STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. ROYAL J. BASKERVILLE

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ROYAL J. BASKERVILLE, a/k/a ROYAL

BASKERVILLE, ROY J. BASKERVILLE,

ROY JAMES BASKERVILLE,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________________

May 18, 2016

Submitted April 12, 2016 Decided

Before Judges Espinosa and Currier.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment Nos. 11-10-1021 and 11-10-1024.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Amira R. Scurato, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).

Grace H. Park, Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Milton S. Leibowitz,Special DeputyAttorney General/ Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.

PER CURIAM

Subsequent to the denial of his suppression motion, defendant Royal J. Baskerville entered a conditional guilty plea to third-degree possession of a prohibited weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(b); third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(c)(2); and second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b). He now appeals the denial of the suppression motion. After a review of the record in light of the applicable legal principles, we affirm.

The evidence presented to the motion judge can be summarized as follows. As a result of an undercover operation, officers from the Elizabeth Police Department learned from a confidential informant (CI) that Roman Strong was selling drugs. The CI had previously provided police with information that had led to numerous arrests and the seizure of illegal narcotics. Acting on this information, detectives arranged and observed three drug transactions between the CI and Strong. On each occasion, Strong arrived at the specified location in a gray Dodge Durango; the CI got into the vehicle and made the drug purchase.

After a review of the detective's affidavit, a search warrant was issued for Strong, a residence, and the vehicle involved in the drug transactions. When the police located the vehicle and executed the warrant, defendant1 was driving and Strong, along with three other passengers, were occupants. A search of the vehicle produced a loaded, twelve gauge sawed-off shotgun wrapped in a sweater located in the trunk underneath some fishing equipment, along with nineteen shotgun shells. Defendant was subsequently arrested.

Following the suppression motion arguments and a review of the supporting affidavit, the judge issued an order finding that the affidavit in support of the search warrant detailed police corroboration of three controlled purchases of drugs that had taken place in the Durango. He denied the motion, finding that the search of the vehicle, and subsequent seizure of the weapon and ammunition was based upon probable cause.

In this appeal, defendant argues the following issues

POINT I: THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE AS THE SEARCH WARRANT SHOULD NOT HAVE EXTENDED TO THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE. U.S. Const. Amends. IV, XIV; N.J. Const. Art. I, para. 7.

POINT II: A REMAND IS REQUIRED AS THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO MAKE FULL FINDINGS ON THE RECORD. (Not Raised Below)

In a pro se supplemental brief, defendant raises the following argument

POINT I: TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT ASCERTAINING WHETHER THE AFFIANT'S FACTS STATED IN THE AFFIDAVIT WERE TRUTHFUL AND SUPPORTED [BY] PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT IS "PLAIN ERROR." (Not Raised Below)

When "reviewing a grant or denial of a motion to suppress [we] must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014) (citing State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). We "should reverse only when the trial court's determination is 'so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'" Id. at 425 (quoting Elders, supra, 192 N.J. at 244). "A trial court's interpretation of the law, however, and the consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Ibid. (citing State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010)). "Therefore, a trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo." Ibid. (citing Gandhi, supra, 201 N.J. at 176).

Defendant argues there were insufficient facts to establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant for the Durango. He contends that the CI did not state there were drugs in the trunk of the vehicle and there were no observations made by police to that effect.

"It is well settled that a search executed pursuant to a warrant is presumed to be valid and that a defendant challenging its validity has the burden to prove 'that there was no probable cause supporting the issuance of the warrant or that the search was otherwise unreasonable.'" State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 388 (2004) (quoting State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 133 (1983)). "In considering such a challenge, '[w]e accord substantial deference to the discretionary determination resulting in the issuance of the [search] warrant.'" State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 211 (2001) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 72 (1991), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929, 113 S. Ct. 1306, 122 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1993)).

We find no basis to disturb the motion judge's ruling. Each of the drug transactions took place in the Durango. There was a more than reasonable probability that a search of the vehicle would result in drugs, contraband or other evidence related to the illegal activity. In determining whether probable cause exists to support a search warrant, the issuing judge is to determine whether "there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83, 93 (1998) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 548 (1983)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1033, 119 S. Ct. 576, 142 L. Ed. 2d 480 (1998). We are satisfied that it was reasonable for the judge to conclude probable cause existed for a search of defendant's vehicle. As we find defendant's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2), we affirm the trial judge's ruling.

Affirmed.

1 Defendant was determined to be the owner of the vehicle.