KATHLEEN BIKOFF v. DAVID J. BIKOFF

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

 
 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

KATHLEEN BIKOFF,

Plaintiff-Respondent/

Cross-Appellant,

v.

DAVID J. BIKOFF,

Defendant-Appellant/

Cross-Respondent.

________________________________

December 12, 2016

 

Argued November 28, 2016 Decided

Before Judges Nugent, Haas and Currier.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Sussex County, Docket No. FM-19-36-10 and FM-19-604-10.

Bruce H. Nagel argued the cause for appellant/cross-respondent (Nagel Rice, LLP, attorneys; Mr. Nagel, on the briefs).

James P. Yudes argued the cause for respondent/cross-appellant (James P. Yudes, PC, attorneys; Kevin M. Mazza, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant David Bikoff appeals from the entry of a dual final judgment of divorce ("DJOD") by the Family Part on July 31, 2013, and the trial court's September 16, 2013 order denying defendant's motion for reconsideration. The September 16, 2013 order also clarified that the alimony defendant was required to pay plaintiff Kathleen Bikoff was taxable to plaintiff and tax-deductible to defendant. Plaintiff has filed a cross-appeal, challenging the Family Part's November 18, 2011 order addressing the enforceability of a 1999 consent order, along with portions of the July 31, 2013 DJOD, and the September 16, 2013 order denying plaintiff's cross-motion for reconsideration. We affirm.

I.

A. BACKGROUND

The parties are fully familiar with the procedural history and facts of this case and, therefore, they will not be repeated in detail in this opinion. The parties met in 1982, when plaintiff began working for defendant in his medical practice. They married in August 1984. The parties have no children together.

In June 1992, the parties moved into separate homes. In January 1994, plaintiff filed her first complaint for divorce. In April 1995, the parties entered into a consent order that required defendant to pay plaintiff $8000 per month in pendente lite support. However, in November 1995, the parties voluntarily dismissed the divorce action. In the stipulation of dismissal, the parties further agreed that if either party filed a new divorce complaint within six months, the cut-off date for inclusion of assets for purposes of equitable distribution would be January 31, 1994.

Less than six months later, defendant filed a complaint for divorce. On October 25, 1999, the parties also dismissed this action by stipulation. In the stipulation of dismissal, the parties agreed that January 31, 1994 would continue to be the cut-off date for the inclusion of assets for equitable distribution, the determination of the value of the assets and the resolution of any economic issues.

B. THE CURRENT LITIGATION

In June 2009, plaintiff instituted that action that is the subject of this appeal by filing her second complaint for divorce. Judge Robert Gilson conducted a seventeen-day bench trial in two phases during the period between May 9, 2011 and February 28, 2013. In all, he examined over 8300 pages of exhibits, pleadings, and other documents.

After completing the first phase of the trial, Judge Gilson determined that the October 25, 1999 consent order was enforceable in its entirety. In a thorough written opinion accompanying the November 18, 2011 order, the judge found that both parties had full knowledge of the terms of the consent order, and authorized their attorneys to negotiate it on their behalf. Plaintiff presented no evidence that the order was entered as "the result of a mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." The judge further found that the January 31, 1994 cut-off date for the determination of equitable distribution and other economic issues, such as alimony, was eminently fair because, although the parties remained married, they had physically separated in 1992 and had "both established committed and on-going long-term relationships with other persons." The judge therefore determined "it would be inequitable not to enforce the 1999 [c]onsent [o]rder under the facts of this case."

C. THE DJOD: EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION

The second phase of the trial concerned the parties' disputes over equitable distribution and alimony. On July 31, 2013, Judge Gilson issued the DJOD, accompanied by a comprehensive forty-six-page written decision addressing each of the parties' assets and claims for support, and fully explaining his reasons for the conclusions he reached.

We begin by summarizing the judge's rulings concerning equitable distribution. As noted above, the court had already determined that January 31, 1994 was the cut-off date for the inclusion of assets for purposes of equitable distribution, and that the assets would be valued as of that date. With that in mind, the parties identified seven assets that were in dispute. The judge addressed each of these assets in turn.

1. HORIZON HOUSE CO-OPS

Prior to the parties' marriage, defendant purchased Unit 1016 in a co-op known as Horizon House in Fort Lee, New Jersey. He paid $145,000 for this property. Defendant never transferred title of this asset to plaintiff.

Several years after the parties' marriage, they jointly purchased Unit 1209 and the title for that property was held in both their names. Defendant argued he used $112,000 in premarital assets to buy the second unit, while plaintiff claimed the couple used money from their joint checking account. The parties sold both units in 2011 for a net gain of $345,000 and then equally divided that amount between them prior to the conclusion of the trial.

Judge Gilson found that Unit 1016 was purchased before the parties were married and, therefore, defendant should be permitted to recover the $145,000 he paid for that property. In doing so, he rejected plaintiff's contention that defendant purchased the unit in contemplation of the parties' marriage because her assertion was not supported by the testimony presented. However, the judge also ruled that Unit 1016 was "not completely exempt from being equitably distributed as part of the marital assets" because the parties lived in the home after their marriage. The judge found that unit 1209 was a marital asset that was purchased by both parties during the marriage.

Based on these findings, the judge awarded defendant the first $145,000 from the $345,000 net gain from the sale of the two units, leaving $200,000 for distribution. The judge then ordered the parties to equally split that amount, with each of them receiving $100,000. Because the parties' earlier equal distribution of the $345,000 net gain left plaintiff with $172,500, the judge ordered her to return $72,500 of this amount to defendant.

2. THE STILLWATER PROPERTY

In 1986, the parties bought a second home in Stillwater, New Jersey for $412,000. At trial, defendant claimed he used his premarital savings and the proceeds from the sale of a different premarital property to buy the home. However, plaintiff asserted the parties used marital funds to pay off a $380,000 loan on the property and that title to the house was in both of their names. Plaintiff used the home as her principal residence when the parties separated in 1992. Defendant paid the taxes on the property for seven years.

Judge Gilson found that the Stillwater property was a marital asset subject to equitable distribution. He further found that defendant "failed to present sufficient proofs that his premarital monies were used to purchase the" home. Instead, the evidence adduced at trial clearly reflected that plaintiff used the home with defendant's full knowledge.

Thus, the judge ordered the parties to sell the home and "share equally (50/50) the net proceeds of the sale." In the alternative, either party could agree to buy out the other party's interest.

3. THE 321 ESSEX STREET BUILDING

In 1981, defendant acquired a 50% interest in a commercial property in Hackensack that he used for his medical practice. The purchase price was $600,000, subject to an existing $400,000 mortgage. When she joined the practice as a receptionist, plaintiff helped set up defendant's office. In 1992 and 1993 when the property was renovated, plaintiff was acting as defendant's office manager. In this role, plaintiff claimed she was in charge of the renovation project. In June 2002, defendant sold the building for $3.2 million, and received net proceeds of $828,114.

At trial, plaintiff asserted she was entitled to a "marital portion" of these proceeds because the property was an active immune asset subject to equitable distribution. Plaintiff's financial expert testified that the original property was worth $600,000 when the parties married, and $750,000 as of January 31, 1994. However, the renovated value of the property was $1.9 million. Based on this valuation, the expert opined that the "appreciated value" of the renovated property was $1.15 million, which he stated was 60% of the property's total value.

Based upon the evidence presented at trial, Judge Gilson concluded that this property "was a premarital asset exempt from equitable distribution." The judge found that plaintiff's testimony that she oversaw the renovation "was not persuasive or credible." He also rejected the testimony of plaintiff's expert that the value of the property had only appreciated $150,000 between 1984 and 1994. Moreover, the judge observed that plaintiff was paid for working as the office manager and she never used any of her earnings to support the parties during the marriage. Under these circumstances, the judge ruled "[i]t would be inequitable to allow [p]laintiff to keep all her earnings during that period of time and also allow her to share in the appreciation of a premarital asset."

4. DEFENDANT'S MEDICAL PRACTICE

Defendant graduated from medical school in 1973 and began his medical practice that same year. When the parties married, plaintiff worked for the practice as a receptionist and later became the office manager. Defendant's gross annual income from the practice grew from $237,000 in 1984 to $401,000 in 1993.

At trial, defendant argued that the entire practice was a premarital asset not subject to equitable distribution and that plaintiff did little, if anything, to contribute to its value. On the other hand, plaintiff asserted she was entitled to 50% of the growth of the practice from 1984 until January 1994.

Plaintiff's expert opined that the value of the practice appreciated by $1.163 million during the course of the marriage. Defendant's expert accountant stated the practice had only appreciated $350,000 during this period.

Judge Gilson concluded that defendant's medical practice was an active immune asset because it was established by defendant prior to the parties' marriage, but it grew in value during the marriage due to the efforts and contributions of both parties. In that regard, however, the judge noted that defendant made the greater contribution, and that plaintiff was paid a salary for the work she performed.

In determining the value of the business, the judge accepted the testimony of plaintiff's expert over the opinions expressed by defendant's accountant. The judge found that unlike defendant's accountant, plaintiff's expert "used the best available information and used that information consistently and reasonably in analyzing an appropriate valuation methodology." Thus, the judge determined that the property had appreciated $1.163 million during the parties' marriage and that plaintiff should receive 25% of that amount ($290,750) plus interest, reflecting her contribution to the increase in value of the asset.

5. PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS

i. Defendant's Plans

Defendant came into the marriage with $220,870 in a defined benefit plan and $66,956 in a money purchase plan. According to plaintiff's expert, these plans were rolled over and combined into one plan during the parties' marriage and this plan had a balance of $933,518 in January 1994. The expert opined that 52.19% of this amount was premarital, with the remaining 47.81% portion being a marital asset subject to equitable distribution. Defendant did not present an expert concerning his pensions.

Judge Gilson found that plaintiff's expert was credible and that he used an appropriate methodology to trace the funds in the pension plans. Using the expert's valuation, the judge determined that the 47.81% marital portion of the pension was $446,271 and that this amount should be divided equally between the parties.

Plaintiff also alleged that sometime during the 1980s, a check for $237,345 had been withdrawn from defendant's defined benefit plan. Defendant could not trace what happened to those funds, but testified that he never withdrew any money from his pension accounts.

Judge Gilson found that plaintiff did not present "enough evidence" at trial to demonstrate she was entitled to any portion of these purported missing funds. The parties never listed the alleged withdrawal of these funds on their joint tax returns and there was no evidence the funds were placed in any other account. Moreover, the judge observed that "the parties were married at the time and to the extent they received monies, those monies were used for marital purposes."

Defendant also had an IRA pension that he maintained as a separate account since 1994. By the time of the trial, there was $2.4 million in this account. The parties agreed to take 47.81% of this amount and then equally share this sum between themselves.

ii. Plaintiff's Pension

During the marriage, plaintiff had an IRA account. The parties agreed that $2000 in this account came from pre-marital assets. She rolled this account over into various accounts and, at the time of the trial, had $115,580 in an IRA account. The judge ruled that plaintiff was entitled to the $2000 she contributed to the account prior to the marriage, and that the parties were to equally divide the remainder.

6. BANK ACCOUNTS

Plaintiff had two separate bank accounts of her own, one with $99,340 and the other with $102,244. Plaintiff asserted she funded these accounts with her earnings between August 1984 and December 1993. However, she earned approximately $500,000 during this period and, therefore, there was $300,000 that defendant argued was not "accounted for" and should be subject to equitable distribution.

In response, plaintiff testified that she used these funds to pay her own expenses or those of her children from a previous relationship. She also testified she spent large sums of money that she earned on defendant. Relying upon this credible testimony, the judge found that there was "no factual basis for allowing [d]efendant to share in fifty percent . . . of any account [p]laintiff currently maintains." Therefore, the judge did not order defendant to "account for" any of the allegedly "missing" funds from her personal accounts or to pay any portion of them to defendant.

However, the judge did find that the evidence showed that plaintiff took $708,000 from the parties' marital bank accounts after she gained control of them in 1994. The judge found that neither party was able to establish that any portion of these funds was premarital and, instead, the entire amount was comprised of marital funds and, therefore, subject to equitable distribution.

For example, defendant testified that the money that plaintiff removed from a joint account included a $143,000 payment he received from a 1993 insurance settlement related to an art collection he owned prior to the marriage. Defendant asserted he should get a credit for this amount. However, defendant admitted that a deposit of $143,000 was not reflected in the joint marital account, and that he did not know where he actually deposited the funds.

Similarly, defendant argued that the money plaintiff removed from a joint marital account also included $90,000 that represented the sale of a Ferrari automobile that he had purchased prior to the marriage. However, plaintiff explained that the Ferrari needed over $40,000 in repairs and refurbishments during the marriage, which the parties jointly agreed to pay. In addition, defendant later admitted that he deposited $55,000 into one of his own individual bank accounts.

Based upon the credible evidence in the record, Judge Gilson concluded that defendant failed to present sufficient evidence to support his contentions on this point and, therefore, he was not entitled to an extra credit against the total amount of money plaintiff took from the marital bank accounts. Therefore, the judge ruled that the $708,000 plaintiff took from the marital accounts was subject to equitable distribution, with each party being entitled to receive 50% "of that money; that is, $354,000." The judge ordered plaintiff to pay defendant his $354,000 share, plus interest starting on August 1, 1994 until repayment.

7. PERSONAL PROPERTY, ART COLLECTION, JEWELRY, AND ANTIQUES

The parties collected a great deal of art, jewelry, and antiques during their marriage. The parties agreed on a list of these items, which identified which "were marital, premarital, post-marital or gifts." The parties also agreed that certain items should be sold, but they could not agree on how the proceeds of the sale should be divided between them. Defendant sought an 80/20 split in his favor because "he had greater expertise in collecting art and antiques and the parties principally used his income to purchase the art and antiques."

Judge Gilson rejected defendant's contention and ordered the parties to equally share the proceeds of the sale of these items. The judge found that the parties acquired these items as part of a shared enterprise in which they each equally participated.

D. THE DJOD: ALIMONY

Judge Gilson next considered plaintiff's claim for alimony. Plaintiff alleged that the parties' marriage ran from 1984 until she filed her second complaint for divorce in 2009. Therefore, she sought a permanent award of alimony. Plaintiff also asserted that defendant had never paid her the full amount of support established in the 1995 pendente lite alimony order and that she was therefore still owed over $1.570 million in back alimony.

In response, defendant pointed out that the judge had already found that under the terms of the 1999 consent order, the parties agreed to use January 31, 1994 "as the date for the determination of any economic issues between the parties" and, therefore, the marriage lasted less than ten years. Defendant also argued that plaintiff waived her right to receive the pendente lite support because she never sought it after the parties agreed to drop the first and second divorce actions and because, as discussed above, plaintiff took over $700,000 from the parties' joint bank accounts.

In his decision, Judge Gilson agreed with defendant's interpretation of the 1999 consent order. Although the order did not specifically refer to "alimony," it clearly stated that the January 31, 1994 date would be used "for the determination of any economic issues between the parties," which would obviously include alimony.

The judge next found that the 1995 pendente lite order did require defendant to pay plaintiff $8000 a month in support. Defendant paid that amount for a time but, in 1996, he reduced his monthly payments to $2000 and, in 1997, reduced them further to $1000. Defendant then stopped making any of these payments. At the same time, he paid for some of plaintiff's expenses.

Based on these facts, the judge rejected plaintiff's argument that she was entitled to over $1.570 million in "back alimony" under the 1995 order. The judge noted that at the time of the 1999 consent order, defendant had already reduced his monthly payments to $1000 and then stopped paying them at all. Plaintiff also admitted that she used her share of the $708,000 she took from the parties' joint bank accounts after 1994 to pay her expenses. Thus, the judge concluded that plaintiff had waived her right to enforce the 1995 order.

The judge also rejected plaintiff's contention that she was entitled to permanent alimony. Under the terms of the 1999 consent order, the length of the marriage, August 1984 to January 1994, was less than ten years. In addition, plaintiff was going to receive substantial assets in equitable distribution and had already "entered into a new committed cohabitation relationship" with another man.

Judge Gilson observed that he was "called upon to look back to the facts as they existed in January[] 1994, and make an award of alimony in 2013." Under this "rather unique set of circumstances[,]" Judge Gilson found that plaintiff was entitled to seven years of limited duration alimony. In calculating the amount of support, the judge noted that both parties gave conflicting testimony concerning the marital lifestyle between 1984 and 1994. Yet, in the 1995 consent order, the parties had agreed that $8000 a month was a fair support figure.

Thus, the judge ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $8000 per month in alimony for a seven-year period, which totaled $672,000. The judge gave defendant credit for the $158,000 he paid plaintiff under the 1995 order, leaving a balance due of $514,000. The judge gave defendant a further $37,000 credit because he bought plaintiff two cars after 1994. In addition, the judge gave defendant an additional $186,000 credit because he paid all of plaintiff's taxes between 2000 and 2009. With these credits, defendant owed plaintiff $291,000 in alimony.

The judge rejected plaintiff's argument that defendant should pay her interest on this amount. He also gave defendant the option of paying the $291,000 to plaintiff in a lump sum, or at the rate of $8000 per month until it was fully paid.

E. THE DJOD: ATTORNEY'S AND EXPERT'S FEES AND COSTS

Each party argued that the other should be responsible for paying their respective attorney's and expert's fees and costs. Judge Gilson considered all of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and Rule 5:3-5(c), and concluded that each party should "bear her or his own attorneys' fees. . . . [and] his or her own expert fees and all of the costs each of the parties incurred during this litigation."

In so ruling, the judge explained that each party had the "financial circumstances and abilities to pay their own fees." In addition, each party was successful on some aspects of their claims, but did not prevail on others. Thus, "the ultimate result obtained is not a victory or loss for either party."

After the entry of the DJOD, both parties filed motions for reconsideration. Judge Gilson denied these motions on September 16, 2013 in another comprehensive written decision. However, the judge did clarify that "[t]he alimony ordered to be paid by [d]efendant to [p]laintiff, will be taxable to [p]laintiff and tax-deductible to [d]efendant[.]" The judge concluded that this was "the fair and reasonable tax treatment" to use based upon all of the circumstances discussed in his July 31, 2013 decision. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.

II.

On appeal, defendant raises the following contentions

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT MADE MULTIPLE ERRORS IN EQUITABLY DISTRIBUTING THE MARITAL ASSETS.

A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NUMEROUS RESPECTS IN DISTRIBUTING THE PURLOINED FUNDS TAKEN BY [PLAINTIFF] POST-SEPARATION.

1. [PLAINTIFF] FAILED TO SUSTAIN HER BURDEN OF PRO[VING] THAT SHE CONTRIBUTED TO THE INCREASE IN THE ACCOUNT BALANCE.

2. [DEFENDANT] WAS ENTITLED TO A CREDIT FOR THE $143,000[] INSURANCE PROCEEDS.

3. [DEFENDANT] WAS ENTITLED TO $90,000[] FROM THE SALE OF HIS PRE-MARITAL FERRARI.

B. THE COURT ERRED BY EQUALLY DIVIDING THE NON-EXEMPT PORTION OF [DEFENDANT'S] PENSION.

C. STILLWATER.

D. THE COURT ERRED IN DIVIDING THE TWO FORT LEE CO-OPS.

1. Sale Proceeds.

2. The Court Erred by Failing to Credit [Defendant] With the Carrying Costs of the Two Co-op Units.

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS OVER $300,000[] IN MARITAL ASSETS.

POINT III

THE COURT ERRED BY NOT DISTRIBUTING [PLAINTIFF'S] INDIVIDUAL BANK ACCOUNT.

POINT IV

THE OVERAL[L] EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION SPLIT IN THIS SHORT, TROUBLED, CHILDLESS, SECOND MARRIAGE WAS UNFAIR AND UNJUST.

POINT V

THE COURT ERRED BY AWARDING [SEVEN] YEARS OF LIMITED DURATION ALIMONY.

POINT VI

THE COURT ERRED BY NOT AWARDING FEES TO [DEFENDANT].

In her cross-appeal, plaintiff presents the following arguments

POINT [I]

IN ITS DISPOSITION OF THE HORIZON HOUSE CO-OP UNITS, THE ISSUE IS NOT WHETHER EITHER OR BOTH OF THOSE UNITS WERE PASSIVE OR ACTIVE ASSETS AS SUGGESTED BY [DEFENDANT]; RATHER, IT IS THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE HORIZON HOUSE UNIT #1016 WAS NOT BOUGHT IN CONTEMPLATION OF MARRIAGE NOR FULLY SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION WHICH WAS CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT OF THE CREDIBLE EVIDENCE, AND AS SUCH, MUST BE REVERSED.

POINT [II]

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 321 ESSEX STREET COMMERCIAL PROPERTY WAS AN EXEMPT PREMARITAL ASSET NOT SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION IN THIS MATTER.

POINT [III]

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AWARD [PLAINTIFF] BACK SUPPORT ACCRUED UNDER THE PARTIES' 1995 PENDENTE LITE ORDER WHICH HAS REMAINED IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT BY OPERATION OF THE OCTOBER 25, 1999 CONSENT ORDER WHICH THE TRIAL COURT DEEMED TO BE VALID AND ENFORCEABLE WITHOUT CARVE OUT OR EXCEPTION UPON THE SUCCESSFUL APPLICATION OF [DEFENDANT], SUCH CLAIMS NEITHER BEING BARRED BY THE DOCTRINES OF WAIVER OR ESTOPPEL, NOR BY THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL, WHICH THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY MISAPPLIED IN THIS MATTER.

POINT [IV]

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE REMAINING ALIMONY DUE AND OWING TO [PLAINTIFF] SHOULD BE TAXABLE TO HER AND DEDUCTIBLE BY [DEFENDANT] WHEN HE ALREADY RECEIVED CREDIT FOR INCOME TAXES PAID BY HIM ON BEHALF OF [PLAINTIFF] AGAINST THE GROSS AMOUNT OF THE ALIMONY AWARDED.

Our review of a trial court's fact-finding in a non-jury case is limited. Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011). "The general rule is that findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence. Deference is especially appropriate when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility." Ibid. (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)).

Moreover, we owe substantial deference to the Family Part's findings of fact because of that court's special expertise in family matters. Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 411-12. Thus, "[a] reviewing court should uphold the factual findings undergirding the trial court's decision if they are supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence on the record." MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 253-54 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)).

While we owe no special deference to the judge's legal conclusions, Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995), "we 'should not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless . . . convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice' or when we determine the court has palpably abused its discretion." Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 47 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 412). We will only reverse the judge's decision when it is necessary to "ensure that there is not a denial of justice because the family court's conclusions are []clearly mistaken or wide of the mark." Id. at 48 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)).

With regard to the specific contentions raised by the parties in this matter, we apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing challenges to the amount of an equitable distribution award or the manner of allocation. Borodinsky v. Borodinsky, 162 N.J. Super. 437, 443-44 (App. Div. 1978). Similarly, a trial court's rulings on alimony are discretionary and should not be overturned unless the trial court abused its discretion, failed to consider applicable legal principles, or made findings unsupported by the evidence. Gordon v. Rozenwald, 380 N.J. Super. 55, 76 (App. Div. 2005). Likewise, we will alter an attorney's fee award "only in the clearest case of abuse of discretion." Yueh v. Yueh, 329 N.J. Super. 447, 466 (App. Div. 2000).

After reviewing the record in light of these principles, we conclude that Judge Gilson's factual findings are fully supported by the record and, in light of those facts, his legal conclusions are unassailable. Judge Gilson carefully reviewed the relevant evidence and fully explained his reasons in a logical and forthright manner. In light of the record, the parties' arguments reveal nothing "so wide of the mark" as to require our intervention. Parish, supra, 412 N.J. Super. at 48.

We therefore affirm each of the orders under review substantially for the reasons that Judge Gilson expressed in his comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion.

Affirmed.