STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. ANTHONY BETHEA

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ANTHONY BETHEA,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________________________

August 31, 2015

Submitted May 20, 2015 Decided

Before Judges Ashrafi, Kennedy and O'Connor.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 08-11-0955.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Lauren S. Michaels, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Angelo J. Onofri, Acting Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Jennifer Moran, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals his conviction following a plea of guilty to first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(2); N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6. Defendant argues that the Law Division erred in denying his earlier motion to suppress a statement he had given after his arrest, and that his sentence of fifty years' imprisonment, subject to an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, is manifestly excessive. We have carefully considered these arguments in light of the facts and the law, and we affirm.

I.

The facts that follow are derived from the hearing on the motion to suppress.

On November 14, 2007, Trenton police received information about a potential homicide on Edgewood Avenue, and Detective Manuel Montez was assigned to investigate. Montez obtained a search warrant for the premises, after he had responded to the scene and, from outside the premises, observed a body on the kitchen floor. Pursuant to the search warrant, Montez entered the residence and found the body of eighty-four-year-old Jerry Eure, Sr. Eure had several stab wounds to the neck. Eure's wallet, laptop, cell phone, and vehicle were all missing.

Montez thereafter secured a communication warrant for Eure's cell phone, and on December 17, 2007, learned that the cellphone had been used to call the Diamond Cab Company. The company confirmed that a cab had been dispatched to an address on Walnut Avenue in Trenton. Montez and other police then set-up a surveillance of the home on Walnut Avenue, and observed defendant's seventeen-year-old cousin and mother leave the house. The officers at the scene called Eure's cell phone number, and a phone in the cousin's possession began to ring. Montez thereupon asked him and his mother to return to Trenton police headquarters.

After interviewing defendant's cousin, the detectives signed juvenile petitions against him and his seventeen year-old cousin, defendant, Anthony Bethea, and obtained a search warrant for defendant's residence.

That same night, Montez arrested defendant at his home and brought him to Trenton police headquarters. After they arrived, Montez spoke with defendant's mother, Tracie Webb, and explained that defendant was a suspect in Eure's homicide. He asked Webb for permission to interview defendant, and urged Webb to accompany defendant during the interrogation.

Webb signed a "Trenton Police Department Consent Form for the Interview of a Juvenile Suspect" at 12:15 a.m. The consent form stated

I, Tracie Webb, have been informed by Detective Manuel Montez that my son, Anthony Bethea, is a suspect in the crime of homicide that occurred at 924 Edgewood Avenue on or about November 17, 2007 [sic.]. The detective has requested my presence during the interview. I do not wish to be present but give consent for my child to be interviewed in my absence. I understand that the consent for this interview/statement must be voluntary on my part. I knowingly make this choice and I also know that this interview/statement can be refused. I further realize that I or my child can stop answering at any time during the interview and I have advised my child of this fact. I am also aware that we have the right to be represented by an attorney and do not wish that representation at this time. I further acknowledge that no promises have been made to us in exchange for granting permission to the detective to interview my child.

Although Montez tried "for several minutes" to persuade Webb to accompany defendant during the interrogation, she refused.

Montez and another officer, dressed in plain clothes, began speaking with defendant at 1:50 a.m. The proceeding was videotaped. For the first five minutes, Montez filled-out and explained the "Mercer County Uniform Complaint/Arrest Warrant Notice Form" to defendant. Montez read the form aloud and told defendant he was being charged with murder, felony murder, robbery, possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, burglary, theft, and tampering with evidence. After indicating that he understood the charges, defendant read the first part of the form aloud and signed it at approximately 1:55 a.m. Defendant had some difficulty reading the form, and Montez offered to read the second part of the form, setting forth in handwriting the charges.

Montez then read defendant the "Trenton Police Department Criminal Investigation Bureau's Rights Form" setting forth the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). After every sentence, Montez asked defendant, "Do you understand that?" Each time, defendant responded, "Yes, sir." Defendant then read the Rights Form aloud, and Montez again asked defendant if he understood the form, to which he replied, "Yes, sir." Defendant signed the Rights Form at 1:57 a.m. Montez then read defendant the "Waiver of Rights Form." Defendant again indicated that he understood. Defendant read the Waiver of Rights Form aloud, and signed it at 1:59 a.m.

Shortly thereafter, the detectives began questioning defendant. Defendant initially denied involvement in Eure's death. Montez then advised defendant that his cousin had "told us everything that happened" and he told defendant not to throw his whole life away by lying and to set the record straight with his version of what happened.

Defendant then explained that he and his cousin broke into Eure's home to rob him, and that although "[his] intention wasn t to kill [Eure]," he was scared Eure would recognize him because he was a next-door neighbor. Once inside the home, he and his cousin assaulted Eure, and defendant stabbed Eure in the back and side of his neck with his cousin's knife. They fled after taking Eure's wallet, cell phone, and laptop.

The police interaction with defendant was approximately one hour and fifteen minutes, according to the videotape monitor. At the end of the questioning, Montez told defendant that he would still be young when released from prison and he would try to help him out. Montez also told defendant his step-father had stopped by during the interrogation. The detectives offered defendant something to eat or drink twice, but defendant demurred that he was "straight" and had to "face the time" and "man-up for [his] mistakes."

Following the return of an indictment charging defendant with murder and other offenses in connection with the murder of Eure, the Law Division held a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress his statement, at which both Montez and defendant testified and the video of the interaction was played in its entirety. Defendant conceded he had been read the Miranda rights many times before, but said he did not understand the waiver form and "was under the impression that if [he] sign[ed] it, [he] would be able to go home if [he] told [the detectives] what they want[ed] to hear." Defendant acknowledged being read his Miranda rights and telling the detectives he understood them. Defendant added he felt shocked, nervous, nauseous, and scared while in police custody.

Judge Edward M. Neafsey denied defendant's motion to suppress the statement, and found Montez credible and defendant "wholly incredible." Judge Neafsey found no sign of nervousness or shock in defendant's demeanor during the interrogation, and characterized defendant as "very relaxed and comfortable." He found the detectives made no promises to defendant in exchange for his statement, and concluded that "defendant fully comprehended and understood his Miranda rights and wanted to -- and he also waived them in a knowing, voluntary and intelligent manner." In his comprehensive opinion from the bench, Judge Neafsey stated

It's clear from watching the tape that the defendant was not under physical duress or even discomfort. The Court observed no psychological problems the defendant had, nor did it appear to me that he was under the influence of any drugs. He answered the detectives' questions willingly and without hesitation. His demeanor was calm. He was attentive. He was interested in the discussion and he was responsive. It was clear to me that his will was not overborne. He was relaxed and coherent while responding. At no time did any detective promise him anything. They didn t promise to recommend that if he -- I'm sorry. They didn t promise to recommend that he would be released if he spoke to them. So he wasn t threatened, pressured or mistreated. I noted that only at one time did the detectives raise their voice during the hour and fifteen minutes, but they did not yell or scream at defendant. And I also noted while it was at the end of the interview that the defendant was asked if he wanted something to eat, his response was that he did not need anything to eat. In fact, he said, "I'm straight, man." The detectives did not coerce him into giving up his rights and making a statement. His will was not overborne even though his mother refused to be present. I find beyond a reasonable doubt that his statement is voluntary relying on State v. Galloway and based on the totality of the circumstances I find he voluntarily, knowingly and willingly waived his right to remain silent. I find beyond a reasonable doubt that the requirements of Miranda have been met. I will, therefore, permit the use of the statement in this trial and I rely on State v. Jordan.

Thereafter, defendant agreed to enter a retraxit plea of guilty to first-degree murder in return for the court's indication it would impose a fifty-year NERA term of imprisonment. The State reserved the right to seek a longer sentence, and defendant reserved the right to argue for a lesser sentence. The plea agreement provided that defendant could retract his guilty plea if the court stated it would sentence him to a term of imprisonment exceeding fifty years.

At the plea hearing, defendant presented his signed "New Jersey Judiciary Plea Form," a "Supplemental Plea Form for No Early Release Act (NERA) Cases," and a "Supplemental Plea Form For Non-Negotiated Pleas." Defendant answered "Yes" to a question on the form which asked if he understood that by pleading guilty "you are not waiving your right to appeal (1) the denial of a motion to suppress physical evidence (R. 3:5-7(d) . . . ." Defendant also answered "Yes" to a question on the form which asked if he also understood that by pleading guilty, "you are waiving your right to appeal the denial of all other pretrial motions."

During the plea colloquy, defendant said he understood the charges, plea, and sentence, and was satisfied with his legal representation. Defendant also indicated that he read, understood, and signed the plea forms voluntarily and with the advice of counsel. After Judge Neafsey explained that defendant was giving-up his constitutional rights by pleading guilty, defendant again stated that he understood and wanted to plead guilty. Defendant then gave a factual basis for the guilty plea.

Subsequently, Judge Neafsey sentenced defendant to fifty years' imprisonment with forty-two and a half years of parole ineligibility pursuant to NERA. This appeal followed.

II.

Defendant raises the following arguments on appeal

POINT I: BECAUSE THE COURT FAILED TO AFFIRMATIVELY ADVISE [DEFENDANT] THAT WHEN HE ENTERED HIS GUILTY PLEA HE WOULD WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL THE DENIAL OF HIS MIRANDA MOTION, HE DID NOT ENTER THE PLEA KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY, AND HE MUST BE ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA; ALTERNATIVELY, HIS PLEA SHOULD BE TREATED AS CONDITIONAL, ALLOWING HIM TO CHALLENGE THE DENIAL OF HIS MIRANDA MOTION ON APPEAL.

POINT II: BECAUSE [DEFENDANT] DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE MIRANDA WARNINGS, AND BECAUSE THE POLICE EXPLOITED [DEFENDANT'S] YOUTH AND DETECTIVE MONTEZ'S RELATIONSHIP WITH [DEFENDANT'S] MOTHER, REPEATEDLY INSINUATING THAT THE POLICE CONSIDERED THE CASE "CLOSED" AND WOULD ONLY USE WHAT [DEFENDANT] TOLD THEM TO REDUCE HIS SENTENCE, HIS STATEMENTS MUST BE SUPPRESSED.

POINT III: BECAUSE [DEFENDANT'S] ARREST AND QUESTIONING OCCURRED IN THE ABSENCE OF COUNSEL, HIS STATEMENT MUST BE SUPPRESSED. (Not raised below).

POINT IV: THE DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE OF 50 YEARS WITH 42 1/2 YEARS WITHOUT PAROLE IS EXCESSIVE.

As we noted earlier, we have carefully considered defendant's arguments and we affirm.

Initially, we observe that there is much to commend the State's argument that defendant, by entering an unconditional plea of guilty, has waived his right to challenge the Law Division's denial of his motion to suppress his statement on grounds of a Miranda violation.1 Nonetheless, we shall address defendant's Miranda challenge given defendant's youth and the alleged confusion on the plea form with respect to waiver of appellate challenges of various pretrial motion orders. Cf. Smith, supra, 307 N.J. Super. at 8 (we may address constitutional issues "in the interests of justice" that are otherwise waived by entry of a plea).

The privilege against self-incrimination, as set forth in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, is an important right that pre-dates our republic, State v. Presha, 169 N.J. 304, 312 (2000), and the protection it provides applies to juvenile and adult interrogations alike. State ex rel. A.S., 203 N.J. 131, 146 (2010). To admit into evidence a juvenile's statement, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights based on the totality of the circumstances. Ibid.; Presha, supra, 163 N.J. at 313. The inquiry focuses on whether the suspect's will was overborne by police conduct. Presha, supra, 163 N.J. at 313.

In determining whether a Miranda waiver was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, the court must consider "'the suspect's age, education and intelligence, advice as to constitutional rights, length of detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature and whether physical punishment or mental exhaustion was involved.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 402 (1978)). A suspect's previous encounters with the law are also relevant. Ibid. (quoting Miller, supra, 76 N.J. at 402).

If a juvenile is interrogated without a parent present, the parent's absence is considered a "highly significant factor among all other factors and circumstances." Presha, supra, 163 N.J. at 315. If "an adult is unavailable or declines to accompany the juvenile, the police must conduct the interrogation with 'the utmost fairness and in accordance with the highest standards of due process and fundamental fairness.'" Id. at 317 (quoting In re S.H., 61 N.J. 108, 115 (1972)).

Defendant argues he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights because of his age and below-average intelligence. Defendant also points to the fact that his mother was not present for the interrogation and did not discuss with him the wisdom of talking with the police. He also claims the detectives used "coercive techniques" to elicit a confession. Defendant argues it was improper for the detectives to reference their relationship with his mother, urge him not to lie, suggest that his story did not match his cousin's or the crime scene, and that he should tell the truth. Finally, defendant avers that the police questioning was coercive, given that he was only "partially clothed" and handcuffed during the interrogation.

We reject these arguments and find in this record ample evidence that defendant's confession was the product of his own free will. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 617 (1999). Montez read defendant his Miranda rights and the accompanying forms before asking him to read the documents aloud. Montez also repeatedly asked defendant if he understood the forms and his rights. Each time, defendant replied, "Yes, sir." Montez gave defendant a "clear and easy-to-understand" explanation that meaningfully informed him of his constitutional rights. A.S., supra, 203 N.J. at 149.

After waiving his Miranda rights, defendant did not request the presence of counsel or his mother or ask to terminate the interrogation. He answered every question responsively. If defendant felt shocked, nervous, nauseous, or scared, his demeanor did not reflect it. Instead his "demeanor, appearance, and responses indicated to the officers that he was alert and in control." Timmendequas, supra, 161 N.J. at 617.

Furthermore, the detectives "never threatened defendant or physically coerced him to cooperate or confess." Id. at 618. Telling defendant he was not being truthful and that his story did not match his cousin's or the crime scene did not overbear his will.

"There is a natural reluctance on the part of a suspect to admit to the commission of a crime and furnish details." Miller, supra, 76 N.J. at 403 (citing State v. Smith, 32 N.J. 501, 550 (1960), cert. denied, 464 U.S 936, 81 S. Ct. 383, 5 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1961)). "Efforts by an interrogating officer to dissipate this reluctance and persuade the person to talk are proper as long as the will of the suspect is not overborne." Ibid.

Similarly, Montez's remarks about helping defendant's mother previously and offering to help defendant once he was released from prison did not taint the confession. Although perhaps disingenuous, the comments were not false and do not invalidate defendant's confession. State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253, 257 (1990). "The fact that an investigative officer is friendly, sympathetic, and encourages the trust of the defendant to give a statement ordinarily [does] not render the confession involuntary." Ibid. (citing Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 605 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989, 107 S. Ct. 585, 93 L. Ed. 2d 587 (1986)); see Miller, supra, 76 N.J. at 404 (officer's comment that defendant must help himself by telling the truth before the officer could help him did not overbear defendant's will and invalidate confession); State v. Cabrera, 387 N.J. Super. 81, 103 (App. Div. 2006) (police officer's statement that he did not believe defendant's first story and neither would anyone else, did not render the subsequent confession involuntary).

Nor is there any evidence indicating that defendant was of limited intelligence or incapable of understanding his constitutional rights. Timmendequas, supra, 161 N.J. at 618. Defendant was seventeen-years-old at the time of the interrogation and had completed some high school education. He had previous encounters with the law and a familiarity with the criminal process. See Presha, supra, 163 N.J. at 318 (juvenile's advanced age and familiarity with the criminal process were two factors that weighed in favor of finding a valid Miranda waiver). Although defendant struggled to read the first form, he read the rights and waiver forms with much less difficulty. Even if defendant did in fact have limited intelligence, that is not a bar to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving Miranda rights. See State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 449 (1998) (defendant's limited intelligence did not preclude a determination that his statements were given voluntarily); State v. Carpenter, 268 N.J. Super. 378, 385 (App. Div. 1993) (illiterate defendant with an I.Q. of 71, who attended special education classes while in school, understood and waived his Miranda rights), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 467 (1994).

While defendant was only wearing flip-flops, shorts, and a shirt draped over his shoulders during the December interrogation, his lack of clothing was his own fault. Defendant jumped out of a second-story window to evade police when they came to arrest him. See State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 467 (2009) (defendant having to wear a hospital gown and socks did not weigh in favor of coercion as defendant was responsible for the removal of his clothes at the scene).

Finally, Webb's absence from the interrogation does not render defendant's confession inadmissible. After speaking with Montez and being informed of the charges against defendant, Webb chose not to be present for the interrogation. She was not tricked, threatened, coerced, or intentionally excluded. Montez tried to persuade her to accompany defendant for several minutes, to no avail.

A parent's role in an interrogation is to "serve[] as a buffer between the juvenile . . . and the police, . . . [and] assist juveniles in understanding their rights, acting intelligently in waiving those rights, and otherwise remaining calm in the face of an interrogation." Presha, supra, 163 N.J. at 314-15 (citing Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54, 82 S. Ct. 1209, 1212-13, 8 L. Ed. 2d 325, 329 (1962)). Though Webb's presence was certainly desirable, her absence cannot be said to have affected defendant in any way. Defendant remained calm throughout the investigation and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights.

Defendant also argues his confession must be suppressed pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. P.M.P., 200 N.J. 166 (2009). In P.M.P., the Supreme Court held that the "filing of [a] juvenile complaint by the Prosecutor's Office, followed by the issuance of a judicially approved arrest warrant, constitutes a 'critical stage' such that the statutory right to counsel is implicated." Prior to P.M.P., the filing of a formal judicial complaint did not trigger the right to an attorney's presence before initiating a custodial interrogation of a juvenile. State v. Hodge, 426 N.J. Super. 321, 328 (App. Div. 2012). "Rather, such interrogations only triggered the right to the presence of a parent or legal guardian during interrogation, whenever possible, to assist the juvenile in understanding his or her Miranda rights, intelligently waiving them, and helping the juvenile stay calm in the face of an interrogation." Ibid. (citing Presha, supra, 163 N.J. at 315).

In Hodge, supra, 426 N.J. Super. at 327-36, the court held that P.M.P. announced a new rule of law and should only be applied prospectively. Relying on the three factors set forth in State v. Feal, 194 N.J. 293, 308 (2008) ("(1) the purpose of the rule and whether it would be furthered by a retroactive application, (2) the degree of reliance placed on the old rule by those who administered it, and (3) the effect a retroactive application would have on the administration of justice."), the court summarized

[T]he purpose of the new rule is not to "overcome some aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs the truth-finding function" and it does not raise "serious question[s] about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials." Additionally, the State's good faith reliance upon the old rule has been longstanding. Law enforcement officials, who for more than forty-three years have relied upon the old rule requiring the presence of a parent or legal guardian, whenever possible, during custodial interrogations of juveniles, and who, for more than ten years, have operated under the parameters of the old rule as expounded upon in Presha, should not be penalized with the retroactive application of P.M.P. Finally, we anticipate that the effect retroactive application would have upon the administration of justice would be significant, due to the number of new trial demands that would be filed as a result of retroactive application of the new rule.

[Id. at 336 (citations omitted).]

We agree that P.M.P. broke new ground and should not be applied retroactively. Before P.M.P., "no court ha[d] previously held that after the filing of a complaint or the issuance of an arrest warrant, custodial interrogations of juveniles trigger the right to counsel and the requirement that counsel be present before questioning." Id. at 331.

Defendant's argument for pipeline retroactivity is similarly without merit. All three Feal factors weigh against retroactive application, as we explained in Hodge, supra, 426 N.J. Super. at 333-37. First, P.M.P. "discourages the custodial interrogation of unrepresented juveniles," supra, 200 N.J. at 176-77, and "does not replace an old rule that substantially impaired the truth-finding process, nor does it raise serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials." Hodge, supra, 426 N.J. Super. at 335 (citing Feal, supra, 194 N.J. at 311-12). Second, law enforcement officers justifiably relied on the previous standard governing the custodial interrogation of juveniles for more than forty-three years and should not be penalized with retroactive application of P.M.P. Ibid. Third, because the State and court system have relied on the previous standard for the past forty-three years, the number of cases impacted by retroactive application of P.M.P. would be significant. Id. at 336.

For these reasons, we reject defendant's argument that P.M.P. applies here and warrants suppression of his statement to Trenton police.

Finally, we address defendant's argument that his fifty year sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred by failing to find mitigating factors and improperly weighing aggravating factors.

An appellate court exercises a limited, deferential review over criminal sentences and must affirm absent a "clear showing of abuse of discretion." State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014) (quoting State v. Whitaker, 79 N.J. 503, 512 (1979)). An abuse of discretion only exists if: "(1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the findings of aggravating and mitigating factors were not 'based upon competent credible evidence in the record;' or (3) 'the application of the guidelines to the facts' of the case 'shock[s] the judicial conscience.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)). We may not substitute our judgment about an appropriate sentence for that of the sentencing judge; when the court adheres to the "principles set forth in the Code and defined in our case law, its discretion [is] immune from second-guessing." State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601, 612 (2010).

In this case, Judge Neafsey did not abuse his discretion in sentencing defendant to fifty years' imprisonment. The court's finding of aggravating factors two, three, six, and nine was fully supported by the record. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2), (3), (6), (9). Defendant's arguments about his youth and lack of an adult criminal record are without merit.

The seventeen-year-old defendant had an extensive juvenile record beginning at age thirteen. He was adjudicated delinquent six times, with three burglary charges. Defendant committed the current crime two and one-half months after he was released from prison and while still on parole.

The gravity of defendant's crime was substantial. Defendant and his cousin planned their crime, fully knowing they could overpower Eure, defendant's elderly neighbor. Upon entering Eure's home, defendant and his cousin immediately began beating Eure, and then brutally stabbed him to death, in the hope they would evade detection.

In addition to the aggravating factors, the court found mitigating factor ten, which it used as a "catch-all." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(10). Defendant apparently expressed remorse during the preparation of the pre-sentence report, although he did not do so on the day of his plea or sentencing. He also pled guilty, sparing Eure's family from a trial.

Judge Neafsey stated during sentencing that "this is the kind of murder where a life sentence would be a just sentence for the defendant's crime." We agree. Defendant's sentence does not "shock the conscience." Bolvito, supra, 217 N.J. at 228.

Affirmed.

1 It is well settled that "a defendant who pleads guilty is prohibited from raising, on appeal, the contention that the state violated his constitutional rights prior to the plea." State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 470 (2005) (quoting State v. Crawley, 149 N.J. 310, 316 (1997)); accord Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L. Ed. 2d 274, 279-80 (1969). Those constitutional rights include "'the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, the right to confront one's accusers, and the right to a speedy trial.'" Ibid. (quoting Crawley, supra, 149 N.J. at 316).

There are three exceptions to the general rule of waiver. Id. at 471. First, Rule 3:5-7(d) and Rule 7:5-2(c)(2) permit a defendant to appeal the denial of a Fourth Amendment based motion to suppress evidence after a conviction, whether based on a guilty plea or conviction. Ibid. (citing State v. Greeley, 178 N.J. 38, 50 (2003)). Importantly, Rules 3:5-7(d) and 7:5-2(c)(2) do not allow for the appeal of unsuccessful challenges to statements and Miranda violations. Ibid. (citing State v. Smith, 307 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 1997)). Second, Rule 3:28(g) permits a defendant to appeal the denial of admission into PTI. Third, Rule 3:9-3(f) allows a defendant "enter a conditional plea of guilty reserving on the record the right to appeal from the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion." In the event a defendant prevails on appeal, he or she "shall be afforded the opportunity to withdraw his or her plea." Ibid.

None of these exceptions is applicable here.