M.C. v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

M.C.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF

HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION

OF FAMILY DEVELOPMENT,

Respondent-Respondent.

_________________________________________

December 16, 2015

Before Judges Yannotti and St. John.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Human Services, Division of Family Development, Docket No. GA925480.

Stanley G. Sheats argued the cause for appellant (Northeast New Jersey Legal Services, attorneys; Mr. Sheats, on the briefs).

Gerard A. Hughes, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Erick James Lucadamo, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
 

This appeal arises from the decision of the Director of the Division of Family Development (DFD) denying appellant M.C. admission to the Housing Assistance Program pilot project (HAP). For the reasons explained below, we affirm the decision of the DFD Director.

I.

Prior to her application for HAP funding, M.C. was a recipient of general assistance (GA) through the Work First New Jersey Program. She was considered incapable of working, and held a MED-1 form indicating her total disability from February 14, 2013 to February 13, 2014.

A. M.C.'s Application to HAP

HAP provides a twenty-four month extension of housing support for qualifying applicants. N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.10(a). One way to qualify for HAP is to be a GA recipient who has exhausted the emergency assistance available under that program, and who "has applied for and is either pending approval or appealing a denial for . . . SSI [supplemental security income] disability benefits . . . supported by a MED-1 form substantiating at least 12 months of disability." N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.10(a)1.i.

In October 2013, M.C. was denied admission to HAP by the Passaic County Board of Social Services (PCBSS). She subsequently applied for, and was granted, an emergency fair hearing by the DFD. The matter was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), and an emergency fair hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ). On November 7, the ALJ issued a decision affirming the denial of emergency assistance because M.C. failed to prove that she had any pending application for SSI benefits or appeal from a denial of SSI benefits, as required by N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.10(a)1.i.

Following the hearing, M.C. submitted a letter of exception to DFD. Attached to the letter was a Report of Confidential Social Security Benefit Information (Report) from the Social Security Administration (SSA), dated November 8, 2013, the day after M.C.'s emergency fair hearing. The letter of exception was reviewed by the Director of DFD, who remanded the case to the OAL for further fact-finding in light of the newly submitted Report.

On December 20, 2013, the ALJ conducted further fact-finding in light of the Report, and issued a decision affirming PCBSS's denial of emergency assistance. M.C. again filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision. On December 27, 2013, the Director issued a final decision affirming the ALJ's decision. On January 13, 2014, the Director issued an amended decision addressing the arguments in greater detail, but still adopting the decision of the ALJ and affirming the PCBSS's determination.

B. Appellant's History with the Social Security Administration

In the past, M.C. received SSI, but her eligibility ended on June 1, 2011 because she and her husband, G.C., failed to account for "substantial income" that G.C. had received from the estate of his mother and a separate insurance settlement. M.C. sought reconsideration of the denial. Consequently, in April 2012, SSA issued a Notice of Reconsideration informing her that SSA regulations barred her from refiling for SSI for three years, and that she could refile for SSI in November 2014. The SSA denied her request for an administrative hearing to appeal its three-year sanction of ineligibility.

II.

"An administrative agency's final quasi-judicial decision will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record." In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007) (citing Campbell v. Dep't of Civ. Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963)). The burden of making this showing rests with the person challenging the administrative action. J.I. v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 441 N.J. Super. 564, 583-584 (App. Div. 2015) (citing McGowan v. N.J. Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002)).

Additionally, "our courts give 'great deference' to an agency's 'interpretation of statutes within its scope of authority and its adoption of rules implementing' the laws for which it is responsible." In re N.J.A.C. 7:1B-1.1 et seq., 431 N.J. Super. 100, 114-115 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting N.J. Ass'n of Sch. Adm'rs v. Schundler, 211 N.J. 535, 549 (2012)). "If there is any fair argument in support of the course taken by the agency or any reasonable ground for difference of opinion among intelligent and conscientious officials," the decision should not be disturbed. Lisowski v. Borough of Avalon, 442 N.J. Super. 304, 330 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Newark v. Natural Resource Council in Dep't of Environmental Protection, 82 N.J. 530, 539 (1980)).

III.

The primary issue presented on this appeal is whether DFD's interpretation of N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.10 was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or lacking support in the record. M.C. contends that all varieties of SSA appeal would qualify under N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.10, and DFD should be prevented from imposing its own narrower interpretation onto the regulation. She further contends that the SSA's Notice of Reconsideration was sent to her in response to her application for SSI, and that her subsequent request for a hearing should therefore qualify as an appeal from a denial for SSI benefits under N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.10.

However, as DFD asserts, an applicant is only eligible for HAP if he or she "has applied for and is either pending approval or appealing a denial for . . . SSI." N.J.A.C. 10:906.10(a)1.i (emphasis added). The use of the conjunctive "and" implies that the regulation requires both an application for SSI benefits and a pending approval or appeal from a denial.

In interpreting legislative language, "[w]e must assume that the Legislature purposely included every word, and we must strive to give every word its logical effect." Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 214 N.J. 419, 441 (2013). The same rule applies when we interpret a regulation. US Bank, N.A. v. Hough, 210 N.J. 187, 199 (2012). Here, the word "and" does not render the clause incomprehensible, redundant, or undermine the goals of the overarching regulatory scheme; therefore it must be given full effect. See Restaurant.com, Inc., supra, 214 N.J. at 441. Thus, the DFD properly interpreted the regulation as requiring both an application for SSI and either a pending approval or appeal. This interpretation makes logical sense, because in order to have an appeal of a denial of SSI, there must first be an application for SSI.

Viewed in this light, it is clear that DFD's decision to deny HAP funding to M.C. was consistent with the language of N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.10. The parties agree that M.C. was barred from applying for SSI. Thus, M.C. could not have an application for SSI benefits and, therefore, could not have a pending appeal from a denial of SSI as required by the regulation.

Affirmed.