. A-0 OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY v. T.E. and C.E IN THE MATTER OF Ca.E Cu.E., Ch.E., and Ce.E Minors

 

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NOS. A-0

A-1005-14T1

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

T.E. and C.E.,

Defendants-Appellants.

_____________________________

IN THE MATTER OF Ca.E.,

Cu.E., Ch.E., and Ce.E.,

Minors.

_____________________________

February 9, 2016

 

Submitted January 11, 2016 Decided

Before Judges Simonelli and Carroll.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, Docket No. FN-09-394-13.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant T.E. (Thomas G. Hand, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant C.E. (Gilbert G. Miller, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Joyce Calefati Booth, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors (Sean P. Lardner, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant T.E. is the biological mother and defendant C.E. is the biological father of Ca.E. ("Carol"), born in 1998; Cu.E. ("Cal"), born in 2003; Ch.E. ("Cindy"), born in 2007; and Ce.E. ("Candace"), born in 2009.1 In these consolidated appeals, defendants appeal from the May 9, 2014 Family Part order finding that they had abused or neglected their four children pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b).

In May 2013, the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency ("Division") conducted an emergency removal of defendants' four children after their eldest daughter, Carol, disclosed that C.E. physically and sexually abused her and that T.E. knew of this abuse but failed to take any action. After conducting a four-day fact-finding hearing, Judge Bernadette N. DeCastro issued a detailed written opinion concluding that the Division proved by a preponderance of the evidence that C.E. sexually abused and inflicted excessive corporal punishment on Carol and that T.E. failed to protect Carol from C.E.'s abuse. The judge further found that both defendants abused and neglected the three younger children by exposing them to domestic violence and abuse, thereby creating a home environment injurious to their health and well-being.

On appeal, both defendants argue that the trial court's finding of abuse and neglect should be reversed because (1) the court improperly allowed the Division's expert to testify about psychosocial evaluations he did not personally conduct; and (2) there was insufficient credible evidence to support the finding of abuse and neglect against them. C.E. also argues that (1) the court erred in allowing inadmissible hearsay evidence; and (2) he was denied due process at the fact-finding hearing. Having reviewed defendants' arguments in light of the record and applicable legal principles, we affirm.

I.

On May 2, 2013, the Division received a referral with respect to Carol, who was fourteen years old at the time. According to the reporter, Carol had made statements that her parents had been abusing her since early April. Specifically, Carol alleged that C.E. walked in on her while she was taking a shower and touched her inappropriately. Carol informed T.E., who took no action in response.

The reporter stated that the abuse worsened later in the week when C.E. learned Carol had a boyfriend. Carol was only allowed to eat at dinner time, was forced to wear the same clothes every day, and was locked in her room where she was forced to sleep naked on the floor. Defendants also required her to be home from school at a certain time, and on one occasion when she was late, C.E. "punched her in the face a couple of times." The reporter stated that Carol had purple and yellow knuckle marks on her left shoulder from where her father had punched her in addition to marks on her wrists that appeared to be cigarette burns, although Carol denied that they were burns.

The reporter also recounted an incident where Carol's parents caught her sneaking out of the family home to see her boyfriend. When Carol returned, C.E. used duct tape to bind her hands behind her back and made her kneel down on the tile floor in her bedroom for the remainder of the evening. The reporter stated that, although Carol was a straight-A student, her grades had been dropping since the abuse began, which caused C.E. to "punch[] her so hard in her chest [that] it hurt[] for her to breathe."

Division caseworker Julia Borras interviewed Carol at her school on May 6, 2013. Carol disclosed that recently she felt distracted at school, her grades had dropped, and that she felt stressed. She further indicated that, since April 2013, her parents had begun calling her names such as "bitch," "slut," and "whore." Carol told Borras that her parents disapproved of her sixteen-year-old boyfriend, R.B., and told her to stay away from him. Carol stated that she arrived home late from school one day in April 2013 because she was walking with R.B., and her father "smacked her in the face with an open hand." Carol further disclosed that C.E. hit her buttocks and legs with a belt and that she sustained injuries to her hands from attempting to block the blows.

Carol also reported that C.E. began touching her inappropriately shortly before she turned fourteen years old. She stated that C.E. came home intoxicated and would look at and squeeze her chest. C.E. "told her not to worry about it because fathers do that to their daughters." She also stated that C.E. has asked her to lift her bra up and has squeezed her buttocks with her clothing on and off. Carol told her mother about these incidents, and although T.E. said she would speak to C.E., Carol did not believe her mother took the allegations seriously.

Carol also alleged that, on two occasions in late March 2013, C.E. "checked her vaginal area . . . to see if she was sexually active." The first time, she was sleeping in her bedroom when C.E., who was intoxicated and smelled of alcohol, woke her up and told her to open her legs. C.E. then "tried to touch her vagina by opening her 'vaginal lips.'" T.E. entered the room and asked C.E. what he was doing, to which he responded, "what I always do." T.E. told C.E. to go to their bedroom, where he "passed out." T.E. then asked Carol what C.E. was trying to do, and Carol replied that "[he] tried to open her legs and touch her vagina." T.E. did not respond and left the room.

On the second occasion, "her father asked her to open her legs and . . . opened her vagina and stuck his fingers in the vagina. . . . She stated that she felt her father's fingers on her vagina but she was not sure if it was inside or outside her vagina as she flinched when being touched." Carol alleged that this incident occurred in the bathroom2 and that C.E. was not intoxicated at the time, although he was upset because he had found letters that R.B. had written to her. Carol stated that she did not tell T.E. about this second incident "as her parents share everything with each other and her mother does not see it as anything wrong."

Carol reported that, after this second incident, she wrote a letter to R.B. stating that she wanted to die because of what her father was doing to her. T.E. subsequently found this letter and, in response, called her a "suicidal bitch," stripped her of her clothing for nine days, forced her to sleep on the floor naked, and would not allow her to wear clean clothes or brush her teeth.

Carol admitted that on April 1, 2013 she snuck out of the family home around midnight to visit R.B. When she returned around 6:30 a.m., her parents noticed she had "hickeys on her neck." Carol denied that she had sex with R.B., but C.E. accused her of lying, "choked her, pulled her hair, and stomped on her." He then dragged her by her "hoodie" and took her to the police station to let the police know that she had returned home.3 After they left the police station, C.E. called her a "slut" and punched her in the stomach.

Upon arriving home, Carol recounted that C.E. "dragged her and choked her by the hoodie as they were going up the stairs." He also punched her in the face and took her into the bathroom where he struck her in the face and, when she fell to the floor, "began stomping on her chest and legs with his boots." C.E. then made her sit in a corner and urinate in a bucket. He thereafter did not allow her to eat or bathe and continued calling her names. Carol reported that, as a result of this incident, she had blood on her neck, a "busted lip," and a black eye. Although T.E. was home during this incident, she "did nothing."

On April 29, 2013, Carol went into the kitchen to eat around 3:00 a.m., after her parents had gone to sleep. She reported that C.E. woke up and noticed the napkin that she had used to wipe her hands. He then tied her hands and legs with duct tape and punched her "several times" in the chest, head, arms, and stomach.

Borras took Carol to the nurse's office to check her body for marks or bruises. There Borras observed scratch marks on Carol's neck, which Carol attributed to C.E. choking her and "grabbing her by her hoodie." The caseworker also observed two circular bruises on Carol's left upper arm that were purple and yellow, which Carol attributed to C.E. punching her arm, and two circular marks on Carol's right wrist, which Carol said were from her hands being tied behind her back with plastic ties.

Borras contacted Detective Carla Espinal of the Hudson County Prosecutor's Office Special Victims Unit (SVU). Carol's parents and siblings were also contacted and reported to the SVU to be interviewed.4 Espinal first interviewed Carol, who reiterated the allegations of abuse consistent with what she had told Borras. Espinal then interviewed T.E., who initially denied Carol's allegations.5 However, T.E. eventually admitted that C.E. was angry when Carol left home on April 1, 2013, and that he grabbed Carol by her jacket, causing the zipper to scratch her neck. Upon further questioning, T.E. admitted that C.E. also punched Carol in the arm, but denied that anything had occurred recently. T.E. continued to deny that C.E. sexually abused Carol.

When interviewed by another detective, Cindy reported that Carol sleeps on the floor with no covers and that C.E. locks Carol in her room at night and does not allow anyone to enter or speak to Carol. When asked if her parents hit her or her siblings, Cindy denied that she, Cal, or Candace are hit, but stated that C.E. choked Carol, smacked Carol on the face, and told Carol not to shower.

C.E. admitted that he and T.E. yelled at Carol following the April 1, 2013 incident, but denied that he hit her. He further denied that Carol sleeps on the floor, or that he ever choked, hit, or sexually abused her. C.E. did admit that he locks Carol in her bedroom at night, but explained that this was to prevent her from sneaking out of the house again.

While the detectives interviewed T.E. and C.E., Division caseworker Diana Buitrago supervised Cal, Cindy, and Candace. One of the girls mentioned to Buitrago that C.E. hit their sister, to which Cal responded, "you know daddy doesn't like you telling." Buitrago told the children that it was okay to talk, and Cal stated that his father does not like them telling anyone about "family business" or "things that happen in the home." Cindy then informed Buitrago that C.E. choked Carol after he caught her sneaking out of the house and that Carol was not allowed to shower or eat. Candace stated that Carol sleeps on the floor. Cal continued to tell his sisters not to say anything because their father would be mad.

Buitrago asked whether anything else happens in the home, and Candace stated "the tape." Cal then explained that "this one time daddy taped [Carol] around her body." Cindy then told Buitrago that C.E. chokes Carol and scratches her neck. Cindy demonstrated this by pretending to scratch her own neck. Candace told the caseworker that C.E. does not allow her, Cal, or Cindy to speak to Carol and that, when Carol gets in trouble, "she uses the pee bucket." Cal confirmed that Carol is not allowed to use the bathroom without permission and has to use the "pee bucket." Cal also confirmed that Carol is not allowed to shower, but "mommy and daddy let us shower."

Candace further stated that Cindy is afraid of C.E. because she does not know if he will hit her, although both Candace and Cindy denied that C.E. hit them, and Cal confirmed that C.E. only hits Carol. Buitrago then asked the children if their father hits anyone else in the home and Candace stated that he hits their mother. Specifically, Candace stated "daddy chokes mommy" and demonstrated by putting her hands around her neck. Candace said that Cindy cries when this happens, and both girls reported that they have witnessed arguments between their parents.

Following the interviews at the SVU, T.E. and C.E. were arrested.6 The Division then conducted an emergency removal of all four children and placed them in foster care.

On May 9, 2013, Borras and Division permanency supervisor Eva Myrick met with T.E. and her sister T.R. for a Family Team Meeting. T.E. stated that, upon the advice of her attorney, she would not "speak about anything." Myrick told T.E. that she understood her concern, but that their priority was the safety of her children and she asked T.E. "if she would like to share her family story."

T.E. thereafter disclosed that her relationship with her husband has been "rocky" at times and "that they have had arguments with one another and it has been physical." T.E. also stated that her children have witnessed the domestic violence. She recounted one incident where C.E. did not want her to go to a party, so he hit her, broke her necklace, and threw her to the floor while her children watched. T.E. said that her children were never harmed during these incidents, but that they were scared.

T.E. provided additional details about the events of April 1, 2013, when Carol left home to visit R.B. T.E. stated that, when Carol returned home that morning, she would not disclose where she had gone and cursed at her parents. C.E. became angry and hit Carol. He then grabbed Carol by her jacket, which caused scratches on her neck. When asked about the bruises on Carol's arm, T.E. stated that C.E. punched Carol in the arm during an incident when they lived at their old apartment.

T.E. also disclosed that C.E. used to drink a lot and "would do things that he would not remember doing." She said that once C.E. went into the bathroom while Carol was showering and pulled the shower curtain back. When T.E. asked C.E. what he was doing, he responded "[Carol] came from my balls and [I] can do whatever [I] want[]." She claimed that she told C.E. that this was inappropriate and not to do it again.

T.E. stated that there was another incident when C.E. went out drinking and came home after the children had gone to bed. T.E. woke up and went into Carol's bedroom after she heard a noise and saw C.E. opening Carol's legs. T.E. asked C.E. what he was doing and he responded that he heard Carol telling a boy on the phone that she liked the way he touches her leg.

All four children subsequently underwent psychological evaluations under the supervision of Dr. Anthony D'Urso at the Audrey Hepburn Children's House (AHCH). HaeSung Han, Psy.D., evaluated Carol on June 11, 2013. Dr. Han concluded that Carol's allegations of sexual abuse, physical abuse, psychological maltreatment, exposure to domestic violence, and exposure to pornographic material were all clinically supported. Dr. Han diagnosed Carol with major depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder.

Eloise J. Berry, Ph.D., evaluated Candace on August 20, 2013. Dr. Berry found that Candace's exposure to domestic violence, physical abuse, and emotional abuse, were all clinically supported.

Sean Conlon, a licensed clinical social worker, conducted a psychosocial evaluation of Cal. During the evaluation, Cal described how C.E. would abuse Carol. Cal also revealed that C.E. would "smack[] [him] on [the] face," once gave him a black eye, put soap in his mouth, used his hand to "bash [Cal's] head . . . on the table," and struck him with objects including a belt and a steel chair. Conlon found Cal's physical abuse, psychological maltreatment, exposure to domestic violence, and exposure to paternal alcohol abuse were clinically supported. Conlon diagnosed Cal with "adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct" and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder.

Finally, Joanne Glaeser, a licensed clinical social worker, conducted a psychosocial evaluation of Cindy. Glaeser concluded that Cindy's allegation of corporal punishment was clinically supported and her exposure to physical abuse was substantiated. Glaeser diagnosed Cindy with "adjustment disorder with anxiety."

The fact-finding hearing spanned four non-consecutive days beginning January 15, 2014, and ending on April 4, 2014. The Division first presented the testimony of caseworker Borras, who testified about the initial referral and the Division's investigation. Over various objections by both defendants, the trial court admitted into evidence various documents, including the Division's screening summary, photographs of Carol's injuries, and the Division's investigation summary. Next, the Division called caseworker Buitrago, who testified about her observations of and conversations with the children while their parents were being interviewed at the SVU on May 6, 2013.

The Division then sought to call Dr. D'Urso as an expert witness in child abuse. Both defendants objected on the grounds that Dr. D'Urso could not testify concerning the conclusions in the children's psychosocial evaluations because he did not conduct the evaluations himself.

The court conducted an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing to determine the propriety of Dr. D'Urso's testimony. Dr. D'Urso testified at the N.J.R.E. 104 hearing that, when AHCH receives a referral, it is then assigned to a team and a clinician conducts an evaluation. The clinician then reports back to Dr. D'Urso, and both the clinician and Dr. D'Urso review the facts of the case and the clinical issues before arriving at a determination. The clinician then prepares a report, which Dr. D'Urso reviews before it is sent out in final form. In the present case, Dr. D'Urso testified that he signed each of the four evaluations,7 he was involved in the review of all four evaluations and final reports, he was familiar with the basis for the conclusions reached in each report, and he agreed with the conclusions reached in each report.

On January 24, 2014, after receiving written submissions from the parties, Judge DeCastro issued a written decision permitting Dr. D'Urso to testify. Judge DeCastro found that, under N.J.R.E. 703 and State v. Stevens, 136 N.J. Super. 262 (App. Div. 1975), an expert may base his opinion on work done by or hearsay evidence of another expert if the latter expert is supervised by the former expert. Moreover, in this case, AHCH "conducts its evaluations through a team approach" and Dr. D'Urso "was materially involved with the assessment process." Therefore, citing Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512 (1981), the judge concluded that Dr. D'Urso could testify even though he did not conduct the evaluations of the children himself.

The fact-finding hearing resumed on January 30, 2014. Over T.E.'s objection, the court admitted into evidence and subsequently viewed the videotaped interviews of T.E., C.E., and the four children that were taken at the SVU on May 6, 2013.8

Dr. D'Urso testified on behalf of the Division on April 4, 2014. His testimony included descriptions of the interviews conducted, the psychological tests administered, and the conclusions reached by the clinical team at AHCH. Over defendants' objections, the court allowed in evidence the written psychosocial evaluations of the four children. On cross-examination, Dr. D'Urso acknowledged that he did not conduct or personally observe the evaluations of the children, nor did he administer any of the tests or prepare the written reports. However, Dr. D'Urso testified that he personally made the diagnoses of the children after consulting with the clinicians.

Neither defendant testified or presented any witnesses. Following written summations, Judge DeCastro issued a cogent written opinion on May 8, 2014, in which she concluded that both defendants abused or neglected their four children under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b).

Judge DeCastro found that "the Division has provided several accounts from several parties that corroborate the claims by [Carol] that [C.E.] acted in the absence of a minimum duty of care by physically and sexually abusing his daughter." The judge noted that Carol disclosed the "extreme" physical abuse to the Division, and the Division documented her bruises with photographs. The judge also found that Carol's account of events was consistent with the version of events that Cal, Cindy, and Candace reported to the SVU investigators and the AHCH staff. In addition, Carol's allegation of inappropriate touching by C.E. was corroborated by T.E.

Judge DeCastro concluded that, concerning Carol,

[a]ny one of these acts alone could be enough to support a finding of abuse and neglect, so certainly these acts together warrant such a finding. [C.E.'s] acts fell below the minimum standard of care because he was aware or should have been aware of physical, emotional, and psychological stress that his actions placed on [Carol]. Such disregard placed [Carol] in a substantial risk of harm.

Additionally, [T.E.] also [] committed acts of abuse and neglect against [Carol]. [T.E.] failed to protect [Carol] from sexual and physical abuse by [C.E.], thereby causing harm. Evidence shows that [T.E.] saw and knew of the physical abuse and sexual abuse that was taking place and she did not report the abuse or prevent it from occurring.

In sum, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b), the [c]ourt finds that [C.E.] abused and neglected his daughter, [Carol], by inflicting excessive corporal punishment upon her by choking and punching her and sexually abusing her. The court also finds that [T.E.] abused and neglected her by failing to protect [Carol] from a substantial risk of harm.

With regard to the three younger children, Judge DeCastro found "[t]he Division proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the environment in the family home was filled with violence and rage to support a finding that [Candace], [Cindy], and [Cal] were harmed or at risk of harm." Relying on the testimony of Dr. D'Urso and the psychosocial evaluations conducted at AHCH, the judge found that Cindy was exposed to the physical abuse of her sibling and to arguments between her parents, which caused her to suffer from "Adjustment Disorder with Anxiety." Similarly, the judge found Candace was exposed to domestic violence between her parents and the physical abuse of Carol, and was told to "maintain the family secret of abuse," which the judge found "raise[d] anxiety and cause[d] undue stress and increase[d] [the] chances for further abuse." Finally, the judge found that Cal was diagnosed with "adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct," as a result of his being "exposed to domestic violence in the home, paternal alcohol abuse and the maternal failure to protect him and his sister, [Carol]." The judge did not base her finding of abuse and neglect of Cal on Cal's statement that he was physically assaulted by C.E., as that statement was not sufficiently corroborated.

II.

We begin our analysis of the legal issues raised in these appeals by reaffirming the applicable standard of review. We defer to the Family Part's findings of fact and conclusions of law based on those findings. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007). "'[F]indings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Z.P.R., 351 N.J. Super. 427, 433 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). Even where there are alleged errors in the trial court's evaluation of underlying facts, a reviewing court "will accord deference unless the trial court's findings went so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (citations omitted).

Abuse and neglect cases are fact sensitive and "[e]ach case requires careful, individual scrutiny" as many cases are "idiosyncratic." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R., 205 N.J. 17, 33 (2011). The burden is on the Division to prove abuse or neglect by a preponderance of the "competent, material and relevant evidence[.]" N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 22 (2013).

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b) provides that an "abused or neglected child" means an individual under the age of eighteen years

whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or guardian . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof[.]

A parent "fails to exercise a minimum degree of care when he or she is aware of the dangers inherent in a situation and fails adequately to supervise the child or recklessly creates a risk of serious injury to that child." G.S. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 181 (1999).

The Division's regulations add clarity. They define "the types of injuries or risk of harm that may be abuse or neglect" as including "bruises, abrasions, [and] welts," as well as "mental or emotional impairment." N.J.A.C. 10:129-2.2(a). Additionally, "sexual exploitation," "sexual molestation," and "tying or close confinement" are included among "the types of injuries or risk or harm that may be abuse." N.J.A.C. 10:129-2.2(b). Factors the court may consider include the child's age, whether the parent intentionally inflicted the punishment, the physical effect on the child such as the presence of bruises or other signs of injury, and whether the parent "disregarded the substantial probability" that the child would be injured by the parent's conduct. P.W.R., supra, 205 N.J. at 33-34; N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. K.A., 413 N.J. Super. 504, 510-11 (App. Div. 2010), certif. dismissed as improvidently granted, 208 N.J. 355 (2011).

A.

Defendants argue that the trial court improperly allowed the Division's expert witness, Dr. D'Urso, to testify concerning the factual allegations and professional conclusions in the psychological evaluations performed by clinicians at AHCH. T.E. contends that this testimony was inadmissible hearsay and violated her due process rights because Dr. D'Urso did not have first-hand knowledge of the information contained in the evaluations, and the clinicians who conducted the evaluations and prepared the reports did not testify. C.E. additionally argues that the court erred in admitting the psychosocial evaluations of the children into evidence. We conclude that these contentions lack merit.

The admissibility of expert testimony lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44, 64 (1993); Muise v. GPU, Inc., 371 N.J. Super. 13, 58 (App. Div. 2004). The scope of review of a trial judge's evidential rulings requires we grant substantial deference to the judge's exercise of that discretion. DeVito v. Sheeran, 165 N.J. 167, 198 (2000). Rulings on evidence will not provide a basis for reversal unless they reflect an abuse of that discretion. Benevenga v. Digregorio, 325 N.J. Super. 27, 32 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 79 (2000). Reversal is not warranted unless the trial judge's ruling was "so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted." State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 106 (1982).

Expert witnesses may testify about facts or data that inform their analyses and opinions, so long as that information is "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject[.]" N.J.R.E. 703. Pursuant to this rule, an expert witness need not have personal, first-hand knowledge of a case. "Indeed, an expert's testimony may be based on the work done or even hearsay evidence of another expert, particularly when, as here, the latter's work is supervised by the former." State v. Dishon, 297 N.J. Super. 254, 281 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 144 (1997); accord Stevens, supra, 136 N.J. Super. at 264.

Here, Dr. D'Urso testified that he based his expert opinion on the Division's screening summary and investigation reports, and the information obtained from the clinical interviews with the children. The information obtained by the team of clinicians at AHCH was reasonably considered by Dr. D'Urso as part of his professional functions. As he testified, he supervised the process of evaluating the children at AHCH and reviewed those evaluations. He indicated that this procedure "is accepted in the psychological community as a valid way of coming to an opinion with regard to a diagnosis for a patient that's being evaluated." Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. D'Urso's expert testimony.

Moreover, Dr. D'Urso reviewed and approved the written reports of the professional staff that he supervised at AHCH. Rule 5:12-4(d) permits the Division "to submit into evidence . . . reports by staff personnel or professional consultants," provided they satisfy N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) (the business records hearsay exception). The psychological evaluation reports satisfied N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) because, as Dr. D'Urso testified, they were kept in the normal course of business at AHCH and were generated at or about the time that the evaluations were conducted. The reports were therefore properly admissible under Rule 5:12-4(d).

Pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6), hearsay statements of opinions and diagnoses are further subject to N.J.R.E. 808, which provides

Expert opinion which is included in an admissible hearsay statement shall be excluded if the declarant has not been produced as a witness unless the trial judge finds that the circumstances involved in rendering the opinion, including the motive, duty, and interest of the declarant, whether litigation was contemplated by the declarant, the complexity of the subject matter, and the likelihood of accuracy of the opinion, tend to establish its trustworthiness.

In the present case, as noted, the opinions and diagnoses contained in the evaluation reports were the conclusions of Dr. D'Urso, arrived at in collaboration with the clinicians he supervised. Dr. D'Urso provided the requisite foundational testimony under N.J.R.E. 808, and the opinions contained in the evaluation reports were thus properly admitted.

B.

Defendants each separately argue that the trial court's finding of abuse and neglect is not supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. We disagree.

As to T.E., the record amply supports the court's finding that she abused or neglected Carol by failing to protect her from being physically and sexually abused by C.E. Carol's statements to the Division caseworkers, the SVU investigators, and the clinicians at AHCH, demonstrate that: (1) Carol was physically and sexually abused by C.E.; (2) T.E. was aware that this abuse was occurring; and (3) T.E. failed to take any action in response.

Although Carol did not testify at the hearing, her statements were admissible under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4), which provides that "previous statements made by the child relating to any allegations of abuse or neglect shall be admissible in evidence; provided, however, that no such statement, if uncorroborated, shall be sufficient to make a fact finding of abuse or neglect." Corroboration may include "eyewitness testimony, a confession, an admission or medical or scientific evidence." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. L.A., 357 N.J. Super. 155, 166 (App. Div. 2003). Corroborative evidence may be circumstantial, as we have recognized that often there is no direct physical or testimonial evidence to support a child's statements. Z.P.R., supra, 351 N.J. Super. at 436. "The corroborative evidence need not relate directly to the alleged abuser, it need only provide support for the out-of-court statements." Ibid.

In the present case, Carol's statements were sufficient to support a finding of abuse and neglect against T.E. They were corroborated by Dr. D'Urso's expert testimony and Dr. Han's clinical observations, the statements of Carol's siblings, and T.E. herself. Importantly, T.E. admitted to the physical and sexual abuse inflicted on Carol by C.E. during the course of her Family Team meeting with the Division caseworkers. T.E. is unable to point to any response that she took to protect Carol from this ongoing abuse, which clearly resulted in Carol's physical and emotional harm.

The record similarly supports the trial court's finding that T.E. abused or neglected the three younger children by allowing them to be exposed to domestic violence in the home. "'[C]hildren, even when they are not themselves physically assaulted, suffer deep and lasting emotional effects from exposure to domestic violence.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.H.C., 415 N.J. Super. 551, 585 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18). We acknowledge that it is improper for the trial court to assume that "witnessing domestic abuse had a present or potential negative effect on the child sufficient to warrant a finding of abuse[.]" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. S.S., 372 N.J. Super. 13, 26 (App. Div. 2004), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 426 (2005). However, such a finding may be sustained where, as here, there is credible evidence presented that the exposure to domestic violence has actually harmed the child. See I.H.C., supra, 415 N.J. Super. at 585-86.

In this case, there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to establish that T.E. failed to protect Cal, Cindy, and Candace from witnessing C.E.'s physical abuse of herself and Carol. T.E. told Division workers that C.E. assaulted her, and that the children witnessed and were scared by the violence. Carol made statements to the Division caseworkers, the SVU investigators, and AHCH staff that she was physically abused and that her younger siblings were present while the abuse was occurring. Carol's statements were corroborated by the statements of her siblings and T.E.'s own admissions.

Further, the Division presented evidence, in the form of the psychosocial evaluations and Dr. D'Urso's testimony, to establish that Cal, Cindy, and Candace suffered emotional harm from witnessing the physical abuse. The trial court properly relied on this evidence in finding that the three younger children suffered emotional harm from the exposure to domestic violence.

We reach the same result as to C.E. As noted, the trial court found that C.E. abused and neglected Carol by sexually assaulting her, by physically assaulting her, and by inflicting excessive corporal punishment. This determination is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. First, Carol disclosed extensive details to the Division caseworkers, the SVU detective, and the clinician at AHCH, about how C.E. touched her inappropriately on several occasions; punched, choked, and stomped on her after she snuck out of the house on April 1, 2013; tied her hands and legs with duct tape and punched her; would not allow her to eat or bathe; and forced her to urinate in a bucket.

As we have explained, Carol's statements were admissible under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4). They were sufficient to sustain a finding of abuse and neglect because they were corroborated by other evidence in the record. Specifically, Carol's allegations of sexual abuse were corroborated by Dr. Han's psychosocial evaluation and Dr. D'Urso's expert testimony. They were also consistent with T.E.'s admissions, which provide additional evidence of their trustworthiness.

Carol's allegations of physical abuse were corroborated by the Division's photographs depicting her injuries. C.E. argues that the statements of Carol's siblings should not themselves be used to corroborate Carol's statements. Even if we accept C.E.'s position, we nonetheless observe that the statements of the three younger children are consistent with and in no way impair or diminish the trustworthiness of Carol's statements regarding C.E.'s physical abuse.

The trial court also found that C.E. abused and neglected Cal, Cindy, and Candace by exposing them to domestic violence and creating a home environment "injurious to their health and well-being." For the reasons we explained with respect to T.E., there is sufficient evidence in the record that the three younger children suffered emotional harm from their exposure to C.E.'s various acts of physical abuse and domestic violence. On this record, we see no basis to disturb Judge DeCastro's decision.

The parties' remaining arguments, to the extent we have not addressed them, lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

1 To maintain confidentiality, we use pseudonyms for those involved.

2 Carol initially stated that both instances of C.E. touching her vagina occurred in the bathroom. However, when asked to provide more details regarding the first instance, she stated that it occurred while she was sleeping in her bedroom.

3 C.E. told detectives that he filed a missing persons report with the police earlier that morning when he and T.E. noticed that Carol had left the home.

4 The interviews taken at the SVU were videotaped and entered into evidence at the fact-finding hearing.

5 At the start of the interview, the detective read T.E. her Miranda rights and T.E. signed a form waiving her rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

6 C.E. was charged with aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault, child abuse, child abuse and endangering the welfare of a minor and aggravated sexual contact. T.E. was charged with failure to protect, child abuse, and endangering the welfare of a minor.

7 On cross-examination, Dr. D'Urso further explained that his signature on the evaluations signified that he "was materially involved in the assessment process[.]"

8 The judge determined that the videotaped interviews were business records, admissible under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6), after they were authenticated by an agent from the Hudson County Prosecutor's Office.