STACEY GOODALL-GAILLARD v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

STACEY GOODALL-GAILLARD,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

___________________________

December 12, 2016

Argued November 28, 2016 Decided

Before Judges Nugent and Haas.

On appeal from State of New Jersey Civil Service Commission, Docket No. 2015-808.

Luretha M. Stribling argued the cause for appellant.

Gregory R. Bueno, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Mr. Bueno, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellant Stacey Goodall-Gaillard appeals from the February 9, 2015 final administrative determination of the Civil Service Commission ("Commission") that denied her application for Sick Leave Injury ("SLI") benefits. We affirm.

Appellant is an employee of the New Jersey Department of Corrections ("DOC"). On August 10, 2010, she filed a request for SLI from August 2, 2010 through January 1, 2011. In her application, appellant asserted she was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") due to discrimination, harassment, and retaliation against her by her supervisors and fellow employees. On September 2, 2010, the DOC denied appellant's application, stating that the incidents which allegedly caused her illness could not be considered "traumatic" in nature.

On November 6, 2010, plaintiff appealed the DOC's decision to the Commission. At that time, she submitted a report prepared by her personal physician, who opined that appellant was suffering from PTSD. The doctor stated that appellant claimed she was "the target of harassment, a hostile work environment and discrimination." Based upon appellant's claims, the doctor opined that "her employer's behavior toward her is causally related to" appellant's PTSD.

Requests for SLI benefits by State employees "due to injury or illness directly caused by and arising from State employment [are] governed by rules of the" Commission. N.J.S.A. 11A:6-8(a). In order to be eligible for SLI benefits, the employee's "disability must be due to an injury or illness resulting from the employment." N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.6(d). However, a "psychological or psychiatric illness [like PTSD] is not compensable, except [(1)] when such illness can be traced to a specific work-related accident or occurrence which traumatized the employee thereby causing the illness, and [(2)] the claim is supported by medical documentation." N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.6(d)(5). See In re Bennett, 335 N.J. Super. 518, 519 (App. Div. 2000) (holding that an employee "who suffers [from PTSD] resulting from a pervasive and continuous course of sexual harassment" was eligible for SLI benefits).

Here, the report prepared by appellant's personal physician constituted the "medical documentation" required by the second prong of the test established by N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.6(d)(5). However, the issue for determination by the Commission was whether appellant had established "a specific work-related . . . occurrence" or a "pervasive and continuous course of" discriminatory conduct by the DOC under the first prong of the regulation.

In this regard, the Commission determined to await the outcome of litigation appellant had already filed against the DOC and its employees in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey before considering her application for SLI benefits. In her complaint in that matter, appellant raised "various constitutional claims" against the DOC and its employees under 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 and 42 U.S.C.A. 1981, together with "gender discrimination and retaliation claims brought under Title VII and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD")," N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. Stacey Goodall-Gaillard v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., Civil Action No. 09-00954 at 2 (3d. Cir. Aug. 24, 2015).

The district court subsequently found that appellant failed to demonstrate any acts of discrimination by the DOC or its employees. Therefore, the district court granted the DOC's and the individual employees' motion for summary judgment and dismissed appellant's complaint. Ibid.

On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. Ibid. In finding there was simply no basis for appellant's claims of discrimination, the court stated

[Appellant]'s appeal suffers from the same fundamental flaws as her briefs before the District Court. While it is clear that [appellant] was dissatisfied with her position at the []DOC and believes she suffered unfair and disparate treatment, she fails to connect the litany of accusations of gender and race discrimination to facts that are sufficient to support her claims.

[Id. at 3.]

The court continued

[Appellant] produced no evidence that she suffered an adverse employment action or that the alleged action occurred under circumstances that gave rise to an inference of discrimination. . . . While [appellant] did make a single unsubstantiated complaint alleging sexual harassment which may constitute protected activity, there was no evidence that the []DOC retaliated against her in response to that sexual harassment complaint.

[Ibid. at 8-9.]

By the time of the district court's decision, the DOC's Division of Equal Employment Opportunity/Affirmative Action had also completed its investigation of appellant's discrimination claims and found them lacking in merit. Following its review of the matter, the Office of Employee Relations ("OER") issued a determination on September 2, 2014, which concluded that appellant failed to substantiate her allegations of discrimination and harassment.

Based upon the results of the federal district court litigation and the OER's investigation, the Commission rendered a thorough written opinion on February 9, 2015, denying appellant's application for SLI. Because appellant produced no competent evidence of discrimination by the DOC or its employees, the Commission found that she failed to meet the first prong of the N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.6(d)(5) test. The Commission explained

The Commission has conducted a review of the record and finds that a thorough investigation of . . . appellant's discrimination complaint was conducted. The investigation included interviewing witnesses and reviewing pertinent documents. No testimony or evidence was found to corroborate . . . appellant's claims that she had been discriminated, sexual[ly] harassed, or retaliated against in violation of the State Policy [Prohibiting Discrimination in the Workplace].

Because appellant was unable to connect her alleged psychological condition to any "occurrence" of discrimination at her job under N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.6(d)(5), or to "a pervasive and continuous course of" discrimination under Bennett, supra, the Commission denied appellant's application for SLI. This appeal followed.

On appeal, appellant argues that the Commission's decision was "inconsistent with the case law" and that she was prejudiced because the Commission waited to decide the matter until after the conclusion of appellant's federal district court litigation and the completion of the OER's review. We disagree with both contentions.

"Our scope of review of an administrative agency's final determination is limited." In re Williams, 443 N.J. Super. 532, 540 (App. Div. 2016), (citing In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007)). Moreover, "[a] strong presumption of reasonableness attaches" to the Commission's decision. Ibid. (quoting In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 85 (2001)).

Thus, we will "not disturb an administrative agency's determinations or findings unless there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence." Id. at 541 (quoting In re Application of Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008)). "The burden is upon the appellant to demonstrate grounds for reversal." Ibid. (citing McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002)).

We have considered appellant's arguments in light of the record and applicable law. We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the Commission's final administrative decision, which is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. We add the following brief comments.

As discussed above, appellant's claims of discrimination were found wanting by the federal district court, and subsequently by the Third Circuit. Thus, appellant was collaterally estopped from asserting otherwise before the Commission. See L.T. v. F.M., 438 N.J. Super. 76, 86 (App. Div. 2014) (noting that a party is barred from relitigating "any issue which was actually determined in a prior action, generally between the same parties, involving a different claim or cause of action") (quoting State v. Gonzalez, 75 N.J. 181, 186 (1977)). Similarly, appellant presented no competent evidence to the OER concerning any other alleged acts of discrimination that were not addressed in the federal litigation. Because appellant was therefore unable to connect her PTSD to any "occurrence" or series of incidents at her workplace, the Commission properly found she was not eligible for SLI benefits.

Appellant's argument that the Commission improperly "delayed" considering her request for SLI benefits also lacks merit. It is well established that "[d]elay will not, generally, affect the validity of administrative decisions." In re Darcy, 114 N.J. Super. 454, 462 (App. Div. 1971). Moreover, appellant's claims of discrimination in the federal litigation and before the OER were clearly relevant to the issue of whether appellant was entitled to SLI benefits. Therefore, we are satisfied that the Commission prudently waited for those matters to be concluded before addressing appellant's application.

Affirmed.