, impugned the integrity of the DOC, and seriously compromised the orderly administration of this maximum security penal institution. The charges against appellant were heard by a hearing officer, who issued a final report and findings on May 7, 2014.

Appellant argues that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted in violation of his right to procedural due process. He also claims that the decision of the hearing officer was not supported by substantial evidence. Finally, appellant argues the sanctions imposed were excessive and in violation of his constitutional rights.

We reject these arguments and affirm. The record shows appellant was afforded all of the procedural due process rights he was entitled to receive.

In the seminal case of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2974, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 950 (1974), the United States Supreme Court declared that "[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country." The Court thus established minimum federal procedural due process requirements for prison disciplinary proceedings. Our Supreme Court has extended "State due-process guarantees beyond the federal constitutional minimum." McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 195 (1995); see also Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 520 (1975).

With these principles in mind, we are satisfied that the hearing officer's factual findings are supported by substantial, credible evidence. Jacobs v. Stephens, 139 N.J. 212, 222 (1995). The scope of appellate review of a decision reached by a State administrative agency is well-settled

On appeal from a final agency determination, we can intervene only in those rare circumstances in which an agency action is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable[,] or are otherwise not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. Under the arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable standard, our scope of review is guided by three major inquiries: (l) whether the agency's decision conforms with relevant law; (2) whether the decision is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record; and (3) whether, in applying the law to the facts, the administrative agency clearly erred in reaching its conclusion.

If the agency decision satisfies these criteria, we are bound to give substantial deference to the agency's fact-finding and legal conclusions, while acknowledging the agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field. We do not substitute our judgment for the agency's [judgement], even where we might have reached a different conclusion.

[Twp. Pharmacy v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 432 N.J. Super. 273, 283-284 (App. Div. 2013) (citations omitted).]

The record developed by the extensive investigation conducted by the DOC revealed a web of corruption and illegal activity that cannot be tolerated in our State's prisons. Appellant received an impartial review of that evidence by the hearing officer. The disciplinary sanctions imposed were within the legal discretion afforded the DOC.

Affirmed.

1 N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1 describes the various disciplinary infractions an inmate may be charged with and sanctioned for, after a hearing officer concludes the DOC presented sufficient evidence to sustain the charges.