STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. SCOTT M. WASELIK

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SCOTT M. WASELIK,1

Defendant-Respondent.

___________________________

December 3, 2015

Submitted November 9, 2015 Decided

Before Judges Simonelli and Sumners.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Sussex County, Municipal Appeal No. 2013-000200.

Laddey, Clark & Ryan, LLP, attorneys for appellant (Jonathan E. McMeen, Sparta Township Municipal Prosecutor, on the brief).

Scott M. Waselik, respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM

In this matter, the State of New Jersey appeals from the November 7, 2014 Law Division order, which granted the motion of defendant Scott M. Waselik to suppress evidence seized from his home. We affirm.

We derive the following facts from the record. At approximately 8:00 p.m. on October 8, 2013, defendant entered the Sparta Township Police Department. He was shirtless, bleeding from his left side down to his pants from an apparent stab or puncture wound, both of his eyes were swollen and discolored, and he had bruising and abrasions on his face. Defendant told two police sergeants that he and his boyfriend, Kevin Rios, had an altercation the prior evening after he told Rios to leave the home in Sparta where they lived together. Defendant reported that approximately thirty minutes before arriving at police headquarters, Rios punched him in the face and about the body numerous times and hit him with a knife.

Defendant's friend, Chris, who was with defendant at police headquarters, told one of the sergeants that he was in the home when the incident occurred and saw Rios attack defendant unprovoked and threaten defendant with a knife. The sergeant advised Chris that police officers were already at the home and asked him about potential officer safety issues, such as weapons and syringes. Chris responded that there were no guns, needles or drugs in the home.

Two police officers arrived at defendant's home, saw Rios in the backyard, handcuffed him, retrieved the knife from his pants pocket, and then secured him in a patrol car. The officers then went into defendant's home, "cleared" the interior, and confirmed that no one was in the home. While in the home, they saw in plain view a large bag of marijuana, a digital scale, and drug paraphernalia.

The police subsequently obtained a search warrant, searched defendant's home, and seized approximately seventy-four grams of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled dangerous substance N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(4), and possession of drug paraphernalia, N.J.S.A. 2C:36-2, both disorderly persons offenses.

Defendant filed a motion to suppress. In opposition, the State argued that the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement applied, and thus, the search warrant and search were valid.

In a November 7, 2014 written opinion, the judge granted the motion. The judge found that the officers knew the pertinent facts of the assault, the identity of the alleged assailant and the condition of the victim and the victim's location; there was no ongoing emergency where the situation was volatile; and the officers had no objective basis to believe that anyone else was in the home who was at risk. The judge concluded the emergency aid exception did not apply because the totality of the circumstances at the time the officers arrived at defendant's home did not indicate a clear and imminent danger or support a finding of an objectively reasonable basis to believe there was an emergency. On appeal, the State again relies on the emergency aid doctrine.

"[A] trial court's factual findings are entitled to deference." State v. Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453, 467 (2015). We must uphold a trial court's factual findings on a motion to suppress "when they are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." Ibid. Applying this standard, we discern no reason to disturb the judge's ruling.

The emergency aid doctrine is based upon the principle "'that exigent circumstances may require public safety officials, such as the police . . . to enter a dwelling without a warrant for the purpose of protecting or preserving life, or preventing serious injury.'" Id. at 469 (quoting State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586, 598, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 876, 125 S. Ct. 108, 160 L. Ed. 2d 128 (2004). The warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution do not require "'that public safety officials stand by in the face of an imminent danger and delay potential lifesaving measures while critical and precious time is expended obtaining a warrant.'" Ibid. (quoting Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 599). Police without a warrant can "'break down a door to enter a burning home to rescue occupants or extinguish a fire, to prevent a shooting or to bring emergency aid to an injured person.'" Ibid. (quoting Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 600).

The court must avoid viewing the public safety officials' actions through the "'distorted prism of hindsight[.]'" Ibid. (quoting Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 599). Instead, the "court must 'examine the conduct of those officials in light of what was reasonable under the fast-breaking and potentially life-threatening circumstances that were faced at the time.'" Ibid. (quoting Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 599).

The Court has adopted a three-prong test to determine whether a warrantless search by a public safety official is justified under the emergency aid doctrine. To justify a warrantless search, the State must show "that '(1) the officer had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency require[d] that he provide immediate assistance to protect or preserve life, or to prevent serious injury and (2) there was a reasonable nexus between the emergency and the area or places to be searched.'" Id. at 470 (quoting Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 599). As the Court stated,

[t]he emergency aid doctrine only requires that public safety officials possess an objectively reasonable basis to believe -- not certitude -- that there is a danger and need for prompt action. The reasonableness of a decision to act in response to a perceived danger in real time does not depend on whether it is later determined that the danger actually existed.

[Ibid. (quoting Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 599).]

"'The scope of the search under the emergency aid exception is limited to the reasons and objectives that prompted the search in the first place.' Therefore, police officers looking for an injured person may not extend their search to small compartments such as 'drawers, cupboards, or wastepaper baskets.'" Ibid. (quoting Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 599). "If, however, contraband is 'observed in plain view by a public safety official who is lawfully on the premises and is not exceeding the scope of the search,' that evidence will be admissible." Ibid. (quoting Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 599-600).

In this case, the judge correctly found that the officers had no objectively reasonable basis to believe there was an emergency that required entry into defendant's home to provide immediate assistance, protect or preserve life, or prevent serious injury. Defendant and Chris, the only individuals involved in this incident other than Rios, were at police headquarters and no longer faced any threat of harm or serious injury. There was no evidence whatsoever of other victims or persons in defendant's home. Moreover, the perpetrator, Rios, no longer posed a threat because he was in police custody and the weapon had been secured. The totality of the circumstances confirms there were no exigent circumstances, articulable facts, or clear and imminent danger requiring the police to enter defendant's home without a warrant. Accordingly, the motion to suppress was properly granted.

Affirmed.

1 Referred in the record also as Scott M. Waslik.