NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY v. T.G.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

T.G.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________

IN THE MATTER OF L.G. and J.G.,

Minors.

_____________________________

June 10, 2015

Submitted June 2, 2015 Decided

Before Judges Fisher and Accurso.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Gloucester County, Docket No. FN-08-0016-13.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Carol Willner, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Jaime Millard-Tindall, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minors (Melissa R. Vance, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on

the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant T.G. appeals from a fact-finding order, made appealable by a subsequent order terminating the Title Nine proceeding, that he sexually abused his fourteen year old daughter in violation of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21c(3) and (4). Because we agree with the Division of Child Protection and Permanency and the Law Guardian that there is substantial credible evidence in the record to support the trial judge's finding of abuse and neglect, we affirm.

The facts are recounted in considerable detail in Judge Chell's twenty-five page written opinion. We only briefly summarize them here. Defendant and D.G. are the parents of Leah,1 who was born in November 1997. They have three other children, all of whom are younger than Leah. D.G. was seventeen when she married defendant. He was thirty-two. Prior to their marriage, defendant was indicted on a charge of sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2c, involving a minor, whom he claimed lied to him about her age, and entered a guilty plea to an amended charge of fourth-degree criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3b.2

Leah's parents brought her to the hospital five months after her fourteenth birthday because of her out-of-control behavior and wanting to harm herself. It was there she disclosed her father, defendant, had been having sex with her since she was eight years old. Leah made a detailed video-recorded statement to the prosecutor the same day. In the weeks following her allegations, defendant's twenty-five year old adult daughter from a prior relationship came forward to disclose that defendant had sexually molested her as well during a brief period when she lived with him. She was seven or eight years old at the time. Following a sexual abuse evaluation conducted by the CARES Institute, the supervising licensed psychologist concluded that Leah suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder arising from the sexual abuse.

At the conclusion of a two-day fact finding hearing during which the Division presented the testimony of an in-take worker, the detective who took and presented Leah's video-recorded statement, Leah's half-sister, and the expert who oversaw Leah's evaluations, and defendant presented the testimony of two Division caseworkers, his adult son, who is Leah's half-brother, and his son's fiancé, the judge concluded the Division had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had engaged in illegal sexual relations with Leah over the course of several years in violation of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21c(3) and that his actions placed her physical, mental and emotional health in imminent danger of impairment as a result of his failure to exercise a minimum degree of care for her welfare in violation of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21c(4).

Making detailed findings about the testimony of each witness and his assessment of their credibility, Judge Chell analyzed the facts within the framework provided by Title Nine. He found Leah's statements about the abuse to her mother, the hospital, the Division and the prosecutor's office consistent and credible. He found "more than sufficient corroboration [for those statements] through the very credible testimony of [defendant's adult daughter]," which he found "strikingly similar" to Leah's account of the abuse she suffered. And he found the Division's expert in child abuse trauma psychology to have "extensive experience in her area of specialty" and "quite knowledgeable" in the area of her expertise. He accepted her conclusion that Leah's post-traumatic stress disorder arose out of her sexual abuse both because there was no other trauma in Leah's life and she was "re-experiencing . . . the trauma that was specific to sexual abuse."

On appeal, defendant argues that the expert offered only a net opinion based completely on the work of a non-testifying expert and the court erred in crediting the testimony of his adult daughter "because there is no evidence to substantiate her allegations" that he sexually abused her. We reject these arguments.

We grant substantial deference in Title Nine cases to the trial judge's discretionary evidentiary rulings and "will only reverse when the trial judge's ruling was 'so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.G., 427 N.J. Super. 154, 172 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 106 (1982)). We find no such error here.

The Division's expert supervised the psychosocial needs evaluation conducted at the CARES Institute and oversaw the work of the postdoctoral appointee who interviewed Leah and administered the test battery. The expert testified that she consulted with her colleague and that the two collaborated on the child's diagnosis. The expert signed the evaluation as a licensed psychologist. At the hearing, she explained thoroughly how she came to her diagnosis and the facts on which she relied. Defendant's claim that the expert was somehow not qualified to render expert testimony or that she rendered only a net opinion is meritless. See Troum v. Newark Beth Isr. Med. Ctr., 338 N.J. Super. 1, 27 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 168 N.J. 295 (2001) (holding an expert's "conclusions . . . based on the facts supplied to him by others and his own training and experience" do not constitute a net opinion).

Defendant's argument concerning the testimony of defendant's adult daughter's account of her abuse by defendant is premised entirely on alleged errors in the judge's fact finding. We, however, are not free to overturn the factual findings and legal conclusions of a trial judge "unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). Our review of the trial court's factual findings in this abuse and neglect proceeding is strictly limited to determining whether those findings are supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence in the record. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. V.M., 408 N.J. Super. 222, 235 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 201 N.J. 272 (2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3502, 177 L. Ed. 2d 1095 (2010). Because the trial judge's findings have such support in this record, we are bound by them in deciding the appeal. See Rova Farms Resort, Inc., supra, 65 N.J. at 484.

We affirm the abuse and neglect finding in this matter substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Chell in his thorough and thoughtful written opinion of March 20, 2013.

Affirmed.

1 This is a fictitious name chosen to protect the child's privacy.

2 The judgment of conviction was entered into evidence after defendant withdrew his objection. The judge noted that he considered it as part of defendant's past history "but gave it limited weight."