DONNA K. MEYERS v. JOSEPH V. MEYERS

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

DONNA K. MEYERS,

Plaintiff-Respondent/

Cross-Appellant,

v.

JOSEPH V. MEYERS,

Defendant-Appellant/

Cross-Respondent.

____________________________________

December 8, 2015

Argued October 27, 2015 Decided

Before Judges Reisner, Hoffman and Whipple.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County, Docket No. FM-02-1191-13.

JosephV. Meyers, appellant/cross-respondent, argued the cause pro se.

DianaSherwood arguedthe cause for respondent/cross-appellant(Puglisi & Sherwood, L.L.C., attorneys; Ms. Sherwood, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals from orders of the Family Part dated April 11 and June 27, 2014. We dismiss in part and affirm in part.1

We discern the following facts from the record. The parties, who had been married for twenty-five years, were divorced on February 18, 2014. The parties' Dual Judgment of Divorce (Judgment) incorporated a Memorandum of Understanding which was marked as Exhibit J-1 (the Agreement). The parties reached agreements on the issues of custody, child support, alimony and equitable distribution, but not on counsel fees. The parties thus agreed to submit their respective positions to the trial judge, with supporting briefs. The parties agreed that the trial judge would determine the ultimate amount of counsel fees, if any, defendant would pay to plaintiff, as well as the disposition of escrowed proceeds from the sale of the marital residence.

On April 11, 2014, after reviewing the submissions of the parties, the trial judge issued an order and a written statement of reasons granting plaintiff's request for counsel fees and ordering defendant to pay $27,457.15 in satisfaction of his counsel fee obligation. On May 16, 2014, plaintiff filed a motion in aid of litigant's rights asserting that defendant had failed to abide by the terms of the Agreement. She asked the court to direct the distribution of escrowed funds from the sale of the marital home to pay certain creditors and obligors consistent with the Agreement and to enforce several other terms of the Agreement. In addition, plaintiff asked the court to enforce the April 11, 2014 order awarding counsel fees out of the escrowed funds. On June 27, 2014, the trial judge granted the application to distribute funds held in escrow pursuant to the Agreement and the counsel fee award.2 On August 2, 2014, defendant appealed both the April 11, and June 27, 2014 orders.

On appeal, defendant argues that the April 11, 2014 counsel fee award should be vacated because: the trial court's findings are not supported by substantial credible evidence; the trial court's award of counsel fees is inconsistent with the law on fee shifting; and the trial court erred in distributing marital funds pursuant to the June 27 order.3 We disagree.

At the outset, we dismiss the appeal of the April 11, 2014 order as it was untimely. Final judgments are appealable as of right, while interlocutory judgements may only be appealed by leave of the Appellate Division. R. 2:2-3. An appeal from a final judgment must be taken within forty-five days of that judgment's entry. R. 2:4-1. In this case, the notice of appeal was filed August 5, 2014, appealing both the April 11, 2014 order and June 27, 2014 order. The April 11, 2014 order was a final judgment order deciding all issues between the parties and the June 27, 2014 order enforced the judgment. Because the appeal was not filed until August 5, 2014, it was filed beyond the time mandated by Rule 2:4-1. We reject defendant's assertion that the April 11, 2014 order was interlocutory.

We also reject defendant's assertion that the trial judge erred in the June 27, 2014 order by requiring him to pay plaintiff one-half of the interest on the mortgage for the month of January 2014. The Agreement states under a section titled "Support Prior to the Sale of the Marital Residence" that "[t]he parties shall continue to abide by the June 7, 2013, Order until the residence is sold." The June 7 order requires the defendant to pay plaintiff $500 per week for "reasonable and necessary Schedule C expenses" as pendente lite support. These expenses included the mortgage on the marital residence, which is why the trial court directed defendant to pay one-half of the interest for January 2014, when the house was sold on January 31. The trial court's decision was therefore based on the parties' Agreement.

We are similarly unpersuaded by defendant's assertion that the court erred in denying his motion to distribute escrowed funds in accordance with his plan for distribution. The order directs plaintiff's share of the escrowed funds, $106,824.63, to be deposited directly into Sherwood and Puglisi L.L.C.'s Trust Account. Defendant argues that the court should have directed two payments, the balance of plaintiff's outstanding attorney's fees to Sherwood and Puglisi L.L.C., and the remainder of the money to plaintiff. He argues that by ordering all the money to the firm's trust account, the firm may decide to reduce the attorney's fees plaintiff owes them without defendant's knowledge. His arguments are speculative and unripe for review.

Dismissed, in part, and affirmed, in part.

1 The cross-appellant in this case did not raise any new issues relating to any substantive appeal; rather, cross-appellant's briefs concerned the arguments raised by appellant. Because cross-appellant did not seek any new relief and only sought to rebut appellant's arguments, we dismiss the cross-appeal.

2 Other prayers for relief were also addressed but are not relevant to the issues raised in this appeal.

3 Defendant has limited his appeal of the June 27, 2014 order to paragraphs 7 and 13.