STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. GURLAL BHULLAR

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

GURLAL BHULLAR,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________________________

May 4, 2016

Submitted March 15, 2016 Decided

Before Judges St. John and Guadagno.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, Docket Nos. FO-12-253-13, FO-12-196-14, and FO-12-479-14.

Kochanski, Baron & Galfy, P.C., attorneys for appellant (Andrew M. Baron, on the brief).

Andrew C. Carey, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Brian D. Gillet, Deputy First Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Gurlal Bhullar appeals from judgments of conviction for harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a), and contempt, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b), entered after a bench trial before the Family Part November 2014. We affirm.

R.J. was born in India and came to the United States as a green card holder (permanent resident). In July 2009, when she was twenty years old, R.J. returned to India and was introduced to defendant by her uncle.1 On that day, R.J. and defendant became engaged to marry. Ten days later, they entered into an arranged marriage orchestrated by R.J.'s uncle.

R.J. stayed in India for six weeks before returning to the United States. During this time, R.J. became pregnant. Soon thereafter, the marriage began to deteriorate. Defendant did not accompany R.J. when she returned to the United States because his visa had not been processed. On May 2, 2010, R.J. gave birth to a daughter, S.B., in New Jersey. R.J. returned to India in October 2010 with her daughter, and stayed with defendant for six weeks before returning to the United States in November 2010.

Defendant came to the United States in 2012 and lived with R.J., their daughter, and R.J.'s mother in Middlesex. On September 13, 2012, R.J. obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) based on her allegations that defendant threatened her, slapped her in the face, and took $1500 in cash from her purse. R.J. also filed a criminal complaint against defendant.

On October 15, 2012, after a hearing, a Family Part judge issued a final restraining order (FRO) granting R.J. exclusive possession of her apartment and custody of her daughter, barring defendant from R.J.'s residence and place of employment, and prohibiting defendant from having any contact with R.J. and members of her family. Defendant's parenting time was temporarily suspended until the completion of a risk assessment by the Middlesex Probation Department.

On March 15, 2013, an amended FRO was entered compelling defendant to pay child support of $70 per week retroactive to February 11, 2013. Apparently, the previously ordered risk assessment had not been done and another was ordered. The FRO indicated that defendant accepted service of a divorce complaint filed by R.J. in court.

On June 10, 2013, defendant pled guilty to contempt for violating the FRO and was sentenced to probation.2 On October 28, 2013, defendant was again charged with violating the FRO but was given a "break" and was permitted to plead guilty to harassment. He was again sentenced to probation. R.J. and defendant were divorced in March 2014.

At trial, R.J. testified that on April 26, 2014, she was home with her mother and S.B. when she received a phone call from an unlisted number on her cell phone. When she answered, she recognized defendant's voice. He said he wanted to speak with S.B. because her birthday was coming up. When R.J. told defendant that the FRO prohibited him from contacting her, defendant threatened to kill her and her family and take the child. R.J. began to lose consciousness and the police were called.

Police Officer Paul J. Steffanelli testified that he was dispatched to R.J.'s apartment and found R.J. very upset and sobbing when he arrived. Steffanelli found it difficult to get information from R.J. because she was choked up and very emotional. After R.J. related her conversation with defendant, Steffanelli called his headquarters to verify that the FRO was still in place. After confirming the FRO was valid, he drove R.J. to headquarters, where she provided a written statement and signed a complaint. A municipal judge then issued a warrant for defendant's arrest for terroristic threats and violation of the FRO. Defendant was arrested the following day.

At trial, Officer Steffanelli identified a photograph of the display on R.J.'s phone, which showed that a call was received on April 26, 2014 at 10:18 p.m. from a restricted number and lasted two minutes and fifty-three seconds.

Defendant testified that he could not have called R.J. on April 26, 2014 because he did not have her cell phone number. He also claimed he was concerned at the time by the death of his sister's child and his mother's illness.

The judge found R.J.'s testimony that defendant called her and threatened her to be very credible. The judge also found that defendant knew the FRO was in effect, called R.J. in violation of that order, and threatened to kill her and take away her child. The judge found defendant's testimony that he did not call R.J. and was twice coerced into pleading guilty by his attorneys lacked credibility, and found him guilty of both harassment and contempt.

Defendant sought a suspended sentence. The judge rejected this request, noting that this was defendant's second domestic violence contempt offense and that N.J.S.A. 2C:25-30 required a mandatory period of incarceration. The judge found no mitigating factors and aggravating factors three, the risk that defendant will commit another offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), and nine, the need for deterring defendant and others from violating the law, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9). The judge imposed concurrent eighteen-month probationary periods for the harassment and contempt charges, forty-five days incarceration, and appropriate fines, fees, and penalties.

On appeal, defendant raises the following points

point I

evidence resulting in conviction was improperly admitted.

point ii

trial judge should have recused herself due to past knowledge of defendant and victim's history.

point iii

trial court rulings and decisions were arbitrary and capricious.

Defendant first challenges the judge's decision to admit a photograph of R.J.'s cell phone showing an incoming call on April 26, 2014 from an unknown caller. Citing no authority, defendant argues that the use of such evidence constitutes reversible error. He notes that the police and the State failed to obtain phone records of the call despite "the easy ability in today's technological climate to secure phone records."

We review a trial court's evidentiary ruling under a deferential standard and uphold those rulings "absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, i.e., there has been a clear error of judgment." State v. J.A.C., 210 N.J. 281, 295 (2012) (quoting State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001)).

When the State attempted to introduce the photograph of R.J.'s phone display at trial, defendant objected because the display did not specifically identify defendant by name and indicated only that the call had come from an unidentified number. The judge overruled the objection.

We are satisfied that the photograph of the display on R.J.'s phone was properly admitted. The display was sufficiently authenticated by R.J. and Officer Steffanelli, and served to corroborate R.J.'s testimony as to the date and time of the call.

Defendant next argues that the trial judge should have recused herself because she had taken two prior guilty pleas from defendant. Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion pursuant to Rule 1:12, requesting that the trial judge recuse herself and reassign the trial "to another judge, who has no familiarity with this defendant." The only reason given was that the trial judge had previously accepted two guilty pleas from defendant. The judge entered an order on October 3, 2014 denying the motion.

Motions for disqualification are entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge and are subject to review for abuse of discretion. State v. McCabe, 201 N.J. 34, 45 (2010). Defendant does not allege bias or unfairness on the part of the trial judge, and the record presents no reason to doubt the judge's complete impartiality. The mere acceptance of a defendant's guilty plea by a judge who subsequently presides over that defendant's trial in another matter does not, standing alone, require disqualification. See Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 4 on R. 1:12-1(d) (2016) ("The rule does not . . . apply to opinions expressed by the judge on the issues before the court in earlier proceedings in the controversy.").

Finally, defendant presents a sweeping claim that because the trial judge denied his pre-trial motions for recusal and to withdraw his guilty pleas, he did not receive a fair and unbiased trial. This argument is devoid of merit and we need not address it further in our opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

1 Defendant testified, and the judge found, that defendant first met R.J. at a wedding in 2003 attended by 400 people when R.J. was fourteen years old.

2 We glean this information from the statement made by the prosecutor on November 12, 2014, at defendant's sentencing. Defendant did not dispute the statement.