PRASAD KUMMARAPURUGU v. PADMINI THOTA

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

PRASAD KUMMARAPURUGU,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PADMINI THOTA,

Defendant-Respondent.

_____________________________________________

May 21, 2015

Before Judges Accurso and Manahan.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer County, Docket No. FM-11-213-06.

David Perry Davis argued the cause for appellant.

Padmini Thota, respondent, argued the cause pro se.

PER CURIAM

In this post-judgment matrimonial action, plaintiff Prasad Kummarapurugu appeals from the trial court's order of February 12, 2014, recalculating his child support obligation to $272 per week. Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in its calculation of child support. We affirm.

The parties were married in 1999 and divorced in 2006. They are the parents of one child and share custody. Both parties have remarried and had children with their current spouses. On July 8, 2013, plaintiff filed a motion seeking, among other relief, a review of his child support obligation as the result of his current wife giving birth to a child a year earlier.

The court conducted oral argument on August 8, 2013. Thereafter, the court entered a multi-purpose order, dated October 31, 2013, which granted in part the plaintiff's application. The recalculation of plaintiff's child support was dependent upon certain financial information to be provided by the parties. On February 12, 2014, after provision of the requested submissions but without further argument by the parties, the court issued an order modifying plaintiff's child support obligation to $272 per week, effective the date of the order. In the determination of the child support amount, the court held

After receiving the parties' submissions the Court ran a sole parenting worksheet based on the documentation provided. The Court averaged the plaintiff's bonuses and calculated his income at $2,750 per week, or $143,000 per year. The Court calculated defendant's income at $1,549 per week or $80,000 per year. The Court calculated plaintiff's overnights at fifty-two per year, included defendant's contribution for medical insurance, and plaintiff's other dependent deduction. Based on all those factors, the plaintiff's child support obligation shall be modified to $272 per week, effective February 12, 2014. The child support guideline is attached thereto and made apart hereof as schedule A.

On appeal, plaintiff contests the trial court's determination of his child support amount. His principal argument is that it is unfair to have his child support amount modified as the court failed to consider the appropriate child support guideline factors. In opposition, defendant argues the judge made sufficient fact findings to justify the child support award. We are satisfied from our review of the record that the judge's reasons and explanation sufficiently support the issuance of the order.1

Our review of the judge's findings is a limited one. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). "Because of the family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, [we] should accord deference to family court fact-finding." Id. at 413. Accordingly, we will not "'engage in an independent assessment of the evidence as if [we] were the court of first instance,'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Z.P.R., 351 N.J. Super. 427, 433 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999)), and will "not disturb the 'factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless [we are] convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). Where our review addresses questions of law, a trial judge's conclusions "are not entitled to that same degree of deference if they are based upon a misunderstanding of the applicable legal principles." Z.P.R., supra, 351 N.J. Super. at 434 (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).

The trial court is afforded substantial discretion to determine child support awards and other support obligations. Foust v. Glaser, 340 N.J. Super. 312, 315 (App. Div. 2001) (relying on Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 594 (1995)). A support order is "always subject to review and modification on a showing of changed circumstances." Lepis, supra, 83 N.J. at 146. "If consistent with the law, such an award will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly contrary to reason or to other evidence, or the result of whim or caprice." Foust, supra, 340 N.J. Super. at 315-16 (quotations omitted). "When reviewing decisions granting or denying applications to modify child support, we examine whether, given the facts, the trial judge abused his or her discretion." J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 325-26 (2013). Applying these standards, we discern no reason to disturb the judge's decision.

By statute, parents are presumptively required to provide for the financial support of their unemancipated children. Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix IX-A(1) to R. 5:6A at 2625 (2015). The statute enumerates several factors to consider in calculating support, including (1) the "[n]eeds of the child"; (2) the "[s]tandard of living and economic circumstances of each parent"; (3) "[a]ll sources of income and assets of each parent"; (4) the "[e]arning ability of each parent"; (5) the "[n]eed and capacity of the child for education"; (6) the "[a]ge and health of [each] child and each parent"; (7) the "[i]ncome, assets and earning ability of the child"; (8) the "[r]esponsibility of the parents for the court-ordered support of others"; (9) the "[r]easonable debts and liabilities of each child and parent"; and (10) "[a]ny other factors the court may deem relevant." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a).

The Supreme Court established presumptive Guidelines, and corresponding factors, to calculate child support. Pressler & Verniero, supra, Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A at 2625-2647. "A court may deviate from the [G]uidelines only when good cause demonstrates that [their] application . . . would be inappropriate." Lozner v. Lozner, 388 N.J. Super. 471, 480 (App. Div. 2006) (citing Ribner v. Ribner, 290 N.J. Super. 66, 73 (App. Div. 1996)). "The key to both the Guidelines and the statutory factors is flexibility and the best interest of children." Pascale, supra, 140 N.J. at 594.

In Loro v. Colliano, 354 N.J. Super. 212 (App. Div. 2002), we considered a trial court's award of specific child support payments. The plaintiff argued, among other things, that the lack of findings by the trial judge was reversible error since the record lacked support for the quantum of support permitted. Id. at 220. We disagreed with the plaintiff, although we noted that the judge's findings were "not a paradigm of the findings required by R. 1:7-4." Ultimately, we concluded that the facts adduced from the record were sufficient to support the award. Ibid.

As in Loro, we are satisfied the judge made sufficient and particular findings related to the parties' incomes and child support obligation. The judge appropriately addressed the recalculation of child support through application of the statutory factors. Given our deferential standard of review, we find no error in the court's determination. We are satisfied from our review that the court's order was not "manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable or contrary to the evidence." Loro, supra, 354 N.J. Super. at 220.

Finally, plaintiff argues, assuming we were to agree with his child support calculation, the effective date of the child support order should be amended to the filing date of his motion to modify on July 8, 2013, due to the time it took the court to issue an order. We find no error in the decision regarding the effective date of the modification. N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a prohibits retroactive child-support modifications. Although the statute contains an exception "with respect to the period during which there is a pending application for modification," we find no abuse of discretion by the court not availing itself of the exception.

Affirmed.

1 At oral argument, the parties referenced changed circumstances that occurred after the court's decision. We did not consider those arguments as they were outside the record. See, e.g., Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 558 (2002). We note that a support order is "always subject to review and modification on a showing of changed circumstances." Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146 (1980) (citations omitted).